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The reconfiguration of the communication environment: Twitter in the 2013 Brazilian protests



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Résumé

Cette thèse porte sur les changements apportés par l'utilisation des médias sociaux au système de communication brésilien et sur la dynamique de communication qu'ils ont favorisée dans le cas des manifestations brésiliennes de 2013. Notre argument repose sur une triple approche qui prend en compte : une vision systémique de l'environnement de communication, telle que proposée par Chadwick (2013) ; une conception de la technologie comme structurée et transformée par son utilisation et, en même temps, comme un élément qui influe et modifie les utilisations qu'elle implique (Jouët, 1993) ; et la dynamique de la communication en tant qu'élément essentiel des systèmes démocratiques (Della Porta, 2013). Notre recherche est basée sur des entretiens avec des acteurs clés parmi les activistes, les acteurs politiques et de la communication des manifestations, ainsi que l'analyse d'un corpus de tweets. La structure du travail est centrée sur trois discussions principales. Nous abordons d'abord les relations entre l'utilisation des médias sociaux et les discours sur les médias traditionnels à travers le concept de médiactivisme (Cardon et Granjon, 2010). Après cela, nous explorons différentes voies d'information rendues possibles par l'utilisation des médias sociaux, dans lesquels des nouveaux médiateurs émergent. Enfin, nous cherchons à comprendre les conséquences de la dynamique de visibilité des médias sociaux sur la construction du monde commun, tel que défini par Hannah Arendt (1958). Finalement, après la proposition de Hardt (2017) selon laquelle un mouvement doit également être analysé en relation avec les faits qui les précèdent et les succèdent, nous écrivons une dernière partie exploratoire de la thèse reliant certaines de nos conclusions à des problématiques politiques et de communication en œuvre au Brésil après les mouvements de 2013.

Descripteurs: réseaux sociaux; mouvements sociaux; Brésil; système de communication.

Abstract

This dissertation discusses the changes brought by social media use to the Brazilian communication system and the communicative dynamics they favored in the case of the 2013 Brazilian protests. Our argument is based on a triple approach that considers: a systemic view of the communication environment, as proposed by Chadwick (2013); a conception of technology as structured and transformed by its use and, at the same time, as an element that impacts and modifies the uses it entails (Jouët, 1993); and the communicational dynamics as an essential part of democratic systems (Della Porta, 2013). Our research is based on interviews with key activist, political and communicational actors of the protests and on the analysis of a corpus of tweets. The structure of the work is centered in three main discussions. We first access the relations between the use of social media and the discourses about mainstream media through the concept of mediactivism (Cardon & Granjon, 2010). After that, we investigate alternative paths of information made possible by the use of social media where new mediators emerge. Finally, we search an understanding of the consequences of the social media visibility dynamics on the construction of the common world, as defined by Hannah Arendt (1958). In the end, following Hardt's (2017) proposal that the temporality of a movement needs to be analyzed in the relation with the facts that precede and succeed them, we write an exploratory final part of the dissertation linking some of our findings with political and communicational issues that emerged in Brazil after the 2013 movements.

Keywords: social media; protest; social movements; Brazil; communication system.

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Introduction

Presently, Brazil is going through troubled political times. The young Brazilian democracy, re-established in 1985 only, after 21 years of military dictatorship, now struggles with different issues that put it at risk. Despite the fact that conservative forces – political, economic, cultural, religious and military – explain in great part the current threats to democracy, profound changes at the social level do not seem to be completely understood.

The 2013 Brazilian protests showed that the civil society has found a new form of organizing and expressing discontent (Judesnaider et al, 2013). Traditional actors of the Brazilian political life, such as political parties, trade unions and class associations became secondary actors: active participants, but not leaders of the movements that brought millions to the streets of the country. People started to mobilize through other means and causes. Although the explanation to that phenomena is complex and involves a series of different political, economic, cultural and social causes, one new element captures our attention: the heavy use of social media.

If that use started to gain major attention in Brazilian political life in 2013, it remained central in important political turns in the years that followed. Being written between 2018 and 2019 this dissertation approached the discourses about the effects of social media on Brazilian political life shift, departing from a very positive point of view - the tools that allowed marginalized people to be heard - towards a very negative one - the communicative environment that promotes misinformation and threatens democracy. Considering that both those extremes do not fully explain the phenomena of the political use of social media, in this dissertation, we try to closely analyze both the social media use and the social environment in which it is embedded, in order to understand the complexity of the issue.

This dissertation is located at the crossroad of three thematic fields: media studies, social movement studies and democracy studies. These three fields compose not only the theoretical references we work with and different parts of our object of study, but are also mixed in the approach we propose, that is not among the most common to this topic.

Trying to draw the general guidelines of the research field about protest and digital media, we could say that a first major line in this area, mainly related to sociological studies, tries to understand how the use of social media changed the logic of collective action. Less structured and more horizontal organizations, lack of clear leaderships, ephemerality of organization and more individualized actions are frequently pointed as characteristics of these new forms (Bringel & Domingues, 2013; Pleyers & Glasius, 2013). A second approach is more related to a political sciences view and tries to access and discuss the impact of these new movements on the institutional political system, discussing their relations with political parties, elections and traditional social movements (Alonso & Mische, 2017; Scherer-warren, 2013). A third approach, concentrated in the communication field, tries to identify, describe and analyze more precisely the practices of the actors involved in those movements on social media (Malini, 2016; Medeiros, 2016; Zago, Recuero, & Bastos, 2015). From social network analysis, to content and discourse analyses, different methods are employed to categorize the content that is shared in these networks; describe the different kinds of conversation and reactions they generate; identify key actors to the information flow in this new communicative atmosphere.

Our aim with this dissertation is not fully aligned with none of those approaches. Although we could situate this research as closer to the third approach, because it dives in the social media practices in order to understand the specificity of the phenomena, there is a clear difference in what we propose here. Our main objective is not to understand the use of social media in itself, but rather to capture the changes that this use may have brought to the communication system in a broader sense.

We understand social media as a new element in the communicative landscape that not only has its own specificities but that also makes all the other actors in the system move to adapt themselves to this new dynamic. What guides this research are questions about a supposedly new functioning of that system: what changes in the way information is produced in the context of a protest movement? How do new mediators of information defy mainstream media and what are the consequences of that phenomenon? Are these new actors really included in the most visible part of public debate? We face the use of social media as the key to investigate those changes.

At first sight, maybe the more obvious research design to explain that phenomena would seem to be a comparative one between the different actors that are part of this system. We could have, for example, compared the coverage of the protests on social media and on different mainstream or traditional alternative media. Yet our choice was to use social media as the ambience to study these changes in the system.

Theoretical assumptions and problematic

That choice is founded in our perception that social media should be seen not only as one more media, but rather as a system in itself, where different media logics take place and interconnect. To approach this issue we worked with the concept of Hybrid Media System, developed by Chadwick (2013). To the author, hybridity is understood as a characteristic that would be the outcome of “power struggles and competition for preeminence during periods of unusual transition, contingency, and negotiability” (p.15). That notion seems suitable to support the discussion we want to propose.

It is also important to clarify some basic notions of this work. Regarding the term social media, we adopt the concept proposed by boyd and Ellison (2007) that define them as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system”¹. We do not see social media as completely opposed or aligned to alternative or mainstream media². We rather consider that the conversation on social media will have the participation of both of them, along with a plurality of individual and collective voices.

¹ According to this concept, social media is different from social network. This last one would be the actual network of relations between people, which do not depend on digital platforms to take place. Social networks are not a new phenomenon, they just gain new forms and possibilities with social media.

² We adopt here the definition of alternative media as a media that has dissident origins or approaches in regard to mainstream media. Our aim with this very broad conceptualization is to characterize all media experiences that offer alternatives (in terms of the actors that produce them or the editorial line of the content they produce) to the Brazilian mainstream media. This last is mostly formed by all the major press and broadcast media groups. So, our option is not to have a more specific and universal concept of alternative media – that is why do not attach them necessarily to militancy (Cardon & Granjon, 2010) or to social struggles (Suzina, 2018) – but rather to construct the category always in opposition to the concrete reality of Brazilian mainstream media.

That is to say that the social media environment in itself will, on the one hand, absorb the already existing media logics and, on the other, open a new space for a diversity of actors, creating a new interactive and complex communication system

Therefore, the systemic vision of social media, both within themselves and outwards, is a first element that will guide our research. This approach also comes from the literature, where a diversity of scholars point to the necessity of overcoming the separation of social media and a broader communication environment as an important problematic in the field (Couldry, 2009; Chadwick, 2013; Mattoni & Treré, 2015). They highlight the importance to integrate the analysis of these new media with other communication actors.

Mattoni and Treré (2015), for example, highlight that many studies in the field of media and social movements present what they call a “one-medium bias” (p.4). The authors explain that the tendency to focus on only one media or platform frequently produce a fracture in the academic fields between studies that focus either on mainstream media coverage or on alternative media. The lack of dialog between these two fields is pointed as a challenge to be faced. That challenge becomes even more evident considering that, following the mentioned notion of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), the interaction between different media and citizens is constant and dynamic. Only a broader analysis – one that includes both mainstream and alternative media and seeks to understand their interactions – seems capable of providing a better understanding of this environment.

We believe that our approach to the use of social media goes in the sense of overcoming this gap. By approaching our Twitter data, we are not limited to investigating the use of the media in itself, but rather interested in the relations between different media and actors present in this network. It is also in the sense of broadening the understanding of the media use that we also made interviews with key actors from the activist, communicational and political arenas about their media practices. So, it is both from our understanding of the phenomena of social media and from the clues given by the literature that emerges this first perception that will structure our research.

A second central point is our comprehension of the role of technology in this process. In this work, we try to avoid simplistic approaches to technology – and social media in particular – that see it just as tools of communication or accessories to already existing structures. As expressed by Della Porta (2013), there is a gap in the studies in digital media and democracy

that makes them generally not able to properly access the role of technology. As a result “the debate on the Web tends to be highly normative or rather technical, with even some nuances of technological determinism” (p.27).

In order to avoid that, we try to refrain from two misreadings of the phenomenon: the perception of complete novelty and that of an essential characteristic of technology, which would intrinsically favor or disfavor democracy. Our understanding is that the use of these new technologies creates specific practices, sociability logics and information flows that need to be understood.

We believe that communicative dynamics and practices that take place on social media will reproduce certain existing practices as well as presenting new ones. The novelty comes not only from the new communicative possibilities they open, but also from the new forms of constant interaction between formats that these spaces will entail (Chadwick, 2013). In that sense, even if what we propose here is not a comparative study, it is important to have in mind what were the dynamics and logics before the existence of social media in order to access with greater more precision what has really changed and what are the practices that already existed and just changed to adapt to a new environment (Clavert, Grandjean, & Méadel, 2018). That approach helps us to avoid the “technological fascination bias” (Mattoni and Treré, 2015, p.4) of perceiving all technological features as completely new and disconnected from previous practices.

The second misreading we want to overcome regarding technology is the essentialist vision of it. Our study is not about social media, it is about their use. To our understanding, the social value of technic comes from the use that is done of them (Santos, 2000), technic and use being imbricated parts of the social reality. As explained by Jouët (1993), both social and technical determinism should be avoided. Following her argument, we do not see communication practices neither as products of the transformations in the communication technologies, nor as completely detached from these technologies and only dependent on social action.

The conception and design of social media platforms may not be seen as exterior to their use. They are rather conceived and transformed by the use, at the same time as they impact and modify the uses they entail (Jouët, 1993). As proposed by Jouët, there would be a double mediation effect at the same time technical and social that is produced “in the encounter of

the technical evolutions and social change” (p.101). In this perspective, communication practices are “a privileged field of observation to approach the construction of this convergence” (p.101).

This theoretical assumption is also based on our perception of the need to counter certain popular discourses about the political use of technology in Brazil. At the beginning of the years 2000, including the moment of the 2013 protests, as in many other protest movements around the world at that moment, there was a clear positive discourse about the role of these technology in democracies (Morozov, 2011). Social media were frequently presented on academic texts as being able to strengthen political participation and open space to marginalized social voices (Castells, 2013). Years later, with the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit campaign and, in the Brazilian case, the strong social mobilization that demanded the destitution of President Dilma Rousseff (2016) and after with the wide spread of fake news and the election of the first far-right Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro (2018), the narrative was inverted (Benkler, Faris and Roberst, 2018; Chadwick, Vaccari, Loughlin, 2018). Social media became a target to blame concerning the degeneration of Brazilian democracy. We consider that none of these visions account for the complexity of the phenomena because both of them picture technology as the changing vector of social change and not the social practices that they may entail. Only by accessing the specificities of the use of these communicative spaces, that are constantly changing over time, we can better apprehend their consequences.

A third assumption that guides the research we present here is that the communication systems and the information flows are essential to understanding democratic systems. Donatella della Porta (2013) points to the dissociation of studies in social movements and media from an analytical view of democracy as problematic. She argues that, in most studies, democracy and the media system are seen just as the context in which social movements will develop and not as elements in dispute and construction by these very movements.

We understand that the effort to discuss the communication system and its transformation with the emergence of social media goes in that sense. Ultimately, the comprehension of this system allows us to have a better vision of how people are getting informed, with what types of information and from what kinds of information producers. That dynamics has an essential role on democratic systems (Gomes & Maia, 2008; Keane, 2013; Dryzek et al.,

2019), both on electoral choices and on the day-to-day exercise of citizenship. To our understanding, social media use impacts the relations between citizens, media and democracy in its most different instances – from elections to accountability of representatives, including social mobilizations (Gomes, 2016). The changes in the way information is produced, diffused, shared and received change essential elements of democratic life. Thus, a change in the communication system is intrinsically related to changes in political systems.

Considering the systematic approach proposed by Chadwick (2013), the role of technology discussed by (Jouët, 1993) and the communicational dynamics as an essential part of democratic systems (Gomes & Maia, 2008; Della Porta, 2013), we can say that the main problem this dissertation addresses is the understanding of the changes brought by social media use to the communication system and the communicative dynamics they favor in the case of the 2013 Brazilian protests. In our opinion, the analysis of the phenomena from this point of view may bring light to new nuances of this moment of the Brazilian political life that often escape traditional frames of analysis.

Our hypothesis is based on the proposition of Scolari (2012), to whom the inclusion of a new element in the communication environment not only brings new particularities, but also changes the environment in itself. So, we suppose that once entering the communication system, social media do not only include a new and specific communicative logic, but also displace the actors that were already there. The other actors are, at the same, acting outside and within social media and incorporating the changes the new communicative landscape brings to their own logic of functioning. Although the 2013 protests may not be pointed as the very initial moment of this phenomenon in Brazil, we believe they are an important landmark of intensification and visibility of it.

Three main concepts will guide our approach to investigate that hypothesis. We will first access the relations between the use of social media and the discourses about mainstream media through the concept of mediactivism (Cardon & Granjon, 2010). That approach will allow us to link the activist practices with the actors views and practices towards the communication system. After that, we will investigate alternative paths of information made possible by the use of social media where new mediators emerge. Focusing on mediations and not on the media (Martín-Barbero, 1987) includes in the discussion a larger social and

cultural reality that embeds the practices of these actors. Finally, we search an understanding of the consequences of the pluralization on mediations on the construction of the common world, as defined by Hannah Arendt (1958). To her, that is the instance where people and issues become socially visible in the political arena and we are interested in seeing which actors are influencing this construction of the common world with the use of social media.

Structure of the work

Before going directly into the analysis – that will be developed in three main chapters -, we dedicated a first part of this dissertation to well establishing the basis on which this research is grounded. In order to do that, we explore four central dimensions that will guide this research.

On Chapter one, we establish the historical and social contexts in which the 2013 Brazilian protests are embedded in. In order to explore that topic, we reconstruct the argument about why social movements are important for democracies and take a look at how they were structured in Brazil, as of the beginning of the military dictatorship in 1964 until 2013. After that, we will present a timeline of the 2013 protests, trying to identify what are the novelties they present and, particularly, which of them will interest our analysis. We will also discuss both, the formation and main actors of the communication environment that we will be working with.

Chapter two is devoted to the main theoretical issues involving the interface of digital communication and protests. To do that, we focus on the state of the art of the studies in the field. Our aim is to present major points of discussion in the literature that help us outline the approaches we are going to adopt in our analysis. We also devote a specific section to discuss the particularities of Twitter, since we are working with data from this platform.

The personal trajectory that led to this research will be explored in Chapter 3, retracing the personal background that led to the choice of the topic and problematic of this dissertation. The personal experience as social media editor of the Lula Institute allowed me live from a very specific place the events of 2013. At that moment, the fact of working with social media in a traditional political environment put me in a singular position both as participant and as observer of the changes in the social, political and communication arena that were undergoing. It was from that experience that the problematic of this work emerged.

Different from the others, this part of the dissertation is written in first person as I remember, explain and problematize my experience as a social media editor at the Lula Institute. It was out of that experience that many of the questions and problems that I address in this work emerged.

The last Chapter of this first part (Chapter 4) is devoted to the methodological issues. We outline in detail the choices that were made both regarding our interviews and the Twitter data we work with. Our analysis is based on a corpus of 23 semi-structured interviews with activists, journalists and communication advisors to governments. Those social groups were chosen based on the proposal of Peter Dahlgren (2009) to whom the media logics are co-constructed by media, publics and political actors.

In addition, we analyzed a dataset of 97 thousand tweets collected from July 1st to September 30th 2013. The tweets were collected after the hashtag #vemprarua (come to the streets), one of the most used during the demonstrations. The interplay between these two sources of data will guide our path.

It was not simple to deal with two different corpuses, which translated into very different contributions to this work. Regarding the Twitter corpus, we also present here an overview of the data we work with. Our aim is to explain general information about our dataset in order to make it possible for the analytical Chapters to go directly into the analysis they propose.

In the second part of the dissertation seek to respond to the different problematics and research questions we already discussed in this introduction. It is dedicated to analyze the effects of the use of social media on the communication system from three different angles. We will start by an effort to understand in which ways the possibilities brought by social media influence the discourses about mainstream media. Through the analysis of our interviews and corpus of tweets, we will try to establish how some of the main Brazilian media are mentioned and discussed on social media. After that, we will focus our efforts into understanding the communication processes going beyond mainstream media-related action. That is to say, once these media are no longer almost exclusive mediators of information, a new mediation dynamics emerge. On their turn, these new possibilities will be used in different senses by the three different types of actors we interviewed. We will then investigate what are the new mediation processes they try to establish. The last chapter of

this part will then analyze the outreach of new mediators in the dynamics of social media conversation. Using data from our Twitter corpus, we will establish parameters to indicate not the potentialities social media conversation opens, but concretely, what dynamic was established in the case of the 2013 Brazilian protests in terms of visibility.

On Chapter 5, we address the issue of criticism to mainstream media and how it is reshaped in the environment of social media. Although this is not a new issue in the Brazilian political life, since the mainstream media outlets in the country are owned by a few families, leading to considerably low diversity (Azevedo, 2006), we argue that it takes new forms in face of the emergence of social media. The critics to them is a historical issue in Brazilian society and that it also gained important attention in the 2013 protests. So, what we try to understand is how the new spaces of public debate (Cardon, 2010) on social media affect the way people rely on mainstream media. We use the concept of mediactivism (Cardon and Granjon, 2010) to address these practices. The research question that guides this analysis is: how social media are used to take position in regards to mainstream media?

Once we understand how the relationship with mainstream media is established with the new element of social media, we turn our focus to other kinds of mediation that can arise out this ambience (Chapter 6). Discussing the concept of mediation and the new possibilities that became real on social media, we focus on the appropriations or uses of these new possibilities by different actors involved in the protests. In our analysis, we challenge a common vision that digital technologies would decrease the mediation levels in diverse instances of social life. By accessing the actor's discourses, we question if the fact that we can publish information and make it available to more people, without passing through a journalistic filter or that a politician can directly address its citizens in a social media profile really mean a decrease in the role of mediation. Two are the research questions that guide this analysis: how does the appropriation of alternative mediations to mainstream media take place? What kinds and levels of mediation are we talking about when discussing social media?

The third step of the path we propose here is then to identify not the possibilities of existence of different paths for the information flow, but rather to analyze the actual paths they went through. We consider that, although a multiplicity of actors is present on social media, there are significant asymmetries between them that will influence the visibility they may actually get. Having the possibility to publish on social media is very different from actually being

heard in the public debate. By analyzing the measures of visibility, we can identify who and what becomes more visible in the discussion and try to elaborate on the causes to that (Chapter 7). Ultimately what interests us is to go beyond the possibilities that social media open and see in a concrete case what is the logic of the information flows and what novelties it does really present. Again, we have two research questions that guide us: who are the actors that become more visible in the Twitter discussion concerning the 2013 protests? Does that represent a different logic if compared to broadcasting?

Contributions of this dissertation

We believe that this approach that starts by considering the impact of the social media use on mainstream media, followed by the attempt to understand the specificities of alternative paths of information established in this ambience, to finally discuss who is really gaining attention on the social media debate can bring important elements to understand the democratic role communication may have nowadays. Of course, the study we propose has limitations, which will be discussed along the text, but it also touches upon important questions to understand the current Brazilian reality.

This dissertation has, on the one hand, a historical value, in terms of registering a series of communication discourses and practices of a singular moment of the Brazilian history, but it also points to the future, identifying issues that are not limited to the 2013 wave of protest. That is why we decided to include a last part of the dissertation that aims to connect our findings about 2013 with more recent political phenomena in Brazil. Considering we are writing this dissertation in 2019, we cannot disregard the facts that followed the 2013 protests.

Our final remarks are not yet conclusions on the analysis done, but rather consist in an effort to connect our findings to political phenomena that erupted more recently in the Brazilian political life. Even if it would be impossible to analyze all the political facts that unfolded in these six years, we could not avoid finding in our analysis clues that help to explain some elements of the Brazilian political reality today. Our aim is not to look back in a predictive sense as if all that would come after could be predicted by elements that were already there, but rather to understand that the current situation has deeper roots and historical explanations.

Only one year after the 2013 protests, Brazil had a presidential election in which, President Dilma Rousseff, from the Worker's Party (PT)³, won with a very tight result. As the political climate in the country was already becoming very polarized, the supporters of Aécio Neves – her defeated opponent, from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)⁴ – did not accept the election results and immediately started to question her right to be president⁵. That campaign grew in strength with the outbreak of a major corruption scandal involving the Brazilian semi-public petroleum Company Petrobras⁶. Rapidly, the movement turned into a huge wave of protests demanding for her impeachment. With an eroded parliamentary basis, no support on the media and the inaction of the justice system, Rousseff's government was withdrawn of office.

The almost two years and a half during which the Vice President Michel Temer, from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)⁷, took office were marked by the inversion of all priorities of the PT governments, with important reduction in social policies, revocation of important worker's right foreseen in the Constitution of 1988 and a liberal shift in economy. It was also during his government that the former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was imprisoned, in the context of the *Lava Jato* operation, in a very controversial lawsuit, where the lack of concrete evidence proving his culpability is shocking. That exposed an explicit politicization of a part of the Judiciary, that resulted in the negligence of many of the former president's rights set forth in the Constitution. One of the many indications of how

³ The *Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT* (Worker's Party) was founded in 1980 and is the biggest left-wing party in Latin America. Its foundation is closely related to the trade union movements and to a progressive branch of the Catholic Church called *Teologia da Libertação* (Liberation Theology). The main leader of the party, from its foundation until today is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was president for two terms, from 2003 to 2010.

⁴ The *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira - PSDB* (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) was founded in 1988 and can be identified as a center-right-wing liberal party. It has been the main opponent to PT since the 90's.

⁵ Aécio Neves not only criticized her election, accusing her of electoral fraud for announcing measures after the election that were different from what she had promised in the campaign, but also put the Brazilian electoral system in doubt by questioning the reliability of the electronic voting machines. He also registered a formal claim in the electoral justice against the elected president.

⁶ The *Lava Jato* (Car Wash) operation was launched in 2014 and is still running in 2019. It is led by the Brazilian Federal Police and aims to disclose corruption scandals related to Petrobras and political authorities. According to the judge Sérgio Moro, who became known as the most important judge of this operation and is now the Justice Minister of the Bolsonaro government, the operation is inspired on the Italian *Mani Pulite* (Clean hands). The operation succeeded to disclose many levels of corruption in national and regional levels, but is highly criticized by its polarization and by its lack of respect to essential guarantees of the Brazilian constitution such as the proper right of defense and the presumption of innocence.

⁷ The *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – MDB* (Brazilian Democratic Movement) is a centrist party founded in 1965 and that has participated in all Brazilian federal governments since the redemocratization of the country, in the 80's.

problematic this lawsuit is can be explained by the fact that the judge that sent Lula to prison, preventing him from running for president in 2018, is now the Justice Minister of the Bolsonaro government.

The imprisonment of Lula is a key element to understand the following presidential election, which took place in October 2018. Lula was the front runner in that election. That last poll that considers Lula as a candidate, released on August 22nd 2018, pointed that he had 39% of the vote intention, more than the double than Jair Bolsonaro, which appeared with 19% (Datafolha, 2018). The fact that the justice system prevented him from running, hugely affected the final result of the election, which was won by the far right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro.

On the one hand, we have no intention of building direct links between the 2013 protests and the election of Bolsonaro. The paths that link these two moments five years apart are rather tortuous and complex. On the other, it seems clear to us that the wave of protests does make room to a social space that allows the articulation of certain social groups that will be at the center of the scenes in the following years. If the fact of analyzing data from 2013 with a certain temporal delay poses difficulties, especially regarding the access to online data, it is also an opportunity to see that historical moment having in mind some of its longer-term developments. As Hardt (2017) defends, the temporality of a certain movement needs to be analyzed also in the relation with the facts that precede and succeed them. In that sense, we decided to write these final remarks that, in spite of being exploratory, they do point to interesting linkages. We believe that connection may help to avoid simplistic and fragmentary explanations of reality.

At the end, we draw our conclusions about the research work presented here in a triple effort to explain the impact of the social media use in the 2013 protest on the communication system, link them with what Brazil is going through today and reflect on possible paths to future research.

Our hope is that this work may contribute to three different fronts. The first would be bringing new elements to understanding the Brazilian communicational dynamics and its interrelations with political phenomena. We believe this might be an important contribution to the academic field of democracy and digital communication as we try to present a broad view of the current Brazilian communication system - focused on the interactions between

the actors that compose it - and its political impacts. That may put more light in the systemic approach as a path to a more complex understanding of the Brazilian contemporary communicational and political reality.

The second is to contribute to the political arena, in order to provide politicians, political parties and governments, especially from the progressive ideological spectrum, with a complex vision on the system they participate in. That would allow them to make better choices regarding their communicational and political strategies and build new perspective to try to overcome historic challenges related to fighting for a more democratic and pluralistic communication system.

At last, we hope our effort will be also useful to social movements and citizens in general that are willing to mobilize themselves in this moment of the Brazilian political life where social participation and pressure seem so urgent. Understanding the complex relations between different media logics and the role and importance that civil society may have in it may be a first step to build effective mobilization and protest strategies towards the construction of a democracy that better represents its citizens.

1. The 2013 Brazilian protests in context

Social movements have been an essential force for social change in contemporary societies (Touraine, 1973). While in democratic regimes they function as a civil society force that puts pressures on and contributes to shaping institutional decisions, in dictatorial societies they function as means of resistance to oppression. It was no different during the 2013 protests, which combined a diversity of traditional Brazilian social movements with new groups of different organizational and communicative dynamics.

Although the more classical concepts of social movement have been developed in the European context, Latin America has made an effort to create its own view on the phenomena, which is not always aligned with what happens on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The unquestionably agitated May 1968, for example, was experienced in very different manners across various countries of Latin America and in European countries. In the 70s, Europe saw the emergence of movements for women's rights, environmental issues and immigrant causes, but in Latin America popular movements began mostly in the urban peripheries, fighting for better living conditions, while articulated with intellectuals and the Church in the fight against the military dictatorship. Movements emerging out of identity politics were only being born in Brazil (Gohn, 2013). At that time, despite the great differences between the two socio-political contexts, "the majority of them, both in Europe and in Latin America, were analyzed under the paradigm of the 'new social movements' (...). The production of knowledge was guided by theories created in other contexts, different from their national realities" (Gohn, 2013, p.312).

Our option is, then, to adopt a social movement concept that is closer to Brazilian reality, such as defined by Maria da Glória Gohn: "Social movements are collective actions with sociopolitical and cultural character that enable different forms of organization and the expression of individual's claims" (2013, p.309). These movements would have three basic characteristics: an identity, an opponent and a project of society. They adopt different strategies and mobilize different networks (from local to transnational) in the pursuit of their goals. This concept includes both movements that seek for social change and those who fight

for the maintenance of the *status quo*, although the first ones are much more preeminent in recent Latin American history.

Nevertheless, prior to delving into the Latin-American reality, we will discuss the relations between social movements and democracy. In which sense does the first matter to the latter? What role does an active social society play in democratic realities?

1.1 Social movements and democracy: beyond institutions and procedures

Although democracy may be frequently defined by its institutional characteristics (periodic elections, power balance, the design of the State, etc.), many authors highlight the importance a politically active society to such political model (Della Porta, 2013; Rosanvallon, 2006; Manin, 2012; Champagne, 1984).

In this sense, social movements are an essential part of democracy (Della Porta, 2013). They represent a counter-balance (Rosanvallon, 2006) to the institutional system. Although the system is designed to ensure a harmonic relation between the represented and the representatives, where that the latter would effectively address the issues of the first, in practice it does not work that perfectly. From the distance between this two essential parts of representative democracy would emerge a sense of mistrust that would permeate democratic societies (Della Porta, 2013).

Instead of considering this phenomenon as a problem or a dysfunction of the system, Della Porta (2013) proposes it can actually be seen as an important element, one that helps to create links between the society and the political system. To the author, mistrust is as an opportunity through which democracy can improve its functioning. It shows that the system ought to overcome the simple periodic electoral premise it entails to become a more permanent reality for the whole society.

Della Porta's proposition seems very interesting as it highlights the formation not only of a democratic institutional system, but also of a democratic society. Notwithstanding, nowadays the level of mistrust seems to be attaining a higher level, and that may be seen as a threat to the system itself. Even if that does not necessarily mean the degradation the

system, it is certain that more appropriate analytical frames are required so as to understand this shift.

According to Bernard Manin (2012), attention should be paid to democracy's transitions. The first shift takes place at the end of the XIXth century, in opposition to parliamentarism and is backed by strong massive parties – initially seen as one of the strengths of the democratic model since they were capable of bringing represented and representatives closer, if compared to the previous model. The second, from a democracy of parties to a democracy of the public, emerges at the end of the XXth century, triggered by the decline of the previous model. Personalization of the electoral choice – enabled by the new media (television and radio, at the time), that made it possible for candidates to outreach from structures other than their political parties – and the prominence of the personality over the parties' political programs are two of the main characteristics of the new moment. “The electorate turns into public/audience that reacts to the terms that are exposed to in the public scene. That is why this form of representation is called the democracy of the public” (Manin, 2012, p.286).

For Manin, in the democracy of the public, the structures that shape the public opinion are not structurally related to the ones driving the vote. That is to say, the partisan media lost ground to mass media, the latter having its own particular interests as well, the author admits. Mass media would not portray reality as a mirror, having other engagements that are not limited to the political dispute in question.

In 2012, Manin reconsidered two elements included in the previous editions of his work. First, the transition from a democracy of parties to a democracy of the public would not entail the disappearance of the parties. Rather, he indicated there was a decline in party loyalty and in the capacity held by parties to guide electoral choices in a more general manner. Secondly, is that it is important to consider that many forms of non-institutional political participation emerged in parallel to the institutional democratic system. He acknowledges this participation is based on characteristics other than partisan participation – described as more episodic and centered in specific problems – but highlights its importance to the democratic system.

In a similar sense, Rosanvallon (2006) argues that the current crisis faced by democratic systems in different countries cannot be simplistically explained by bad governments and

weak citizenship. This conception would be based on an idealized vision of both citizens and politicians, as if, in a moment in the past they would have been more suitable to democracy. The author's argument is grounded on the fact that the crisis of democracy should be explained with regards to a larger social corpus, which includes "the reactions of society to the original dysfunction of the representative system" (Rosanvallon, 2006, p.10).

To Rosanvallon (2006), since its origins, democracy has always been simultaneously based on the promise of a regime suitable to the problems of society (that would be founded by the imperative of equality and autonomy), and on the problem of the eternal failure to fulfill that promise.

In this context, the author sees tension and contestation as parts of the history of democracy. He indicates that these forms of mistrust will, on the one hand, help to improve the democratic system and the very process of representativeness and, on the other, create a social counter-power. To him, this counter-power can be either informal or organized.

According to the author, this counter-power would be organized around three dimensions of the power of people. Departing from the basic power to elect representatives, that is the central power of people in a representative system, Rosanvallon (2006) argues that we also have to take into account their power of surveillance, to veto, and to judge. The power of surveillance would have the aim to stretch the capacity of the people to stay in contact and monitor the representative's actions to non-electoral moments. The veto power would be based on a series of mechanisms that were created to allow people not only to give permission to someone to act as their representative (elections), but also to prevent them from doing so in certain cases. And the judge power would have to do with the increasing judicialization of politics, where judges and the judiciary system became an important actor between the people and their elect representatives.

Additionally, to Gohn (2011), social movements are important elements of change in society. They either "convey energies of resistance against the old oppressive system or pave the way for something that is new and liberating. Previously dispersed social energies are channeled into and fueled through 'proposition-making.'" (p.336). To her, there are two intrinsically related dimensions of such action and proposition: practices and discourses. Gohn (2011) draws our attention to the role of social movements in building identities, perceptions of belonging, marking a clear opponent and upholding a project of life and society.

The author also emphasizes that the conflict is not always the ideal framework to foster the relationship between social movements and institutional politics (Gohn, 2013). In the Brazilian case, for example, as we will explore on topic 1.2, there were moments when the organized civil society acted as an important stakeholder in the elaboration of public policy. Gohn (2013) considers that, in this case, the framework of contentious politics, such as proposed by Tilly and Tarrow (2006), among others, might be more suitable. That approach would try to focus less on the political conflicts and more on the negotiations and on the social engineering between social movements and the institutionalized power.

Social movements are, then, a central force of democratic systems, seen not as rigid institutional structures, but rather as living organism under ongoing transformation. If they have a certain degree of spontaneity, much related to specific social-political contexts and organizational arrangements, a great part of social movement's action is the result of a historical accumulation. To understand the Brazilian reality in which the 2013 movements are immersed, we will do a brief retrospective of recent history of social movements in the country.

1.2 Social movements in Brazil (1964-2013): from demands for democracy to its construction

The history of social movements in Brazil begins of course much before 1964. We could retrace it to the independence movements that led to the formation of the Brazilian country as we know today and no longer as a colony of Portugal. Clearly, all previous experiences contributed to how the Brazilian society currently works, but due to space and time constraints, we decided to focus on the more contemporary period, the one that has a more direct influence on today's Brazil. Our historical reconstitution will start at the beginning of the military dictatorship and retrace it until nowadays.

This period of almost 50 years (1964-2013) is marked by very different movements, with prominence of different fights and struggles. The Brazilian Military Dictatorship adopted a strategy that alternated repression and tolerance to social movements, as points out Alves (2005):

Table 1⁸ - Cycles of repression and liberalization in the Brazilian Military Dictatorship

Cycles of repression	Cycles of liberalization
1964: first wave of repression, to eliminate those with relations with political and social movements existing at the time.	1965: Policy of the “return to normality” by Castelo Branco, after the Institutional Act n.1.
1966-1967: Conclusion of the political expulsions, after the Institutional Act n.2.	1967-1968: “Policy of relief” by Costa e Silva, managing negotiations with sectors of the opposition.
1969-1973: Embracing and more severe cycle of repression to face the armed rebellion and to put in place the repressive apparatus.	1974-1976: Policy of “distension” by Geisel is put to an end with the Package of April 1977.
1975-1976: Repression more localized in the state of São Paulo, to face the emergence of a broad national opposition front.	1977-1979: Policy of “distension” by Geisel is reestablished, starting negotiations with the opposition to reform and revoke the Institutional Act n.5.
1979-1984: Repression with class targets, intended to destroy workers and peasant social movements.	1979-1984: Policies of “opening” by Figueredo, embracing enlarged negotiations with elite sectors of the opposition and with the Church.

Even in that context, social movements were very active in Brazil during the military dictatorship, especially in the 70’s and 80’s, after the regime became stricter (the so called *anos de chumbo*, or the years of lead). These movements had different origins, but there was a strong influence of the Catholic Church, especially through its Liberation Theory (Gohn, 2011), a progressive strand of the church. The factories, schools, churches, universities and the countryside were also essential spaces of organization. This mobilization led, for example, to a huge worker strike in 1978 in São Bernardo do Campo, in the metropolitan area of São Paulo. It was at that moment that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva started to appear as a national leader (Alves, 2005). At that time, an armed resistance was organized against the regime. Even though it did not involve a great part of civil society, neither had its support, different groups played important roles in discrediting the regime.

⁸ Table extracted from Alves, 2005, p. 380. Translated into English.

The wave of extreme violence installed by the AI-5⁹ fueled the oppositional movement, then joined by the middle classes and the intellectualized part of society who started to mobilize the base for the more institutional opposition that emerged after 1974, when the regime softened (Alves, 2005). At that moment, traditional socio-professional organizations, such as the Brazilian Bar Association, the Brazilian Press Association and the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops brought together many others discontent sectors and personalities. The space created by these organizations generated the conditions that allowed the reemergence of the student movement, especially through the National Student Union (UNE) (Alves, 2005).

After the end of the military dictatorship and especially after the new constitution of 1988, which gave prominence to social guarantees and political liberties, social movements started to organize in a new manner. The very constitution became the cornerstone in guaranteeing the rights of marginalized groups in the newly democratic society.

The dictatorial period was marked by the intense – but many times illegal – action of social movements, with a clear and mostly unified goal, the return to democracy. The achievement of the return to a democratic system presented new challenges to the organization of these movements, leading to an initial decrease in social fights, but then reappearing in a different manner (Gohn, 2011).

The return to legality allowed the formation of more formally organized social movements. Progressively, social movements became more institutionalized and started to work in collaboration with the government in order to allow and facilitate the implementation of certain public policies (Dagnino, 2004; Gohn, 2011). The new social space they occupied allowed them to promote massive national meetings, where national problems were evaluated and strategies to organize their fights were agreed on.

In the transition from dictatorship to the recent democratic period, Brazilians took to the streets in a significant social mobilization to demand for direct presidential elections. Even if the military were losing power, they wanted to avoid giving the right to elect the president

⁹ The Institutional Act number 5 (AI-5) was the harshest act done by the Brazilian military dictatorship. It was signed in 1968 and resulted in the loss of mandates from parliamentarians opposed to the military, interventions were ordered by the president in the municipalities and states, and also the suspension of constitutional guarantees, which resulted in the institutionalization of torture.

back to the people. The movement known as *Diretas Já* (direct elections now), that gained the streets of the country in 1983 and 1984 was organized by the institutional opposition of the regime, but also by many social movements. It succeeded in conquering the necessary votes to pass the law, but were defeated by a political maneuver. Indirect elections were instated until 1989.

The first moment of great attention to social movements on this new period happened in 1992 and was the movement known as *Caras Pintadas* (painted faces), that demanded the destitution of Fernando Collor de Mello, the first president to have been elected by universal vote after the end of the dictatorial period. The mobilization was led by the student movement, organized by UNE and the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students (UBES). They took to the streets in August 1992 demanding the impeachment of the president, who was accused in multiple corruption scandals. At the end of that year, Collor de Mello resigned.

In the first decade of the 21st Century, movements that went beyond national borders grew around the world, such as the alter or anti-globalization movement, present at the World Social Forum. Networks enabled by new communication technologies gained importance and a fragmentation of claims and ideals gained space among activists (Gohn, 2011). The attempt of the United States of America to implant a free market zone in the Americas (ALCA) also propelled the creation of transnational networks in Brazil (Bringel, 2013). This anti-neoliberalism feeling can also help explain the election of left wing governments in the region in the beginning of the years 2000' (Quijano, 2004).

An important phenomenon that happens in Latin America at that time is the creation of a vast number of NGO's. If on one side their presence provided the society with instances of discussion and advocacy of topics previously neglected by the traditional social movements, on the other it changes the constitution of the organized civil society and creates a "strong identification between 'civil society' and NGO, where the meaning of the expression 'civil society' is increasingly restricted only to these organizations" (Dagnino, 2004, p.100)

From that moment on, emerged more movements "focused less on ideological and political assumptions – that were preeminent on the social movements of the 70's and 80's – and more on social communitarian ties organized due to color, race, gender and human abilities and capabilities" (Gohn, 2010, p.12).

To Quijano (2004), this shift in the social movements comes with the formation of new social individuals “with claims, discourses and new forms of organization and mobilization, and that arrive on the political scene of certain countries as decisive actors” (p.19).

Gohn (2010) proposes that this new moment of the Brazilian social movements may be divided in three different categories of mobilizations: movements that advocate for identity politics for social, economic, political and cultural rights; movements fighting for better life conditions in urban and rural areas; global or globalizing movements that act on sociopolitical and cultural networks.

The author will identify five main points that differentiate these movements from the previous ones. The first one would be that they challenge the classical definition of social movements, such as defined by Touraine (1973). “They are not only reactive, moved by needs, they can also emerge and develop from a reflection about their own experience” (Gohn, 2010, p.16). She highlights their focus on the acceptance of differences, multiculturalism and diversity.

The second substantial difference of these movements is the political scenario where they happen. The wave of leftist's governments in Latin America in the beginning of the 21st Century affected the action of these movements. “At the same time that many social movements, in many countries, had better organizing conditions both internally and externally, in regards to the prevailing political environment, in others, they lost much of their political force for different reasons” (Gohn, 2010, p.17).

Changes in the very structure of the State also caused mutations on social movements. The construction of a “globalized state” (Gohn, 2010, p.20) favors attempts to capture certain social movements by the institutional political system. Actors of civil society that were once organized in movement and protest actions are then partially committed to institutionalized public policies (Gohn, 2010). Often, social participation finds itself driven by needs of the State and not necessarily of the actors. That dynamic is clear, for example, in the case of the development of the Brazilian policies of quotas for black and poor students at the universities, where the black and student movements played a central role. That does not mean that this policy did not benefit those social groups (and society in a more general sense), but the initiative stemmed from the State and not from social movements.

The fourth change pointed out by the author is the multiplication of protagonists in political actions, changes in the formats of mobilization and in its acting form. The use of social networks “enlarges the boundaries of social tensions and conflicts” (Gohn, 2010, p.25).

And the last shift identified by the author is that gaps continue to exist in the academic attempts to understand and describe these movements, taking place in an era of transitions where “social movements and associativism did not die, nor did new ‘activists/mobilizers’ completely take control the scene of the organized civil society” (Gohn, 2010, p.27).

The changes pointed out by Maria da Glória Gohn (2010) set the basis on which the protest movement of 2013 will develop. For the purposes of this dissertation, we will focus especially on the role that the new communication and information technologies had on the shift of this contemporary movements.

1.3 What’s new on the 2013 Brazilian protests?

Now that we have outlined the major contextual elements that characterize our case study, we will go directly into it, trying to understand and highlight its specificities. The protests of 2013 were the largest demonstration experienced in Brazil since the country’s redemocratization process during the 80s/90s. According to Gohn (2013), there were only three similar moments in the Brazilian history: in 1992, the demands for the impeachment of the President Collor de Melo; in 1984, the *Diretas Já* movement, for direct presidential elections; and in the 60s, both the strikes that preceded the military coup of 1964 and the student mobilizations of 1968. The 2013 movement marked not only an outstanding moment of mobilization of Brazilian civil society, but it was also the first time digital social networks were widely used in a protest movement.

In that year, 12 capitals of Brazilian states – and dozens of smaller towns - had protests that claimed the revocation of the raise in the fare of public transportation. We will use the chronology of the protests in São Paulo, the biggest Brazilian city and one of the cities where the protests were most active, as an illustration of what took place in almost the whole country.

As the protests developed in a very heterogeneous way in terms of demands and participants, different authors (Locatelli, 2013; Gohn, 2014; Pinho et al, 2016) have proposed distinct

ways to explain the deployment of the demonstrations. We chose to divide the wave of protests of 2013 in three different moments to better understand them.

The first moment is characterized by a limited movement. During the wave of demonstrations, each protest was called “act” and the first one took place in São Paulo, on June 6th. It was still a considerably small protest, with around two thousand people, mostly students. This protest was called by the *Movimento Passe Livre - MPL* (Free Fare Movement) demanding the revocation of the 20-cent increase over the price of public transportation in the city of São Paulo. The first act succeeded to stop the traffic in the 23rd May Avenue, one of the most important of the city of São Paulo and was violently repressed, ending with rubber bullets and tear gas bombs thrown by the police forces.

Even though afterwards some narratives about this protests portray a supposed spontaneity, as if there was no previous planning of the actions, that is not completely true. In his book *#VemPraRua* (2013), the journalist Piero Locatelli, that worked in the coverage of the protests, tells how a very large-sized black sign with the slogan “If the price does not drop, the city will stop” written in white in the central region of São Paulo was a surprise to people passing by, but that had been very well planned by the activists. “MPL activists had this idea in mind for months. They had photos of the place, had studied the paths in Google Earth and had spent nights going through the details” (Locatelli, 2013, 1^o Protesto — 6 de junho, quinta-feira, 2nd paragraph).

The second (June 8th) and third (June 11th) acts reproduced almost the same logic of the first one, just a little bigger, with around five thousand people. Until then, the protests had a very specific demand: to revoke the increase on the price of public transportation. The acts were attended mostly by students that had different kinds of relationship with the MPL. The fourth act began in line with the same atmosphere.

On June 13th, the fourth act took place, with 20 thousand people according to the organizers. This protest marks the first shift on the movement in consequence of the extremely violent treatment received by the protesters. This time, police violence did not only target people that were protesting, but also hit journalists covering the act. Locatelli (2013) remembers that, until that moment, most of the media coverage demanded for stronger action from the police, in order to contain the protests that disturbed the city. On that same June 13th, editorials from two of the major Brazilian newspapers, *Folha de S. Paulo* and *Estadão*, urged

the police and the government to strike harder and put an end to the movement. That night, activists and journalists were persecuted by the police and 61 people were arrested in the act, while more than 200 were detained for verification (Locatelli, 2013).

It is important to highlight that many people were arrested just for having vinegar in their backpacks, since the substance was used to offset the effect of the tear gas pumps used by the police. Such a senseless police action would later lead to the Vinegar protest, which aimed specifically at this event.

The images of the violence spread rapidly through social networks and were also broadcasted by the mass media, which, until that moment, remained very skeptical about the movement (Rolnik, 2013; Bringel and Pleyers, 2015). This gives rise to the second moment of the protests, marked by its growth and diversification. The support of the population to the protests grew rapidly after this episode. According to Datafolha (2013), 55% of the population supported the protests on June 13th and in less than a week this rate went up to 77%, on June 18th. That circumstance sparked a solidarity movement that could be seen online, but also on the following protests.

The fifth act took to the streets 65 thousand people, on June 17th, in São Paulo. But from this moment on, the acts were coordinated to happen simultaneously in many cities. On this date, 12 capitals of Brazilian states reported protests that reunited a total of 215 thousand people. As we will see, the movement's expansion changes some of its patterns. The public that attends the protests has no longer a direct relation to the MPL movement, although they remain as the reference organization calling the protests. Social networks gain in importance, as tools spreading information about the protests to people that were not necessarily connected to the central organization.

As a consequence, the diversification of the public translated into the multiplication of demands. The price of public transportation becomes one of many themes that are evoked in the posters carried by the protesters, such as: the money spent to prepare the country to the 2014 World Cup, the quality of the public health and education system and the fight against corruption.

On June 19th, the protests achieve their main goal and the mayor of São Paulo announces the revocation of the increase on the price of public transportation. Local governments of other

Brazilian capitals such as Cuiabá, Porto Alegre, Recife and Joao Pessoa had already done the same thing. But the protests did not cease.

The third moment of the protests begins precisely when the main demand is accomplished, but the protests continue. June 20th marks the biggest protest day, with over one million people on the streets in 75 cities. The vast number of people indicates the high heterogeneity of the protesters in terms of occupation, political affiliation and types of demands.

Right after this protest, the MPL, that so far had been the main organization to call the protests, announces they are not going to continue the mobilization. They had achieved their main goal and, feeling the movement had run out of their control, decided to withdraw from the streets.

A part of the protesters insisted on remaining on the streets, but in a context where they did not have any common goal or common leadership. That also provided the space for the emergence of some groups that used violence as a political tactic. Parties and trade unions members were beaten while trying to join the mobilizations. A number of Black Bloc demonstrators began to use property damage tactics and confrontation with the police. That led to the decrease of public opinion support to the movement and the reduction on the number of participants. In different temporalities, the protests faded out in all Brazilian cities by the end of July. But the society did not completely demobilize, regaining activity in several moments, such as September 7th (the Brazilian Independence Day) that same year, or the movements for and against the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff two years later.

Thus, the impact of the protests was not limited to itself. One year later, Brazil experienced one of its most competitive presidential elections, which resulted in the re-election of President Dilma Rousseff. But the social mobilization organized during the campaign period did not cease, having actually grown after the results. Groups pro and against the impeachment of Ms. Rousseff started to compete for the streets even before the formal beginning of her second term. The development of this social pressure along with the investigation of a public corruption scandal, the dismantling of the parliamentary basis of the government and a very controversial media coverage led to the president's impeachment on October 2016. Two years later, in October 2018, Brazil democratically elects, for the first time in its history, a president from the far-right wing.

As seen in section 1.2, Brazil has, from time to time, protests of this magnitude. The issue of public transportation is not a new subject of protests either. Protests related to the theme can be found in various moments and realities of Brazilian history (Pinho et al, 2016).

Nevertheless, the 2013 political process was a novelty on the Brazilian political scene, as it presented some characteristics that differ from previous protest movements. Gohn (2013) characterizes this moment as “a new form of social movement” (p.317). Many differences may be pointed out, such as the loss of protagonism of the political parties, the organization led by non-hierarchical collectives, the use of digital networks and the use of a different aesthetics to produce the protests (Gohn, 2014).

It is also important to notice that the principles and organization forms of those movements differs from the traditional Brazilian political actors, such as political parties or trade unions¹⁰. These differences in the conception of political organization were expressed in the fact that, in the protests of June 2013, only 4% of the protesters in São Paulo declared to be affiliated to a political party and 83% said they did not feel represented by any Brazilian political party (Ibope, 2013). When asked if they believed that any Brazilian political party actually represented them, the percentage that disagreed rose to 89% (Ibope, 2013).

Gohn (2013) also highlights that the relationship between the individuals and the movement changed. If previously they were seen as militants of a movement, now they are treated as activists. The changes in the movements’ composition and functioning also affects the conception of society they stand up for and the models of development they entail (Bringel, 2013).

But the main shift represented by the protests of June 2013 that interests us in this dissertation is the high use of digital social media to communicate, organize and publicize the protests. This element interests us not only because it is aligned with recent protests that arose around the world, but also because we believe it has a crucial role in the movements’ formation and development.

What interests us are the changes in the information flow around the protests, with the inclusion of this new actor in the communication landscape. In a country where the

¹⁰ Although the relation between this traditional political organizations and social movements had been under reconfiguration since the 80’, as highlights Sader (2001) in his analysis of four popular movements in São Paulo in the 70’ and 80’.

mainstream media is extremely criticized, what happens when they are no longer the sole mediator of information? Do new actors have a voice in the construction of narratives regarding the movement? Does the role of traditional media change in that context? How do different digital social media-related actor interact with each other? Does the activism through media gain a central role in the activist action in general?

To address those questions and to understand how that process works, we are first going to establish how the social media system was formed in our study case and who are the main actors in play on social media conversation.

1.3.1 Social media in a larger communication landscape and the main actors of the conversation about the 2013 protests

In order to establish the basis of the analysis we are going to propose, firstly, we shall explore the media system that was formed in connection with the protests, in an effort to understand who are the different actors that participate on the discussion on social media and, more than that, what are their views about the communication system. This part starts with discussion about media systems so as to assess why it might be useful to our proposal. We will then describe how this communication system was constituted in the case of the 2013 Brazilian protests.

As for the use of social media in protest movements, the main novelty is not about the digital media itself, but rather the multiple types of communication that coexist in this environment. Much of the research currently developed focuses on the analysis of the relation between activism and social movements either to mass media or to social media (Cammaerts, Matonni and McCurdy, 2013). Even though that perspective may bring an interesting point of view, it is the interplay between these different models of communication that seems the most revealing about the process. “It is precisely the interplay between different forms of mediation and a wide variety of media practices/formats that has particular relevance for present-day activism and practices of resistance” (Cammaerts, Matonni and McCurdy, 2013, p.3).

The opposition between the discourses of mass media and social media during the 2013 protests was present in many of the interviews we did with activists. But it seems more of a general perception than an empirical reality. Mass media cannot be seen as an actor that is

external to social media, as they are actually important elements of this new environment. So, even though the logic of broadcast is challenged in many ways due to the emergence of social media, the main players of that logic are also present in the new environment, what makes an opposition between them to be false. They are much more complimentary than opposed.

In that sense, our initial interest in analyzing the role of social media use on the Brazilian wave of protests of 2013 proved rapidly to be insufficient. Social media cannot be analyzed neither as homogeneous nor as an isolated media, what pushes us towards a broader concept that allows us to understand both: the complexity of the social media dynamics that takes place in social media itself and the relation with other actors in play in the broader media landscape.

To address this larger picture, we will approach concepts that may help us understand this diversity of logics present on the social media environment, starting by the concept of media ecology, coined in the 60's, based on McLuhan's approach to the media (Scolari, 2012). Inspired in the original conception of McLuhan of "media as a medium" (McLuhan, 1964) other scholars will develop the idea of a media ecology. Among others, Neil Postman will be one of the main thinkers to draw on this new approach.

To Postman (2000), media ecology is "the study of media as environments". Other more specific conceptions will derive from that, but the center of this approach is to conceive media as environments capable of shaping actions. According to him, these environments are structures that give shape to individual action, allowing or not certain actions, as well as encouraging or not others. This environment surrounds the individuals and models, their perception and cognition (Scolari, 2012).

The objective of media ecology would then be to make these environments visible and explicit as many times they may be seen as natural. The accent here is on the environment, the interactions between media, and how the addition of a new element to the system does not only add a certain particularity, but rather than that, it changes the environment in itself (Scolari, 2012).

If, on the one hand, this conception seems very useful to think the interconnections between different media and how the created environment around them affects the individuals, on the

other it seems insufficient to address the different and unequal power relations that emerge from these connections. Furthermore, this approach conceives media as environments formed by different interconnected elements, but it does not put an accent on the possible overlaps between them. That point is especially important to us given that the understanding of the interactions between different media logics is at the core of our analysis. Although the idea of hybridization is present (Scolari, 2012) and not contradictory with the media ecology conception, it is not the center of the discussion.

That is why the concept of hybrid media system, proposed by Chadwick (2013) seems to be a suitable perspective to our analysis. The author explains that the concept emerges from the premise that it is necessary to try “to integrate the roles played by older and newer media in political life” (p.4). That approach would avoid the reductionist analysis centered only on supposedly new or old media; instead, it focuses on their interactions.

According to Chadwick (2013), when thinking about the ever-evolving relationship between media and politics, the concept of hybrid allows us to integrate three elements that seems crucial: complexity, interdependence and transition. For the author, the concept allows us to make an interesting bridge between old and new, hybrids being “recognizable for their lineages but also genuinely new” (p.14). The newness emerges, then, not from completely new elements, but rather from the recombination of prior existing elements.

Even though the relationship between new and old is not always oppositional, it is frequently combined with tensions and disputes, which makes the power component very central. These disputes create an unstable environment and a changing balance between different media logics. “Particulate hybridity is the outcome of power struggles and competition for preeminence during periods of unusual transition, contingency, and negotiability” (Chadwick, 2013, p.15).

The author considers the notion of hybridity may be useful to understand three main elements: power relations among political actors, media actors and publics; the idea of system; and the idea of media logics.

To Chadwick (2013), the power relations are at the core of the understanding of these complex systems and he highlights that the analysis must involve not only the relationship between social actors, but also the relation between social actors and technology. The notion

of system will be addressed as a flexible, adaptable and evolutionary concept, as it emerges from the sum of social interactions. The notion of system also integrates a sense of interdependence. Even if the different actors that form a system are unequal and entail different power relations, there must be a level of cooperation that enables the existence of the system itself. This dynamic “sometimes gives those with fewer obvious resources the power to act in ways that force adaptation among those who seemingly had greater resources before specific interactions began.” (Chadwick, 2013, p.17). Power is seen as emerging from the system, in a relational and contextual manner.

Media logics, in its turn, is conceptualized after Peter Dahlgren as “the imperatives that shape the particular attributes and ways of doing things within given media and even within specific genres” (2009, p.52). The notion is useful to understand both the power of media and the power within media. It considers that the interactions between media and political systems are crucial to understand what is seen and built as publicly valued information and communication and that the logics force is co-created by media, political actors and publics. In the complex media landscape of nowadays, there would be a variety of competing and overlapping media logics (Chadwick, 2013).

To try to understand how these different actors and logics exist side by side on the case of the Brazilian protests of 2013 and what relationships they establish, we will firstly outline who are the main actors in this ecosystem.

Social media is frequently mentioned as a singular place of expression of individuals and citizens. That characterization is comprehensible if we take into account that effectively one of the innovations of social media in relation to previous media is exactly the democratization of the right to speak and publish information and opinions¹¹. But that does not mean that individual citizens are the only, nor the most influential actors in this communication environment.

From citizens to institutions, from politicians to governments, from professional to alternative media, there is a variety of social actors that are present and active on social

¹¹ When we talk about the democratization of the right to speak and publish we refer to the fact that any person with access and technological knowledge to use social media can publish content. That does not necessarily mean a democratization of visibility or of the participation on the public debate, as will discuss on Chapter 7.

media. Each of them will assume a different role in a different debate, depending on each context and reality. More than that, it is their interaction that emerges from the core of the communication dynamics on social media (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Chadwick, 2013; Segerberg & Bennett, 2011).

So, the first step to understand the use of social media in the Brazilian protests of 2013 was to identify who were the main actors constructing the debate. Our aim was to understand the media landscape of this event, that is to say how the communication system was formed and how each actor dealt with the use of social media and their capabilities of challenging the traditional communication system.

Regarding the 2013 Brazilian protests, an overview of our Twitter corpus allowed us to identify five main actors that constructed the discussion on social media. The first of them is comprised of mainstream media outlets, very active on this new communication environment. Twitter profiles from major TV channels, newspapers, magazines and news portals appear among the users that tweeted about the protests. Second, by their side, there are also alternative media accounts that participate on the discussion. Here we can mention both alternative media organizations that existed already before the protests and “communication collectives”, as they usually auto proclaim themselves, which emerged during the demonstrations. These new groups are eager in the use of digital communication and usually are based on collaborative and less professionalized models of production¹². The third and not very numerous group is composed by organizations participating in different ways on the debate. Some of them are social organizations directly involved in the protests, such as social movements and NGOs, some are just taking positions in regard to specific issues that emerged during the demonstrations. The same accounts for the politicians and political parties that appear in the conversation, which compose the fourth group of actors. This was a point of tension since the activists quarreled over those for whom political parties should not participate on the protests versus those that sustained they were welcome to participate. Anyway, in the online conversation, they did not hesitate to express their opinions and perceptions regarding the movement. And the last group we identified consists, of course, of personal profiles from individuals that composed a diffuse and non-organized flow of information while participating on the protests and producing content about it. Those

¹² In Chapter 6, two of those cases will be discussed in more detail.

five general profiles, together, are responsible for a major part of the conversation on social media around the 2013 protests. Each of them will be further explored in the following chapters.

2. Protests and digital communication: issues on new forms of political action

The use of online social network platforms for the organization of protests is not a new topic on the communication research field. A broad bibliography covers the relation between online mechanisms and political engagement (Aguiton and Cardon, 2008; Bennet and Sergerberg, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012; Badouard, 2013; Valenzuela, 2013; Bakardjieva, 2015; Kavada, 2015; Gomes, 2016; Mabi & Gruson-Daniel, 2018) and the topic gains special interest from the scientific field from 2010 on (Gomes, 2018). However, one might find quite different interpretations on the social and political consequences of this relation. There are plenty of possible interpretations and analyses of this phenomenon, varying between extremes: on the one side, authors who support that social networking services completely change the way in which people protest, and on the other, those who believe these mechanisms only reproduce offline behavior. Avoiding to adopt any of these extremes, we will identify some specificities of the phenomenon.

Here, it becomes important to link and differentiate the concept of social movement and that of protest. The first, as seen above (in topics 1.1 and 1.2), refers to “collective actions with a sociopolitical and cultural character, which enable different forms of organization and expression of individual’s claims” (Gohn, 2013, p.309). Thus, social movements tend to be more organized and durable structures that allow different forms of collective actions, the protests being one of those forms. Protests, in their turn, are punctual political actions that may or not involve social movements. The act of protesting may take different forms, such as strikes, uprisings, riots, rallies, boycotts, sit-ins, marches and mass demonstrations (Cammaerts, 2012). Social movements are often considered as facilitators of the individuals’ decision to become involved in collective action, such as protests (Diani, 2015), but recent protest movements, particularly with the central role of digital communication technologies, have defied that approach.

A first element that captured our attention when it comes to this new relation between protest movements and digital technologies is its respective nomenclature. According to the bibliography, many expressions name the convergence between online social media and

protests. There are new terminologies, as proposed by Bennet & Segerberg (2012) – connective action –, by Karatzogianni and Schandorf (2014) – cyber-conflict and digital activism – and by Di Felice (2013) – net-activism, and also the review of classic sociological terms, as presented in Bakardjieva (2015) – collective action – and Kavada (2003) – social movement.

Besides, even though the studies on the relation between protests and digital technologies have existed for at least a decade, several authors (Gerbaudo, 2014b; Karatzogianni and Schandorf, 2014) show that the wave of manifestations that started in 2011, has been quite different from previous movements. Since the first protests that used digital technologies of information and communication prioritized the creation of new platforms, nowadays many of these movements use already-existing platforms, featuring substantial concentration of users (Gerbaudo, 2014b). The central question for them is not the ethics of the structure used for communicating and mobilizing people, the aim being to convey the message and to mobilize as many individuals as possible.

Accordingly, the so-called online activism (Karatzogianni and Schandorf, 2014) would have reached its fourth phase¹³. At this point, this kind of action is no longer a novelty and is turning mainstream, in the sense that they start to use private and mainstream communication systems. This phase would include the Arab Spring protests, as well as those in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Turkey, Nigeria, India, etc. Thus, it is necessary to analyze and understand the differences between such movements and their predecessors, and also of their political consequences.

To explore some of the main characteristics of this imbrication of protests and digital communication, we will present an overview of the main topics of the literature relevant us. We identified four main topics of literature that will help us explain the phenomena we analyze in the second part of the dissertation: the emergence of a new sociability, the issue

¹³ The origins of this type of action would appear between 1994 and 2001, from the Zapatista movement and the anti-globalism ones – they coincide with the ones pointed out by Gohn (2013) on topic 1.2. At this moment, the focus was the creation of new platforms and the use of open code (open source movements). Between 2001 and 2007, this kind of action would have increased significantly, particularly in the United States, reinforced by the attacks of September 11th 2001. The election of Barack Obama for the Presidency of the US, in 2008, showed the potential power of online actions on the political life of a country and served as reference of an online activism propagation phase worldwide. Between 2008 and 2010, movements against austerity policies started in reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, especially in Syntagma square, in Greece.

of individual X collective actions, the temporality and spatiality of the movements and the connections between online and offline.

The emergence of a new sociability

We need to consider that a new sociability emerges also from this online activism. According to Gomes (2016), hyper connection, self-broadcasting and social commenting and social editing would be its main characteristics. The first one would lead to the end of the separation between “real” and “virtual”. The action of “going online” loses sense once the connection to the online world becomes constant and dissociated from the computers as physical objects – especially with the increasing importance of mobile use. The digital would no longer be a separated reality. The second refers to the increase in the possibilities of real-time broadcasting one’s actions. Gomes (2016) highlights this is not restricted to a narcissistic perspective, but also linked to political activities, as a new possibility of citizen empowerment.

The third element of this new sociability pointed out by the author would be the sharing and re-appropriation of content as a form of political action. The author calls this characteristic the “bleachers effect”¹⁴, meaning that the public that is not at the center of the action may also interfere in it by helping to disseminate related content. This reaction to the content may be done through commenting or editing, which would create a complementing role between those that act by publishing content about their presence on a protest and those whose political action consists in reacting to that content and helping to spread it.

That proposition on how to perceive and elaborate on this new sociability seems very interesting to the phenomena we are going to analyze here. Especially, the aspect referring to the capacity of self-broadcasting and the essential role of those that interact with the published material, adding layers, interpretations and helping to diffuse them.

Individual X Collective actions

In order to deepen the understanding on this new sociability, it is fundamental to approach the roles of collective and individual actions. A wide array of authors discuss the question

¹⁴ The “efeito arquibancada”, in the original in Portuguese, does a reference to the role of supporters of sport’s teams that even not being in the game court may influence the game by their actions of support to those that are the main responsible for the action. It seems that in the American culture it would be something like the armchair quarterback.

of the collective concerning movements where the basis of organization relies on online media (Akrich & Méadel, 2007; Bennet and Sergerderg, 2012; Boullier, 2013; Gerbaudo, 2014a; Gerbaudo and Treré, 2015; Kavada, 2015). They question whether the notions of collective action and identity are still pertinent for analyzing these movements where the individual level of decision is increasingly important.

Bakardjieva (2015) argues that, even in traditional collective actions, the role of individual decision cannot be disregarded. Therefore, the author chooses to stress the role of personal decisions and motivations instead of reinforcing the structural vision according to which the needs and decisions of individuals are highly influenced by a pre-established structure. The author adverts then about the risk of going from a former social structuralism to a technological one. That is to say that her argument against social structuralism is also valid when talking about digital communication technologies, hence the simple fact that people use these technologies to organize themselves cannot be seen as an element that will rigidly format the actions that will emerge from it. The element that most interests us in this analysis proposed by Bakardjieva (2015) is that the use of technology does not lead to one clear format of mobilization, but rather the different uses people make of it will shape different kinds of possibilities.

That perception is in accordance with the finding of Akrich and Méadel (2007), when analyzing mailing lists related to health topics. They identify two forms of connection between the individuals that participate on the conversation and the collectivity that is formed around it. They first suggest a form of search for collective recognition, that would lead these individuals to gather and speak in the form of “we” when expressing their needs and possibilities of action. The second would be a collectivity based on the sum of individuals, which would be expressed through mechanisms of search of a common opinion, such as surveys and petitions. The authors conclude in their case study that there was a “limited adhesion” (p.152) to the group, since there was no shared project in a broader sense. These groups would be constructing a new form of collective, where the representation model does not work well and they do not search for a stable and well defined identity (Akrich & Méadel, 2007).

On their turn, Bennet and Segerberg (2012), will propose a different approach to the question. According to them, these technological tools would allow the conformation of

activist movements based on a more personalized participation and where communication plays a central role in the organization of the movements itself. These authors also call this type of activism “connective action”, differentiating them from the traditional “collective action”. Although the personalization of the informational dynamics through interactive networks is not a new element, as it was already pointed out in 1993 by, among others, Josiane Jouët, according to Bennet and Segerberg (2012) this process would have now attained a different level of consequences. According to them, connective action would not be centered on the collectivity. Thus it would require, on the one hand, low or no coordination and, on the other, participants very connected to online media, where they would share personal opinions on the movements. In this scenario, the relations with formal political and social organizations are no longer central to the mobilizing process.

It is worth it to clarify that the difference between these two kinds of activism would not consist on the use (or not) of technological tools. Overall, it is the way technologies are used that would establish the difference between them: while “collective action” is grounded on social media use as an accessory communication tool, in the “connective action” case, social media would be a way of organization in itself. Kavada (2003) supports that same perception of social media as organizational tools. To her, social movements started to use online tools as a new form of communication, and they became an organizational process in themselves. This changed the movements’ structure: according to the author, considerations about the role of digital media on protest movements may not disregard the functioning of platforms as networks, in which power is relational. Following network theory, she proposes that the analysis of social behavior may start from interpersonal relations, at both individual and collective levels. Power would not emerge from the nodes (one singular point of the network) themselves, but rather from connections.

Going back to Bennet and Segerberg (2012), it is clear that their main objective is to show that “connective action” cannot be analyzed through the same theoretical frame of “collective action”. They support that differences between these two concepts are significant, so it is necessary to adopt other theoretical lenses to analyze them.

In the sense of searching for such analytical tools, Cammaerts (2014) proposes an interpretative frame for this issue, going further in terms of analyzing the links among individual, collective and connective action. He starts with Foucault’s notion of

“technologies of the self”, which establish technology as a tool that discipline the human being, while it allows the social construction of personal identity. Then, he uses the concept of mediation to achieve the notion of “technologies of self-mediation”. He argues that these technologies are the tools through which social movements become self-conscious. So, he is still working in the interface between individual and collective, with the conciseness of a movement emerging precisely from the interaction between these two spheres, which would happen through digital media.

Cammaerts (2014) analyzes the affordances and the constraints of these technologies, considering that, to him, these two aspects are not opposed, but overall complementary. The constraints are not necessarily negative; they are conditions that guide the action. Six affordances of the “technologies of self-mediation” are proposed: dissemination of the movements’ discourses; mobilization and recruitment to action; internal organization; immediate coordination; (self-)recording protest events; archive protest artifacts. As constraints, he presents the digital divide and the low interest on politics; the individualism in the use of these platforms; the commercial characteristic of online social media; and the possibility of surveillance of the State over users.

Another attempt to connect the individual and collective levels of these movements was carried out by Valenzuela (2013). According to him, concerning this issue, information, expression and activism are the three main dimensions of the use of social media. Regarding the informative use, the author highlights that the difference of the process of information access into these networks is that it can be accidental, i.e. it does not totally depend on the will of the user. That would create new possibilities in terms of information flow. At the expression level, Valenzuela supports that it is easier and cheaper for oneself to express politically online and this allows a more intense visibility of this kind of discussion. And the connection with the collectivity comes from the fact that, because of the two previous characteristics, citizens are more susceptible to engage into an activist movement, since they become more exposed to political information and discussion.

So, there are three different interpretations of the role of social media in this individual-collective connection. The first is proposed by Bennet and Segerberg (2012), to whom the so-called “connective action” would “result in action without the requirement of collective identity framing” (p.750). To them, the process would become so personalized that it would

require interpreting by other frames of analysis. But then Cammaerts (2014) and Valenzuela (2013) notice that the point is maybe not to completely disregard the collective level, but rather to try to understand the new interconnections between them, taking into account the use of digital media. Cammaerts (2014) proposes a path of understanding that goes from the collective to the individual level, considering that movements became self-conscious through a series of actions done by individuals, taking into account affordances and constraints of digital networks. Valenzuela (2013), in his turn, will opt to establish the connection in the other sense: individual actions done in a networked communication environment would positively affect – and thus help to generate - the individual participation in collective action. Remembering Bakardjieva's (2015) proposition explained above, it seems logic to us that the forms of interconnection between these two levels may take different shapes depending on specific appropriations of the communicative and social environments of collective actions. In any case, it seems important to us to keep in mind that, when analyzing these networks, in order to understand the relations and, more than that, the power structure in place, the focus should be on the connections and not on the nodes of the network, as proposed by Kavada (2003).

Temporality and spatiality of the movements

The temporality and spatiality of these movements are another central topic to understand how the use of these technologies affects the forms and motivations of people protest. Hardt (2017) admits that cycles of struggle seem to be shorter nowadays, but he proposes that there are more nuances behind that perception than it may seem. “Rather than lamenting that contemporary movements are too brief and stunted, however, we should recognize the ways they are embedded in multiple temporalities that link them to the past and embed them in long-term political projects” (Hardt, 2017, p.390).

The author defends the rapidity of current protest movements may not be seen as disconnected from a larger historical picture. He highlights that those movements are both rooted in the past and pointing to the future and that their actions should be evaluated considering such linkages. He offers different forms to oppose the simplistic interpretation about supposedly more ephemeral movements, connecting the movements from North Atlantic to the Global South. He demonstrates that a global consideration on these movements allow us to establish a much more coherent timeline, not marked by hiccups in

otherwise smooth social realities, but rather by a more or less continued process of social outburst with very different agendas and formats.

Also defying a superficial notion of short-lived movements, Boullier (2013) proposes the concept of “inactive networks”. He makes use of Lippmann’s concept of democracy in establishing that popular participation is an eventual choice, which does not happen all the time. It differs from the Habermasian proposal, for example, concerning the concept of deliberative democracy, in which citizens’ participation is aimed to be more continuous. So, to Boullier (2013), on social media, the public may be dissociated, being considered as inactive public, although they can reorganize themselves at any moment. That would mark an important difference between these movements and previous ones, where the demobilization could mean the end of the movement since much more resources would be needed to bring people back together.

Concerning the spatiality of the networks, Boullier (2013) also points out two different dimensions. The first concerns the very space of social media. He argues that these media gain forms that differ from the traditional broadcasting model. Because they do not depend on a unique spokesperson, there might be a greater amplification of scandals, for example. Overall, these networks depend on the repetition, the spreading of information and the capacity to provoke emotion. To Boullier, the conformation of a network with a certain topic would derive from the capillarity of informative dissemination instead of a central diffusion center, as in the broadcasting model.

Concerning the physical space, Boullier (2013) highlights the importance of the public space occupation. According to the author, through the occupation of physical areas, the abstract numbers of online participation, often related to protest and social movement, become more concrete.

The idea of the expansion of public space through the internet is proposed by Cardon (2010). He sustains that the online communicational environment could work as an enlargement of the public space in its Habermasian sense. To him, when the internet was created, it was viewed and functioned as a parallel reality, without direct connections to the physical reality. At present, however, these two dimensions would have overlapped, allowing both dimensions of this public space to intertwine.

It seems clear that the analysis of the use of digital communication in protest movements shall not be limited nor to the specific moment of the protest, nor to the restricted space of social networks. It is precisely through expanding these boundaries that we will be reach a more complex understanding of their social impact. From a temporal perspective, analyzing a movement that happened six years ago may be an advantage, as we are able to take a longer historical perspective into consideration. Also, the idea of enlargement of public space through digital media seems an interesting approach to think about the integration of online and offline dimensions, which we will discuss below.

Online and offline overlaps

The articulations between online and offline worlds seem to be another axis of the analysis for this kind of movement. Rodríguez, Ferron and Shamas (2014) propose an interesting starting point for conceiving models to analyze the use of social media by social movements without losing the bigger picture, where the online social dynamics are embedded in. These authors call the attention to four risks that should be avoided in this kind of study.

The first one is the risk to neglect the historical context. The online dynamics and the social behavior on social media are part of a larger network of social relations and media environment that should be taken into consideration. The historical perspective is also highlighted by Clavert, Grandjean and Méadel (2018), who insist on not restricting to the sensation of novelty brought by social media, and realizing they “reactivate and reformulate problems that are not exclusive” (p.8).

In this sense, Dahlberg (2015) calls our attention to the concept of ‘social’. He reminds that, throughout human history, there have been different social media, hence it is necessary to consider the historical scenario so as to organize a precise analysis on online social media uses.

The second risk presented by Rodríguez, Ferron and Shamas (2014) is separating the media and new communication technologies from their political economic frames. This has special importance when it comes to social media, since almost all major communication platforms belong to private enterprises, and are poorly regulated by national and/or international laws.

The private nature of enterprises that own social network sites cannot be disregarded. It is fundamental to consider the affordances of the platforms for social networking, i.e. the

possibilities of foreseen and inventive actions into a platform and, similarly, what kind of action cannot be done. The use of content from social network platforms has other aims in this context, beyond those imagined by their users.

Simplistic definitions of communication comprise the third risk presented by the authors. Rodríguez, Ferron and Shamas (2014) insist on the importance of seeing the communication not only as a news diffusion strategy. They highlight the need of understanding the social fabric in which communication processes take place in. By using this notion, it is interesting to think about the activism itself as a communicative strategy. Here, the authors discuss how to conceive communication in its different roles in social movements. In this case, it is important to consider that social media have been conceived as social technologies and not specifically for political uses.

Finally, the fourth risk the authors present is to lose an extended view of the research field and to try to reinvent the wheel. They stress the remarkable previous research that has been done on the topic. They point out several behaviors and uses of communication, considered as a new reality, that have actually existed for a long time, having been simply transposed to a new platform.

Consequently, all changes and new possibilities derived from new technologies have to be taken into account, in close relation with the sociopolitical environment where they are used. As Gerbaudo (2012) states, both extreme positions (the one that considers that technology revolutionizes society and the other that argues it does not bring any positive change) "are characterized by an essentialist vision of social media as being automatically either suitable or unsuitable as means of mobilization" (p.5).

Another interesting aspect of the discussion on the interconnections between online and offline dimensions is whether the use of social media does or does not help to create what is considered as real action (Morozov, 2011), or if it does provide tools to trigger the actual mechanism that would be taking people to the streets (Gerbaudo, 2012). So, the online activism, regardless of its aims, is frequently viewed as a tool to increase, facilitate or encourage forms of protest that take place offline.

These views about this relationship between online and offline activism gains different nuances depending on how the author sees the role of technology. Morozov, well known for

his extremely skeptic view about the use of technology, says that it is difficult to consider that technology “all by itself, help cultivate a deep commitment to serious causes. This, at least for the foreseeable future, would be the task of educators, intellectuals, and, in some exceptional cases, visionary politicians.” (2011, p. 189).

Although we agree that technology does not have an effect ‘by itself’, what Morozov does not consider is that nowadays the use of social media cannot be seen as a, entity separated from ‘educators, intellectuals and visionary politicians’. These actors, as most societies they act in, use such technologies not only to communicate, but also to socialize online. That is why the use they make of it may also impact forms of activism.

Morozov assumption that “at some point one must convert awareness into action and this is where tools like Twitter and Facebook prove less successful” (Morozov, 2011, p. 191) proved not to be completely true. Firstly and more clearly because the use of these technologies did participate in the occurrence of a variety of protests around the world. But, more importantly, also because maybe we can think in the conversion of awareness into action within the online world. That is to say that online activities may also be considered as ‘real action’.

Nowadays, when the use of this technology no longer represents a scape from reality, but rather it overlaps with offline world, online and offline actions cannot be seen or analyzed in separate ways. It is not a matter of understanding digital actions as accessory, complementary or prior to offline activism; instead, one could see it as a constitutive and transforming part of the movement itself. We do not agree with the idea that online actions should only be assessed according to their offline outcomes, but according to the experiences and consequences that it, while online action, can participate in creating. It is not a matter of moving from the virtual to the real, but rather of understanding that the virtual itself has concrete and real impacts on society. The latter can no longer be thought of without its virtual dimension.

So, the idea of Morozov that a ‘slacktivist campaign’ could be differentiated from a ‘serious campaign’ because the first one would only aspire that “given enough tweets, the world’s problems are solved” (2011, p. 190) seems an a reductionist way to interpret online activism. A very different conception is elaborated by Badouard (2013). When talking about what he calls the ‘keyboard mobilizations’, he highlights the role they may have in expanding the

public that engage in those kind of actions: “Above all, it goes beyond the scope of militant activities: it concerns both "ordinary" citizens and organized activists and has a wide range of formalization levels” (Badouard, 2013, p.92).

In an effort to look more closely to the possibilities of online participation, Greffet, Wojcik and Blanchard (2014) propose six categories of actions: dialoging, contacting, showing oneself, getting informed, sharing and commenting and producing original content. The aim of the authors is to understand online political participation on electoral moments, not on protests, but the diversity of repertoires of action displays various options we need to take into account when talking about online political actions. Thus, online political actions should not be interpreted homogeneously and the different practices need to be regarded according to their specificities.

Yet, we do strongly agree with Morozov’s position that technologies do not have a social impact all by themselves. This ‘fetish’ around them, as if they could magically transform the social reality (Gerbaudo, 2012), is not only false, as well as it does not help to understand the complexity of the problem. We consider that it is the use of technology, among others, that social changes can take place. “The technique cannot be seen as an absolute data, but as a relativized technique, namely, as it is used by man” (Santos, 2000).

In that sense, the proposition made by Gerbaudo seems interesting. On the one hand, he considers that social media must be understood as a complementary form to face-to-face gatherings and, on the other, he admits this new media may create “new forms of proximity and face-to-face interaction” (2012, p.12-13). Although the author does consider the possibility of a new sociability arising from online gathering, the offline action remains his goal.

It is no coincidence that his book is called “Tweets and the streets”. While analyzing the 2011 protests in Egypt, Spain and in the USA, he highlights “the risk of seclusion that the use of social media can create, when their use is not accompanied by street-work and interaction with those on the other side of the digital divide, who, to use a recurrent activist expression, ‘do not have a Facebook account’” (Gerbaudo, 2012, p.13).

Nonetheless, he considers the online activism by itself may have problematic consequences for democracy, he does take into account that these actions do have real impact on social

life. That is why he emphasizes the need to consider spatial and individual peculiarities when analyzing online actions.

Gerbaudo realizes that there is a tendency to treat online phenomena as being de-territorialized and disembodied, as if without relation to real individuals in offline world. That is why he criticizes both Castells' concept of network and Hardt and Negri's concept of swarms.

In his treatment of the network society, the 'space of flows' of the internet overtakes the 'space of places', marginalizing local interactions and the identities constructed therein (Castells, 1996: 429). But how are we to understand the Arab Spring, the indignados, or Occupy, if we do not retain a sense of the importance of place in contemporary societies? (Gerbaudo, 2012, p.25-26)

Compared to Castells' discussion of networks, Hardt and Negri do recuperate an appreciation of the role of the body and of its mobility, by way of that vitalistic stream of thought which runs from Spinoza to Deleuze. Yet they too fail to take into account the emplaced character of collective action, the fact that it requires physical locations as stages for its performances. (Gerbaudo, 2012, p.28)

Those perceptions seem interesting to feed a reflection about the status of the online world, frequently seen as a non-place with partial individualities (a specific part of the offline real individual). That is why online activism is generally seen in regard to its capacity of debouching into offline actions. And the effects of this new territory remain undiscussed.

If we follow Rosanvallon (2006) and consider that "the web has also become a social form in its completeness, along with a real political form" (p.72) maybe we can reach to a more complex comprehension of this media. To him, this social form would foster new ways to constitute communities.

In fact, the social link is no longer conceived in the form of an aggregation, a coordination or an identification, as it is usually studied in economics or sociology. The social that creates Internet is pure circulation, free interaction, succession of punctual meetings, open possibility of tree branching (Rosanvallon, 2006, p.73).

Although he advances in the perception of the online space as a space of action in itself, his analysis of the operation of the online dynamic does not reflect the diversity and inequalities present in that environment. Expressions as “free interaction” (p.73) or “this invasive force to which everyone participates without anyone being able to be the master” (p.73) disregard many of the inequalities on the online environment.

We agree with Rosanvallon (2006) in his proposition that the online dimension should be regarded as a space in its entirety. Therefore, it is necessary to address the specificities of this environment and understand them, not as isolated from the offline dimension – on the contrary, they are extremely imbricated -, but in their singularity. Identifying that singularity involves many of the elements presented in this theoretical discussion, but it should also start with concrete study cases. This initial debate-related approach found in the literature about protests and digital communication allows us to better grasp this field and the issues surrounding the phenomena. They set the basis of the analysis we propose in the second part of this dissertation.

But even if there are general guidelines and discussions about the impact of digital communication on activism, those impacts need to be observed, measured and nuanced in specific cases. These transformations and challenges might be discussed in several online communication environments: our option here was to work with the Twitter environment. Further discussion about this choice and the methodological steps we adopted will be presented on topic 4.2. But before going directly into that, it is important to understand in a more general manner how the Twitter platform was conceived, used and studied in its 13 years of existence.

2.1 Twitter: from a personal diary to a political tool

We consider that the conception and design of a platform is an essential part of the actions it is going to embed. As proposes Monnoyer-Smith (2010), the structure of a given platform may be seen as “a material incarnation of the conceptions of democracy” (p. 74). In that sense, we will explore the conception, history and evolution of the Twitter platform.

Twitter is a social media¹⁵ founded by Jack Dorsey and associates in San Francisco in 2006, having been used in several different manners since its creation (Rogers, 2014). Its initial idea brought together two subcultures, new media coding culture, as well as radio scanner and dispatch enthusiasm. So, the so-called first-generation Twitter (Rogers, 2014) was an urban lifestyle tool for friends to provide updates on their daily activities.

The initial format, that limited the size of the messages to 140 characters, was inspired in the size of an SMS message, which had a limited size of 160 characters. Dorsey decided to reserve 20 characters to usernames and the rest to the message itself. The mandatory briefness encouraged the creation of several URL shortening services that facilitated the link sharing (Rogers, 2014). Only in November 2017, the platform expanded the length of tweets to 280 characters.

According to interviews given by the founder of the platform, the inaugural concept of Twitter was to be both a “public information utility” and a “friend-following tool” (Rogers, 2014, p.xi). That mix of private and public communication will gain different arrangements in different countries and at different moments.

The bird that is the icon of Twitter points to the idea of tweets as “inconsequential chirpings” (Rogers, 2014, p.xii), strongly in accordance with that idea of the personal and more uncompromising use of the platform. The question posed to users of the platform, until 2009, was “What are you doing?”, which also corroborates that sense of use.

But not all uses were in accordance to the design of the platform. Users also innovated and started to use features that were later incorporated by Twitter, such as the “@” to mark a reply to another user and a “#” to mark a hashtag, which helped to identify topics of conversation (Weller, Bruns, Burgess, Mahrt & Puschmann, 2014).

Rogers (2014) defends that Twitter should be seen as “shallow media, in the sense that it favors the present, the popular, and the ephemeral” (p.xiv-xv). To corroborate this approach, he highlights the fact that Twitter timeline appears in reverse chronological order – an inspiration from the blog format -, which favors the attention on the most recent posts. It is

¹⁵ We adopt the definition of social media proposed by boyd and Ellison (2007) that define social network sites as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system” (p.211).

also a real-time platform, since it is not necessary to refresh the page to get to see new messages coming in. Besides that, the number of days an old tweet remains available for collection was 20, then 15 and now only 7.

In November 2009, Twitter tagline changed to “What’s happening?”. A little earlier, in April 2009, the Trending Topics appeared as a new tool that allowed users to see the most commented topics of the moment. That moment marks the beginning of what Rogers (2014) calls the second-generation Twitter, when the platform becomes an important tool for events coverage. The San Diego fires, the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, James Karl Buck’s arrest in Egypt in 2008, and the Hudson River landing of a US Airways jet in January 2009 are mentioned as the first major events where Twitter had an impact (Arceneaux & Schmitz Weiss, 2010).

But the major event that set the parallel between Twitter and a revolutionary tool was indeed the 2009 Iranian Revolution (Rogers, 2014; Morozov, 2011). The movement became famous as “The Twitter Revolution” and encouraged the discussion about the tool’s social impact. The idea that Twitter’s always-on persistence, light-weight scripting, open infrastructural base, and portable back-end interface would facilitate political revolutions gained force with other subsequent social uprisings (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013).

Despite the optimistic wave about the new possibilities brought by Twitter, there was also a very critic and suspicious approach to these new technologies. Evgeny Morozov, one of the exponents of this vision, firmly criticized “the fervent conviction that given enough gadgets, connectivity, and foreign funding, dictatorships are doomed” (2011, p.5).

In this second moment of the platform, what seems to most interest researchers is not the use of Twitter as a place on intimacy and personal relations, but rather its impact on social events – protest movements in particular - and the value of on ground information (Rogers, 2014).

The third moment of Twitter, as described by Rogers (2014) is not mainly marked by a shift in its use, but in its commercial strategy and research focus. The platforms commercial use of data became a central point both in economic and analytical terms. On the commercial side, it entails an evolution of terms of service and a mobilization of a wide range of professionals able to handle this issue (Puschmann and Burgess, 2014). From the research point of view, it requires technical infrastructure to capture the tweets, store and analyze

them. Twitter's relatively ease process – in comparison to other social media platforms – have drawn researchers, who were confronted with more restrictions to access this kind of data in other social media platforms. Twitter has become an archived object (Rogers, 2014).

The sociability of the platform also deserves some considerations. The relationship established between users is quite different from platforms such as Facebook, where there is a friendship connection basis (Schmidt, 2014). On Twitter, the act of simply following someone is not necessarily reciprocal, which may generate a lower interaction rate. That made some researchers regard it as news media, while users broadcast or narrowcast to followers (Rogers, 2014).

In terms of audiences, Marwick and boyd (2011) worked with the idea of imagined audiences. According to them, every person that communicates imagines an audience to whom they direct their discourse to, but that public is not necessarily in accordance with the actual audience. They highlight that, although the audience on social media may seem potentially limitless, our understanding of it is limited and will thus influence the conversations that are established within it.

Schmidt (2014), on his turn, discusses about personal publics. According to him, this characterization would derive from three dimensions of the platform: its technological features and affordances; its social and textual relations; and its shared rules. Personal publics may be seen as “an ideal type of communication space” (Schmidt, 2014) in contrast with the traditional public of mass media. Three would be the main characteristics of information in this case: being selected according to personal relevance rather than journalistic factors; being conveyed to an interconnected audience rather than to a dispersed audience; and the communication is mainly conducted according to a conversational dynamic.

Still according to Schmidt (2014), conversation in Twitter happens in distributed conversations that might or not connect to each other. They might be organized through the personal choices of the user's own timelines or through the constant and unedited flow of hashtag's trends. Bruns and Moe (2014) propose a conceptual model to address this different communication centers. They identify three different layers of communication going on in Twitter: “the micro level of interpersonal communication, the meso level of follower-

followee networks, and the macro level of hashtag-based exchanges” (p.16). Although those layers are not isolated from one another, they do have specific characteristics.

The macro level is of special interest for us since we will be working with a dataset based on a hashtag. Hashtags enlarge the public of a certain tweet far beyond the initial circle of followers of a certain user. It also identifies the tweet as in relation to a certain issue and helps to organize the conversation around important topics. Besides that, it “signals a wish to take part in a wider communicative process” (Bruns and Moe, 2014, p.18), what makes it possible to gather different publics around a same topic. Also, hashtag streams may be characterized by interpersonal conversations, what follows a very different logic from the mainstream media outlets (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). We have to consider, however, that users that use a hashtag do not necessarily follow the timeline of the conversation about that keyword, which means that the hashtag use may, in some cases, work more as a marker than an engagement.

In the case of hashtags associated to certain political or social events, the timeline may function as a certain narrative of the event, built by different and multiple pieces of information and opinion (Bruns and Moe, 2014). These audiences tend to form rapidly, but also dissolve as quickly.

If hashtags are the markers of the macro level of communication on Twitter, mentions will do the role of bringing the conversation to the micro level, the interpersonal one. By mentioning a profile use, users direct the conversation specifically to them, restricting the focus. That narrowing of the conversation is also reflected in Twitter’s own mechanism that makes tweets that begin with the @mention of another user to be visible only to the sender and addressee, as well as to users following both accounts. (Bruns and Moe, 2014).

The navigation between the three different layers of conversation is constant. It happens on the one side because of the affordance of the platform itself, that allows personal messages to be retweeted or incorporated on a hashtag, as well as the personification of a general message with a keyword and, on the other, because the users choose by themselves to make this shift. The most important way to move between layers is the retweet (Bruns and Moe, 2014), as it makes it possible both to address a certain message of a general conversation to a user and to replicate a message initially restricted to a certain number of followers (Halavais, 2014).

It is this flexibility of Twitter as a platform for public communication at various levels of ‘public-ness’, this versatility of transition between the three major layers of public communication, which serves as the fundament for Twitter’s considerable success as a social media service. (Bruns and Moe, 2014, p.21)

This versatility of the platform will simultaneously facilitate its use and generate different appropriations by protest movements. Segerberg and Bennett (2011) highlight that Twitter functions both as a networking agent and as a window for protest. That means it is not only a space of visibility to the activists, but it also changes the way the protest in itself is organized. To the authors, Twitter would be a space where individual and collective agencies would be in constant negotiation. That perception will later be developed in their proposition of the shift, as already seen, from collective action to “connective action” (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012), where the use of social media on protest movements would gain a strong organizational role.

Another interesting aspect of the Twitter use in protest movements is its capacity to participate in the creation of alternative gatekeeping processes (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Segerberg & Bennett, 2011). Segerberg and Bennet highlight that Twitter streams, at the same time, “embed and are embedded in gatekeeping processes” (p.202), while Meraz and Papacharissi use the platform to propose the idea of a networked gatekeeping process. We will further explore these conceptions in Chapter 6, but what interest us here is to establish that the use of the possibilities of the platform does bring changes to the communication dynamics, which may have an impact on how protests take place.

Those different aspects and issues of the interplay of protests and digital communication, as well as the peculiarities of the Twitter platform, allow us to establish a panorama of the main elements at stake. That background will guide the analysis in the second part of this dissertation.

3. A meaningful starting point: the experience of managing Lula's Facebook page

My choice of studying the use of social media in the 2013 Brazilian protests and its consequences was not a coincidence. Even if my research background had already been in the crossroad of digital communication and politics, it was the experience of working as a social media editor at the Lula Institute that led me to this dissertation.

The Lula Institute was created after the end of the second term of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as Brazil's president. It is based in São Paulo and has as its main axe of activity "the Brazilian cooperation with Africa and Latin America. The full exercise of democracy and social inclusion allied with economic development are among the main accomplishments of the Lula government that the Institute aims to stimulate in other countries"¹⁶. It was, on the one hand, a continuation to the work Lula had carried out throughout his political life – before and during government -, but on the other, it was a complete novelty. For the first time since Lula had arose as an important political leader, he had not a run for public office in the horizon and, more than that, he had just helped to elect his successor, President Dilma Rousseff.

But the fact of leaving the Presidency did not diminish Lula's role as one of the most prominent Brazilian politicians. Having left government with an 87% of approval rate (Ibope, 2010), Lula's opinions and actions were still of major interest to national and international media, social actors and to citizens in general. His communication strategies were then designed according to the position of a person of public interest – and, of course, also very interested himself in the outcomes of the Brazilian political life -, but no longer in public office.

I was contacted at the end of January 2012 because the communication team¹⁷ at the Lula Institute wanted to create Lula's Facebook page. At that moment, Lula was undergoing

¹⁶ <http://www.institutolula.org/missao>

¹⁷ The communication team was always small at the Lula Institute. At that time, it was composed by a coordinator, a press secretary and a website editor. I joined the team as responsible for the Facebook page and only later became social media editor, extending my responsibilities to other social networks and more strategic tasks.

cancer treatment and was not attending his daily routine at the Institute. From February to May, my job was to elaborate a convincing discourse about why we should create a Facebook page. The communication team had that idea and supported it, but it was not necessarily the case of the board of directors. Previous discussions about a similar subject ended up in a decision in favor of a website with no space for comments, for example. Why then would they agree to create an interactive platform such as a Facebook page?

I spent two months basically gathering arguments in favor of how that platform would give more autonomy to subjects about him, leading to gains of visibility, while negative comments would also exist, but only as a small portion of the discussion on the page that, as other experiences had shown, attracted much more like-minded people than trolls. And of course, the preparation of all the material for the page itself took an enormous time: pictures, texts, the choice of the milestones¹⁸: all the content was carefully chosen and proofread so as to reduce the chance of errors.

In May 17th 2012, the Facebook page was launched. The number of followers rapidly grew and we adopted an editorial line that mixed his daily activities – in May he was already going back to his activities after the end of cancer treatment –, the Institute's activities and more general topics that included historical information and, rarely, comments on some current Brazilian political events. He had purposely focused his activities on the international level in order to allow his successor to gain the attention she needed to run the country.

My personal challenge became, then, to bring him closer to the page. It was very clear in the page description that the posts were not written by him: we always wrote them in the third person when talking about him in order not to create a fake sense of a personal conversation. But personally, I always convinced it was important to have a more personal touch. That was a real challenge, mainly because he already had other ways of communicating, that mostly privileged mainstream media. Press releases were used to inform about his public activities as well as his political statements on major issues. Statements recorded in video were also very common, especially in more institutional occasions, for example on the many events he was invited to, but could not attend.

¹⁸ At that time, Facebook was changing the structure of Facebook pages and adding a historical timeline to them. In that timeline, we could add highlights of his political path with texts and photos on it.

Also in the communication team, the place of social media was not always consensual. The team was composed by three young journalists with different backgrounds and experiences. I remember discussing many times the temporality in which we should post contents on the Facebook page. In the team, there was a general understanding of the importance of social media, but that perception was not easy to put in place, especially for those in direct contact with journalists – who were not happy not to have exclusive information. The press releases that were first only sent to the mailing of journalists started also to be posted on the Facebook page, at the same time, and sometimes even before.

That was not done without very intense internal discussions that helped to diversify and adapt the different approaches. It was important to cultivate certain relations with journalists, who remained important gatekeepers (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013), but also to build a new level of communication with the public. But there were also reactions from the outside. Journalists used to receive privileged information about his activities lost space when more content and information started to rapidly and easily be available to a larger public via Lula's Facebook page.

In my effort to bring Lula closer to the dynamics of his Facebook page, I started producing daily reports. The document showed what we had posted that day, what were the reactions and highlighted some comments. It was not easy to choose which comments to show him. My intention was to bring him closer to that new communicative dynamic and I knew that, in order to make it happen, it was important for him to see people that identified with him and the work that was being carried out. Yet, a false sense of positivity would not favor the complexification of reality I thought social media could bring. So, I did an effort to always present him a positive, a neutral and a negative comment. I also highlighted personal stories, especially of people that had their life changed by public policies implemented during his governments. He was always very touched by them.

These reports brought, if I remember well, the very first interactions I got from him regarding social media. As his routine was very intense and full of activities, we did not have time to discuss that every day (it was far from a priority in his agenda), but we did it once in a while and he expressed very clearly his likes and dislikes. Often his agenda did not allow specific time for that, but I frequently awaited in front of his room for a quick talk between meetings. It was also mostly in those opportunities that I got the chance to discuss with him a little bit

more about the dynamics of social media communications. Considering he personally does not use any kind of social media, all the choices and actions had to be explained and justified. Those talks went on until I left the Lula Institute in June 2015, and I remember perfectly the day he voluntarily asked for the first time to publish something on Facebook.

The next step was to start publishing declarations exclusively prepared for Facebook. On commemorative dates and special occasions, I started to propose small declarations he could deliver to mark the occasion. It could be a national date, the birthday of a personality, or news that I thought that deserved to be commented by him. The idea was to have small declarations signed directly by him among the majority of the content that was produced by the communication team. He agreed to the idea, and just asked me to choose well the topics he really should comment on, so it wouldn't become "*carne de vaca*"¹⁹. The dynamics was always the same: someone in the communications team proposed a topic he could comment on, I wrote a suggestion of statement and took it to discuss with him. Sometimes he demanded the preparation of a certain statement, but these texts made for social media mainly depended on our propositions. I prepared a general calendar that mixed important national and international dates, landmarks from his government – date of creation of certain policies or signature of deals – and other interesting dates. I remember for example that, for the time I was at the Lula Institute, every year he published a statement about July 2nd, a very important date to the Brazilian independence, but that is only well-known in the state of Bahia – my state of origin -, where it is celebrated. The dynamics of approval of these texts was always similar: he usually changed the text completely and we published a signed version on Facebook, almost always gaining major attention and being also published by mainstream media.

That dynamic was only used for Facebook declarations signed by him. For the routine posts – which were not signed –, they were approved internally by the communication team. All posts were previously sent by mail to the team, informing at what time it would be published. That gave the team time to comment, criticize and modify the posts, but also guaranteed a

¹⁹ "Carne de vaca" means "beef meat" and is a Brazilian popular expression that means a very ordinary fact, something usual that, at the end, people do not pay attention to. I remember this expression because the day he told me was the very first day I heard it.

certain routine of publications. If the time of the post arrived and there was no comment, it was published.

Videos were also very much used in his Facebook page and in his communication in general. He likes speaking to the camera and always had a good relationship with his photographer and cameraman, who was by his side since 2002. He already had the habit of sending videos to events he could not attend and we started to prepare internal interviews with him. In general, the mainstream media coverage of Lula and the Worker's Party was far from objective (Aldé, Mendes, & Figueiredo, 2007; Azevedo, 2009) – we will further discuss this topic on section 3.1 - and that created on him the will to speak directly to people. “You can ask me anything, do not avoid the hard questions”, he told us when we were in the studio. In this sense, we recorded many interviews about current and historical topics. The videos were later edited and cut in small pieces to be posted on Facebook and Youtube.

Another moment I remember as very important in this work with social media was the early start of the currently largely discussed phenomenon of fake news on the Brazilian web. From a certain moment on, I started to notice that the number of comments accusing one of Lula's sons of being the owner of the Friboi company started to grow. Friboi is part of the JBS group, one of the largest meat processing companies in the world. That was not the first lie about his son that was circulated (before he was accused of owning a farm that wasn't his and also of having an airplane he never possessed), but it started to gain a striking dimension. My colleagues had the same perception and it was not restricted to Facebook, it could also be perceived in day-to-day conversations on the streets. Talking to him about the matter, I remember Lula refused to “say the obvious”. He highlighted that Friboi CEO himself had declared that his son had nothing to do with the company and that “only people with bad intentions” believed in things like that. He resisted, but when lies regarding his state of health also started to gain major proportions (inventions about his cancer being back existed since his illness, but they started to gain more attention, even though all his exams were almost covered in real time by the press), he decided to start to publicly deny those false information.

It was then in that context of work, challenges and relations that I experienced the 2013 protests in Brazil, in intense contact with a traditional view of Brazilian leftist politics about the communications system and in the middle of an effort to, at the same time, understand and convince people of how social media could change that landscape.

Watching the 2013 movement and the difficulties the traditional political arena had to respond to it, my interest in this topic flourished. Hence, the present research was led by this sense that there was something new, that could not be completely understood, which was gaining the streets and defying the whole system in place since the democratization of the country.

In the day of the biggest 2013 protest, that feeling about this maladjustment became very clear. I tried to reproduce my experience on that day in this short narrative:

It was 8:00 PM on June 13, 2013, in the city of Curitiba and I was accompanying Lula at an event. I was making an effort to turn a sentence I just had heard into a tweet that would fit in the 140 characters. I checked the spelling. Sent it. Thousands of responses began to arrive, something quite unusual even for a large account like the one I managed. I read them and suddenly I realized that I seemed to be living in a different planet from the rest of the country. How could it be if I was working in Curitiba, just there, only 400 km from São Paulo, stage of the major events of that night?

The night of June 13th was the most violent of the demonstrations of 2013. After being stimulated by editorials of newspapers and columnists to treat "with proper rigor that bunch of rioters", the Military Police of the State of São Paulo resolved to show all its power in this tragic night, that ended with 232 people arrested, many of them just for carrying vinegar, and a huge number of wounded. The demonstrators, estimated at 20.000, protested against the increase of twenty cents of *Reais* (Brazilian currency) on the price of public transportation in São Paulo. This evening, they encountered another urgent agenda present in Brazilian daily life: the truculence and lack of preparation of a significant part of our police.

I only knew about what was going on once I received hundreds of outraged tweets because we were not tweeting about what was going on. I stopped tweeting. I talked to colleagues and we all agreed there was nothing to be done, but to be silent until a more strategic decision was taken. Lula had not delivered his speech yet, so I thought perhaps it was important for him to mention something about it, or at least to be informed of what was happening. Instead, those around me thought that was not the case, it was better to wait.

I silenced in the dark of the backstage, sat on one of the empty chairs that were there. We left the event, got in the car, got to the hotel. I got out of the car fast, approached Lula and said I needed to tell him something. He listened attentively to my report, worried, but it was after 11 PM, there was not much to do before the next day.

On June 13, 2013, I was in Curitiba for the event "The Decade that changed Brazil", held by the Workers' Party, the Perseu Abramo Foundation and the Lula Institute. It was the fourth seminar of a series that was intended to commemorate the ten years of the Workers' Party's governments in Brazil. A decade that profoundly changed Brazilian society, promoted unbelievable social improvements and elevated the country to a position never before imagined in the international scene, but was not able to predict that all this would not be enough, that people wanted more and that the structure of inequality had not been changed.

This is how my tweet reproducing speeches about how much Brazil had improved in recent years clashed with thousands of demonstrators fighting for what the country still needed to conquer, and being violently attacked by the police. This meeting, digital but not virtual, between traditional institutions of the left that celebrated recent achievements and diffuse citizens that along with new social organizations expressed a general dissatisfaction with the advances not yet achieved is for me a mark of June 2013.


The days that followed were filled with uncertainty. I did what I knew, i.e. monitored social media, produced reports, talked to the contacts I had to collect impressions. Tried to draw from the immensity of information and opinions that circulated some indication of where the movement was heading to and what political position might be more appropriate. It was difficult, complex, the assessments were very disparate.

At the same time, my main job to produce content to Lula's Facebook page became impossible. There was nothing I could say, there was no possible topic other than the demonstrations. There was a moment of silence. A silence that represented the time of formulation. The time of the reality of the ten years of advances to realize that none of that, or very little of it, mattered to the main agenda at that moment.

Four days later, I was able to present Lula with my reports. They, of course, were not conclusive about the movement. In fact, they were only a tiny part of the thousands of information and analysis he had already received. At that moment, he was convinced of one thing: the agenda of the streets was left-wing, "ours", there was no reason to oppose to them. It was then, not without intense discussion among the communication team, that the first statement of former President Lula about the demonstrations of June 2013 came out, highlighting the democratic right of people to demonstrate and his confidence in political negotiation as a path to understanding.

Lula's first public declaration about the protest was done in this Facebook post:

Image 1 – Lula's first post on Facebook about the 2013 protests²⁰



Source: Lula's Facebook page

It says:

No one in their right mind can be against demonstrations of civil society, for democracy is not a pact of silence, but society on the move, in the pursuit of new accomplishments.

There is no problem without any solution. The only certainty is that the social movement and their demands are not a police case, but rather they should be on the table of negotiation.

²⁰ Screenshot done on February 14th 2019.

If I know the mayor Fernando Haddad well, I am confident that he is a man of negotiation. I am sure that among the protesters, most of them are willing to help build a solution for urban transport.

Lula

This was the first of 23 posts published in Lula's Facebook page relating directly or indirectly to the protests taking place between June 1st and September 30th 2013. In this count, we included posts directly about the demonstrations, but also those that made reference to the measures that were announced by the government in response to the streets. That period of time was chosen to coincide with the temporal frame of the Twitter data I analyze in this dissertation, just adding the month of June, which was not available in our Twitter corpus.

I decided to review these posts in order to partially reconstruct the environment I was a part of at the moment of the protest. The idea is look at these posts and use them to rebuild the dilemmas and questions at stake at that moment and to relate them to major questions that guide this dissertation. These fragments of a personal history will be used both to rebuild the personal path that led to the main questions raised by this work and as elements of a larger picture of the Brazilian political reality at the moment of the 2013 protests.

These 23 posts were part of a total of 367 posts done in the page in that period. We can see that the frequency of posts about the topic goes along with the frequency of protests. The demonstrations were most active in June, still but less active in July, dormant in August and regained force in September, but in a very different sense from the original one, with nationalistic symbols and a strong discourse against the government. That moment of September was not represented in the posts, as we can see by the little quantity of posts about the subject on that month.

Table 2 – Number of posts on Lula's Facebook page from June to September 2013

	Total posts	Posts about the protests
June	94	10 (10,6%)
July	65	5 (7,7%)
August	97	4 (4%)
September	111	4 (3,6%)

TOTAL	367	23 (6,3%)
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From the posts, only the first one (reproduced in Image 1) was prepared and posted at the same moment a protest was taking place. This post was published in the beginning of the evening of June 17th, while people were already gathering in *Largo da Batata*, in São Paulo, for the demonstrations. All the other posts refer to the demonstrations, but were done in moments that do not coincide with the protests.

These posts had very different formats and angles about the protests. Two of them were only composed by texts, while nine contained text and hyperlinks and 12 of them contained images. President Dilma Rousseff is the most mentioned person in these posts: eight of them are directly related to her statements or actions. The mayor of São Paulo at the time, Fernando Haddad, also appears in one of the posts. Altogether, we have an indication that the platform was clearly used to give political support to two of the main political leaderships that were closer to Lula at that moment.

3.1 Facebook as an alternative to hostile mainstream media

The use of social media at Lula Institute was a communication strategy highly related to the already long lasting relation between Lula and mainstream media. Lula had emerged as a public figure in the 70's, during the strikes in the industrial region known as the ABC Paulista. He went from the leader of a trade union to the founder of the biggest left-wing party in Latin America and presented himself to all direct presidential elections in the following democratic period (1989, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). Having lost the three first presidential races, he was elected and then reelected. That trajectory consolidated him as central figure of the Brazilian political life, which placed him at the center of media attention.

However, interest of the media cannot be considered as a sign of support to his political choices, or to his candidatures and governments. An analysis conducted by Azevedo (2009) about the press coverage²¹ of Lula and the Worker's Party in all five presidential elections

²¹ Azevedo (2009) considers in his research the coverage of the three biggest Brazilian newspapers and also that done by the four national weekly magazines.

he participated in showed that only in 2002 one might consider the media “neutral or favorable”. In all other four cases, they disfavored his candidacy. According to Azevedo (2009), in 1989 and 1994, Lula was presented “socialist and radical: anti-system and ‘irresponsible’” (p.62). After that, in 1998, he was pictured by the newspapers as “in transition, but with a radical past that inspires lack of trust” (p.62). In 2002, he succeeds in presenting an image that was considered as more acceptable by the press: “social democrat, integrated to the system and responsible” (p.62). In 2006, however, that image shifts to “social democrat, integrated to the system, but clientelist and corrupt” (p.62).

What Azevedo (2009) suggests is that there is a marked tension between the antagonistic ideological values of the Brazilian press – that he considers as conservative, with a low plurality and adept to market economy and representative democracy – and those of the Worker’s Party – socialist and with groups that are critic to representative democracy.

This tensioned field changed only when the PT moved to the political center and became an “order” party, to use a Gramscian expression, redefining itself as a social-democratic party and integrated with the political and economic system. Thus, in 2002, the mainstream press and the PT were reconciled with the former, recognizing the legitimacy of the latter to come to power from the electoral process. In 2006, they moved away again, but now by conflicts of another order and nature, in which conservative arguments are replaced by ethical and moral arguments. (Azevedo, 2009, p.63)

The behavior of the press towards Lula generated different interpretations in terms of its social consequences, especially in 2006. The fact that Lula was re-elected even under a heavily unfavorable coverage generated a thesis adopted by a part of the researchers (Rubim & Colling, 2007), according to which that phenomenon would show a lower influence of the press on society, that would organize itself more according to its direct social experiences – particularly with social policies implemented by the government – than through mediatized ideas. That thesis was also countered by other scholars (Mundim, 2010), who consider that, actually, the hostile positioning of the press towards Lula’s candidature had an important effect both in generating support to him and also in moving him away from a smaller part of the electorate.

The fact is that this moment gave visibility to the discourse about a supposedly weaker power of the press and new possibilities to establish relations with the people. It is that same conception, of being able to bypass mainstream media, which guided the expectations on the social media use. That, however, gained different forms and nuances in the day to day communication choices.

It is important to highlight, however that, the relations between Lula, his entourage and his communication team with the press continued to exist in various ways. When I arrived at the Lula Institute, the communication team was formed by three journalists, one devoted to the press, another to the website and I was in charge of social media. After a while, the team gained a new member, which was also responsible for the relations with the press. So, responding to the press and managing the relationship with journalists occupied half of the communication team, although the task division was not extremely rigid between us. Their work consisted in continuously responding to press demands – from simple questions about a public appearance, to more complex demands on his opinions or reactions to political events -, arranging written and audiovisual interviews, writing press releases and organizing the press structure (dedicated space with speakers and good angle for the photographs) on the public events. They also produced a daily briefing about the most important news of the day.

Yet, the communication team was far from being the only instance to interact with journalists in regards to the former president's activities. Many of the political leaders with whom he met regularly had their own personal relations with journalists and many times served as sources to their articles. The so called "leaks" of information – when something that is still being decided or a private comment becomes public – were frequent and also contributed to the criticism towards media, which many times published information without naming its sources or seeking for an official statement on certain issues. Sometimes, journalists also came to the entrance of the Institute and waited there to talk to people coming in and out, and sometimes trying to see what was going on inside. On the one hand, journalists treated the place as if major secret activities were going on inside, which had to be discovered and brought to light. On the other, the mistrust of the media work made that the communication team's work also contributed to make it more difficult to access the place.

Those relations also reflected on choices done on the Lula's Facebook page. Regarding the external sources of information, in the posts made during the 2013 protests, we identified hyperlinks in 14 of the posts (from the total of 23, three were no longer available online at the moment of the analysis and six did not present any hyperlinks). Five of these links referred to the website of the Lula Institute itself and six referred to institutional government sources (one to the website of the Presidency, three to the Presidency Youtube channel, one to the website of the national public media system EBC and one to the website of the Town Hall of São Paulo). We can clearly see an option for official information sources. The three other links we identified led to three media outlets: the newspaper New York Times, the Youtube channel of the Brazilian magazine Carta Capital and also to another Youtube account, from TVT channel.

The mentions to these media have important meanings. The New York Times agency was the media chosen by Lula to publish a monthly column. It was made available by the agency to a number of international media that could choose to publish the text every month. The former president had been invited by major Brazilian media to have a regular column in their publications, without accepting any of them. The choice was to use international media – viewed as more diverse and highly influential in Brazil - to generate repercussion in the national one.

The magazine Carta Capital, on its turn, is a Brazilian publication with national circulation and with a clear left-wing positioning. In mainstream press (newspapers and magazines), Carta Capital is the only product to clearly identify itself with the left. It was founded in 1994 by the journalist Mino Carta, who had worked in major Brazilian media outlets. Also, TVT is a media identified with the left. It is the television channel of the trade unionist media network called Rede Brasil Atual. That network consists of a group of media that was created by a partnership between workers' unions led by the São Paulo Bank Employee's Union and the Metalworkers' Union from the ABC Paulista. It is responsible for the production of four media products: Revista do Brasil, the RBA website, the TVT TV channel and the Rádio Brasil Atual.

Among the posts, there is also a mention to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, one of the most important in the country. It is not a hyperlink that leads to a content of the publication,

but rather a textual mention to it. That is the only link to a major communication outlet and it is done exactly to criticize it.

A post published on June 28th denies an article published by the newspaper, where we read that Lula had criticized the way President Dilma Rousseff dealt with the protests. Lula then used his Facebook page to deny what the newspaper published, saying it was pure fantasy and “has no real ground”. He went on saying that he never criticized Dilma Rousseff’s actions: on the contrary, that his “conviction is that comrade Dilma has been leading the government and the country with great competence and firmness, listening to the voice of the streets, building solutions and paving the way for Brazil to advance, for our democracy to strengthen and for the process of social inclusion to be consolidated”. The text is signed by him, as well as his first declaration about the protests.

The affirmations that were attributed to me by Folha de S. Paulo in an article published today on page 4 are a fantasy and with no real ground. I have not made any critic, nor in public, or in private, to the acts of President Dilma Rousseff in the recent episodes. To the contrary, my conviction is that comrade Dilma has been leading the government and the country with great competency and resolution, hearing the voice of the streets, building solutions and paving the way to the advance of Brazil, to strengthen our democracy and to consolidate the process of social inclusion. (...) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva²²

As having to deny affirmations attributed to him by the press was something frequent, all his interviews and public appearances were recorded by us in audio and video. The material served mainly as an historical archive, but also became very useful in certain times when we had to rebuild what he had said months or years before to respond to accusations done by the press or by political opponents.

The discussions on how to manage his Facebook page were thus much related to the conceptions about the Brazilian mainstream media and the new possibilities social media could bring. Yet, the shift to social media was not only a change in the communicative space, but also marked important differences in the actors that participated in those discussions.

²² All posts will be presented in the text translated in English. The original version of the posts can be found in Appendix 2.

3.2 Old and new actors on social media and on the streets

The day-to-day work on Lula's Facebook page clearly divided the Lula Institute in two different groups. The first one was mostly formed by the younger advisors, who were all at the communication team, but also at the team responsible for his agenda and for the Africa and Latin America-related initiatives²³. Those people had Facebook profiles themselves and used the network personally. They were more familiar with the network dynamics and shared opinions, thoughts, ideas and critics to what was being published on Lula's page, but also on other pages that were presented as good or bad examples of what we could do. The second group was formed by Lula's closest political advisors, some of the Institute's directors and other figures that were frequently by his side. As Lula, they were born in the 40's or 50's, had a long political career, frequently related to trade unions in a diversity of fields. Some of them defended fiercely the importance of social media, while to some it was a complete waste of time. Unquestionably, what they had in common is that they were not used to words, practices and meanings related to that communicative atmosphere.

That diversity posed interesting challenges to my work, where very few things were consensual. I remember specifically trying to explain to Lula why I had shared a certain post, instead of having created one myself. It was quite simple to me: it was a governmental action we were helping to publicize, it seemed logical to share a post from an official government page. Doing that would help to get more traffic to the page in question (since Lula's page was, for a long time, bigger than any official governmental page) and allowed us to simply repost what the government was saying, without having to take direct responsibility for it. That seemed as a logical act of support to me. But not for him. There were so many elements that were not familiar to him: the act of sharing and the logic of hyperlinks and traffic, to mention the most evident.

What the 2013 protests did is that they exposed the importance of understanding social media to deal with social reality. Social media was no longer only a trendy communication environment among the youth, but rather it was mentioned by activists and media as one of

²³ As mentioned before, when the Lula Institute was created, it had two centers of interest: sharing public policy experiences with African countries and promoting the Latin American integration.

the main elements of a major social outbreak and that was directly affecting Brazilian political life. That moment marked not only a growing interest in understanding social media and influencing on the decisions related to it, but also the need to face new actors that were emerging from this new political and communicational environment.

In that sense, a post done on July 16th marks an important moment of those discussions. It is about a meeting between Lula and “young people from social movements and independent collectives”. The meeting also had the participation of Jaques Wagner, governor of the state of Bahia at that time, and Juca Ferreira, former Culture Minister of his government.

This afternoon Lula received young representatives of social movements and independent collectives. Side by side with the governor of Bahia, Jaques Wagner, with the culture Secretary of the city of São Paulo, Juca Ferreira and with directors of the Lula Institute, the former President heard the youth about the political movements of last months and also about topics such as culture, democracy, politics e communication. Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula

That meeting was the second attempt to start a closer dialogue with groups that participated in the 2013 protests. The first one had happened when the protests were still more active, on June 25th. From 2013 until June 2015 around seven meetings of that type occurred, reuniting different groups.

I remember how those reunions started. Lula called me and his agenda coordinator and said he wanted to organize a meeting with groups of youths and “the internet”. He did not know exactly what that meant, but he sensed there was something new going on and he was open and eager to dialog with it.

It was very difficult to organize those meetings because of two very different and almost opposite reasons. The first one was that a part of the team – mostly the older ones, who were in the political arena for a long time – had difficulties in going beyond the traditional movements the left with whom they were already in dialogue with. To them, dialoging with the youth meant inviting organized groups related to political parties, trade unions and students’ organizations. They had experienced all Brazilian political protests of resistance to the military dictatorship and, after the redemocratization, the new possibilities of organizing

society and establishing important social organizations that pressured governments and companies to guarantee better life conditions.

These traditional groups were part of the people who were on the streets on 2013, but far from being representative of its majority. More than that, the more structured movements struggled to adapt to the use of social media, having long-lasting bureaucratic communication structures. But, on the other hand, it was extremely difficult to identify new groups or leaders that participated on the protests and would be open to dialogue with a leadership such as Lula.

So, the meeting ended up having more of a traditional public, but also incorporated some new actors. I remember the first of these meeting included representatives of the youth from traditional left-wing organizations such as the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra - MST* (Landless Workers Movement), the *Central Única dos Trabalhadores - CUT* (Unified Workers Union) and the *União Nacional dos Estudantes – UNE* (National Students Union). But members of the movement *Fora do Eixo* (Out of the Axe), that had just gained attention because of its communications initiative called *Mídia Ninja* (Ninja Media), and the movement *Existe Amor em SP* (There is love in São Paulo), that emerged during the political campaign for local elections at the end of 2012, were also present. The meetings were a chance to share impressions and feelings about the protests while building dialogue in respect of different visions. They also became a place of articulation of joint initiatives in the months and years that followed.

In those meetings and also by other channels, new names of groups, collectives and communication initiatives started to emerge. Each of the new groups talked about other new actions that were taking place, while the youth structures from traditional political movements also built new networks and provided these movements with their experiences. It was also interesting to see the how people identified themselves in those meetings, some with very formal and hierarchical positions, frequently validated by internal electoral processes that validated their representative legitimacy, others with just a sequence of different memberships, that denoted no hierarchy and multiple parallel activist affiliations. That more fluid and less hierarchical activism was a characteristic of many movements that were gaining visibility around the globe since 2011 (Gerbaudo, 2012).

Regarding the posts on Lula’s Facebook page during the protest, we identified four mentions to social movements. They are mainly related to traditional Brazilian social organizations or to social movements in a general sense. Only one of them mentions these new actors.

Table 3 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page about the role of social movements

Post Message	Posted	Likes	Comments	Shares
“The mission that inspired CUT’s founding is far from the end. What we wanted back then is exactly what we want today. With the break of paradigms, people become more demanding and want more”, said Lula, yesterday, in the celebration of CUT’s 30 th anniversary. http://bit.ly/157W1A4 Image: Worker’s Party	29/08/2013	2200	108	1017
“I think that we are at a moment of discovering new roles to the Brazilian trade union’s movement”, said Lula in an interview to the <i>Rede Brasil Atual</i> . You can see his full response about the challenges of the worker’s class today:	26/09/2013	1600	135	589
“Some of the achievements from the past ten years were only possible due to the intense participation of social movements”, attested Luiz Dulci, former Minister of the General Secretariat of the Presidency and current director of the Lula Institute. He spoke last night, in Salvador, in the seminar in celebration of the ten years of government, in which Lula and Dilma also participated. http://bit.ly/1blqgNi Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	25/07/2013	785	67	242
This afternoon Lula received young representatives of social movements and independent collectives. Side by side with the governor of Bahia, Jaques Wagner, with the culture Secretary of the city of São Paulo, Juca Ferreira and with directors of the Lula Institute, the former President heard the youth about the political movements of the last months and also about topics such as culture, democracy, politics e communication. Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	16/07/2013	? ²⁴	?	?

If we follow a chronological order, the first of the posts above, dated as of July 16th, is about a meeting between Lula and youth from social movements and independent collectives, which we already discussed. It is the only post to mention these new actors that were emerging at that moment. There is another post, not about social movements, but that mentions a new actor that gained attention in that moment: the fictional character *Dilma Bolada*, a humorist parody of President Dilma Rousseff. The respective Facebook page had

²⁴ Considering all categories, a total of three posts out of the corpus of 23 were unavailable at the moment of the analysis, so we could not retrieve the respective number of likes, comments and shares.

gained great attention since Rousseff's election, but it was in 2013 that it started to be regarded as a relevant political actor that could have an important role on the image of the president. One of the posts on Lula's Facebook page, on July 27th mentions him, as he had been invited to participate on the re-launch of the President's Twitter account.

The President Dilma reactivated today her Twitter account with a very good humored talk with her most famous alter ego in the web: the "Dilma Bolada". The meeting took place in the day that the Planalto Palace launches the new Portal Brasil and its Instagram account. You can follow and participate! President Dilma's Twitter: @dilmabr New Portal Brasil: www.brasil.gov.br Planalto's Palace Instagram: [instagam.com/palaciadoplanalto](https://www.instagram.com/palaciadoplanalto). And, for those who like humor, you can also follow "Dilma Bolada": Facebook: Dilma Bolada Twitter: @diImabr Instagram: [instagram.com/dilmabolada](https://www.instagram.com/dilmabolada)

The second post about the role of social movements was dated as of June 25th and reproduces part of a speech given by one of Lula Institute directors, Luiz Dulci. In Salvador, he had spoken about the demonstration wave, stating that "some achievements of the last ten years were only possible because of the intense participation of social movements". It follows a general tendency of positively evaluating the work of social movements, that until that moment represented, in its majority, progressive forces in Brazilian society.

The third post appears on August 29th and reports a speech delivered by Lula in the occasion of the 30th birthday of the biggest Brazilian trade union confederation, CUT. Lula is one of CUT's founders, and kept very close links with CUT during his entire political career, since he was a unionist in the metallurgical industry. In the post, Lula affirms that "The mission that inspired CUT's foundation is far from the end. What we wanted back then is exactly what we want today. As paradigms are broken, people become more demanding and want more".

The last post, as of September 26th, mentions an interview given by Lula to the *Brasil Atual* network, where he stated "we are in a moment of discovering new roles to the Brazilian trade unionist movement". This post clearly shows that not only the 2013 protests generated complex interpretations about their meaning, but they also influenced the actions and purposes of pre-existing social organizations.

Looking back at these posts, I also noticed there is a frequent recurrence of posts related to official governments' and politicians' actions. It is important to highlight that these editorial choices were much less systematic at the moment of the posts, but they seem to be clear signs of the communicative and political environment I was embedded in. These posts were numerous, long and similar in content; we chose four of them to illustrate this analysis.

Table 4 – Posts on Lula's Facebook page about official governmental actions

Post Message	Posted	Likes	Comments	Shares
The President Dilma reactivated today her Twitter account with a very good humored talk with her most famous alter ego in the web: " <i>Dilma Bolada</i> ". The meeting took place in the day that the Planalto Palace launches the new <i>Portal Brasil</i> and its Instagram account. You can follow and participate! President Dilma's Twitter: @dilmabr New <i>Portal Brasil</i> : www.brasil.gov.br Planalto's Palace Instagram: instargam.com/palaciadoplanalto . And, for those who like humor, you can also follow " <i>Dilma Bolada</i> ": Facebook: <i>Dilma Bolada</i> Twitter: @diImabr Instagram: instagram.com/dilmabolada	27/09/2013	5700	451	1330
The statements that were attributed to me by <i>Folha de S. Paulo</i> in an article published today on page 4 are a fantasy and with no real ground. I have not done any critic, nor in public, or in private, to the acts of President Dilma Rousseff as to the recent episodes. On the contrary, my conviction is that comrade Dilma has been leading the government and the country with great competency and resolution, hearing the voice of the streets, building solutions and paving the way to advance Brazil, to strengthen our democracy and to the consolidate the process of social inclusion. (...) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	28/06/2013	4300	850	2456
"As President, I have the obligation both to hear the voice of the streets and to dialogue with all segments, but everything according to the established by the law and the order, indispensable to democracy (...) I will invite the governors and the mayors of the main cities of the country to a great pact for the improvement of public services. The focus will be: first, the elaboration of the National Urban Mobility Plan, which will privilege collective transportation. Secondly, the destination of 100% of the financial resources of petroleum to education. Third, immediately bring thousands of foreign doctors to extend the coverage of the public health system, the SUS", said Dilma, yesterday night, in national anthem. You can see the full speech of the President:	22/06/2013	3500	1200	1768

Follow live: the mayor Fernando Haddad receives the <i>Passé Livre</i> movement (MPL) in an extraordinary meeting of the City Council to discuss the public transport in São Paulo.	18/06/2013	1100	327	515
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From the nine posts identified in this category, eight made reference to speeches and announcements of President Dilma Rousseff and one of them was related to actions of the mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad. The last on the list was the first to be posted, on June 18th, announcing the live stream of a meeting between the mayor and the City Council to discuss the matter of public transportation.

On June 22nd, a post quoting the pronouncement made by President Dilma Rousseff on national television. On that speech, she drew the general lines of the government’s response to the protests, that later became her proposition of “Five Pacts” on the following topics: fiscal responsibility, education, health, political reform and public transportation. Two of those topics generated more social reactions and also gained more attention in Lula’s Facebook page, as we will see in the next category of posts.

The third post dates as of June 28th and is interesting because it actually denies an article published by the newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo*, as we already explored. The last post of this category is the one that generated most reactions. Posted on September 22nd, it announced the reactivation of President Dilma’s Twitter account, in a joint action with her humoristic profile *Dilma Bolada* – also already mentioned. The re-entrance of the president in social media (she had used it during the 2010 election campaign, but had not posted ever since) may also be seen as an answer to what happened on the streets and the large use social media had among the activists. The post was the second most liked among the posts about the protests, only behind Lula’s first statement.

There were also other four posts about two of the measures announced by President Dilma Rousseff as a response to the protests: the political reform and the *Mais Médicos* program.

Table 5 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page about governmental measures taken in response to the protests

Post Message	Posted	Likes	Comments	Shares
A survey done by Ibope/OAB showed that 85% of the interviewees is in favor of a political reform (read the complete survey here: http://bit.ly/1bccSaW). And you, do you think Brazil needs a political reform? Image: Worker’s Party	13/08/2013	?	?	?
Do you know the propositions of the political reform? People are invited to participate on the decision. Do not stay out of it! Image: Worker’s Party	27/06/2013	3400	389	3086
“The country should understand that we are not trying to replace Brazilians for other doctors, we just want to take doctors to places where there are no Brazilian doctors”, said Lula about the program <i>Mais Médicos</i> , when talking to journalists after a lunch in São Paulo.	05/09/2013	2100	175	966
At the end of his speech yesterday, in Brasília, Lula spoke about public health in Brazil. He highlighted that “it is necessary to take care of the poor people of this country” and that is why President Dilma created the program <i>Mais Médicos</i> . He spoke about the difference in the number of doctors in big capitals, in the peripheries and in the countryside. “These vacancies need to be filled and (...) if Brazilian doctors do not want to work in the <i>sertão</i> , we will bring foreign doctors then” Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	24/07/2013	1200	123	496

Both of the topics were part of the five pacts announced by Rousseff, as a response to the protests, which generated different reactions in the society. The topic of the political reform is a historical claim of the Worker’s Party, which considers that the current Brazilian political system is problematic, but there was not really a consensus on how to do that. The reform announced by President Dilma Rousseff in 2013 included the election of a specific constituent assembly to carry out the political reform. That proposition came from the argument that the congressmen and senators that were already in the National Congress would not be the ideal assembly to do this reform, because they could use it for their own benefit. But as any proposal of political reform has to be first approved in the Parliament, the president actually announced she would send the project to the Congress and work for its approval. The topic appeared on a post as of June 27th. inviting people to get involved in the process of proposing a political reform and again on August 13th, when the Ibope²⁵

²⁵ A Brazilian institute of research on public opinion.

released a pool that showed that 85% of the population approved the idea of a political reform.

The second topic was the *Mais Médicos* program. It consisted in inviting foreign doctors from several countries, but mainly from Cuba, to assume the positions the Brazilian doctors did not want, on the countryside or in the suburbs of large cities. The proposal came from the diagnosis that, although Brazil had a lot of doctors, they were unevenly distributed across the territory, creating extreme inequalities in the access to good quality health services. Areas of difficult access or with high violence rates were identified and disregarded by Brazilian doctors, who refused to fill these positions. Then, the government proposed to bring foreign doctors to occupy these vacancies. At first, the project was very badly received, mainly by medical corporative organizations, with accusations that the program was stealing positions from Brazilian doctors, that it was done to transfer money to the Cuban government and that the medical degree of those doctors was not valid in Brazil. The level of criticism only started to decrease once the doctors actually arrived and started to be very well evaluated by the population. Both of the posts about this topic quoted Lula's speeches defending the program and trying to explain that the objective was not to replace Brazilian doctors, but rather to fill vacancies that would not have been filled otherwise.

So, we can see that there is a dual movement present at this moment. On the one hand, the proximity and support to traditional social movements and the governments of the Worker's Party – locally in São Paulo and nationally – as recognized official sources and representatives of the peoples demands. On the other, the emergence of new voices of both new groups that were on the streets and new actors that were central on social media.

In terms of the relation between social media and the 2013 demonstrations in Lula's communication strategy, we can see that there were also interesting connections. At the same time the protests made it clear that social media had become a central arena of the Brazilian political life, social media exposed a certain view of the protests – different from the one conveyed through mainstream media – presenting new actors as part of the communication arena.

That dynamic brought important changes to my work at the Lula Institute, where social media became a much more central topic on the day-to-day conversations.

3.3 The new possibilities of building a narrative


Along the three and a half years I worked at the Lula Institute, the interest and importance of social media grew progressively, both internally and in the political arena in a more general sense. I remember that an interesting measurement was that the demands for likes and shares on Facebook and Twitter started to grow. At the beginning of the page, in 2012, we did not have many pages to share content from and the decision of liking another page was mostly consensual, since such pages corresponded mainly to official pages from close politicians, parties, institutions and movements. From 2013 on, and especially in 2014, that reality changed. A diversity of people started to ask for actions from the page. The Facebook page had become an important political actor, much more than before.

If that represented a new focus of work – a kind of curatorship of social media content that could be interesting to Lula’s Facebook page –, it also opened new possibilities in terms of working in network. At that moment, many militant pages were created, some with humoristic tones, others dedicated to the compilation of information, or production of memes. That variety of content allowed us to share or repost different kinds of materials and expand beyond the official and rigid discourses.

The 2013 protests were very complex and the use of social media played an important role in the formulation of a discourse about what was going on. As I said, at that moment, Lula – and other actors of the Left – were developing a narrative about the legacy of the 10 years of the Worker’s Party governments, but it was no longer sufficient to explain what was going on in the country. The fact that Lula’s first declaration about the demonstration was made on Facebook cannot be disregarded. Social media had a different timing and the need to say something became urgent sooner.

His first declaration about the protests is the post that generated the most notable reactions among users. In terms of likes, comments and shares, this post, composed only of text – no images, videos or hyperlinks – was the one that gained the most attention. This post was also the one that most affected the growth of the number of followers of the page, as we can see in Table 6.

Table 6 – Number of new likes on Lula’s Facebook Page from June 1st until September 30th 2013



While in that four-month period the average of new likes on the page was of 330 per day, on June 17th, that number jumped to 2624 and continued to grow rapidly, even if at a slower pace, reaching 1417 new likes per day on June 18th. It is important to highlight that these figures correspond to the page’s organic growth.

Even though Lula was not in direct contact with the page and only read a few comments, when someone showed them to him, he always reacted and demanded reactions about that content. He had an intense agenda of meetings where, eventually, there were people that had seen the post on his page or media articles that mentioned them. Opinions about his statement on social media were given to him from several sources.

Yet, the demonstrations changed along time and his formulation about it also evolved. His article published by the New York Times – and replicated on social media – was a second important moment of the elaboration of this discourse, this time in a longer text, following not the temporality of social media, but that of news media. The narrative would also be developed in a diversity of public speeches he did at that time. This use of communicative environments had a dual effect: it publicized a certain point of view of what was going on and, at the same time, helped to produce and improve this same discourse.

During the protests, there were six posts on Lula’s Facebook page regarding the demonstrations specifically, mentioning the protests, the demands and ways to react to it. These posts include his first declaration about the protests, two posts referring to an article

published in the New York Times about the demonstrations, and three speeches mentioning the events.

Table 7 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page regarding the protests specifically

Post Message	Posted	Likes ²⁶	Comments	Shares
<p>Anyone in their right mind can be against demonstrations of civil society, for democracy is not a pact of silence, but society on the move, in the pursuit of new accomplishments.</p> <p>There is no problem without any solution. The only certainty is that the social movement and their demands are not a police case, but rather they should be on the table of negotiation.</p> <p>If I know the mayor Fernando Haddad well, I am confident that he is a man of negotiation. I am sure that among the protesters, most of them are willing to help build a solution for urban transport. Lula</p>	17/6/13	7100	2300	7589
<p>The comment done by Julio Barros was the most liked in the post about Lula’s article regarding the protests that happened in Brazil. Didn’t you see the text? Read it here: http://bit.ly/12VPqck</p>	19/7/13	1600	170	632
<p>In his discourse this morning in Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, Lula also talked about the demonstrations that took place recently in Brazil: “In the past 15 days you saw on TV and read in the newspapers that there was a lot of movement going on in Brazil: demonstrations, protests, etc., and I wanted to tell you that a country should be happy when its people have the freedom to protest. And even happier when people demonstrate and take to the streets saying they want more. (...) President Dilma has had an exceptional behavior. (...) She has been solidary to those that go pacifically to the streets, claiming better conditions for everything that the people have the right to”. #EndHungerAfrica Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula</p>	30/6/13	1500	268	1035
<p>“We have the right to claim for everything that lacks, but we have the obligation to acknowledge everything that we achieved”, Lula, Salvador, July 24th 2013. Image: Jaques Wagner</p>	6/8/13	1200	135	116
<p>“Do people want more? It is our obligation to work so the people have more”, said Lula yesterday, side by side with Nobel Prize winner Leymah Gbowee. Take a look at the video of his full speech:</p>	12/9/13	1100	65	413

²⁶ The number of likes, comments and shares was collected at the moment of this analysis, on February 14th 2019.

The New York Times has just published the article (in English) of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva regarding the recent demonstrations that occurred in Brazil. The full article in Portuguese will be available at the Lula's Institute website on Thursday (18).	16/7/13	759	89	311
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The two posts about the article named “The message of Brazil’s Youth”, published by the former president on July 16th 2013 in The New York Times, had different impacts. The first post was done on the day of the publication of the article, mentioning the text directly, with a hyperlink, but obtained only 759 likes, the lowest rate among the posts related to the protests. Three days later, the topic reappears, quoting a comment done by a Facebook user and inviting people to see the article. This time the post gained more attention, reaching 1600 likes.

The three speeches in which Lula mentions the protests were done on June 30th, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 6th in Salvador, in the Northeast region of Brazil, and on September 12th, in São Paulo, at an event with Nobel Prize winner Leymah Gbowee. All these posts got similar attention from the public.

Since the first declaration, in June 17th, until his speech in São Paulo, on September 12th, we can see his position about the protests evolved, but maintained the same direction. Lula tried to picture the demonstrations positively, showing they were a normal and healthy proof that Brazil had a powerful democracy. But he also tried to show them as a logical consequence of a period of achievements during the Worker’s Party governments. In Addis Ababa, he said “a country should be happy when its people have the freedom to protest. And even happier when people demonstrate and take to the streets saying they want more”, while in São Paulo he added: “Do people want more? It is our obligation to work so the people have more”. In Salvador, he highlighted the need of new accomplishments but demanded recognition for what had already been done: “We have the right to claim everything that lacks, but we have the obligation to acknowledge all that was achieved”.

Yet, the 2013 protests significantly changed with time, as we saw in section 1.3. As the demonstrations were farther from their original demands and actors, increasingly becoming a movement against the Worker’s Party government and the Brazilian political system, the topic also became less visible on Lula’s Facebook page. The increasing polarization would reflect on the page and in public discourse in the following years (2014 and 2015).

Along the three and a half years that I worked in the Lula Institute, I could see and participate in the growing importance of social media in the communication strategy and day-to-day activities. That action may not be analyzed as an isolated element, but the use of social media certainly contributed to his capability to speak to citizens, avoiding the frequently unfavorable frames of mainstream media. In many cases, that communication often reached a public that was already identified with his ideas, but it did also become a central and wider space of interaction. At the same time, the use of these media also provoked coverage of mainstream media about his declarations posted online, showing that they were not limited to that space. The 2013 demonstrations were an essential element to push further the use of this new communicative ambience, encouraging the search for innovation in the use and even more integration in the communication routine.

Even if all these elements and perceptions were not systematized in my mind at the moment of the 2013 protests, today it is very clear to me how this experience contributed not only to my interest in the topic, but also to my analysis of the events.

The years of work as social media editor allowed me to follow closely the different interfaces between politics and digital communications at an important moment of change, when new opportunities were presented and explored. The resistance and difficulties of incorporating the digital communications tools, a process constantly negotiated with communications and political actors, were also important elements in the comprehension of the phenomenon of the 2013 Brazilian protests. It contributed to my vision of it as a complex outburst in the middle of a much bigger changing environment, a turning point that somehow gave a more concrete form to these changes.

Even if my work experience was mostly centered on the Facebook platform, I chose to work with Twitter in this dissertation. Many reasons account for that choice, most of them already explained (in section 2.1). This brief description of President Lula's Facebook activity was only made possible because, as former manager of the page, I kept the platform's data and asked for authorization to use it for scientific purposes. Otherwise, even though most of the data is publicly available (since his Facebook page is public), the access to it would have been much more difficult. The choice to work with the Twitter platform in this dissertation, in addition to allowing access to much more data, has specific conversational dynamics that are suitable to follow protest events.

My research path in this dissertation is then strongly guided by this personal experience. In parallel to my professional experience as social media editor at the Lula Institute, my academic path also led me to the problematic of the changing communication environment. At the end of my bachelor's degree in Journalism, I developed a dissertation entitled "Visibility sphere and unmediated communication: an analysis of the *Fatos e Dados* blog", where I analyzed the strategies of the Brazilian public company Petrobras in its direct communication with citizens through a corporate blog and its dialog with the mainstream media. My studies on the interaction of politics and digital communication continued on during my master, resulting on the dissertation "Visibility dynamics and social media: new democratic possibilities?" that analyzed the Twitter conversation regarding three controversial topics judged by the Brazilian Supreme Court. These works were produced while I was a member of the Center of Advanced Studies in Digital Democracy, which was a crucial place to my academic formation on the topic.

The general questions that articulate this work, such as the relationship between citizens and mainstream media established through social media; the possibilities of social media uses as alternative media; the democratic meanings of the disintermediation processes between citizens and protests and political leaders and audiences; and the emergence of new actors that influence public debate through social media, all came from provocative elements of my previous experience.

Even if my personal trajectory does impregnate this work, from here forward I assume another position in relation to the research subject. Pervaded by this experience, I assume the role of a more distant and analytical observer and researcher, not an actor in the center of the events I will be analyzing. That is both a scientific choice and a reflex of the facts, since I did not participate directly on the protests, nor on the streets or on social networks. The next parts of this dissertation will be guided by this point of view.

4. From the actor's discourse to tweet analysis: our methodological approach

Our analysis of the 2013 Brazilian protests is based on a mixed method choice. As already mentioned, we did 23 interviews with different actors involved in the mobilizations and, in parallel, we worked with a Twitter dataset of 97 thousand tweets about the riots.

This choice to mix interviews and the analysis of social media data was an attempt to avoid a problem pointed out by many scholars (Couldry, 2009; Chadwick, 2013; Rodríguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014; Mattoni & Treré, 2015): that of the analysis of social media as an isolated element, without properly considering their attachments to social and political reality and also to other actors of the communication system. By choosing to directly talk to some of the actors involved in the mobilizations, we hoped not only to add to our analysis elements that do not appear in the exclusive analysis of social media data, but also to give sense to the large amount of data from Twitter.

In an era where a great part of human interactions leaves traces and can be, somehow, quantified (Papacharissi, 2018) and when the study of huge amounts of that data becomes possible (Felt, 2016), it is necessary to give sense to such analysis. We do not believe that data speaks for itself as neutral representations of reality. Instead, we understand data as a product of certain social and technological processes (Felt, 2016) that gain sense not by their existence in itself, but rather by how they are used. In that sense, the discourse of the actors become a fundamental source of information, both to be able to better interpret the quantitative analysis of social media data, and to properly produce their qualitative analysis.

In the next two sections, we will explain the details of the analysis we carried out.

4.1 The actor's narrative

The first part of our research on the social media use in the 2013 Brazilian protests were 23 semi-structured in-depth interviews with actors that participated in the event. Based on the conceptualization done by Dahlgren (2009) about media logic being co-created by media,

publics and political actors, we decided to interview three kinds of actors: activists – characterized as those taking to the streets or on the digital networks related to the organization, mobilization or personal coverage of protests -, journalists – that worked in the coverage of the protests for major news media -, and communication advisors to governments – people that played the role of putting in place communication strategies to deal with the protests from the institutional political system point of view, both on local and national level.

These actors were chosen in order to have different points of view about the role of social media and the new dynamics of the communication system at that moment. While activists produced narratives about phenomena from within the movement, with different degrees of relation to the organized social movements and new collectives that emerged, journalists had the role of trying to precisely report a movement that defied the traditional journalistic routine: there were no evident leaders to interview, no press advisors to contact for statements, no speeches during the protests. On their side, communication advisors to the local and national governments, that had recently created or were creating their social media presence, had their own challenges on how to act about the movement, how to establish a dialog and know which effective measures to take.

The interviewees were initially chosen according to two criteria: the most known organizations that were involved in the protests (specially used for the communication advisors, journalists and to some of the more institutional activists) and activists that were not related to formal organizations, chosen among our own social network. From initial interviews, the snowball strategy was used, which consisted in a form of purposeful sampling in qualitative research, asking participants to recommend other individuals to take part in the study (Creswell, 2004).

Our interviews do not have the aim of being representative of the whole movement. They were used to deepen our understanding of the events, as well as to identify the main issues that were at stake when it comes to the crossroad of social media and protest movement. The interviews were the first step of our field work, so they served as guidance for the posterior work with Twitter data.

The interviews were centered in the city of São Paulo, although some journalists and political advisors worked with the national scenario. São Paulo was chosen for several reasons: it is

the biggest Brazilian city in terms of population and territory; it was one of the cities, along with Rio de Janeiro, where the protests were most active; it is one of the cities that register a higher use of social media; and it was the city where we lived during the protests, thus where there was most familiarity with the events and actors.

That strategy resulted in 37 names that were contacted and 23 interviews that were actually done²⁷. They were conducted either in person or via teleconference, from January 2016 to July 2017. Only one interviewee chose not to be identified in our study, but all interviews were audio recorded.

Each interview started with a very general question about the personal engagement of the interviewee in protests and followed three sets of questions. First about their view on the movement's general setting, approaching topics like leadership, collaboration and dispute between groups, demands and organizational strategies. The second set was focused on the communication strategies and aimed at knowing the platforms they used and for what purpose, the internal organization and decision-making process regarding communication issues, changes and difficulties faced with the adoption of different communication strategies and their assessment of Brazilian mainstream media. The last part was intended to understand their views on the consequences of the 2013 protests, both in institutional and social realities of the country. Each interview ended with personal questions (name, age and affiliation), a request for authorization to identify the person by name and a demand if the person had other people he or she thought it would be interesting for us to interview.

Our sampling for the interviews has a clear bias towards the activists and movement closer to the left wing and the governments of the Worker's Party. That bias comes as a consequence of two elements: one related to the protests itself and another related to the author. The first one is the constitution of the movement of 2013 in itself, since it was triggered by an autonomous movement (the *Movimento Passe Livre* – Free Fare Movement) and spread initially among the left, even though the right wing gained importance once protests grew. The second is the fact that our social network is much more based on people from the left than from the right wing. As a part of the sampling started from that network, the result is not representative of the whole movement, and nor was that the idea. Only one

²⁷ For the full list of interviews see Appendix 1

of the interviewees can be identified as right wing, although she identifies herself as “not from the left nor from the right”.

4.2 Twitter’s data

In regard to social media data, we worked with a corpus of tweets. We chose to work with Twitter data for several reasons. The first is the history of the platform on the coverage of political outbursts (Segeberg and Bennett, 2011; Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013; Rogers, 2014). Along time, Twitter emerged as the preferential platform of instantaneous information on social, political and environmental events, as discussed in section 2.1. Although Twitter does not inform regularly its number of users, a research from the French company SemioCast²⁸ revealed that, in July 2012, 41,2 million Twitter accounts were geolocated in Brazil (SemioCast, 2012). That number put the country in the second position of countries using the platform, only behind the United States, that had, at the time, 141,8 million accounts.

That number shows the platform had significant use in the country, considering that the Brazilian population, in July 2012 (one year before the data collection we work with) was estimated in 194 million people (IBGE, 2012). The research also shows that Brazil had an important growing rate of Twitter profiles at the time, what suggests that the number was even bigger in June 2013, although we do not have the precise data.

But considerations need to be done about that number. The first one is that we cannot assume that 41 million users correspond to the same quantity of users. We have to consider that one person can have more than one account and that there may be fake or fictional accounts. Furthermore, there is an expressive number of inactive accounts. At that time, Brazil was responsible for 8% of the Twitter users but only 6,6% of all public tweets, which account for a difference between profiles created and their real use.

It is also important to highlight that the use of the platform is not homogeneous in the whole country. According to the SemioCast report, two Brazilian cities appeared on the top 20

²⁸ In its website, the company describes itself as “The Social Media Intelligence Company”. About the methodology used, the report explains that “rawing from its experience with previous studies, SemioCast used its proprietary platform, databases and tools to process user profiles in order to determine the location of each user using all available information: free-form location declared in user profile, time zone, language used to post tweets and GPS coordinates for the very few concerned tweets.” (SemioCast, 2012)

ranking list of the most active cities in the world: São Paulo in 4th position and Rio de Janeiro in the 16th position. However, the geographical disparity is not the only issue. Although there is no systematic data about the profile of Twitter users in Brazil, they are usually described as concentrated in urban areas among the wealthiest, most educated and younger Brazilians.

The second reason that led us to choose Twitter is the availability of the data. Although every Twitter user may decide to keep his tweets private, the default mode of the platform is to make them public (Medeiros, 2016). More than that, the Twitter API is the most accessible to researchers when compared to any other social networks. At the moment of the 2013 protests, Facebook and Twitter were the most used social media in Brazil, but the data of the first was hardly collectable.

The methodology of the Twitter data analysis we produced consisted of four steps: the collection of data, also known as data mining; the processing of the data, which consists of the creation of filters and categorizations; the creation of graphic visualizations to present the data; and, finally, the analysis and interpretation (Medeiros, 2016). In our case, we did both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The Twitter dataset we worked with in this dissertation was collected by the Laboratory of Studies on Image and Cyberculture of the Federal University of Espírito Santo (Labic-UFES²⁹). They extracted the data from Twitter using yourTwapperKeeper (O'Brien III, 2012), that is an open-source tool that tracks any term or keyword on Twitter activity (Bruns and Liang, 2012). It is possible to capture multiple searches simultaneously and the collection of tweets starts from the moment of insertion of the search.

Created by John O'Brien III, yourTwapperKeeper (yTK) is an open-source solution that offers functionalities compatible with its similar and previous version: the TwapperKeeper. This last one was sold to the company Hootsuite. The difference is that to use yTK, a server must be maintained running 24 hours a day for a comprehensive capture of datasets (Bruns, 2012).

²⁹ Once more, we would like to thank the Labic, and specially its coordinator, Fabio Malini, for his generosity in making the data available to us and helping in some of the analysis.

The tool works with two of the public Twitter APIs: Search API and Streaming API, as a form of redundancy. In that way, streaming is used for real-time collection and the search when there is some bottleneck preventing collection via the previous API (Medeiros, 2016).

Our dataset was built around the hashtag #vemprarua, one of the most active during the protests. This hashtag means “come to the streets” and was largely used as a call for participation on the protests. The term used to collect the data was “vemprarua”. The non-utilization of the character ‘#’ allows the broadening of the collection of data. Another strategy to capture a more complete dataset is that the search is not case sensitive, that means that even if the words are written with capital letters, they are captured. Words written with graphic accent were also included. This search resulted on a corpus of 97.707 tweets, collected between July 1st and September 30th 2013.

The collection was done by yTK through the collection algorithm of Labic, which return the following information on the tweets:

- The text of the tweet: the whole message written by the user;
- Recipient’s ID (in case of replies): in case of tweets sent directly to a user, he is identified through his ID (a number that identifies the user on the social network platform);
- Author of the tweet: the name of the Twitter profile that sent the message;
- Tweet ID: the identification number of the message;
- Sender’s ID: ID of the user that sent the tweet;
- Language used on the account: information about which language the account that sent the tweet uses in its profile. It is not the language used on the tweet, but rather on the social network platform (Medeiros, 2016);
- Source: reveals what was the device used by the user to post the message (web, third party online apps, app for iphone, app for android, etc).
- Web address of the profile image of the author: a link to the profile image used by the user that sent the message;
- Geolocation: informs if the tweet hashes metadata that indicates from where it was sent. If there is no information, the two next fields are blank;
- Latitude: the number that indicates the latitude from where the tweet was sent;

- Longitude: the number that indicates the longitude from where the tweet was sent;
- Date and time of creation: exact time references from when the tweet was posted.
Ex: Wed Nov 27 01:12:34 +0000 2013.
- Timestamp: it is the number of seconds that have passed since January 1, 1970 at 00:00:00 until the date indicated. This number is used to standardize the dates and facilitate their handling at the time of processing (Medeiros, 2016).

Table 8 shows an example of 10 tweets from our corpus with its respective metadata.

Table 8 – Example of tweets on the dataset

text	to_user_id	from_user	id	from_user
Precisamos de vcs , UNIVERSITÁRIOS E ALUNOS DO ENSINO MÃ%O DIO ! #vemprarua Nas empresas nÃ£o podemos juntar tantas pessoas !		dgigialira	3,53E+17	1,61E+08
Um depoimento fresquinho de mais violÃªncia por parte da ditadura de Sergio Cabral. #vemprarua #ocupacabral... http://t.co/t90rMf9qAb		fimdacorrupcao_	3,53E+17	4,88E+08
O painel do #vemprarua Ã© horizontal como os movimentos! #youpix Dilma Bolada, Marcha das Vadias, VemÃ©! http://t.co/gaeegORyZq		andersoncosta	3,54E+17	1,63E+08
ResoluÃ§Ã£o do PT cobra mudanÃ§as no governo http://t.co/7TV6UUxmc via @folha_com		vemprarua	3,59E+17	1,48E+09
RT @rafinhabastos: 3h. 8 graus. #VempraRua		rai_torres	3,60E+17	56521686
@darthvanner Causando toda essa Revolta #vemprarua	38878620	caarmo94	3,71E+17	60189065
RT @igorhalfen: #LauraBastos #RumoAos33Mil #VemPraRua		zudlaura	3,72E+17	1,5E+08
RT @MensalaoNao: Vamos TODOS digerir esse tapa na cara, por enquanto... Depois, vamos dar o troco, certo? #AbramOvoto #VemPraRua		lucinhasou	3,73E+17	3,02E+08
RT @JornalOGlobo: #VempraRua mas #semviolencia: de rosto coberto, Caetano pede protestos pacÃ-ficos. http://t.co/CoYySjU0rR		edsoeli	3,76E+17	4,5E+08
NÃ£o pode usar MÃscara? Vamos pintar a cara! #OperacaoSeteDeSetembro #VempraRua		jessicaa fb	3,76E+17	6,36E+08

iso_language_code	source	profile_image_url	geo_type	geo_coordin	geo_coordina	created_at	time
pt	web	http://a0.twimg.com/ir	-	0	0	Thu Jul 04 02:32:34 +0000 2013	1372905154
pt	<a href=""	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Fri Jul 05 04:00:59 +0000 2013	1372996859
pt	"<a href=""	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Sat Jul 06 14:45:50 +0000 2013	1373121950
pt	"<a href=""	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Mon Jul 22 11:44:12 +0000 2013	1374493452
pt	web	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Thu Jul 25 05:52:37 +0000 2013	1374731557
pt	web	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Fri Aug 23 21:25:09 +0000 2013	1377293109
in	web	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Tue Aug 27 00:20:57 +0000 2013	1377562857
pt	web	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Thu Aug 29 04:13:05 +0000 2013	1377749585
pt	web	http://a0.twimg.com/p	-	0	0	Fri Sep 06 22:23:58 +0000 2013	1378506238
pt	<a href=""	http://a0.twimg.com/p	Point	-32.802.986	-601.853.536	Sat Sep 07 13:48:58 +0000 2013	1378561738

The second step of the analysis starts with the processing of the collected data. The dataset created via yTK was run through the script called "parse-tweets", created by LABIC. This script generates some initial measures to be used in a more precise analysis of the data. The result contains the following files (in .csv or .txt format):

- Dates.csv: number of tweets per day;
- Hashtags.csv: number of distinct users that use certain hashtags;
- Hashtags_without_accents.csv: same as the previous one, but without the hashtags that contain graphic accents;
- Hashtags_network.csv: table that indicates the co-occurrence of hashtags, that is to say, those that appear in a same tweet;
- Hashtags_network_without_accents.csv: same as the previous one, but without the hashtags that contain graphic accents;
- Locations.csv: geolocation of the tweets (very limited due to the very small use of the geolocation function of Twitter);
- Mentions.csv: the most mentioned users in the dataset;
- Top_tweets.csv: the most retweeted messages on the dataset;
- Top_urls.csv: the most mentioned urls on the dataset;
- Top_words.csv: list of the most mentioned words and the number of times it appeared;
- Tweets_with_links.csv: list of tweets containing links;
- Tweets_without_RTs.csv: list of tweets that are not retweets (original messages);
- Users_activity.csv: list of users ordered by number of tweets sent on the dataset;
- Users_by_date.csv: number of users that tweeted in each day of the dataset;
- Words_per_period.csv: top 10 most mentioned words of the dataset and the number of occurrences in each day of the dataset;
- Top_words_wordle.txt: text file containing the one hundred most mentioned words on the dataset. It may be used to create a word cloud.

Based on these initial settings, we manually approached and treated the data. Firstly, we perceived there was some kind of error in the capture of certain tweets. That resulted in some tweets been registered only partially (incomplete or absence of text or metadata). We decided

to exclude all the tweets that were not correctly captured to preserve the pattern of the dataset. The clean dataset accounted for 85,963 tweets.

Some characters were also affected on the data collection. All special characters (ã, á, à, â, é, ê, í, ó, õ, ô, ú, ç) were distorted. These changes did not bring prejudice to the comprehension of the texts but they had to be taken into account in all the sub analysis done in the dissertation. These initial manipulations of the data made them ready for the different data analysis we present in the dissertation.

On Chapter 5, we created a sub-corpus of tweets, selecting all those that mentioned the mainstream media outlets we decided to analyze. The formation of this dataset was done by using the Excel filter tool, which allows us to identify tweets that contain certain words. The selected tweets were extracted from the general corpus in order to create a separated one. The search was done using multiple written forms of the media outlets names we are working with, in order to consider eventual misspellings. Names that contained special characters that were distorted in the tweet capture (as explained previously) were also taken into account. We then proceeded a content analysis of these tweets, categorizing them according to several different elements we identified as useful for our analysis.

On Chapter 7, we worked directly with two of the files created by the “parse-tweet” script: the top tweets and the top urls. From these two initial listings, we selected all tweets that appeared at least ten times (the messages that had at least ten retweets and the links that were shared at least ten times) and used them as the base for a classification of users, and a source and content analysis.

In terms of data visualization, we mainly used tables and charts to present our analysis. According to the different analysis that interest us and the available data, we chose the more adequate format to present each data. Data visualizations were primarily generated directly in the .csv file of the data and then adequate to better fit in the text.

The analysis of the data is based on the research problems previously presented and further discussed in each chapter. Specificities of each data manipulation will also be explained along the dissertation. Each data visualization will be followed by the discussion of its results, trying to situate them in the more general Brazilian political scenario and also on the bigger picture of the research field on the topic.

We will briefly present general metrics and characteristics of our Twitter data in order to allow a more direct analysis of our main issues in the next chapters of the dissertation.


4.2.1 An overview of Twitter data

Before going directly into the more specific analysis, we will take a general look at the whole database of tweets, collected between July 1st and September 30th 2013, in connection with the hashtag #vemprarua.

A first important point to highlight is the temporality. The national demonstrations of 2013 started on June 6th and attained their peak on June 20th, with more than a million people on the streets (more complete chronology of the protests was done in section 1.4). But the data we work with were collected between July 1st and September 30th 2013³⁰. That period comprises the third moment of the protests (that remained active until the middle/end of July, with different dates in each city), then a moment of latency, where the reactions to the wave of demonstrations were still being processed, to finally regain force in September. That last moment is due to the national Brazilian commemoration of September 7th, the Brazilian independence day. The date was used by some groups present in the in the demonstrations, which called for big protests on the occasion. Those demonstrations had a very different genesis, focusing on general critics to the government and the political system in general, presenting national symbols (such as the national flag and the t-shirt of the national football team), but they continued building on slogans, symbols and meanings present in previous protests. That is why the hashtag our corpus is based on continues active also during these protests. We can see that the most active months of our data are September and July. August was the least active month.

Table 9 – Total tweets per month

³⁰ As the data was not collected by us and we had no way of doing so, we worked with the period that was available. Although the collection of tweets during the peak of the protests would have seemed as the most obvious choice, we also consider that the changes in the movement from the second to its third phase (see section 1.4) also make the analysis of the period from July to September very fruitful in understanding the contours the movement gained.




The number of tweets per month are also accompanied by the number of users that participated in the conversation per day, in each month. In average, 746 users tweeted with #vemprarua hashtag in each day of July, while in August that number decreased to 344. As in the total number of tweets, the numbers regained strength in September, where the average of active users per day was of 635.

To understand the relationship between the protests and the online conversation during the period of analysis, we will look closely to the peaks of each month. We tried to identify the reasons behind each peak, both searching for news about what happened on that day and by doing a general content analysis of the tweets on the peak days. As the volume of tweets was large to a manual content analysis, we mix the content analysis of some tweets with the analysis of the most mentioned words to try to identify the main topics of the peaks.

In July, we can see that there is a concentration of posts in the beginning of the month. That can be explained by the protest activity in the streets that was still very intense in the whole country. The biggest peak of the month occurs on July 2nd, a day with a lot of political events related to the protests.

Table 10 – Timeline of tweets in July



A truck driver's strike stopped the traffic in 39 roads³¹ in the country, causing major problems to the circulation of people and products³². It was also the day when the mayor of Porto Alegre (a major city in the southern region of the country) revoked the increase in the public transportation price. On that same day, protests against TV Globo were organized in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, but did not have major success³³.

Considering that the peaks of July 1st, 3rd and 4th were rebounds of the same events, we pass to the peak of July 17th. The high number of tweets on that date can be explained by a protest that took place in the neighborhood of Leblon³⁴, in Rio de Janeiro, in front of the apartment of the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral. The protest started peacefully, but ended in confrontation between the activists and the police. 15 protesters were arrested.

Different from the two previously analyzed peaks, the conversation on July 25th was not related to a protest that was taking place at that day. It can rather be explained by two information disclosed by the media that day. The first one was a survey that showed that 89% of the population approved the protests³⁵ that were taking place and the second was the

³¹ <https://noticias.r7.com/cidades/rodovias-federais-tem-bloqueios-em-39-trechos-apos-36-horas-de-protestos-de-caminhoneiros-02072013>

³² It is important to remember that the transportation of products in Brazil heavily relies on the road system, since railway, maritime and river transportation systems are not very developed.


³³ <http://www.jb.com.br/rio/noticias/2013/07/03/ta-nas-redes-protestos-contra-a-tv-globo-no-rio-e-em-sp-tem-baixa-adesao/>

³⁴ <http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/07/protesto-no-leblon-rio-comeca-pacifico-e-termina-com-confusao.html>

³⁵ <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2013/07/pesquisa-ibope-aponta-que-89-da-populacao-aprova-manifestacoes.html>

video that showed that a protester that had been arrested (Bruno) did not have a Molotov cocktail in his possession at the moment he was accused of throwing it against the police³⁶.

Table 11 – Timeline of tweets in August



In August, we highlight three peaks of conversation: the 1st, the 14th and the 29th.

For the first one, the explanation is multiple. On the news, we identified a protest that took place in São Paulo, calling the attention to the disappearance of the construction worker Amarildo de Souza³⁷. Although it was a small demonstration (around 300 people), this issue generated conversation on Twitter. We found 24 original tweets on our collection mentioning his name. Amarildo was taken to a police station in his neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro³⁸ and simply disappeared after that. Protests demanding explanations from the authorities arose in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, especially because the issue of the police force was already on the order of the day after the repression of the protests in June. In São Paulo, the protest of August 1st was the third about this issue. Two previous protests ended in confrontation between the activists and the police. “Brazil wants to know #whereisamarildo³⁹”, says one of the tweets done that day, as a way to put pressure on both political and police authorities for explanations.

³⁶ <http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/07/video-mostra-bruno-sem-bomba-na-hora-em-que-coquetel-e-lancado.html>

³⁷ <https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/protesto-em-sao-paulo-chega-a-avenida-paulista/>

³⁸ Amarildo de Souza used to live in the *favela* of Rocinha, in Rio de Janeiro, and was taken to the UPP (Unity of Pacifying Police), a special police unity created in the context of a national program intended to face violence in local communities in Rio de Janeiro.

³⁹ Original tweet: Brasil quer saber #cadeoamarildo #VempraRua RT ""Onde está Amarildo? Uma pergunta ainda sem resposta <http://t.co/TvbHseG5xN>"" Via @Ancelmocom

Even though this issue seems to be the most relevant related to the protests, the word count shows that along with general words in clear relation with the movement (such as “vemprarua”, “ogiganteacordou”, “acordou”) the words “Justin” and “Bieber” appear 259 and 152 times respectively, on August 1st. The reference to the Canadian singer Justin Bieber on that day is due to his appearance, in New York, with a V for vendetta mask. The mask was used during the Brazilian protests, especially by groups related to the Anonymous, but the singer’s appearance had no direct relation with that.

As for the peak on August 14th, it is related to another protest that took place in São Paulo. It was the demonstration that marked the return of the MPL movement to the streets. It is important to remember that the *Movimento Passe Livre* - MPL (Free Fare Movement) was responsible for calling the first mobilizations against the increase of the price of transportation, in June. But after their demand was fulfilled, they withdrew from the convocation, saying the other issues that were incorporated in protests were not at the center of that movement. But on August 14th they called for another protest after the denunciation of the deviation of 400 million *reais* (Brazilian currency) in contracts entered into by previous administrations of the city of São Paulo for the construction of subway lines. The objective was to deliver a letter from the movement and the subway union to the president of the City Council⁴⁰, but a small group of activists tried to break into the town hall building, causing major confrontation with the guards⁴¹. That same day, another protest was organized by the *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* – CUT (Unified Worker’s Union) in front of the state assembly, trying to force deputies to open an investigation related to corruption in metro contract, but this time done by the state government and not the local one.

August 30th was marked by the National Day of Manifestation and Struggle, called by trade union centrals. In this case, the peak of conversation happened not the day of the protest itself, but on the eve, when the call was taking place. A bus strike was also going to take place, but was banned by the justice. The protest of the trade unions took place in various


⁴⁰ <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/201cvamos-as-ruas-no-dia-14-de-agosto201d-diz-mpl-9447.html>

⁴¹ <http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/politica/2013-08-14/protesto-em-sao-paulo-termina-com-confronto-depredacao-presos-e-feridos.html>

cities of the country and demanded, among other things, the reduction of the weekly working journey to 40 hours and a change in the social security system⁴².

On this peak, for the first time, a word directly related to the political system appears among the ten most mentioned words. The word “deputados” (deputies) was mentioned 63 times that day. This might show that, as this protest was organized by more traditional political actors (the trade unions), the reference to the political system was more direct, differing from other protests, where the demands were more diffused.

Table 12 – Timeline of tweets in September



In September, the rhythm of protests had already decreased significantly, but we see an increase in the conversation, if compared to August. That is due to the mobilization in connection with the 7th of September, the Brazilian Independence Day. That holiday is traditionally marked by protests localized in some cities, but it is not a general practice in the country. In 2013, there was a new element, as the group Anonymous convoked protests in 149 Brazilian cities⁴³ to give sequence to the demands that appeared in the streets in June. At the eve of the protests (on September 6th) the Anonymous group hacked the page of the PMDB political party and posted a video where they made critics to the police, to President Dilma Rousseff, who had banned the use of masks on the protests, and to the governor of

⁴² <http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/brasil/sp/2013-08-30/liminar-da-justica-impediu-paralisacao-dos-onibus-em-sao-paulo.html>

⁴³ <https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2013/09/07/sete-de-setembro-tera-protostos-em-todas-as-capitais-e-cerco-a-mascarados.htm>

Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral, responsible for the arrest Black Block's Facebook page administrators⁴⁴. It was the third hack they did on the PMDB website that month.

On September 7th itself, the protests that had hundreds of thousands of confirmations on Facebook events showed to have a much lower physical presence. They did happen, but were not so significant in terms of number of participants⁴⁵.

This general overview of the temporality of the tweets shows that peaks of conversation on our corpus were either caused by different kind of protests – mostly related to public transportation, police violence and corruption scandals -, or by events inside the communication system itself (news, opinion pools, hackings). Regarding external events, there is no substantial difference from the communication dynamics that existed before social media. It works similarly as the news coverage of a newspaper or a television channel as the attention becomes more intense when the event approaches and losses interest when it passes.

The dynamics of the events created inside the system is, in some aspects, different. It is commonly just a communication action that triggers the conversation. That means that it is the communication system itself that generates the peak drawing attention to issues that emerge within its boundaries. That is the case of the peaks of July 25th and September 6th. The first had as one of the causes the release of a video, while the second was caused by the hacking of a website. This is not a new phenomenon in itself (a TV show, for example, could trigger a coverage on a newspaper), but the fact that there is a broader number of actors on social media means that the power to try to create these facts is spread.

This dynamic shows us that communication actions have an important impact on the conversation around political events, not only when associated with traditional forms of activism, but also that new dynamics started emerging from this new arrangement of the communication system. The interaction between different actors is also able to create communication facts that may impact political ones. This finding seems to corroborate the

⁴⁴ <https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2013/09/06/na-vespera-de-protestos-anonymous-invade-site-do-pmdb-critica-veto-a-mascarados-e-cobra-dilma.htm>

⁴⁵ <https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/politica/dilma-lidera-desfile-de-7-de-setembro-em-meio-a-protestos-timidos,1a00489e9a3f0410VgnCLD2000000dc6eb0aRCRD.html>

premises of the hybrid media system presented by Chadwick (2013), where ‘interdependence’ is one of the main elements.

This initial description of the data we are working with has the sole goal of presenting their general characteristics, establishing a base for the analysis that will be done on the next chapters. That base having been set, we will now dive into the core of our argument, where the main issues of our analysis are, starting by the way mainstream media was pictured by the actors and presented on Twitter discourses during the 2013 Brazilian protests.

5. Mediactivist practices in a hybrid media system

As explored in the first part of this dissertation, the massive use of social media is the key aspect of the 2013 protests that interests us. The use of this media cannot, however, be seen as isolated or homogeneous. That is why we decided to dedicate attention to the fact that the criticism to Brazilian mainstream media became an important issue during the 2013 protests. Posters against these media could be seen on the streets, protests were organized in front of the major Brazilian television channel headquarters and journalists were prevented from doing the coverage of the demonstrations.

In that context, we were confronted with the question that the use of social media was not only a new element in the communication system, but it also provoked the displacement of other actors. Using social media is not only about people being able to express their ideas and opinions for themselves, but also about using it to reflect, construct discourses and express themselves as to the communication system. This perception is in accordance with the concept of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) previously presented and to a diversity of alerts done by scholars on the need to consider the action on social media as a part of a broader communication environment (Couldry, 2009; Rodríguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014; Mattoni & Treré, 2015).

We decided then to approach this issue through the prism of the concept of mediactivism (Cardon & Granjon, 2010). Understanding that it constitutes a particular form of activism, that targets the communication system, we believe the use of this concept may shed light on important elements of the phenomenon. This theoretical background will then be explored in a two-step analysis of our corpus of interviews and tweets.

We start by exploring the actor's discourse about the communication system. Our aim is to establish what they think is new, not only on the use of social media, but rather in the changes and differences it may bring to the communication system. Once we have understood the actor's posture towards the new communicative possibilities, we will explore how the issue is expressed in our Twitter data. Our goal is to understand in which context and with what

intentions traditional Brazilian media was mentioned in the Twitter conversation about the protests.

5.1 Mediactivism as a democratic struggle

Mediactivism is a concept proposed by Dominique Cardon and Fabien Granjon (2010) based on the idea that “the production, dissemination and control of information is at the heart of all social movements” (p.8). That premise is not new and had already been presented by a number of authors, such as Patrick Champagne (1984), to whom demonstrations do not exist in an objective manner. They are mostly known by their image that circulates in the social environment. Around the construction of that image, there is a battle between protesters and journalists, according to him. “We could almost say, without pushing the expression, that the real place where the demonstrations happen (...) is not on the street, a simple apparent place, but on the press (in the broad sense)” (p. 28).

What is new in the concept proposed by Cardon and Granjon (2010) is that it addresses not only the action of activists towards the media regarding the movement in which they participate, but rather towards the whole organization of the communication system. The authors will conceptualize mediactivism as follows: “We will name by the expression ‘informational mobilizations’ or by its neologism ‘mediactivism’ the progressive social mobilizations that orient their actions towards the criticism on the dominant media and/or the implementation of alternative devices of information production” (p.8).

We can extract some interesting aspects from that concept. The first one is that the authors identify critics to the dominant media system by progressive movements, attaching a certain practice to a specific political position. The second one is that they identify two kinds of practices that could materialize this perception of media. The first one is the criticism itself and the second would be the proposal of new tools able to change the scenario.

Regarding the first characteristic of mediactivism, the authors do recognize that the criticism of the media system is also a practice of right-wing groups, but they argue that the topic would need a specific approach, what would explain their exclusion from the scope of mediactivism. The authors do not deepen this discussion on what those differences would be, so it seems complicated to draw this line. We also have to consider that the terms

“progressive” and “right-wing” may gain different nuances depending on national contexts, but the core of our critic is that we are not able to identify what the differences would be on the media critics in both cases.

In regards to the second characteristic, the mediactivist practice would take place based on two different orientations. The “counter-hegemonic” orientation has as Marxist influence and denounces the monopoly of information production by very concentrated economic groups. This orientation identifies the malfunction of the media system with its ownership and calls for the creation of a counter-power. This criticism here is much more centered on the structure and regulation behind the system than on the praxis of the production of news. That means that requirements such as “accuracy and maximum distancing” (Cardon and Granjon, 2010, p.18) are not questioned.

On the other hand, the “expressivist” orientation denounces the reduction of media coverage by dominant actors. This orientation claims the enlargement of the space of expression to a diversity of social groups. Here, “the production of information is seen as an emancipatory instrument” (Cardon and Granjon, 2010, p.18). So, the solution to a more democratic media system goes through a more participative view, based on the experimentation and appropriation of the production of information. That could lead to the formation of a new public opinion. The requirement of objectivity is not a goal to be achieved.

It is also important to highlight that the authors base their concept of the mediactivist practice on the notion of alternative media. To them, it is through these alternative media⁴⁶ that the critics to communication system may take place. To explore that relationship, Cardon and Granjon (2010) will rebuilt a history of popular media and community media in order to discuss the different roles they played in different moments of History. In their historical analysis, they try to identify how the role of the media was seen by activists in each specific context. Among the different roles that they identify, the one thing in common is that they are always represented as some kind of alternative to the mainstream media system.

To Cardon and Granjon, this mediactivism practices gain another meaning in the internet era, where the right to produce and disseminate information is spread and “the closing effect

⁴⁶ To Cardon and Granjon (2010) an alternative media can be currently defined as a “militant production of information” (p.15). For a further discussion about alternative media, see Rodríguez, C., Ferron, B., & Shamas, K. (2014).

exercised by the gatekeepers that had the monopoly of the right of choosing the information that deserved a dissemination in a large communication network has lost its efficacy” (2010, p.12). What would be a mediactivism practice in this new communication environment?

In that regard, the authors point out that the internet seems to be “specially adapted to mediactivist projects” (p.84) since it helps to “lighten editorial constraints, reduce drastically the cost of diffusion, model communication many to many (...), facilitate collaborative production and open an enlarged participative space that allows greater interaction” (p.84). For them, that new communication space would not only give a renewed place to different mediactivist practices, but also encourage a work of politicizing the technique, with alternatives such as free software, among others. On another note, the internet would allow the emergence of communication models based more on differences and singularities than on resemblances.

So, to Cardon and Granjon (2010), mediactivism are progressive contestation practices that offer an alternative to the mainstream production of information through criticism of the system itself or through the implementation of concrete experiences of media. Those experiences can develop in many ways and with a variety of notions of the role of communication, but they would be aggregate around two conceptions: the counter hegemonic proposal and the expressivist point of view. And, to them, the internet would be a communication environment that could encourage that kind of practice.

If we take the concept of hybrid media system that we already discussed, and try to analyze how a mediactivist practice could have place in it, we can identify interesting points of integration and contradiction between them.

Of course, Chadwick’s model of a hybrid media system is a macro-level conception of how the communication environment is organized today and the mediactivist approach refers to a specific practice towards this environment. Our aim is to try to understand how the latter would have a place in the former, which characteristics of each of those approaches go along well and which are in contradiction, or need to be amended. Or even, how they point out to other ways of understanding.

To Chadwick (2013), the media system is currently based on three main characteristics: complexity, interdependence and transition. The first one seems to go along very well with

the development of mediactivist practices since it is clear that those practices may be developed not only on different media supports, but also with different conceptions about the role of media and how one should react to it.

The idea of interdependence also poses no problem to incorporating a mediactivist practice in that system, but it does highlight an aspect that is not much developed in the construction of the latter concept. Although the mediactivist practice has always a certain degree of interdependence, since it is done in reaction to a certain media system that already exists, to Cardon and Granjon, it is more an assumption than an issue. The dimension of this interdependence on mediactivist practice is not highlighted by Cardon and Granjon (2010). The work of proposing an alternative to the media system is viewed much more as an experience in itself than as the addition of a new element to a greater system, where that initiative will be incorporated, appropriated and transformed.

Transition is an aspect that appears in both contexts, but in different ways. While in the hybrid media system the idea of transition is a permanent state of the communication system, for mediactivism it would possibly be a set of different stages that succeed each other. Transitions in the mediactivist practice can be identified historically and represent different moments, but when seen in a specific moment of time, the practice is not described as one that is in permanent state of transition.

On the other hand, if we take the characteristics pointed out by Cardon and Granjon (2010) when they describe the idea of mediactivism, there are also some constraints to think about it in a hybrid media system approach.

The first issue we would like to stress is that the idea of mediactivism is attached to a progressive movement. To the authors (Cardon and Granjon, 2010), although the practice of criticizing the media system is done by groups with different political views, the concept they develop is only appropriated to describe progressive initiatives. Although it is perfectly possible to develop a progressive initiative embedded in a hybrid media system, the boundaries to that definition may become more blurred.

The assumption that all parts of the system are interdependent makes it difficult to circumscribe the ideology of a certain communication initiative. A communication project or initiative may be conceived and put in place within a progressive action, but once it is part

of the system, it is the circulation of its content and the building of a complex audience that will make of it a major player in the media landscape. For example, a NGO that fights against climate change may create an online news platform that denounces the bias of mainstream media on behalf of governments and lobbies that have practices that are not in accordance with good actions for the environment. This could be considered as a mediactivist practice, according to Cardon and Granjon's (2010) concept.

But, once it is online, it lies on the interaction with various other actors in the communication system. Probably, one of the ways to spread its content and make it more visible would be to share it on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram. Those networks are controlled by big commercial companies that cannot exactly be considered as progressive. They do not identify themselves as progressive nor is it a characteristic we can identify in their actions.

Once it achieves an audience that is broader than the one that would go directly to the NGO's website, it may also reach journalists that work on mainstream media (directly via the NGO's social networks or via the buzz it generated among users). The content may then be re-appropriated by mainstream media, the ones that were the target of criticism in the first place. That re-appropriation may happen in different ways, but the fact is that the visibility generated by an eventual mainstream media coverage may result in an increase of audience to the initial media.

So, all this path is to say that, in a hybrid media system, even progressive communication initiatives are constantly in interaction with a very complex variety of actors. That context brings new questions to what would be considered as alternative communication.

That is where we rejoin the second characteristic of the mediactivist practice, the possibility of its development as a counter-hegemonic or an expressivist criticism towards the media system. There is no contradiction between the creation of these two kinds of alternative communication in a hybrid media system. There are just new issues that may confront this two proposals.

To the counter-hegemonic proposal, it seems the difficulties are of the same kind, as when we discussed the interaction between mediactivism as a progressive practice and the hybrid

media system. As the system is in constant interdependence, it is difficult to imagine that an initiative may be feasible without having any contact with hegemonic models.

As for the expressivist proposal, it may gain more space on a hybrid media system, where the production of information is not necessarily in the hands of professionals. But it may also be confronted, for example, with issues related to trustworthiness of information. The possibility and will to take the production of information out of the exclusive hands of professional communication groups creates the new issues in terms of how to guarantee standards of quality and truth. Furthermore, this kind of activism may also generate an almost unlimited multiplication of communication initiatives related to specific social groups or issues, but that not necessarily gain any attention in the public debate opening the risk of creating very small and self-centered bubbles of information.

We think, then, that the concepts of hybrid media system and mediactivism may go along in a complementary manner. While the first explains the functioning of the general landscape of media, the second focuses on specific ways of criticism and alternative proposals. Although based on different assumptions, the two concepts dialog and complement themselves forcing adaptations to better understand the phenomenon we are analyzing. The combination of the two may allow us to do a more complex analysis of the phenomena, based on the action of the different actors, but always keeping in mind the bigger picture in which this activism takes place.

We consider that it what is essential in the development of these mediactivist practices on social media are the specificities of their use⁴⁷, rather than the platforms themselves. In order to access what would guide these specificities, we decided to analyze the dimension of the actor's discourse on the use of these tools and also how that discourse takes shape in the actual practices of a social media conversation.

5.2 Protest actors and their discourses about the media

⁴⁷ The platforms of social networking sites may not be considered separately from their uses, since their respective affordances and constraints will shape the actions done in them (Cammaerts, 2014). Yet, here we want to focus on the human dimension of the phenomena, trying to understand the discourses and practices that guide them.

In order to have a closer access to the discourses of actors that are part of such conversation towards the media system, we conducted interviews. As explained previously, they were done with three kinds of actors: activists, journalists and communication advisors to governments. The semi-structured interviews focused on the context, practices and dynamics of the media use done by these different actors and on their visions about the Brazilian communication system and eventual changes brought by the inclusion of social media as an actor.

Although the general topic was used to conduct the conversation, what specifically interested us was the actor's views about the communication system: their assessment, the interplays between media, the competing ideas. Following the concept of hybrid media system presented before, more than the different uses done by each of these actors, what interests us here are the frequent interactions between these different media logics that form a multimedia communication network (Ahy, 2014). Here, we were specifically looking at the forms in which the use of social media allowed these actors to, in some way, bring chances to the communication system.

We identified three main discourses about the communication system among our interviewees. Although they were not the only topics that appeared, they were the most frequent and appeared to be a constant between the different kinds of actors we talked to.

5.2.1 “Dropping the mask of the press”

The first frequent discourse we identified is about the role of social media unmasking traditional media. This very critical view of the professional media seemed to dominate the environment of protests and was very present in the actors' discourse towards the use of social media. The use of social networks was turned into a tool to oppose the narrative that mainstream media diffused about the events.

When discussing mass media outlets in Brazil, it is important to highlight some of its characteristics. Professional media system in Brazil is almost entirely private and highly concentrated because they are owned by a few. A research done by the Media Ownership

Monitor⁴⁸ in 2017 showed that 50% of the 50 most popular media in terms of audience are owned by only five families (Media Ownership Monitor Brazil, 2017).

Azevedo (2006) identifies some characteristics of the Brazilian communication system that remain unchanged over time:

The family monopoly and cross-ownership in the mass media, the small political diversity and the conservative bias, low circulation of newspapers associated with the low number of readers and, as a consequence, in mainstream media, a journalism oriented primarily to the elites and permeable to the influence of strong audiences (p.89).

Scholars devoted to the history of the Brazilian press (Albuquerque, 2000; Aldé et al., 2007; Azevedo, 2009) point that the model adopted in the country is closer to the American, where newspapers define themselves as independent institutions, not associated with parties and governments, differentiating themselves from the model of a partisan press (Azevedo, 2009). But the adoption of the model in Brazil did not take place without adaptations. Albuquerque (2000) points that the independent posture did not avoid the defense of certain agendas, as for example the reform of the State. That positioning would be done in the name of a general interest of the nation, far beyond party-related interests. Azevedo (2009), on his turn, highlights the central role of opinion journalism in Brazil. According to him, differently from the USA, where journalism would be predominantly informative or, at least, the informative part of it would be clearly separated from the opinion, in Brazil, the opinion would have a central role in the press. The author sees problems in that hegemony of journalists and writers with a center and right-wing point of view and the risk of their opinions contaminating what should be the informative part of publications.

The criticism towards this situation of the mass media landscape in Brazil has been present in the Brazilian society for a long time and it was also very intense during the 2013 protests. Posters saying "People are no fool. Down with Rede Globo" could be seen on the streets, and the headquarters of the Rede Globo, the largest Brazilian conglomerate of communication, which was targeted in one of the events in São Paulo and another in Rio de

⁴⁸ This research has been done in 11 countries and is funded by the German government. In the Brazilian case, the research was done with the Brazilian ONG Intervezes and the Reporters without borders, based in France.

Janeiro. Although Globo was the main target of criticism among the professional media outlets, journalists from several groups were prevented from doing their coverage during the protest and had to hide their badges and other identifications.

The journalist Bruno Lupion, that worked for the news website UOL at the time of the protests, reports that “there were posters saying: ‘Down with Rede Globo!’, there was a critic to media in some slogans and some posters, that was very noticeable”. With that climate, some journalists were harassed while during their coverage of the protests, but Lupion says it was not his case. He does not report any problem doing his job during the demonstrations.

Talking about the history of the political foundation of Brazilian reality, Nobre (2013) also gives value to the role of social media against the mass media system:

On the one hand, they have taken away from the traditional media the monopoly of opinion formation and the vocalization of dissatisfaction. It was no coincidence that the traditional media were attacked in many of the protest slogans. And, on the other hand, they created their own channels of coping with the system, leading to revolt on the streets. (p.3)

In regards to this coexistence of mass media with other narratives that emerge on the digital environment, the activist Rebeca Lerer, that helped create a medical center for the protesters that were blessed in confrontation with the police, will remark: “I think that social media had the role of dropping the mask of the press, in a certain way”. In a similar sense, the activist Everton Rodrigues, stated that the role of social media was essential to “build different narratives to try to oppose the narrative of the media”.

Lerer highlights that the narratives from the media and from social media went into frontal collision. To her, the episode that better illustrates that confrontation is when the television presenter Datena⁴⁹ launched a live poll on television about the protests. At that time, he and most of the media had a very critic position about the demonstrations that were pictured by them as a movement that stopped the traffic and disturbed the life of the citizens that just

⁴⁹ José Luiz Datena is a journalist and Brazilian television presenter known by his very sensationalistic coverage of violence. He is responsible for the live show Cidade Alerta, that is aired on open television every afternoon.

wanted to get home from work. The question of the poll was: “Do you support protests that cause disturbance?”. And surprisingly to him, while 2179 people said yes, only 915 said no. That result left Datena without reaction on live television, showing there was another discourse circulating on the society, which was completely different from those from the media.

Diná Ramos, activist that participates in various collectives around urban issues and that was involved in the movement *Ocupe a Mídia* (Occupy the Media) attested that:

In the groups where I participated, it was very clear to all that mainstream media, or the “coup-supporting media”⁵⁰ – as it was referred to - acted, starred and tried to construct a collective consciousness, a hegemonic thinking. It had ideology, it had a side, and that side is one of conservative perspective, reactionary, a perspective of abusive and unrestricted capital advocacy.

Ramos reports that in her networks during the protests, “nobody doubted it was necessary to have a big debate about reforming the media, about communication rights in Brazil”. To her, the movement Occupy the Media, that emerged during the 2013 protests, tried to give form to such demands. They organized some direct actions in the headquarters of some of the Brazilian major media outlets, among other smaller activities, especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

In some discourses, there was also an underlining perception that mass media was diverting the meaning of the movement. According to Dafne Sampaio, that worked in the coordination of the digital actions of the São Paulo City Hall, mass media was responsible for the shift of the movement from the demand about the price of public transportation to a general discontent towards Brazilian politics. He claims it was the media that transformed the demand for the reduction of 20 cents in the price of public transportation into the slogan “It is not only about 20 cents”.

Diego Soares, member of the *Movimento Passe Livre - MPL*⁵¹(Free Fare Movement), also expresses this vision about the traditional Brazilian media. They would have been

⁵⁰ The original expression, in Portuguese, is “mídia golpista”. We did not find an exact translation in English.

⁵¹ The MPL was the movement that started the calls for protests. His role is explained in topic 1.4.

responsible for the inclusion of demands that, according to him, were not being discussed by the people on the streets. Leandro Fortes, that coordinated the social media strategy for the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Worker's Party) at that time goes beyond and considers the movement "was first captured and then used as a tool by the Brazilian mainstream media for overthrowing PT's government".

According to the actors interviewed, this opposition to the mainstream media seems to have gained three main forms: the construction of alternative discourses via social media, strategies of direct confrontation of these media (especially in the actions organized by the Occupy the Media movement) and attempts to create new media to diffuse alternative narratives. Although the first and third forms of action may seem similar, they differ in an essential element: the attempt to organize and control the discourse and the narratives. While the first action supposes the individual use of social media and credits the creation of narratives to the sum of different voices present in this environment, the third usually emerges from organized movements that consider essential to create structures to organize these narratives.

Regarding the third line of action, Bia Abramo, that acted as the coordinator of the social media strategy of the São Paulo City Hall, regrets the difficulty to implement an organized social media strategy by the City Hall even "knowing that the mayor getting his image tarnished as a result of action by the coup-supporting media⁵²". Once again, the use of social media is seen as a way of contradicting or proposing a dissonance to mass media, in that case to diffuse the version of the local power.

Leandro Fortes, on his side, says that what motivated the creation of the *Agência PT* (PT Agency⁵³) was "the need to fight for a narrative in the Brazilian media, different from the one conveyed by the hegemonic Brazilian media". Another differential element mentioned by Fortes regarding the PT's communication strategies was its objective to "end with the

⁵² The original expression used in Portuguese is "Partido da Imprensa Golpista – PIG", that literally means Putschist Media Party.

⁵³ The *Agência PT* (PT Agency) was an attempt of the Worker's Party to create its own News Agency. The project aimed at integrating all communication professionals working for the different instances of the party as well as those working for elected members of the parties to centralize the production and diffusion of information regarding the party.

mediation of media. We wanted to create our own media so as to speak directly to the people (...) The media has to come after us and not the contrary”.

That vision about the possibility of reducing mediation between actors and publics was also expressed by the activist Everton Rodrigues, which stated that “the internet had a fundamental role in constructing another narrative, not the narrative that the media was fostering. It was a non-unified narrative, that was closer to reality”. This specific aspect will be further explored in Chapter 6.

Regarding the vision of the MPL, whose social media profiles were responsible for the initial calls for the demonstrations, Diego Soares remembers that, at the time, the movement had its site and its profiles on Twitter and Facebook. They also had partners, such as Independent Media Center (CMI), which produced audio-visual content about the events and published on YouTube.

The CMI describes itself as “a network of independent producers of media that seeks to offer to the public quality information that is alternative and critical, that contributes to the construction of a free, egalitarian society, that respects the environment”. This objective is described as “giving voice to those who do not have a voice as a consistent alternative to business media, that often distorts facts and presents interpretations, according to the interests of economic, social and cultural elites”⁵⁴.

Soares believes that the movement's social media channels were mainly important in advertising the movement. When asked if new people approached the movement via social networks, he explains that the people who joined the movement just after the protests were, for the most part, those that already had strong links with it:

People who came [to MPL] via social networks have just arrived [2017].
Because our reach expanded as of June 2013. Previously, we did not have the

⁵⁴ “O CMI Brasil é uma rede de produtores e produtoras independentes de mídia que busca oferecer ao público informação alternativa e crítica de qualidade que contribua para a construção de uma sociedade livre, igualitária e que respeite o meio ambiente. O CMI Brasil quer dar voz à quem não têm voz constituindo uma alternativa consistente à mídia empresarial que frequentemente distorce fatos e apresenta interpretações de acordo com os interesses das elites econômicas, sociais e culturais”, in the original version in Portuguese. Retrieved from: <https://midiaindependente.org/>

same reach on Facebook. No one approached the movement via social networks in June 2013 because it was a very tense moment.

Soares also explained how the communication committee worked in the movement:

There is a communication committee. The movement is divided into committees, and there is a communication committee that deals with social networks. Any member can participate in any committee. Indeed, the positions on the committees alternate periodically.

If the social base of the MPL movement did not depend on social media at the moment of the protests, the same was not true to new movements that emerged during the demonstrations and started to organize themselves at that moment. It was the case of the *Vem Pra Rua* (Come to the Street) movement, which was very active in a posterior moment, during the organization of the movements for and against the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. Janaína Lima, one of the most known members of the *Vem Pra Rua* movement, elected as municipal councilor, states the importance of the channels of communications of the movements, especially for the very young movements. Since these movements were recent and had no previous social base, digital channels gained even more importance:

Whatsapp, Facebook, printed material, a lot of brochures. We used various ways to mobilize and engage people, all the means of communication that were possible. But, of course, social networks are and have always been the strongest of the movement.

5.2.2 Multiple media and multiple connections

Janaina Lima's statement also highlights the second main element of the actor's discourse about the media: the multiple use, integration and interconnectivity of different media. The mention to the use of several media at once and to their interconnection is the second discursive element we would like to highlight.

Alfredo Santos, then communication secretary of CUT (Unified Worker's Union), reports that, at the time of the interview (June 2017) the organization already had Instagram,

Facebook and Twitter channels, as well as a structure to monitor social media. But he says the construction of the structure to accommodate the new and multiple media was not easy. He says among all social media capabilities, it was their ability to call people to the streets that first attracted the leaders of the union and made possible to start working on that domain.

Everton Rodrigues remembers that in 2013 the members of the collective he was part of communicated through “all media, Twitter, Facebook, Whatsapp, e-mail. We just did not use the telephone so much”. Pablo Capilé, one of the founders of *Fora do Eixo* (Out of the axe) movement and the *Mídia Ninja* (Ninja Media) also remembers the movement used Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Flickr and Twitcast, a platform on which they did live broadcast. But he establishes a clear difference in the use of each of these platforms: “We used Twitter to talk to organizations and we used Facebook to communicate with people who were not organized,” he claims.

The use of different and interconnected media was not limited to social media themselves, it also affected the work of traditional media, as attests the journalist Bruno Lupion: “I know the people in the newsroom benefited a lot from the networks as they had access to what the organizers were posting, who they were, they could then ask for interviews through social media, to have an agenda of the events. There was no press advisor”.

If, on the one hand, we can see this multiplicity of media is centrally based in an interconnection and circulation of content among different media environments, in the other, it does not necessarily mean an approximation of their discourses about the movement. Diogo Santana, former executive secretary of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, responsible for the relations of the Presidency with the social movements, attests that, in comparison to the young part of the government that followed the 2013 events on social media, “it was funny that the people that followed [the protests] through the press, maybe older people in the government, had a completely different vision of what was going to happen”.

5.2.3 The emergence of new voices

One of the differences that marked the distance between these two media environments was the inclusion of new voices on the debate triggered by social media (Badouard, Mabi, Monnoyer-Smith, 2016). Voices that were not present on mass media. That issue is the third frequent element of the actors discourse about the media system. As claimed by Bringel and Pleyers (2015), “many groups and individuals who did not belong to organizations played a major role in triggering and spreading the protest, including - but not only - via social networks” (p.13).

Diná Ramos said she believed that "social networks have allowed everyone to become a political agent". Dissemination of information between individuals on social media was particularly important because many of the protesters had never participated in a protest. A poll done by the polling institute Datafolha on the protest of June 18th showed that 71% of the protesters were participating for the first time in a protest. "Social networks were fundamental because many people had never participated in any protest. I mean, the guy did not know what to do, he did not know how to get there", says Ramos.

At the moment of the demonstrations, when the articulation was crucial but had not been previously prepared, "social networks served as articulators of the movements, of people who wanted to organize", explains the activist Paulinho Fluxus_, who also participated in the demonstrations.

To the activist Pablo Capilé “the diverse and polyphonic clickactivism gained the streets. Because the crisis of representation led people to search for alternative representations, the first solution they found was to represent themselves. Since they had social networks with them, they would represent themselves”. Jefferson Lima, former Youth Secretary of the Workers' Party, considers that social media was also an important element to make pressure on the Parliament to approve measures related to the youth such as the Youth Statue and the bill against genocide of black youth, exactly because it included voices that were unheard before.

But not all new voices remained individualized, some organized themselves in new communication collectives that had an important role in the coverage of the protests. These so-called independent media collectives⁵⁵ have made an important contribution to the

⁵⁵ We will analyze the case of one of these collectives on topic 6.2.

construction of a public image of the events. The action of these collectives is strongly linked to the perception of the professional media work previously expressed. In seeking ways to depict more accurately how the protests were viewed from within, these collectives proposed alternative coverage. We consider as part of this group all the groups that declared proposing alternative information expressing critics to the mainstream media and without having big structures to rely on.

Although there have been a number of different groups working on this kind of action, the *Mídia Ninja* (Ninja here is actually an abbreviation of Independent Narratives, Journalism and Action) was the one who gained the most visibility. The group made live transmissions on the protests, as well as published photos and information about the mobilization. *Mídia Ninja* was born out of the *Fora do Eixo* (Out of the axe) group, which until then was known in the cultural field, for organizing music festivals and creating collective houses for artists in many parts of the country.

Contrary to what is often advanced (Castells, 2013; Bennet and Sergerberg, 2012), the use of social networks does not always lack a formal organization. Even if the protesters, as individuals, can use the networks in a rather personal way, the movements and collectives seem to try to professionalize their uses, aiming at gaining more attention. Each movement tries to create its own inner working to make effective decisions in this area.

Pablo Capilé told us that since the beginning of the action of the group, in 2004-2005, when in interaction with other collectives in the country, they all knew that they had to have an online radio, an online television and a blog. According to him, in 2013:

We were already super-organized. We already had a team of 5, 6 photographers, videographers, and those responsible for the live transmission. We did editorial meetings at home. We already knew what testimonials we could get, what were the best places to take pictures.

These three main elements of the actor's discourses about the media (social media as a possibility of opposing the media; plurality and interconnection of media; and inclusion of new voices) will be the ground of our further discussion about mediactivist practices and the analysis of our corpus of tweets.

5.3 Mediactivist practices in the 2013 Brazilian protests

Having outlined the media environment of the 2013 Brazilian protests, as well as the major elements of the actor's discourses about the media, we will now address how the mediactivist practices took shape in the Twitter conversation about the protests.

Having in mind the theoretical discussion presented here, we will now analyze how Twitter was used during the 2013 Brazilian protests to talk about mainstream media. Our aim is to investigate if and how social media was used as a privileged environment to mediactivist practices. According to the actors we interviewed, how did the main discourses towards the media translate into practices in the use of the Twitter platform? Does Cardon and Granjon's (2010) proposal of internet being "specially adapted to mediactivist projects" apply to the case of the 2013 Brazilian protests?

In order to analyze the mediactivist practices more closely, we created sub corpus of our Twitter dataset only with the messages that mentioned mainstream media outlets. That selection of tweets will allow us to see how the media content is being used and what is being said about the different media.

We selected 12 major media outlets of four different types of media (televisions, newspapers, magazines and websites). Firstly, we decided witch types of media we would take into account. That selection was done in accordance with their real-time coverage of the protests and their presence in our corpus. Then we identified the main media of each type, according to measurements of their audiences and finally searched for their presence in our corpus.

We identified mentions to the 4 major Brazilian television channels (Globo, Band, Record and SBT⁵⁶), 3 major newspapers (Folha de S. Paulo, Estadão and O Globo⁵⁷), 3 of the

⁵⁶ Globo, Band, Record and SBT are the four biggest open television channels in terms of audience. They are all commercial channels. Globo is the leader of audience and is part of the Globo group, the bigger Brazilian media outlet and one of the biggest in the world. The channel got it is permission to air in the 50's and is owned by the family Marinho. The Band TV channel started to air on 1967, during the military dictatorship and is owned by the family Saad. The channel Record exists since the 50's but changed its profile many times and in the 90's it was bought by the Bishop Edir Macedo, from the evangelical church *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus*. SBT was founded in the 80's and is owned by the businessman and TV presenter Silvio Santos.


⁵⁷ The three are commercial newspapers, based in São Paulo (Folha and Estadão) or Rio de Janeiro (O Globo), but with national distribution. While O Globo is a member of the Globo group and was founded in the middle of the 20's, Folha de S.Paulo was founded in the early 20's by the Frias family that intended to

magazines with higher circulation in the country (Veja, *Época* and *Carta Capital*⁵⁸⁵⁹) and two 2 most accessed news websites⁶⁰ (UOL and G1⁶¹).

To create a sub corpus for each media, we searched for variations of its names (with and without spaces, with and without @, # and so on) and excluded manually each mention that was not related to the media itself. We located a total of 6256 tweets that made reference to one or more of the selected media.

The total number of mentions of each media can be seen in Table 13:

Table 13 – Total mentions per media



As we could expect, the three most mentioned media are the television channel, the website and the newspaper of the group Globo, the biggest Brazilian media group. They not only have the biggest audience among the other communication outlets, but they were also the target of the most critics of the protests towards the communication system. They are

offer an alternative to the conservative newspaper of the rural elite that was O Estado de São Paulo, commonly known as Estadão. This last one is the oldest among the four, having been founded in 1875.

⁵⁸ We did not include the magazine *Isto É* because although it is one of the major Brazilian magazines, it appeared only two times in our corpus.

⁵⁹ Again, we have here three commercial publications, but this time with very marked internal differences. The magazine *Carta Capital* is the only among the major Brazilian media that is identified with the left wing. It was founded in 1994. On the other hand, the magazine *Veja* changed its positioning in the political spectrum along its existence and today is closely identified with the right wing. It was founded in 1968 and is a part of the Abril group, a major Brazilian editorial group owned by the family Civita. The *Época* magazine is the newest among the three having been founded in 1998 and is part of the Globo group.

⁶⁰ We based the number of visits of the news websites on the Alexa ranking:

<https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/BR>

⁶¹ The two news websites are related to major Brazilian media outlets. While G1 is the news portal of the Globo group, UOL is a part of the same group as the newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo*.

followed in volume of mentions by the magazine *Veja*, highly identified with the right wing, and the two biggest Brazilian newspapers, *Estadão* and *Folha*.

Table 14 allows us to see the total mentions per media outlet with its respective type of media and the percentage of the total corpus it represents. The percentage of the total tweets allows us to conclude that 6,6% of the conversation around the hashtag #vemprarua mentioned one of these 12 media outlets, which is not negligible.

Table 14 – Total mentions and percentage per media

Mass Media	Type of media	Mentions	Percentage of total
Globo	Television	2335	2,07%
G1	Website	1583	1,84%
OGlobo	Newspaper	680	0,79%
<i>Veja</i>	Magazine	575	0,67%
<i>Estadão</i>	Newspaper	367	0,43%
<i>Folha</i>	Newspaper	256	0,30%
UOL	Website	174	0,20%
Record	Television	81	0,09%
SBT	Television	78	0,09%
Band	Television	68	0,08%
<i>Carta Capital</i>	Magazine	48	0,06%
<i>Época</i>	Magazine	20	0,00%


If we take a look at the number of mentions per media platform (Table 15), we can see that televisions are the most mentioned, followed by websites, newspapers and magazines, respectively. That result is partially surprising. On the one hand, television is the most consumed medium in Brazil, and therefore its content is expected to be much referenced on the conversation, but, on the other, television channels were not streamed online on real time in 2013⁶². That means that the mention of a television content probably emerges from the consumption of the content in another platform different from a computer, the so called dual screen process (Vaccari, Chadwick, & O’Loughlin, 2015).

Dual screening is “a bundle of practices that involve integrating, and switching across and between, broadcast media and social media” (Vaccari et al., 2015) and can be considered as

⁶² Some programs or news were available on the websites of the television shortly after their broadcasting, but the whole content could not be accessed online, nor could the channels it be seen in real time, via streaming. That was valid for all the channels considered here.

an essential part of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), since information is not restricted to one media, but rather circulates among different media and media supports. This circulation can gain different forms and directions for different members of the public. Vaccari, Chadwick and O’Loughlin’s study about the broadcast party leaders’ debates held during the 2014 European Parliament elections in the United Kingdom (2015) showed, for example, that while some people watch an event on television and comment on Twitter, others learned about a certain television program on the social network.

Table 15 – Total mentions per media platform




Although content from websites, newspapers and magazines are partially or completely online for free, they are not as much mentioned as the television ones. That shows not only the weight of the content produced and disseminated via television channels, but also how the television outlets themselves are a topic of conversation. Those two aspects will become more evident in the following analysis.

It also indicates a strong overlap between online and offline dynamics. The consumption of television content done offline (and probably online for a small part of the users) is generating conversation on an online social media platform.

Although television is the most mentioned media platform, the number of mentions is extremely unbalanced between the four television channels. While Globo has more mentions than any other media, the three other channels are only in 8th, 9th and 10th position in the ranking. In contrast, magazines and newspapers are those who present a lower standard variation since the different representatives of these categories are closer in the ranking of mentions.

Table 16 – Average and standard deviation per media platform



Another interesting aspect to take a look at are the different kinds of tweets where the mentions to a certain media appear. Identifying whether media are mentioned on original tweets (original texts written by the users⁶³), mentions (those that start with another Twitter profile to which the message is addressed) or on retweets (those that start with an RT, indicating it is a replicated message) allows us to identify in what kind of conversation a certain media is being quoted.

Remembering the proposal of Bruns and Moe (2014) to analyze the different layers of conversation on Twitter (as discussed on topic 4.4.1), we decided to take a look at what kind of tweets mentioned the different types of media.

Using the categorization of the mentions by types of media, we analyzed their distribution between the different kinds of tweets. In all four categories (television, newspapers, websites and magazines) we found the same pattern, even if with different proportions: the number of mentions is significantly lower than those of retweets and original messages.

⁶³ In addition to completely original tweets, we also considered as “original tweets” those that included and RT but added a personal commentary.

Table 17 – Replies, RT and original messages percentage in mentions to mainstream media

TV CHANNELS			WEBSITES		
Globo	Original	46,50%	G1	Original	25,00%
	Replies	6,30%		Replies	3,00%
	RT	47,20%		RT	72,00%
Record	Original	44,60%	UOL	Original	47,10%
	Replies	11,80%		Replies	11,50%
	RT	43,60%		RT	41,40%
SBT	Original	36%	MAGAZINES		
	Replies	21,30%	Veja	Original	72,50%
	RT	42,70%		Replies	6,30%
		RT		21,20%	
Band	Original	60,30%	Época	Original	40,00%
	Replies	4,40%		Replies	5,00%
	RT	35,30%		RT	55,00%
NEWSPAPERS					
Estadão	Original	46,60%	Carta Capital	Original	60,40%
	Replies	16,10%		Replies	12,50%
	RT	37,30%		RT	27,10%
Folha	Original	53,90%			
	Replies	10,90%			
	RT	35,20%			
O Globo	Original	25,30%			
	Replies	14,40%			
	RT	60,30%			

Although the number of replies is lower than the other two in all categories, the variation between the number of original tweets and retweets indicates there is more to understand about this dynamic. The lower number of replies indicate that people are not really establishing a conversation about media, but rather expressing opinions or replicating other's

opinions. To further investigate this dynamic, we decided then to do a content analysis of this tweets. To do that we built some categories of analysis.

Our analytical categories were based on the main points identified in the interviews. Among the three main aspects about the communication system that emerged from the actor's discourse, two of them were directly related to traditional media: the idea of unmasking the press and that of the diversity of media. The third one, about the inclusion of new voices, will be explored on Chapter 6. To investigate if and how the two first discourses took shape on the use of Twitter during the protests, we designed the following analytical approach.


Firstly, we classified the tweets in those that were about some media content (a tv program, an article, an opinion of a columnist etc) and those that talked about the media outlet itself (they did not mention any specific content, but the company itself). In the first case, referring to messages about the content, we then observed whether the intention of the tweet was to comment a content seen in the media or to address the media about contents or frames they would like to see among their content. In the first case, the media is seen as a source where the content was seen/read and then generated a comment. In the second, the media is seen as a target that the user tried to reach with its tweet, in an attempt to influence editorial choices.

Where the media was the source of the tweet, we then categorized the discourse of the user about it: if a compliment, a critic or a simple comment. In the case of the media as a target, we tried to identify if the user intended to show the media was about an agenda (an event, a happening, a subject they wanted covered), about a framing (a point of view they thought to be excluded from that media) or about other subject.

In the second case, if the tweet was not about the media content but about the media outlet itself, we analyzed two things. Firstly, if the tone of the tweet was a compliment, a critic or a simple comment about the media. Secondly, if the tweet mentioned one, two or more than three media outlets, to try to establish if the discourse was particular to that media or more general to the communication system.

Here is a summary of our analytical chart:

Table 18 – Summary of analytical chart of media mentions



We applied these categories to original tweets and replies that mentioned the 12 media in question. We excluded from this analysis all the retweets to avoid the bias of messages that were largely reproduced. What interests us here is the way people mostly mentioned the media and not, for the moment, how far they spread on Twitter. The results will be presented by media platform (television, newspaper, website and magazine), having the results for each media identified.

Table 20 shows the separation between tweets about the media content and those about the media outlets themselves for the four television outlets. We can see that, with the exception of Globo, for the other three televisions, the number of mentions to media content is higher than that to the media outlets. Band is the television channel that is the least mentioned as an outlet (only two times), while Record is the outlet that shows the most balance between the two categories, 21 mentions to the content and 20 to the outlet.

Table 19 – Number and percentage of mentions to media content and to media outlet per television channel

Total Record	41	
Mentions to media content/Record	21	51,20%
Mentions to media outlet/Record	20	48,80%
Total Band	43	
Mentions to media content/Band	41	95,30%
Mentions to media outlet/Band	2	4,70%
Total SBT	44	
Mentions to media content/SBT	25	56,80%
Mentions to media outlet/SBT	19	43,20%
Total Globo	1085	
Mentions to media content/Globo	123	11,30%
Mentions to media outlet/Globo	962	88,70%

As we can see on Table 19, the results for Globo – 89% of the analyzed mentions being to the outlet and not the content - show clearly that it was the main target of the protesters. Record and SBT also had significant mentions to their outlets, 49% and 43% respectively. Further analysis will help to clarify the reasons for that. The only television outlet that was basically mentioned by its content was Band – only 5% mentioned the outlet.

Regarding the second most mentioned type of media: the news websites. We can see in Table 20 that, as the majority of the television channels, the news websites are also mostly mentioned by their content and not the news outlets themselves. The difference here is that the numbers here are much higher, representing almost the totality of the mentions for both of the cases we analyzed.

Table 20 - Number and percentage of mentions to media content and to media outlet per news website

Total G1	444	
Mentions to media content/G1	436	98,20%
Mentions to media outlet/G1	8	1,80%

Total UOL	103	
Mentions to media content/UOL	103	100,00%
Mentions to media outlet/UOL	0	0,00%

This tendency persists on our third type of media, the newspapers (Table 21). Considering the three cases we took into consideration, for two of them the mentions to media content represented more than 95% of the mentions. The only exception is the newspaper O Globo, that also has a high level of mentions to its content (80%), but also has the highest percentage of mentions to the media outlet (almost 20%). It does not seem a coincidence that the newspaper having received most critics is exactly the one that is part of the same media group of the online television channel that was most mentioned as an outlet. That reinforces the perception of Globo as the center of the critics of the activists in 2013. There's also another element that has to be taken in consideration in this case: the O Globo Twitter account was hacked by the Anonymous group⁶⁴ and the episode generate many reactions on Twitter regarding the media outlet.

Table 21 – Number and percentage of mentions to media content and to media outlet per newspaper

Total Estadão	230	
Mentions to media content/Estadão	224	97,40%
Mentions to media outlet/Estadão	6	2,60%
Total Folha	166	
Mentions to media content/Folha	165	99,40%
Mentions to media outlet/Folha	1	0,60%
Total O Globo	271	
Mentions to media content/O Globo	219	80,10%
Mentions to media outlet/O Globo	52	19,90%

In the case of magazines, we obtained similar results. Mentions to their contents are literally the total for two of the cases we analyzed (Carta Capital and Época) and the majority of them

⁶⁴ During the timeframe of our dataset, the Anonymous group hacked two media profiles on Twitter. On July 22nd, they hacked the G1 account and posted messages criticizing the role of the mainstream media. On September 6th, the group invaded the account of the newspaper O Globo and used it to call people to the streets on September 7th.

(almost 82%) for Veja. It is important to highlight that the case of magazines is the only one with declared ideological bias. The magazine *Época* is part of the group Globo and as the other media of the group, they present the publication as following “exemption, correction and agility”⁶⁵ as the main attributes of their journalistic information. *Carta Capital*, on its turn, is currently known as identified with the left-wing. It is the only publication among the big Brazilian media outlets to have that political positioning. In its manifest, it declares to be “at the service of democracy and diversity of opinion, against the darkness of the authoritarianism of single thought, ignorance and brutality”⁶⁶. Although we were unable to find information about the editorial principles of the *Veja* magazine, it is currently known as a right-wing publication. *Veja* is part of the group Abril, a major Brazilian press outlet. This magazine was also targeted in a mass tweet campaign about Wikileaks revelations that would concern the media.

Table 22 – Number and percentage of mentions to media content and to media outlet per magazine

Total Carta Capital	35	
Mentions to media content/ <i>Carta Capital</i>	35	100,00%
Mentions to media outlet/ <i>Carta Capital</i>	0	0,00%
Total Época	9	
Mentions to media content/ <i>Época</i>	9	100,00%
Mentions to media outlet/ <i>Época</i>	0	0,00%
Total Veja	453	
Mentions to media content/ <i>Veja</i>	371	81,90%
Mentions to media outlet/ <i>Veja</i>	82	18,10%

In this first analysis, it clear that most of the media are mentioned by their content and not as an outlet. The only exception to that is the television channel Globo, which reported almost 90% of its mentions directly related to the outlet. In general, television channels seem to be the type of media with the greater level of critics to the outlets, with three of the four cases we analyzed attaining more than 50% of that type of mentions, while in the other types of media it tended to stay lower than 5%. The two exceptions to that are the newspaper O

⁶⁵ <https://epoca.globo.com/principios-editoriais/>

⁶⁶ <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/editora/cartacapital>

Globo and the magazine *Veja*. While in the first case we can say that a general critic to the Globo group may explain the elevated level of criticism to the newspaper, in the second it may be associated with the positioning of the magazine in the right wing of the political spectrum.

When we go into the analysis of the mentions to the media content, we can see that all televisions are mostly mentioned as the source of the content than as the target of it (Table 23). That means that people are mainly talking about what they saw on the television rather than suggesting or demanding content or positions towards a certain subject from those television channels.

Table 23 – Number and percentage of mentions to media as a source and media as a target per television channel

Mentions to media content/Record	21	
Media as a source/Record	13	61,90%
Media as target/Record	8	38,10%
Mentions to media content/Band	41	
Media as a source/Band	39	95,10%
Media as target/Band	2	4,90%
Mentions to media content/SBT	25	
Media as a source/SBT	15	60%
Media as target/SBT	10	40%
Mentions to media content/Globo	123	
Media as a source/Globo	85	69,10%
Media as target/Globo	38	30,90%

While Globo, Record and SBT have between 30% and 40% of mentions that had the intention to influence the media content, in Band-related tweets that represents only around 5%. That seems to be related to our finding about Band in the first analysis, which showed that, while the other channels had around 40% in critics to the media outlet, Band reported only 5% of them. That seems to show a tendency that this specific TV channel is rarely addressed by the Twitter audience, neither to talk about the media outlet neither to make demands in terms of their content.

In the case of the news websites (Table 24), we can see that while UOL follows the pattern established by the television channels, G1 represents another pattern. That may be explained by the fact that G1 was the target of a massive tweet campaign informing about the streaming of the September 7th protest. The multiple repetition of this same tweet – that was also addressed to the magazine *Veja* – strongly influenced the results. From the 294 times where G1 was mentioned as a target, 270 were with small variations of this tweet:

Cobertura AO VIVO #VempraRua #OperacaoSeteDeSetembro @wandfc @g1 @VEJA em <http://t.co/H6AC7sw81D> <http://t.co/FhTtb9IOct> #DT @brazilnocorrupt⁶⁷

Table 24 – Number and percentage of mentions to media as a source and media as a target per news website

Mentions to media content/G1	436	
Media as a source/G1	142	32,60%
Media as target/G1	294	67,40%
Mentions to media content/UOL	103	
Media as a source/UOL	99	96,10%
Media as target/UOL	4	3,90%

All the three newspapers we analyzed followed the same general pattern of presenting the vast majority of mentions to their content picturing the source and not the target of the comments (Table 25).

Table 25 – Number and percentage of mentions to media as a source and media as a target per newspaper

Mentions to media content/Estadão	224	
Media as a source/Estadão	217	96,90%
Media as target/Estadão	7	3,10%
Mentions to media content/Folha	165	
Media as a source/Folha	163	98,20%
Media as target/Folha	2	1,80%
Mentions to media content/O Globo	219	
Media as a source/O Globo	216	98,60%
Media as target/O Globo	3	1,40%

⁶⁷ In free translation: Coverage in REAL TIME #VempraRua #OperacaoSeteDeSetembro @wandfc @g1 @VEJA IN <http://t.co/H6AC7sw81D> <http://t.co/FhTtb9IOct> #DT @brazilnocorrupt.

In the case of magazines, we can notice that Veja is the exception (Table 26). While the other two follow the general pattern, Veja presents almost 80% of the mentions targeting her. That is due to the massive tweet campaign previously mentioned, the same that targeted the website G1.

Table 26 – Number and percentage of mentions to media as a source and media as a target per magazine

Mentions to media content/Carta Capital	35	
Media as a source/Carta Capital	33	94,30%
Media as target/Carta Capital	2	5,70%
Mentions to media content/Época	9	
Media as a source/Época	8	88,90%
Media as target/Época	1	11,20%
Mentions to media content/Veja	371	
Media as a source/Veja	80	21,60%
Media as target/Veja	291	78,40%

In this analysis, the general trend for all considered media is clear: when people mention the media content, in most cases they tend to do it aiming at commenting on something they saw or read instead of aiming at influencing the media on the coverage they are producing. The only exceptions are the website G1 and the magazine Veja, that were the targets of a tweet campaign to diffuse the online streaming of the September 7th protest.

People who are talking about the television media content as a source are generally only commenting, without expressing a favorable or unfavorable opinion about it, as shown in Table 27. That represents the majority of the cases for the mentions to Band, SBT and Globo. Only Record presents a number of critic comments that is larger than those that are only comments. The number of compliments to the content are the least frequent in all four cases.

Table 27 – Number and percentage of compliments, comments and critics to media content per television channel

Media as a source/Record	13	
Compliment/Record	2	15,40%

Comment/Record	5	38,50%
Critic/Record	6	46,10%
Media as a source/Band	39	
Compliment/Band	4	10,30%
Comment/Band	31	79,40%
Critic/Band	4	10,30%
Media as a source/SBT	15	
Compliment/SBT	3	20%
Comment/SBT	8	53,30%
Critic/SBT	4	26,70%
Media as a source/Globo	85	
Compliment/Globo	10	11,80%
Comment/Globo	61	71,80%
Critic/Globo	14	16,40%

Compliments are very rare, here is an example of a tweet complimenting Record while criticizing Globo:

*A @tvrecord está dando uma cobertura melhor que @rede_globo Rio de Janeiro. Parece q a Globo comitê os protestos #VemPraRua*⁶⁸

The most common tweets are just comments about content people see or saw previously on TV:

*Vendo no @PanicoNaBand guerra de espadas, isso seria legal nos protestos...quero sabe aonde se compra isso #vempraru #changebrazil*⁶⁹

Record is the television outlet that reports the higher proportion of critics to its content. That is due to critics about its coverage of the protests. The topic about the confrontation between activists and the police was a special focus of criticism:

⁶⁸ In free translation: The @tvrecord is doing a better coverage than @rede_globo Rio de Janeiro. It seems Globo is the committee of the protests #VemPraRua.

⁶⁹ In free translation: Seeing on @PanicoNaBand the war of swords, this would be cool on the protests... I want to know where to buy that #vempraru #changebrazil (Swords war is a tradition of the Brazilian city of Cruz das Almas during the festivities of Saint John when people simulate a fight with a kind of fireworks)

*E a imprensa disse que os manifestantes começaram #vemprarua fora #recordnews #globo*⁷⁰

Regarding the news websites, newspaper and magazines, the trend is exactly the same, with neutral comments on the content representing almost the totality of the cases (Table 28).

Table 28 – Number and percentage of compliments, comments and critics to media content per news website, newspaper and magazine

News websites			Newspapers			Magazines		
Media as a source/G1	142		Media as a source/Estadão	217		Media as a source/Carta Capital	33	
Compliment/G1	1	0,80%	Compliment/Estadão	0	0%	Compliment/Carta Capital	0	0%
Comment/G1	138	97,20%	Comment/Estadão	217	100%	Comment/Carta Capital	33	100%
Critic/G1	3	2,0%	Critic/Estadão	0	0%	Critic/Carta Capital	0	0%
Media as a source/UOL	99		Media as a source/Folha	163		Media as a source/Época	8	
Compliment/UOL	1	1%	Compliment/Folha	1	0,7%	Compliment/Época	0	0%
Comment/UOL	98	99%	Comment/Folha	159	97,5%	Comment/Época	8	100%
Critic/UOL	0	0%	Critic/Folha	3	1,8%	Critic/Época	0	0%
			Media as a source/O Globo	216		Media as a source/Veja	80	
			Compliment/O Globo	0	0%	Compliment/Veja	1	1,20%
			Comment/O Globo	215	99,50%	Comment/Veja	79	98,80%
			Critic/O Globo	1	0,50%	Critic/Veja	0	0%

The corpus of tweets that had the media as a target was not significant among the mentions to television channels (Table 29), so it is difficult to draw conclusions from the data. The two most prominent categories among all four television channels are comments demanding for the coverage of certain agenda items and those that present other demands, neither related to agendas nor framings. The latter are especially relevant in the case of SBT, where they

⁷⁰ In free translation: And the press says that the protesters began #vemprarua out with #recordnews #globo

account for 80% of the mentions. That is due to a discussion about the different programs the channels should or not include according to the viewers.

An example of a tweet demanding for the coverage of a protest was directed to Globo:

*Leblon em guerra, e a Globo mostrando futebol!! Aff... #VemPraRua*⁷¹

Table 29 – Number and percentage of agenda, frame or other comments made to the media per television channels

Media as target/Record	8	
New agenda/Record	6	75%
New framing/Record	0	0%
Other/Record	2	25%
Media as target/Band	2	
New agenda/Band	1	50%
New framing/Band	0	0%
Other/Band	1	50%
Media as target/SBT	10	
New agenda/SBT	2	20%
New framing/SBT	0	0%
Other/SBT	8	80%
Media as target/Globo	38	
New agenda/Globo	26	68,40%
New framing/Globo	8	21,10%
Other/Globo	4	10,50%

Globo was the only television media mentioned in tweets demanding for different frames of the protest:

*#Ocupacabral #vempraria #ogiganteacordou Globo corta manifestante que iria expor máfia dos transportes <http://t.co/xEE8rhSn4>*⁷²

⁷¹ In free translation: Leblon is in war and Globo is broadcasting soccer!! Aff... #VemPraRua (Leblon is a neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro).

⁷² In free translation: #Ocupacabral #vempraria #ogiganteacordou Globo stops broadcasting when protester was about to speak out about transportation mafia <http://t.co/xEE8rhSn4>

~manifestantes apanhando , isso a globo n mostra.. ~manifestantes reagindo à agressão, a globo distorce e passa de 5 em 5 seg.. #VemPraRua⁷³

Both tweets claim the television channel showed the protests, but that it should give space to a different narrative about it. In the first case, it accuses Globo of preventing a denunciation of a mafia from being broadcasted. In the second, the text argues that the editorial choice of the channel is to distort protesters' reaction to the violence they are suffering. Both critics are well in accordance with the critics that are made to the outlet itself, as we will see further.

Regarding the other types of media we took into account, the numbers of mentions in this category are very low, which means that we cannot draw many conclusions. As we saw previously, the only media that have a significant number of mentions are the website G1 and the magazine Veja, due to the tweet campaign we already explained. All the other cases are minor.

Table 30 – Number and percentage of agenda, frame or other comments made to the media per new website, newspaper and magazine

News websites			Newspapers			Magazines		
Media as target/G1	294		Media as target/Estadão	7		Media as target/Carta Capital	2	
New agenda/G1	294	100%	New agenda/Estadão	5	71,40%	New agenda/Carta Capital	0	0%
New framing/G1	0	0%	New framing/Estadão	2	28,60%	New framing/Carta Capital	2	100%
Other/G1	0	0%	Other/Estadão	0		Other/Carta Capital	0	0%
Media as target/UOL	4		Media as target/Folha	2		Media as target/Época	1	
New agenda/UOL	3	75%	New agenda/Folha	2	100%	New agenda/Época	0	0%
New framing/UOL	1	25%	New framing/Folha	0	0%	New framing/Época	1	100%
Other/UOL	0	0%	Other/Folha	0	0%	Other/Época	0	0%
			Media as target/O Globo	3		Media as target/Veja	291	
			New agenda/O Globo	1	33%	New agenda/Veja	287	98,60%

⁷³ ~protesters being beat, that Globo does not show. ~protesters reacting to the aggression, globo distorts and broadcasts each 5 seconds... #VemPraRua

			New framing/O Globo	2	67%	New framing/Veja	4	1,40%
			Other/O Globo	0	0%	Other/Veja	0	0%

Especially regarding the framing demands, the demands for different coverages of the violence episodes between activists and the police were the most frequent. Here are two examples of tweets directed to the newspaper Estadão:

@repimlins: @Estadao CONFRONTO o cacete. Os PMs atacaram. Atacaram os manifestantes. E são culpados por tudo o que se seguiu. ""#vemprarua⁷⁴

@Estadao @VEMPRARUA_TQM PM que começou, passa a noticia correta⁷⁵

It also caught our attention that the only media to which the program *Mais Médicos*⁷⁶ was a source of framing comments was the magazine Carta Capital. That is probably due to the choice of this media to support the program while it was strongly criticized. The two tweets that targeted the media regarding framing issues were about this governmental program:

@cynaramenezes @cartacapital CRM-SC rejeita médicos sem revalidação <http://t.co/VY1ybvtwLS> #foradilma #foraforo #vemprarua⁷⁷

@evandrogsilvabh @cartacapital Deixar de usar médicos-agentes como cabos-eleitorais? NOSSOS médicos, militares ou não, hora de #VemPraRua⁷⁸

The first message is directed to a journalist of the magazine – Cynara Menezes – and the magazine itself, informing that the Medicine Regional Council of the state of Santa Catarina had refused to grant work permit to foreign doctors without the validation of their degrees. And the second message questions the magazine about stopping to use doctors as political supporters.

When we pass to the tweets that mention not the media content (Table 31), but the media outlets themselves, the critics become more frequent. Among all four television channels,

⁷⁴ In free translation: @repimlins: @Estadao To hell with CONFRONTATION. The Police attacked. Attacked the demonstrators. And are responsible for everything that followed on. #vemprarua

⁷⁵ In free translation: @Estadao @VEMPRARUA_TQM the Police that started. Write right news.

⁷⁶ We explained this program previously. S

⁷⁷ In free translation: @cynaramenezes @cartacapital Medicine Regional Council of Santa Catarina rejects doctors without revalidation <http://t.co/VY1ybvtwLS> #foradilma #foraforo #vemprarua

⁷⁸ In free translation: @evandrogsilvabh @cartacapital Stop using doctors-agents as political supporters? OUR doctors, militaries or not, time to #VemPraRua

critics are the most frequent tone for three of them. Just for Band, that has only two mentions to the outlet there is a tie between critic and comment. As seen in the analysis of the tweets related to the media content, compliments are extremely rare.

Table 31 – Number and percentage of compliments, comments and critics to media outlets per television channel

Mentions to media outlet/Record	20	
Compliment/Record	1	5%
Comment/Record	1	5%
Critic/Record	18	90%
Mentions to media outlet/Band	2	
Compliment/Band	0	0%
Comment/Band	1	50%
Critic/Band	1	50%
Mentions to media outlet/SBT	19	
Compliment/SBT	0	0%
Comment/SBT	1	5,30%
Critic/SBT	18	94,70%
Mentions to media outlet/Globo	962	
Compliment/Globo	2	0,20%
Comment/Globo	120	12,50%
Critic/Globo	840	87,30%

Except for Band, all the other television channels have more than 80% of the mentions in a critical tone. That shows clearly that the overall opinion about the media is mostly negative. Tweets usually put the television channels as institutions to be fought against. One of the messages about Record says the problem is that it is now very similar to Globo.

Hoje vi na #recordnews o que só via na globo a tv mostrando uma coisa e o narrador puxando o saco do Estado #vemprarua⁷⁹

⁷⁹ In free translation: I saw in Record what I only saw in Globo, the TV showing one thing and the presenter kissing the State's ass.

Three different hashtags were used to criticize Record: #RecordMente (#RecordLies) #RecordVaiTomarnoCu (#RecordGoFuckYourself) #RecordCuspiunaCaradoPovoBrasileiro (#RecordSpitInTheFaceofBrazilianPeople). ,Also regarding the SBT, the tweets are general critics about the outlet and news about protests against the media channel. Some of them are very aggressive:

*SBT Mais uma Mídia FACISTA do Caralho!! Chega a dar raiva, Bando de FDP, Invertem tudo man *--* #VemPraRua*⁸⁰

The critics to Globo go in the same sense. A very common word to criticize specially Globo is “manipulation”. Variations of the noun were used in 55 tweets. The news outlet is accused of not showing certain facts and of distorting the sense of the facts.

*Jornal Hoje manipulando o povo. NÃO se deixe enganar pela Rede Globo. #protestorj #vempraru*⁸¹

But it is also interesting to see that, in the case of Globo, there are also accusations of it being partisan both for and against the government. The partisans of the Dilma Rousseff’s government, and the left wing in general, accuse Globo of fostering the protests, stimulating people to take to the streets against the government. On the other hand, the partisans of right wing parties accused the outlet of supporting the government. Both ideological fields consider the work of the channel as biased, but in completely opposite senses.

Here are two examples of tweets that accuse Globo of using the coverage of the protests to try to overthrow the left-wing government:

*#VemPraRua Globo tentou colocar fogo no país para tirar Dilma/PT do Governo!!! Feitiço voltou contra o Feiticeiro !!! Povo Grita #ForaGlobo*⁸²

*Não podemos nos calar Brasil, a @rede_globo quer fazer vc de otário, ela é tucana e comprometida a golpear o gov Dilma e Lula!! #VEMpraRua*⁸³

⁸⁰ In free translation: SBT is one more fascist media!! It makes me sickr, sons of bitches, they inverse everything, man *--* #VemPraRua.

⁸¹ In free translation: The Jornal Hoje manipulates the people. Do not be fooled by Rede Globo #protestorj #vempraru (Jornal Hoje is one of the news products of Globo).

⁸² In free translation: #VemPraRua Globo tried to put fire on the country to overthrow Dilma/PT from the government!!! The spell turned against the sorcerer!!! People shout #ForaGlobo

⁸³ In free translation: we cannot silence Brazil, @rede_globo wants to make you a sucker, it is *tucana* and committed to overthrowing the govt Dilma and Lula!! #VemPraRua (*tucano* is how the supporters of the right-wing party PSDB are called).

In the other sense, people also identify Globo as trying to support the government and work for the reelection of Dilma Roussef since, at that moment, the country was only one year away from the elections:

A @rede_globo e o seu jornalismo tendencioso vai tentar eleger a @dilmabr outra vez #VempraRua⁸⁴

Globo vendeu na era PT um Brasil no Caminho Certo.Hj sabemos que fomos Enganados/Roubados.Este Ã© o sentimento do povo Brasileiro #vempraru⁸⁵

That very negative vision about Globo from all ideological fields resulted in the use of 22 different hashtags that criticized the media outlet: #globomente (Globo lies), #foraglobo (Globo get out), #globogolpista (Globo for the coup d'état), #globofascista (Globo is fascist), #issoaglobonaomostroa (Globo does not show that), #ocupearedeglobo (occupy Rede Globo), #globomanipuladora (Globo is manipulative), #globomanipula (Globo manipulates), #globonaomerepresenta (Globo does not represent me), #umdiasemglobo (one day without Globo), #semglobo (without Globo), #globoracista (Globo is racist), #globopreconceituosa (Globo is prejudiced), #foraredeglobo (out with Rede Globo), #opovonaoeboboabaixoaredeglobo (people are no fool, down with Rede Globo), #fimdaglobo (the end of Globo), #abaixoredeglobopovonaoebobo (down with Rede Globo, people are no fool), #globolixo (Globo is garbage), #cpidaredeglobo (parliamentary inquiry commission for Globo network), #trollingGlobo, #redeesgoto (sewage network).

Apart from the political positioning of the news outlet regarding the government, another focus of critics to Globo was related to its choices on the coverage about violence. That had already become clear in the critics to Globo's content, but is also significant in relation to the critics to the outlet itself. As there were many conflicts between the police forces and the protesters, including the participation of Black Blocs at the end of the protest wave, the way to describe the action of these different groups was not consensual and, again, Globo was criticized both by supporting and for attacking the aggressive acts of protesters:

⁸⁴ In free translation: @rede_globo and its biased journalism will try to elect @dilmabr again @VemPraRua

⁸⁵ In free translation: Globo sold that the PT era was a Brazil in the right direction. Today we know we were fooled/robbed. This is the feeling of the Brazilian people @vempraru.

Globo transforma dia de vandalismo de grupo fascista em ""Dia de manifestações"". Isso me cansa a beleza! #VemPraRua #OperacaoSeteDeSetembro⁸⁶

B.Blocks Queimam bandeiras e quebram propriedades! E A Globo apóia esses fascistas, tentando atingir o governo! #VemPraRua Fazer baderna?⁸⁷

As imagens são claríssimas: são Black Bloc, Pouquíssimas pessoas de bem e quase nenhuma pauta. A @Globo transformou em Fora PT! #VemPraRua⁸⁸

E a imprensa disse que os manifestantes começaram #vempraruia fora #recordnews #globo⁸⁹

Eu queria entender pq a Globo fala que os manifestantes ""invadiram"" a rua. cara como podem invadir algo que é público?? #vempraruia⁹⁰

So, critics to Globo were generalized, but mainly focused on their support or not to the protesters and the government. It is interesting to see that these are the issues that divided the public's opinions and not the original issue of the protests: the price of public transportation. When these tweets were analyzed (from July to September 2013), this initial issue seemed long gone as a provocative element of debate.

Only one of the news website we analyzed had mentions in this category. The G1 website, that is part of the Globo group, was mainly criticized in tweets that also mentioned the Globo television channel or the outlet in general. This one, for example, refer to the day in which the G1 Twitter account was hacked by the Anonymous group:

Haha , @G1 se deu mal ! #GloboLixo #VempraRua #Anonymous⁹¹

Table 32 – Number and percentage of compliments, comments and critics to media outlets per news website

Mentions to media outlet/G1	8
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⁸⁶ In free translation: Globo turns a day of vandalism by a fascist group into “Day of Protests”. This makes me sick! #VemPraRua #OperacaoSeteDeSetembro

⁸⁷ In free translation: B. Blocks burn flags and destroy properties! And Globo supports these fascists while trying to knock down the government! #VemPraRua to make a mess?

⁸⁸ In free translation: The images are very clear: those are Black Blocs, very few people and almost no demand. @Globo turned it into “PT get out!” #vempraruia

⁸⁹ In free translation: And the press said that the protesters had started #vempraruia for a #recordnews #globo

⁹⁰ In free translation: I would like to understand why Globo says the protesters “invaded” the street. Man, how can they invade something that is public?? #vempraruia

⁹¹ In free translation: Haha, @G1 got played! #GloboLixo #VempraRua #Anonymous

Compliment/G1	0	0%
Comment/G1	1	13%
Critic/G1	7	87,50%
Mentions to media outlet/UOL	0	
Compliment/UOL	0	0%
Comment/UOL	0	0%
Critic/UOL	0	0%

Regarding the newspapers, we can see that Folha and Estadão report a small number of mentions as outlets and that they are negative in their totality. That is not the case for the newspaper O Globo. This last one has an almost equal percentage of critics and comments among the messages in which it is referred to. As mentioned before, O Globo's Twitter account was hacked by the Anonymous group and that generated diverse reactions on Twitter. The mentions to the hack were identified in 29 of the 52 tweets mentioning the media outlet. On one side there were neutral tweets, simply informing about what had occurred. We found 21 tweets that were considered neutral comments and that were related to the hack, which means the quasi-totality of the 25 comments regarding the media. Here is an example:

*Twitter de @JornalOGlobo invadido. #VemPraRua*⁹²

Considering the tweets that criticized the media, eight were directly related to the hack, which shows a less representative percentage when compared to neutral comments. The critics usually took advantage of the hack to criticize the media's posture towards the demonstrations or the society in general:

*Hackers invadem O GLOBO por mídia democrática <http://t.co/5NJGxludK7>
#chegademonopóliodacomunicação #foracorruptos #vemprarua #semviolência*⁹³

Table 33 – Number and percentage of compliments, comments and critics to media outlets per newspaper

Mentions to media outlet/Estadão	6	
Compliment/Estadão	0	0%
Comment/Estadão	0	0%

⁹² In free translation: @JornalOGlobo's Twitter hacked. #VemPraRua

⁹³ In free translation: Hackers invade O GLOBO for a more democratic media <http://t.co/5NJGxludK7>
#chegademonopóliodacomunicação #foracorruptos #vemprarua #semviolência

Critic/Estadão	6	100%
Mentions to media outlet/Folha	1	
Compliment/Folha	0	0%
Comment/Folha	0	0%
Critic/Folha	1	100%
Mentions to media outlet/O Globo	52	
Compliment/O Globo	0	0%
Comment/O Globo	27	51,90%
Critic/O Globo	25	48,10%

Two of the magazines we considered did not have mentions in this category (Table 34). And the *Veja* magazine received 82 mentions that were about the media outlet, all of them criticizing it. As mentioned before, *Veja* was the target of a mass tweet campaign on Wikileaks revelations involving the magazine. 75 of the 82 messages referring to the media were small variations of the following tweet:

Wikileaks: Revista Veja Tem Ideologia Revelada Por Ag Espionagem
*<http://t.co/UK3JFylGRt> #VemPraRua Brasil Dilma Snowden NSA Celso de Mello*⁹⁴

Table 34 – Number and percentage of compliments, comments and critics to media outlets per magazine

Mentions to media outlet/Carta Capital	0	
Compliment/Carta Capital	0	0%
Comment/Carta Capital	0	0%
Critic/Carta Capital	0	0%
Mentions to media outlet/Época	0	
Compliment/Época	0	0%
Comment/Época	0	0%
Critic/Época	0	0%
Mentions to media outlet/Veja	82	
Compliment/Veja	0	0%
Comment/Veja	0	0%
Critic/Veja	82	100,00%

⁹⁴ In free translation: Wikileaks: *Veja* has its ideology revealed by the spying agency <http://t.co/UK3JFylGRt> #VemPraRua Brasil Dilma Snowden NSA Celso de Mello

Our last category of analysis aimed at assessing whether the mentions to media outlets were generally done to one specific media or rather to a number of them, which might characterize a discourse about the media system in a more general sense.

Table 35 shows that in the majority of cases, mentions are addressed to one media in particular. It is the most common category amid the three TV channels that were included in the study. Band is the only case where comments are more frequently done in group than individually, but the corpus is really small, hence not representative. Critics that involve multiple media are usually based on a vision of homogeneity in the mainstream media system, generally described as “the media” (a mídia) or “the big media” (a grande mídia).

*vamos atacar a grande mídia, que mente na nossa cara. #VemPraRua @tvrecord @rede_globo @SBTOficial*⁹⁵

By far, the most frequent between these tweets are critics to all the mentioned media, but in very rare cases, the message intends to criticize one media and compliment another, drawing a comparison:

*E mais uma vez enquanto a @RedeGloboTV ""oculta imagens"" a @record mostra - mais uma - agressão da @PMERJ aos professores do Rj... #vempraru*⁹⁶

Table 35 – Number of messages mentioning one, two or three or more media per television channel

Mentions to media outlet/Record	20	
One outlet/Record	11	55%
Two outlets/Record	2	10%
Three or more outlets/Record	7	35%
Mentions to media outlet/Band	2	
One outlet/Band	0	0%
Two outlets/Band	0	0%
Three or more outlets/Band	2	100%

⁹⁵ In free translation: let’s attack the big media, that lies to our face #VemPraRua @tvrecord @rede_globo @SBTOficial

⁹⁶ In free translation: And once again, while @RedeGloboTV “hides images”, @record shows – one more – aggression of the @PMERJ to the teachers of RJ... #vempraru

Mentions to media outlet/SBT	19	
One outlet/SBT	11	57,90%
Two outlets/SBT	3	15,80%
Three or more outlets/SBT	5	26,30%
Mentions to media outlet/Globo	962	
One outlet/Globo	948	98,50%
Two outlets/Globo	9	1,00%
Three or more outlets/Globo	5	0,50%

Regarding the three other types of media we considered, the tendency of a majority of messages mentioning only one media was also present. It represented almost the totality of cases in mentions to the newspaper O Globo and the Veja magazine and a least half of them for the G1 website and the Estadão newspaper. Tweets that mention more than one media are generally speaking of similar behavior of these media in a certain matter, as this one for example:

*#SP #Metrô lotado, corrupção no pedágio, roubam vc em bares, polícia apoia traficante e @folha_com @Estadao abafam tudo #vemprarua #tucanoduto*⁹⁷

In the case of the website G1, most of the times, it is mentioned in connection with another media, the Globo channel, which seems logic, since they are part of the same media group. Messages usually criticize both media. Here is an example that we already mentioned:

*Haha , @G1 se deu mal ! #GloboLixo #VempraRua #Anonymous*⁹⁸

Table 36 – Number of messages mentioning one, two or three or more media per news media, newspaper and magazine

Mentions to media outlet/G1	8		Mentions to media outlet/Estadão	6		Mentions to media outlet/Carta Capital	0	
One outlet/G1	5	62,5%	One outlet/Estadão	3	50%	One outlet/Carta Capital	0	0%
Two outlets/G1	3	38%	Two outlets/Estadão	2	33,3%	Two outlets/Carta Capital	0	0%
Three or more outlets/G1	0	0%	Three or more outlets/Estadão	1	11,7%	Three or more outlets/Carta Capital	0	0%

⁹⁷ In free translation: #SP crowded #metro, corruption in the tolls, people steal from you in bars, the police supports drug dealers and @folha_com @Estadao hide everything #vemprarua #tucanoduto

⁹⁸ In free translation: Haha, @G1 got played! #GloboLixo #VempraRua #Anonymous

Mentions to media outlet/UOL	0		Mentions to media outlet/Folha	1		Mentions to media outlet/Época	0	
One outlet/UOL	0	0%	One outlet/Folha	0	0%	One outlet/Época	0	0%
Two outlets/UOL	0	0%	Two outlets/Folha	0	0%	Two outlets/Época	0	0%
Three or more outlets/UOL	0	0%	Three or more outlets/Folha	1	100%	Three or more outlets/Época	0	0%
			Mentions to media outlet/O Globo	52		Mentions to media outlet/Veja	82	
			One outlet/O Globo	50	96,2%	One outlet/Veja	75	91,5%
			Two outlets/O Globo	2	3,8%	Two outlets/Veja	7	8,5%
			Three or more outlets/O Globo	0	0%	Three or more outlets/Veja	0	0%

5.4 Mainstream media as a target and the reconfiguration of the communication system

As we could see both in the analysis of our interviews and of the tweets, the critics to mainstream media is a central point of the discourses concerning the use of social media during the protests of 2013. The use of this new technology is not only seen as a new space where new narratives may be produced, but more than that, those narratives are being produced to confront, unmask and unveil a certain media system already in place.

On the one hand, the interviews clearly showed that the actors of the 2013 protests saw the social media use as an opportunity to counter the coverage of mainstream media. On the other hand, the tweets show that the mentions to these same media were highly critical.

A first conclusion that we can draw from this analysis is that there is no sense in thinking about social media as isolated from mainstream media. There are multiple paths that connect both communicative spaces. In the case of the Brazilian protests of 2013, Twitter – and possibly brought by social media in a more general sense – were not only an environment where mainstream media were mentioned, but also where their content was shared and guided a part of the discussion. In the contrary sense, although we do not analyze the media coverage of the protests here, many of the actions that took place on social media, such as the hacks or the expression of politicians and other well-known public figures, were also reported by mainstream media. It seems clear that they may not be treated as isolated instances. That finding seems to corroborate the conformation of the social media

environment as a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), where different media logics are in place and interconnected.

That being said, it seems reductionist to present social media as an opposition to mainstream media. It is clear in our analysis that the critics to the established communication system occupies an important space in the Twitter conversation, but, at the same time, the mass media content is still a crucial element to guide the discussion (we will deepen that analysis on Chapter 7). So, we argue that social media may not be considered as an entirely alternative media⁹⁹, even if alternative practices and discourses may emerge within it. That is to say, social media in its completeness cannot be seen as an alternative to mainstream media, because the latter are also present in the first.

The importance of this differentiation lies on the fact that social media may be seen as privileged spaces of criticism to mainstream media, as pointed by many of the interviewed actors, and also as supposes the mediactivism concept of Cardon and Granjon (2010). Yet, at the same time, social media is a communication environment where this very mainstream media are frequently guiding the discussion. That means that these media do have an important role in the discussion about the protests that took place on Twitter. That result is corroborated by previous research that found, for example, a central role of mainstream media content on Youtube content in Brazil (Silva & Mundim, 2015). That results in the fact that an important part of the content that people shared, commented and discussed cannot be considered as alternative. The same communication environment also made way to strong and disseminated critic about mainstream media and the traditional communication system in itself.

It is also important to highlight that the critic to the media was done both by left and right-wing. Although their arguments towards the media behavior was opposed, we did not identify significant differences in the way they were carried out. That means that the characterization of the mediactivist practices as “progressive”, as done by Cardon and

⁹⁹ We adopt here the definition of alternative media as a media that has dissident origins or approaches in regard to mainstream media. It is not our aim to extend the discussion about the definition of media that bring differences from mainstream ones, but we do highlight there is extensive literature about that discussion, considering differences in origins, purposes, actors and content produced. For an extensive discussion about that, see Ferron (2006). As the terminology varies across countries, see also Dornelles (2007) for specifics of the Latin American reality. Suzina (2018) proposes and discusses the use of the term “popular media” for several Brazilian experiences, including the *Mídia Ninja* case, also analyzed in this dissertation.

Granjon (2010), does not seem to have a reason to be. In our corpus, we can say that both the right and the left wing do contribute to the discredit of mainstream media.

The second conclusion we might take from our analysis is that the discourse about the media is mostly guided by a strong criticism towards media, especially the media outlets themselves. It is important to highlight that media was not the center of the discussion around the protests, but was amid the topics both of the discussion and of protest actions (approximately 6,6% of all tweets mentioned one of the 12 mainstream media).

Within this discussion, the large majority of comments were related to the television channel Globo, the larger news and entertainment outlet in Brazil. Critical tone prevailed both on comments about specific contents published by the media regarding the coverage of the protests, as well as on those concerning the media outlets themselves. Very few compliments and neutral comments were detected. The media owned by the Globo group (Globo TV channel, news website G1 and newspaper O Globo) seem to be the preferential target of the critics, alongside the *Veja* magazine.

The analysis that most broadly allowed us to see the specificities of the discourse about the media was that of the critics made to the Globo as an outlet. As we had a larger corpus (840 tweets), we could identify more precisely the motivations and trends of the criticism. That analysis indicated two main topics of criticism of the media: its support or not to the government and to the protesters. As those two topics are denotative of that moment of the 2013 wave of protests, the most interesting aspect is actually that Globo was criticized by both sides in the two topics. The outlet was accused, at the same time, of supporting and of trying to overthrow the government, as well as of encouraging and delegitimizing the protesters.

Far from putting Globo in a position of innocent, since it was attacked by both sides, this phenomenon shows a generalized sense of mistrust in mainstream media from all ideological and political fields. The decline of trust in media was also identified by the Edelman Trust Barometer¹⁰⁰ that, in 2018, showed a decrease in the trust in media in Brazil, while the international average stayed the same. The main reasons pointed by the interviewed not to

¹⁰⁰ The complete results of the research may be seen here: <https://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2018-edelman-trust-barometer-brasil-report>

trust in media were the use of sensationalist resources to attract more audience, news published rapidly, without the appropriate verification and some form of ideological bias. Almost half of the interviewed declared they did not know on what news outlet to trust.

Analyzing this finding about the 2013 protests today allows us to establish a link between that phenomena and an episode that would happen further on the Brazilian political life: the enormous dissemination of fake news¹⁰¹ – especially through WhatsApp - and their influence in the 2018 elections. If the motivations of this phenomenon appear to be multiple, certainly the low credibility of the traditional information mediators can be pointed out as an important element to be taken into consideration.

The use of the Twitter conversation to criticize the media represents a clear mediactivist practice, as described by Cardon and Granjon (2010). And the communication environment of Twitter provides indeed specific possibilities for this kind of action, as the articulation of different messages around meaningful hashtags (such as the 22 hashtags we identified criticizing Globo) and broadening of the actors that can publish their opinion function as triggers to these discourses.

The third conclusion results from the previous two: mainstream media are still a major actor when talking about conversation on social media, but they are highly discredited and criticized. That reality changes significantly the way the Brazilian communication system operates. Social media are consolidated as communication environments being used for many social purposes, including political actions. So, not only mainstream media have to compete on the production and dissemination of information against new actors that gain the possibility of publishing their own news and opinions on social media, but they have to do so in the middle of a credibility crisis.

That paves the way for the emergence of new mediators of information and for questioning the very mediation process. That is what we are going to explore on Chapter 6.

¹⁰¹ For more about the use of fake news on the 2018 Brazilian elections, see: https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/10/25/infos-au-bresil-comment-les-fausses-informations-ont-impacte-whatsapp_5374637_4408996.html

6. Mediation and gatekeeping challenges in a social media environment

Now that we have identified how social media was used to elaborate practices and discourses towards mainstream media, we are going to focus our understanding on how the new communication environment of social media opens new possibilities for the mediation processes. Analyzing mediation processes may be a rich way of understanding various elements related to the social impact of collective actions, such as the framing processes in mainstream media, the self-representations by activists, the technology use to organize and mobilize for protest (Cammaerts, 2012).

Although many communication studies tend to focus on analysis of the media, Martín-Barbero (1987; 2006) calls us to focus on the value and importance of discussing mediation rather than the media itself. The author sustains that building a perception about a communication phenomenon only from a media perspective can be reductionist and disregard the wider social process they are embedded in. To him, the communication process is an essential part of a larger social and cultural process that produces complex and, sometimes contradictory, movements in society. Only by paying attention to mediation processes, the sense of this phenomena and the social role of communication may be understood in a more complete manner. What he proposes is “that the axis of the debate shifts from the media to the mediations, that is, to the articulations between communication practices and social movements, to the different temporalities and the plurality of cultural matrices” (1987, p.203).

In that sense, Cammaerts (2012) will then argue that social movements would be inherently dependent on media for certain purposes, what would put communication not at the periphery of the movements, as accessories, but rather at their core. The author proposes a shift from the focus on political opportunity structures to that on mediation/discursive opportunity. He then indicates that these mediation opportunities should be seen as structured around three interlinked levels of analysis.

The first one would relate to mainstream media and focus on “the various ways in which activists attempt to catch the attention of the media mainly by producing spectacle through a show of numbers, through inflicting damage or through bearing witness to injustice” (p.122). The second level shifts the attention to the communication strategies more centered in the activists themselves, which produce counter-narratives independently disseminated. The third level addresses resistance practices mediated through technology “as ICTs increasingly sustain movements, coordinate direct action and have become tools of direct action in their own right.” (p.122).

An analysis of the mediation process would then be capable of articulating these three essential communicational elements on recent protest movements: the role of mainstream media in the production and dissemination of narratives, the possibility of the emergence of alternatives to that discourse and the central role of technology and network logic. We consider the approach proposed by Cammaerts (2012) is interesting to organize the analysis on the topic, although we see the third level of analysis – that of the technology - as transversal to the other two. So, in fact, the mediation exercised both by mainstream media and by the activists themselves may be analyzed in the context of the ICTs, which would not constitute a separated dimension of analysis, but rather cross the other two.

But before going directly into more analytical frames of this issue, we would like to take a step back. If we search for the origins of the mediation process, we can say that the perception of reality by men is and has always been a mediated process. We never had access to reality without intermediaries that would allow an interpretation from what you see. The five senses and the cultural and linguistic repertoire are some of the intermediaries constructing the representation we make of the real. Regardless of any technological apparatus, the perception of reality is always mediated. In that sense, it is important to highlight that we do not attribute any intrinsically negative value to mediation (Santos, 2010). We understand that the representation acts as an inseparable and constructive part of reality, not being necessary to lose 'reality' in relation to the real (Rubim, 2002).

But our interest resides more precisely on the mediation processes that takes place through technological devices that expand one’s visibility beyond the here and now¹⁰² (Thompson,

¹⁰² The visibility dynamics will be further discussed on Chapter 7.

2005). Voirol (2005) highlights the role of these mediators, as actors that perceive a portion of the world, turning them into objects through different supports, such as texts, images and sounds. According to him, “the mediator translates in its own way a single situation and objectifies it in form of a narrative” (Voirol, 2005, p.98). The action of the mediator is, then, focused on generating visibility of certain issues to an imagined audience.

Although the emphasis of our analysis is on the role of the mediator, we cannot disregard that those that are subject to this mediation processes shall not be seen as passive. According to Voirol (2005), they will experiment the “world perceived by the mediator” (p.98) with its “own perspective, inscribed in his moral-practical universe” (p.98). Even if the individual will not have access to the concrete situations that generated the mediator’s perspective, he will interpret what he sees according to his own references. “He builds his knowledge of situations or specific experiences, of which he often he has no practical and immediate knowledge, from the construction of the visible operated by the mediator” (p.99).

In contemporary society, media have assumed an important mediation role. From the moment that not all reality that concerns us is at the limit of our sight, media assume a role of bringing facts to public knowledge.

Reality extends beyond what I am experiencing in the first person. My access to it is then mediated by a group of trusted storytellers who, in their turn, experience it directly or rely on witnesses who experience it in the first person. In contemporary societies, the production and certification of the narratives through which we experience the pictures of the world at the moment, the so-called actuality, is a function of journalism. (Gomes, 2009, p.14-15)

But this role of media as an almost exclusive mediator between reality and contemporary societies will be challenged in the context of hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2013), where different media logics coexist and are in permanent interaction. It is that moment of disruption that interest us here.

What social media will do is to defy the gatekeeping role of professional journalism (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Coleman, 2017a; Stier, Schünemann, & Steiger, 2018). By making it possible for any actor to publish information and opinions, social media websites bring about several possibilities in the dispute for public attention. As explains Cardon (2015), for a long

time, media was a beacon that shed light in the panorama and organized public attention. But, with social media, there is a pluralization of panoramas that are drawn by each individual's choices and by a new technical structure that structures it (Cardon, 2015).

Social media enables not only a greater publication of information regarding social reality, but it also creates new possibilities of filtering and curating news (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). Definitely, that does not mean that all actors participating in this process are now in equal conditions as mediators, but it does mean a change to the mediation process, which used to be highly concentrated on mainstream media. As attests Keane (2013), the age of mass broadcasting is fading fast and with it there is a diversification and multiplication of news sources and streams.

To deal with this new diversity of actors that now have the possibility to interfere in the cycle of news production, diffusion and consumption, classical concepts that were used to explain this mediation role of media, such as gatekeepers, have to be rethought. Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) will then propose the idea of networked gatekeeping. According to them, this rereading of the concept would incorporate a multi-level process that includes new actors with variant levels of power. Another difference from the traditional conceptualization of gatekeepers is that it considers sociability as a new variable in the information flow. The authors will use the categories of elite and non-elite to describe the different actors in interaction in this selection of information process, the novelty being that the non-elite actors have now more possibilities of action regarding the information.

This process of emergent eliteness, which we refer to as networked gatekeeping, is arguably different from how prominence was achieved in pre-Web 2.0 newsrooms and news environments, among other power contexts. We thus define networked gatekeeping as a process through which actors are crowdsourced to prominence through the use of conversational, social practices that symbiotically connect elite and crowd in the determination of information relevancy. (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p.21)

Another difference of the gatekeeping process on social media is that those media are, at the same time, creating and being affected by gatekeeping processes (Segeberg & Bennett, 2011). On the one hand, the fact that the platform is part of a broader and strongly interconnected communication system brings exterior influences to the platforms. That

means that being able or not to share a certain content on social media may also depend – and it frequently does – on gatekeeping process already done in other platforms, especially on mainstream media. But, on the other hand, the dynamic inside the platform produces its own gatekeeping logics, much more diffused and empowered by crowd sourced practices. So, Sergerberg and Bennett (2011) will sustain that the disintermediation process has only worked half way, since activists still depend and try to draw the attention of mass media to gain recognition, but attracting that attention relies on new possibilities now.

Social media, and Twitter in particular, allow any person with an account on the network to assume a gatekeeping role in the sense of selecting parts of reality that should be shared with a potentially large public. But we have to take into account that such openness for new actors also creates a whirlwind of information that will not be fully accessed by all the users. That leads to a second selection process that organizes this information in personal ways. It is also at this moment that the initial receiver of information may participate in a more decisive manner in the definition of the information flow, once he or she decides or not to replicate, comment or edit the original content (it would be what Gomes (2016) calls the “bleachers’ effect”¹⁰³).

Also, we cannot disregard that the organization of information flows will always be done in accordance with the affordances of a the technical platform where this communicative exchange is taking place (Jouët, 1993). That is why the role of mediator of the platforms and their designs cannot be disregarded as an influence on the communicative practices that take place in it (Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013). This element is often naturalized and little discussed, but the so-called “digital” may represent very different political, social and technical projects (Mabi et Gruson-Daniel, 2018).

As proposed by Jouët (1993), we should consider a two-step mediation process that mixes the technological and the social roles. According to her, “if the communication technologies play an organizing role in the social productions, at the same time there is a socialization of this devices that gives them form” (p.121). That dual perspective focused on the technique and the social is also proposed in another manner by Martín-Barbero (2006), that highlights

¹⁰³ This idea was previously explained in Chapter 2.

the technicity has become a universal connector that redefines communicational and political dynamics.

To summarize, we are working with a complex mediation environment where mainstream media and alternative sources of information make use of technology in different ways (Cammaerts, 2012). In that context, we focus our attention on the role of the mediators – even if we do not consider this instance as pluripotent, since the reception of information is also a space of dispute (Voirol, 2005) – and on how the new possibilities of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) challenge the old space occupied almost exclusively by mainstream media. In that new space, we consider a triple approach towards mediation: the emergence of a multilevel gatekeeping process (Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013), the overlap of gatekeeping processes that are, at the same time, produced and affected by social media (Seeger and Bennet, 2011), and the role of technology in that mediation (Jouët, 2013).

We will use our interviews with journalists, activists and communication advisors to discuss how are these new paths of mediations and gatekeeping appropriated by different social actors. The three different social groups deal with this new reality according to very different points of view. Journalists are at the center of that change, having the value of their work challenged by new actors and trying to find new forms to differentiate their mediation from others. At the same time, activists and governments try to explore and take advantages of the new possibilities. What interests us is to address two research questions: how do the different actors we interviewed deal with the challenge of the mediating role of mainstream media trying to establish alternative paths of information flow? What kinds and levels of mediation should we consider when discussing social media?

6.1 Journalists and social media: displacing the value of professional mediation

If activists and communication advisors are trying to find ways to take advantage of the new possibilities in the mediation process, the journalists are right at the stake of this change. Journalism, that for a long time had the ambivalent function of making actions accessible to the public and enlarging the visibility horizon by exercising their power to select and format the information (Voirol, 2005) are now challenged by new actors.

The emergence of technologies of digital communication seriously disturbed the journalistic practices, weakened the gatekeeping privileges, broadened the agenda, bypassed the information gap and opened a vast space of autonomous public interaction. This new media ecology did not move the ancient media system, but reconfigured it (Coleman, 2017b, p.31)

In our interviews, we identified that these new mediation processes had influenced the journalistic routines, challenging journalists with the need to deal with new forms of searching for and producing stories. The consequences pointed by our interviewees mainly refer to the lack of institutional intermediary instances between journalists and their sources (such as press advisors or speakers) and, more than that, the lack of clearly established sources in the movements. As we saw, the moment of 2013 protests marks, at the same time, the emergence of new social actors on the streets and on the digital networks, which impacted the way journalists are able to construct representations of reality.

The widespread use of social media strongly influences the journalistic routine. Bruno Lupion, journalist at the news portal UOL at the time of the 2013 protests, remembers that “social media was important especially because the organization of the movement was decentralized. There was no press advisor, no website”. Because of that, Lupion says that journalists used social media to “know who those people were, to ask for interviews and to have an agenda of the protests”.

So, the difference in the organizational dynamics of the protests was also felt in the newsroom. Journalists could not rely only on their traditional way of searching for information and for verified sources for their stories anymore.

Both Piero Locatelli, journalist at the Carta Capital magazine at the time of the protests, and Lupion reported searching for sources to their articles on social media and having succeeded to obtain interviews from those persons. Social media was used not only to contact people, but primarily to identify who was involved in the protests and would agree to talk about it.

Thus, it is not only about new ways of reaching the same old actors, but rather using social media to uncover new personalities that may have important information to disclose. Lupion also mentions the agenda of the protests. Journalists no longer received press releases by e-

mails, containing information about the demonstrations. Instead, they had to actively search for that and social media was the place for it.

In the same sense, a journalist that worked at one of the major Brazilian media outlets and does not want to be identified considers that “What was different in 2013 was the lack of protagonist. They did not step on stages. That affected the comfort of the reporters and the cameramen”. While doing the coverage in place, the journalists were confronted with new challenges: where to point the camera if there is no stage? Who to interview if there are no identified leaders?

Locatelli explains such differences in the press coverage are in connection with the fact that, previously, media “was only interested in institutional politics”. Locatelli supports that the 2013 protests broadened the political view of the press and forced journalists to integrate new forms of investigation and information search. The non-identified journalist we interviewed also agrees with that perception. To her, “social media were already important to the coverage and they become even more when new social groups, that basically were born and grew up on Facebook, entered on the scene”. So, there is a dual movement: both the emergence of new social actors in protest movements and the broadening of the journalistic sources, that no longer passed thru institutional mediators in these kinds of political event. In that crossroad, social media was used as an efficient tool to better understand and approach the dynamics of what was going on in the streets.

If the organizing dynamics of the movements that took to the streets challenged the established logic of the journalistic work, on the other hand, the governmental response to them also posed new elements. Thomas Traumann, former speaker of the Brazilian Presidency explains, for example, that when the government announced new policies via social media, he received a lot of complaints from journalists, accustomed to having exclusivity on those cases. So, even from the traditional sources of journalists, the information was no longer arrived the same way. Information that used to be released by the press on an exclusive manner, was then being shared directly with a broader public.

That is why Locatelli also highlights that, for him, the journalist work is not limited to the identification of stories that are already on social media. He considers that journalists should “look for something not so attached to the immediate”. They can, at the same time, search for information via social networks, being also responsible for “bringing new stories to these

networks”. This sense that social media should not only work as an effective source of information for journalists, but that they should also propose something different in this new environment was also an important element of our interviews.

Social media also creates new possibilities for the content journalists produce since it offers the possibility of a coverage that is much faster than traditional media, which is very well adapted to the diffusion of breaking news (Mercier, 2013). That allows journalists to combine different temporalities of their work. The publication of small pills of their investigation through social network may be a preliminary step to more complex pieces. That was what Lupion told us during the interview. He reports having sent a tweet in the day the protesters in Brasília tried to break into the National Congress in 2013. “I will tell you what it was like: the roof of the Congress trembled because people were clapping their foot on it”, he remembers. The message was at the same time a form of live coverage of what was happening and a part of his investigative work for the news portal he worked for. “Twitter was very useful to report in a raw manner what I was seeing, what was going on”, he attests.

These testimonials account for the effects of different mediation processes in the journalistic work in several senses. On one hand, social media will be used by journalists as alternative to institutional mediators (such as press advisors) to search for official statements, agendas and spokespersons. That will change not only the routine of the journalistic work, but also the kind of coverage they produce, that will include new actors, that before were ignored. On the other, the new possibilities of social media will also change the temporality of the journalistic work, allowing the publication of small pieces of information on social media at the moment of an event. It is important to take into account that these publications will generate reactions, which might be taken into account in the elaboration of the final piece. So, again the different mediation processes will influence the way journalistic information is produced. This effort to report, verify and diffuse information as quickly as possible, also contributes to the blurring of the boundaries of the professional activity and personal opinions in the experiences of journalists (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013).

A third element that caught our attention when discussing this issue is the journalistic work as a level of mediation that relies that organizes or gives sense to information published by others. Locatelli, for instance, considers that “our [the journalists’] main job was to

systematically follow social networks. It was not about pages x or y; interesting stories evolved erratically”. So, at the same time journalists lose their exclusivity in mediation, they may assume other roles in the communicative system, as “curators of broad, cross-cultural conversations as opposed to impartial information disseminators” (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013, p.20).

That is why the journalists we interviewed consider that understanding the role of mediation done by the journalists is at the core of the comprehension of this new communication ecology. The journalist that did not want to be identified highlighted that, in this scenario with multiple centers producing information, “it is important to know from which point of view an information was produced”. She explains that the impact of who produces the story has to be taken into account. And that in order to identify the different origins and interests behind each information “the reporter has to be very cautious. The work with social media needs more and more people”. In this speech, she highlights two important points for this discussion. The first is that not all information should be considered in the same way: the source and point of view in which the information was produced will have a decisive influence that needs to be taken into account when reading a text. If, on the one hand, the variety and abundance of information may facilitate the journalistic work in the sense of making more information available to reporters, on the other, the evaluation about the origins and trustworthy of this information may take time and skills. That is why she highlights that more people are needed to deal with this new reality.

In his turn, when Locatelli talks about the new communication collectives that were formed during the protests, he considers that “these new groups are as much impartial as any other newspaper. What newspaper can do to differentiate them is respecting technical elements. And, in some level, also the ethical commitments. One thing is embedded in the other”. To him, the new communication groups do not necessarily follow these professional procedures. More than that, he refuses to see the work of these groups as impartial, highlighting that that may bring new points of view, but are as partial as any other media. In short, he is saying that it is not sufficient to acknowledge new mediators that enter the communication system, it is necessary to understand how their information is produced and what impact that may have.

As we saw on Chapter 5, questions about partiality of mainstream media dominated the discourse on the 2013 protests, but the same critics were not necessarily directed to other sources of information. Locatelli considers that this partiality of media was not necessarily the consequence of intentional bias, but possibly also due to the fact that “there was a lot going on”. To the unidentified journalist that we interviewed, “we do not do journalism to please, we do it to show what we see. What I see may be different from what you see”. Their discourse does make it very clear that reality will always be more complex than the point of view of one journalist or media is able to express on their articles.

So, this new communicative landscape does not exclude journalism, nor makes it equal to any other information mediators. But its routines, practices and values are displaced and gain new meanings in a communication environment where they no longer fly solo as mediators.

6.2 The utopia of the disintermediated: the live, the unedited, the real

Among the activists we interviewed, the possibility of challenging the mediation of mainstream media is frequently viewed not only as a chance of producing alternative information, but also of producing information that are more faithful to reality. So, it consists in a double movement of taking advantage from the possibility of producing and conveying their own narrative, but also to assign greater value to such narrative, in terms of proximity to reality, as if, more than the mainstream media, the one’s directly involved in the action were capable of transmitting the facts in a more “real” way.

In contrast to mainstream media, that would have vested interests in the production of their own narratives – the negative vision about Brazilian mainstream media was exposed on Chapter 5 and can explain in part this discourse –, activists would then be able to show what happened on the streets in a “direct” and “unedited” manner through social media. Our interviews made clear that the emergence of digital social networks reshaped the way the stories are constructed (Coleman, 2017b) and that that change is often associated to a decrease in the degree of intermediation between reality and people.

During the interviews we conducted, several activists expressed the idea that, in social media networks, information is transmitted more directly, with less interest, and therefore it would be more accurate. The possibility of generating information from the bottom is evaluated positively in comparison to mainstream media information, which would be generated from the top and therefore far from reality (Sirens, 2013).

To the activist Rebeca Lerer, for example, “the answer that came from the streets and social media is not only an answer to the government, but also a kind of indignation, of a way to assume one’s own voice in the public debate”. She considers that the increasing access to information provided by the internet, as well as the education made available through many different public policies implemented in Brazil, were crucial elements in this process where the citizens assumed their own voice. To her, that process of obtaining a voice is important not only in relation with direct demands from the movement in regards to the government, but also in the way activists see themselves.

Another activist, Pablo Capilé, goes in the same sense, declaring: “In my opinion, the first major crisis of intermediaries took place in the music industry. The second was in the media. The third is in the political representation. All of it is a consequence of the organizational model of the internet, with this mosaic of partialities”.

Several interesting elements in his statement address these new mediation possibilities. First of all, he clearly characterizes it not only by a change in mediation, but by a decrease in the degree of mediation, what he calls “crisis of intermediaries”. Secondly, to him, this process is not restricted to the communication arena, but would rather be a more general characteristic of what he calls “the organizational model of the internet”, which would affect different social processes. Capilé also describes the structure of the internet as a mosaic of partialities, which is an interesting form to express new and multiple mediators that are side by side in this communication arena.

Also, regarding the decrease of intermediaries, the activist Paulinho Fluxus_ evaluates positively the fact that social media allowed “a break in the intermediary role the press played between readers and the movements”. To him, the process is also positively evaluated.

That positivity regarding the new possibilities of mediation beyond mainstream media may be partially explained by the new functionalities of digital communication and the possibility of new actors – in this case, activists – to manage them according to their own interests. Antonio and Magalhães (2017) describe the new communicative devices as having a "minimal interpretive character" (p.7). According to them, these media would not privilege the commenting role and instead would allow, for example, live streams, which would convey more "raw" information (p.7). To them, first-person narratives and participants' testimonials are positively viewed as ways of opposing traditional media and their farther stories.

This discourse about the possibilities of new media does not only concern digital media themselves, but must rather be seen in comparison with the perception of mainstream media. It is not in isolation that they are seen as capable of conveying a more real picture of reality, instead they are pointed as being able to produce more truth, in comparison to mainstream media.

This vision of traditional media as a more distant producer of information gains importance in Brazil because of the dimension of the critics to the mainstream media system, as we saw in Chapter 5. That conception of the mainstream media as unable to properly picture reality creates a positive scenario for eventual alternatives that arise. Lerer highlights that "With social media, the press said one thing and we, who were on the streets, said another. And there was a moment where the two narratives collided frontally". This statement makes it clearer that this discourse about mediation is intrinsically related to this vision about differences and oppositions between mainstream and social media.

Lerer also highlights that this process of producing information from the street combines digital and analogical practices in a very specific way: "It is crazy because it is very digital, but very analogical at the same time. In the internet, it is super digital, with videos, live streams. On the streets, it is analogical, with no sound system, posters done by hand and not printed". So, indeed, this supposedly more precise information about reality is not only about digital media, but it may also include analogical processes. What is mostly digital here is the possibility of disseminating this narrative in large scale.

The idea that social media made the emergence of less intermediated communicative processes possible is also a consequence of the vision of mainstream media as excessively interpretative. Pablo Capilé, activist and one of the founders of the alternative media *Mídia Ninja*, says that:

It was the first time that they [mainstream media] saw the population outraged with regards to their partiality disguised of impartiality. They did not have credibility to be on the streets. They were expelled from the streets, they had to do their broadcast from helicopters.

So, according to him, the new possibilities in mediation also led to the authorization or not to certain mediators to be closer to the movement. When mainstream media were perceived as adversaries, they could not reach the movement. In contrast, *Mídia Ninja* is described by him as “a multitude media”. He adds:

We were a media identified with the demonstrators. So, they [mainstream media] did distant evaluations, entrenched in their studios, trying to interpret facts according to their convenience. And we were at the eye of the hurricane, presenting real time the very narrative of the activist, without manipulation. So, they [mainstream media] used their manipulation filter and we gave voice and visibility to those who were on the streets.

It is interesting to perceive the appropriation of the word “manipulation” here. As we saw on Chapter 5, this is one of the most used words to criticize mainstream media. Manipulation is then negatively seen both as a process that creates biased or untruth pictures of reality, and that hides an intention to provoke a certain reaction from the public. Journalists and the mainstream media in general are seen as manipulators, both in regard to reality (manipulating the facts, saying that activists started the confrontation, for example) and in regards to the public (when trying to produce a certain reaction or positioning from the audience).

In that sense, the work of the media, which should be to provide information, is pictured as presenting similarities with propaganda. Referring to network propaganda processes, Benkler, Faris and Robert (2018) describe manipulation as the act of “Directly influencing

someone's beliefs, attitudes, or preferences in ways that fall short of what an empathetic observer would deem normatively appropriate in context" (p.30). This action is clearly in disagreement with the basis of professional journalism, which are described by the same authors as "detachment, nonpartisanship, the inverted pyramid writing style, facticity, and balance" (p.6). It is that expectation breach that tends to drive an important part of the critics to mainstream media. In contrast, alternatives to this mediation, would have the possibility of avoiding these manipulations by "giving voice to those that were on the streets", in a symbolic gesture of giving the prominence back to the main actors.

In face of those new possibilities, Leandro Fortes, that was responsible for the communication strategies of the Worker's Party at that time talked about the challenges of the party:

Social networks became more important because they prevent the exclusive intermediation of journalists in regard to the facts. All citizens become a communicator, a transmitter of information. We need to include these people in the [communication] system. Get out from the bubble of journalists and go to the great bubble of social communication.

To Fortes, it is as if the space of communication had been enlarged and the political parties needed to deal with that by incorporating new voices that were not usually taken into consideration.

The vision of communication expressed by activists, in which the supposed decrease in intermediation is positively valued, can also be related to the concept of democracy supported by the demonstrators. A survey conducted by researcher Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça, who interviewed 50 activists, shows that ideas of increasing participation mechanisms and self-governance are at the core of the understanding of democracy among demonstrators (Mendonça, 2018). Respondents repeatedly emphasized the importance of direct forms of democracy and horizontal self-management practices at all levels of social life. Mendonça and Bustamante (2018) claim that "there was a broader claim for the disintermediation of politics across the protests, setting the field of contention that allowed those different actors to march together". So, both in the political and in the communication

system, people value their direct participation as a way to improve their functioning. Intermediation, both by journalists and politicians, gains a negative meaning.

There is, however, no consensus as to the effects of disintermediation on democracy. A line of discussion present among internet and public sphere-researches argue that internet could be catalyzing a deterioration of social mediation – what Stéphanie Wojcik calls “social fracture” (2011) - and policy that had been traditionally undertaken by mass communication (Lycarião, 2009). For such scholars, this would constitute a negative aspect because disintermediation would cause the fragmentation of collective affairs through which people usually interact discursively. Instead, it would settle highly individualized communication, incompatible with the construction of a public place (the common world, of Hannah Arendt – see Chapter 7).

On the other hand, some researchers see disintermediated communication as a possibility of strengthening the public sphere. They see the internet as an opportunity for the participation of new actors in this sphere, multiplying information sources. "The internet could thus bring about a broadening of discursive participation in the public sphere, substantially increasing the levels of political justice" (Lycarião, 2009, p.7).

But, if on the one hand, journalists and professional media in a broader sense lose their monopoly over the gatekeeping role, that does not mean this control is not undertaken by others. As we saw, networked gatekeeping (Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013) may be thought as a complex and multilevel process, that involves a multiplicity of actors, but the loss of power of mainstream media in that context does not mean a more direct access to reality. Reality is still conveyed to people through mediated processes; what seems to happen is the emergence of a more diverse group of actors that may play this role.

Although activists claim a certain disintermediation, maybe the more precise in this case would be to talk about a re-intermediation process. Their discourses seem to be in accordance with the proposal of Meraz and Papacharissi (2013), who account for this complexification of the process of selecting information that may influence public debate. That does not mean considering the suppression of intermediaries, but rather identifying who these new

intermediaries are and based on what they built their representation of reality, since the journalistic principles are no longer the guide.

Even when we talk about new formats to report facts that seem as direct presentations of reality, such as live streams, the role of the mediator cannot be disregarded. The positioning of the camera, the focus of the image, the possible audios that are captured by the camera, are all small parts of the event being diffused, especially when talking about social uprisings such as the ones of 2013 in Brazil.

So, the new communicative possibilities of social media do not decrease our distance from reality, it may allow the access to more diverse angles of it. The activists themselves identify that sometimes. Pablo Capilé talks about “a number of partialities” that would emerge in place of the supposed impartiality of mainstream media. Paulo Fluxus_, in his turn, will describe the internet as a place that allows people to “make articulations and have a broader spectrum from more fragmented information. There was more capillarity, dissent gained voice in society”. In both cases, what deserves attention is not an unmediated access to reality, but rather a new type of mediation, which includes a greater plurality of voices that gain space through social media and that affects the whole functioning of the communication system.

The role as mediators of the newly emerging voices becomes clear when we are able to identify disagreements between them. That is to say, two actors that create new forms of presenting reality other than the one enabled by mainstream media, do disagree between them on how to do that. That happens because they are not “disintermediated transmitters of reality” but are rather doing their own choices as mediators. For example, Fluxus_ reports having ceased relations with *Mídia Ninja* and created another project called *Mídia Gueixa* because of conflicts on how to do the coverage.

In spite of the multiplicity of mediators and the inequalities between them, the other two approaches we presented towards these new mediation processes do not seem to be an issue to the activists. The perception proposed by Segerberg and Bennett (2011) that social media would embed and be embedded in gatekeeping dynamics is not really taken into account, as social media are more frequently seen as opposed to mainstream media than as

interconnected to them. The perception of technology and its affordances and constraints as mediators of information (Jouët, 1993) also does not draw much attention among activists and seems as a naturalized element of the communication dynamics.

To better understand the role of these new mediators, we will take a closer look at two specific cases that were the object of interviews we were able to make. They were well known communication actors during the 2013 protests and were also mentioned as so in our interviews. For example, when asked about the important actors that diffused information on social networks during the demonstrations, Gabriel Medina, former Youth Secretary of the Brazilian Presidency, said: "*Dilma Bolada* aided a lot. She had a lot of repercussion. There were also other people, Tico Santa Cruz and other artists. Even *Mídia Ninja*".

We had the opportunity to interview people related to two of the actors named by Medina: Jeferson Monteiro, the author of the character *Dilma Bolada*, and Pablo Capilé, one of the founders of *Mídia Ninja*. We will now explore their discourses to try to better understand the role of these media as mediators.


6.2.1 The *Dilma Bolada* case

The first case we would like to discuss as an example of new mediators that arise in social media is the fictional character *Dilma Bolada*. It is a Facebook page inspired on President Dilma Rousseff, that became very popular in Brazil because of the humorous approach to the President and her actions. The character first appeared on Twitter in 2010, but became well known in 2011. The Facebook page was created also in 2011 and had 1.7 million likes on January 2019.

According to the description of the page:

The page called "Dilma Bolada" features a fictional character created with the intention of humorously entertaining its followers. In this way, there is no direct or indirect connection with the Honorable President of the Republic Dilma Vana Rousseff, as well as with her staff or any other member(s) of the Federal Government of this country.

Image 2 – Dilma Bolada’s Facebook page¹⁰⁴



The page was created and is administrated by Jeferson Monteiro, who was 20 years old when he created the fictional character. He was, then, a young college student from the periphery of Rio de Janeiro. We interviewed him on July 19th 2017.

Monteiro explains that, in the beginning of the protests, he decided to position the page in favor of the protests that were happening. He says that he did that because he was in favor of the demands for a lower price of public transportation and also because he thought that President’s Dilma Rousseff history of activism against the dictatorship in Brazil could make a parallel with the emergence of such a social movement.

Monteiro also remembers that, at that moment, there was no active official profile of the president on social media, so many of the comments and critics regarding her were made at his page. That was a moment when the page got a lot of likes. “I did a lot of posts supporting [the movement] and, in terms of perception, she [the character *Dilma Bolada*] acted as she wanted Dilma to act”.

The option to support the protests at that moment was in opposition with the coverage of the major mass media outlets that, in the beginning of the movement, tried to picture it only as a disturbance to the order (Rolnik, 2013; Locatelli, 2013; Bringel and Pleyers, 2015; Moraes et al, 2014; Anderson, 2013; Antonio e Magalhães, 2017).

¹⁰⁴ Image captured on August 22nd 2018.

That situation lasted until the first official speech of Dilma Rousseff on national anthem about the protests. For Monteiro, that pronouncement was “very mistaken”. To him, she threw away the opportunity to bring the movements closer to the government and made an option for a conservative discourse. “It was awful. I liked her, I tried to make it [the speech] sound a bit better, but it was not well received”.

Although the positions of the president herself and the fictional character were very different at the moment, Monteiro told us that he never received any demands from the government or its Party regarding his opinions. “No, because at that moment, I had never spoken to anybody at the government and I had not met Dilma yet. Nobody reached out to me”. He explains that the demands came from his followers, who sent a lot of messages and asked him to denounce the police violence and the repression of the protests.

A very interesting moment reported by Jeferson Monteiro is when, for once, he actually decided to leave home and join a protest in Rio de Janeiro. It was a protest on “Avenida Getúlio Vargas and there were almost one million people there”. He told us that, actually, he stayed in the protest for a brief while and went home right after.

“My coverage offered another view on the protests. Thus, if I stayed on the streets in Rio, I would miss what was happening in São Paulo, in the Northeast, in the South, in the Center-West”. To him, on the streets, he was just one more to participate and to shout, while on social media he thought he could really make a difference.

His perception proposes an interesting dialog with Rosanvallón’s vision of the web as a social form in its completeness and with a real political form (2006). This perception defies the vision of digital activism as only a means to lead people to “real” protests, on the streets and proposes a reflection on the value of online activism. That does not mean that if everybody had stayed home and only Facebook pages had acted the movement would have reached the same results, it just means that some kinds of activism do have a real value, even if they take place only online.

Monteiro goes on to describe his activist work: “I stayed home, then, on my computer. I turned the TV on, zapped between channels and did my coverage according to my line of thought. That was what I needed and from the streets I could not do that”. He saw his role was much more related to an activism on the networks than an activism on the streets. “My

option was to do that, a coverage with another vision. That was the way I contributed most, by showing an angle different from the media coverage”.

The process described by Monteiro show successive stages of mediation that will shape the final content he publishes. It is clear that Monteiro used his fictional character to offer a different view on the protests than that offered by mainstream media, but his role as a mediator is also clear. It is not about offering an information that would be more real, but rather about letting another point of view emerge on the public debate.

When asked about what sources he used to do that alternative coverage, he says he had “primary sources, people that sent me messages. I also used the open TV channels, especially Record, Band and Globo¹⁰⁵”. This testimonial seems strongly related with Segerberg and Bennett’s (2011) proposal, showing that gatekeeping dynamics in mainstream media and social media are highly connected and overlapping. In this case, this new gatekeeping process is firstly done by the TV journalists and is then re-appropriated by Monteiro to build his own mix of facts that are going to build the agenda of his coverage. That is also fairly based on the dual screening practice we also already discussed.

It also relates to the concept of hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). It is the television as a medium and as a discourse serving as source of content to a debate that is going to take place online, on social media, where this TV networks are also present, but the dialog is much larger. Even if his purpose was to build an alternative discourse about the protests and although he could do that on his own communication channel (the Facebook page), this construction is not disconnected from the existing discourses and media. It is in the variety of competing and overlapping media logics (Chadwick, 2013) that such alternatives may emerge.

In relation to TV sources, he says he used them both to know what was happening and to “challenge what they were saying”. Monteiro highlights that he is “strictly against the ‘turn off the TV’” discourse¹⁰⁶. It is not useful for me to turn it off while millions are watching it. The best way is to watch what is going on so you can confront it”.

¹⁰⁵ Record, Band and Globo are the three most important TV channels in Brazil in terms of audience.

¹⁰⁶ The discourse that people should just turn off their TVs is a common discourse among the left in Brazil. They argue that these media are completely aligned with the right and the market and that because of that it would be better not to give any audience to them.

Again, the television here is seen in ambiguous ways. Firstly, it is useful to inform about what is happening and probably also about what many people are going to be talking about on social media. That is because Monteiro was not the only person to watch TV and be active on social media at the same time, that is the common practice of dual screen, as we mentioned before. So, even if his aim was to criticize the media, they were still an important source of information. His perception that just turning off the television does not solve the problem is also an indication in that sense. Secondly, the television channels and the mass media in general were the target of wide criticism about their coverage, criticism expanded to what they represented socially as we discussed on Chapter 5.

It is important to highlight that the behavior of Jeferson Monteiro both towards his action on the streets and on social media were not largely shared among the interviewed activists. Many of the actors we talked to focused on the use of social media to get people to the streets or to report and spread multimedia materials from the streets. This line of thinking was especially strong among activists from more traditional political organizations (like political parties and trade unions), but also appeared in the discourse of activists not strongly related to one movement, or that said to participate in a number of them.

Monteiro's experience also shows that online and offline are two imbricated dimensions of the same reality. "The network is not just a place that we occasionally visit to look for something special, it becomes more and more the central ground of individual daily life" (Dahlgren, 2012, p.16). The Facebook page *Dilma Bolada* is the result of a strong overlap between online and offline media, as well as of mainstream and alternative media content.

Monteiro's role as mediator is also clear. Someone that creates his own way of reporting the facts based on the humoristic tone of his character and on his political beliefs, and that does so using mainstream media as one of its sources, but not the only one. In that combination lies differences he puts on public debate.

6.2.2 The *Mídia Ninja* case

The second case we would like to use to discuss the role of these new mediators of information is *Mídia Ninja*. This media became well known during the 2013 protests, especially because of the live streams they did during different acts. They went to the

protests, equipped with cameras and transmitters, producing their coverage of the demonstrations “from the filed”. We interviewed Pablo Capilé, one of the founders of the *Fora do Eixo* movement, in which *Mídia Ninja* was firstly conceived.

The *Fora do Eixo* group, of which Capilé is a leader, was created in 2001 as a cultural movement, responsible for organizing alternative music festivals in the Brazilian city of Cuiabá – right in the middle of country - and for developing other strategies to facilitate the circulation and visibility of artists that were not part of the mainstream musical market. Capilé explains that, to them, the communication strategies were always a basic part of their work. That is why, in 2013, according to him, they had already a whole communication structure in place to cover the protests. “In 2011, we were already doing the live coverage of the Freedom March. We broadcasted it through Twitter, through Twitcast. From there, we started to do the coverage of all the protests”.

He explains that, initially, the group’s media work was carried out by the *Mídia Fora do Eixo* (Out of the axis media), but in the World Social Forum of 2013, in Tunisia, they launched the project of *Mídia Ninja* (Media Ninja) that is a “free communication network that seeks new forms of production and distribution of information based on new technologies and a collaborative logic of work”¹⁰⁷.

That is how, from the onset of the 2013 protests, they were already on the streets. But communicating the movement is not at all seen as a work dissociated from the activism itself. Capilé says that “we thought we shouldn’t only do the coverage, we wanted them to let us participate on the decision-making process about where that movement was heading to, because we had participated on the preparation to that on previous years”. At that time, the dispute was with the *Movimento Passe Livre* (Free Pass Movement), which existed since 2005 and, historically, was the major traditional movement of the protests around public transportation in Brazil. They were responsible for the first calls of the 2013 protests.

As the *Fora do Eixo* and the *Mídia Ninja* did not gain the space they wanted to participate on the decision-making process, they worked to do “the best coverage possible”. To Capilé, “while the MPL decided about the dates and paths of the protests, we influenced the narrative about it”. In the struggle for the construction of discourses about the protests, *Mídia Ninja*

¹⁰⁷ Retrieved from <http://midianinja.org/quem-somos/>

prioritized two elements that “alternative media did not have until then: quality and speed”. In his evaluation, it was their capacity to produce good images (photos and videos) and to post them online almost in real time with a “pop influence” on the edition of the material that helped them to gain visibility.

He highlights that, in most cases, alternative media struggled to “take good photos and post them quickly. Usually, the same person that took the photo was also responsible to write the text, the video was posted only three days later, the photos needed a lot of treatment so sometimes it was only available the next day”. The difference in the action of *Mídia Ninja* was that the communication was their very activism. That structure led them to produce and distribute faster and with higher quality.

The communicative construction of the protests was also a concern of other activists that participated in smaller groups. The activist Diná Ramos told us she always brought cardboards and pens to the streets, so that “we could produce our memetic, to the photographers, to the journalists, with what I thought should appear in the media. More than what I wanted to say, I was concerned about the content production”. Ramos said they always used different colors of papers and pens, so that they would not give the impression a machine had made all the posters.

This overlap between communication and protest strategies was so intense that Rebeca Lerer remembers a campaign she helped to organize to share the wireless networks of the people that lived near the path of the protests. The goal was to allow people to stay connected and post information in real time, since many of them had limited data packages, or no data at all available on their smartphones.

It is also interesting to see that to manage the communicative actions they proposed, *Mídia Ninja* created their own internal dynamic. Tasks were divided between the group and editorial meetings were done previously to the coverage to decide “what testimonials we could get, what were the best places to take pictures”. That more or less organized process of decision-making clearly shows the mediation role of this media is based on choices and points of view.

Although there is a perception of the communication action as an essential part of activism, the discourse about the objectivity and impartiality of their own media is also present. While

mainstream media are seen as manipulative, *Mídia Ninja* is presented as having an advantage in regard to them: “we could be in the eye of the storm presenting real time the narrative of the activists themselves, without manipulation”. So, even if Capilé pictures *Mídia Ninja* as a medium “identified” with the movement, the discourse about it being able to give a more direct and precise access to reality, avoiding any manipulation, is also invoked.

As in the *Dilma Bolada* case, it seems to us that this new kind of mediators brings to the public debate is more of an alternative point of view in regard to mainstream media, of compared to a supposedly direct access to reality. These alternatives are built upon new mediations that help to compose a multi-level gatekeeping dynamics (Meraz and Pappacharissi, 2013). But, if in the case of activists, these new possibilities of mediation were appropriated in the pursuit for a more direct and unbiased access to reality, they were differently envisaged by the communication advisors to governments.

6.3 Taking over as mediators: representative’s challenges and opportunities in a direct communication with citizens

The new possibilities of mediation made possible by social media also change the way governments and politicians communicate with citizens. That capability gains special interest and importance in a moment of social outburst such as the 2013 protests, where the governments rapidly became a target (Alonso & Mische, 2015) and were expected to offer quick and effective responses. If mainstream media was the predominant way of communication between citizens and governments for a long time, social media made new communicative paths become possible (Santos, 2010).

But what all of the communication advisors we interviewed attested was that, at that moment, governments were not prepared to properly use that new possibility. Both people who work in São Paulo City hall and on the Federal Government report that governmental structures were, at a certain level, unprepared to explore the possibilities of social media and digital communication in a more general sense. It is important to highlight that both communication staffs we interviewed were, at that time, at governments led by the Worker’s Party.

We identified two different dimensions in which these new mediation possibilities challenged the communication teams we talked to. Since our main focus in this topic is to understand which new paths can be established in the communication between two specific social actors - governments and citizens -, it becomes important to discuss these possibilities in both ways of that relationship. On the one hand, the use of social media by the government was a new form of collecting information about the social reality, building a sense of social issues. In that sense, social media acted as a way to make society more accessible (or accessible through other channels) to those responsible for the decision making. On the other, politicians and governments had the opportunity to make themselves more accessible to citizens, by informing and expressing opinions not only to journalists, but directly to citizens through their social media profiles. That would be an action in the other sense, that of making the structure of institutional politics and their actors more accessible to the public.

We will start by exploring the first dimension, that of using social media to access elements about the social reality in both governments of which we interviewed the communication staffs.

6.3.1 A new way to see the society

Thomas Traumann, former speaker of the Brazilian Presidency during the protests of 2013, says that, at the beginning of the demonstrations, the government' social media structure was

Completely unprepared. The evaluations were poorly made. We had nothing. The government was in the 20th Century. There was no preparation for what was going on. But to do justice, it was not only the Federal Government that was in that position.

Diogo Santana, in charge of the relations of the Presidency with social movements in 2013, also remembers that, at a certain moment, social media divided the perception of the government of what was going on the streets. According to him, after the extreme violence of the protest of June 13th, there was an intense discussion about what was going to happen on June 17th, date of the following act.

It is funny that people that followed [the protests] from the newspapers, that were the older people in the government, had a completely different view about what was going

to happen, the extension of it....even though the dimension is something we never know. But even about the content. I think the most important thing noticed by those on social media was that the protests politicized rapidly – after the police violence – and expanded the range of demands. It had a very clear claim, the price of public transportation, but it was also another thing, it was very important in terms of citizenship. And who was out [of social media] did not perceive that.

To Santana, the problem was that 90% of the decision making was in the hands of people that were not on social media. To him, “it is not that they misevaluated the facts, they simply did not see them”.

Traumann has a similar perception. He evaluates that, at the moment of the protests, the government was refusing to dialog with society and the demonstrations served to show that there was a problem. He highlights that the first action of the government to open the dialog with citizens was to call the traditional social and political organizations – trade unions, organized student and class representations, among others – to a meeting in the Palace, which, according to him, “is not wrong, but it is the 1.0 way of doing politics”. He thinks these organizations did not represent the majority of the people who were on the streets and that it was necessary to find ways to create a dialog with a larger public.

Both of them report a mismatch between the perceptions of reality expressed on mainstream media and on social media and the incapability of the government to fully get what was going on online. Even if there were members of the government that carried such perception, there was a tension with long-dated structures and actors that were already in place.

This perception of the incapability to take advantage of the new possibilities brought by the new media is also present in the narrative told by Bia Abramo, former coordinator of the digital communication of the São Paulo City hall. According to her, they “did not well understand 2013. We were incapable of detecting it and of giving an answer to it”. Her opinion is that the local government adopted an excessively top-down approach to the issue and tried to answer “only through traditional media, by giving interviews”.

The mayor of São Paulo at that time was Fernando Haddad, a young leader of the Worker’s Party, whose candidature was strongly supported by the former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. He took office only six months before the protests started, on January 1st 2013.

Abramo explains that, in terms of communication, what they found on the beginning of the term at the City Hall was a complete devastation. That made the work more difficult during the protests that took to the city in June. Fernando Busian, former press officer of the São Paulo City Hall, remembers that, when they arrived in the City hall building, on January 2013, there was not even a wireless network in the communications division. According to him, in the first meetings of the team, social media was treated as foolishness by the Secretary of Communication.

Abramo explains they did not have a systematic monitoring of the social networks and that it was difficult to explain the basic concepts of its functioning to the decision makers. She talks especially about the Facebook events, where they followed the numbers of invitations and confirmations in a certain protest. But in general, she considers that the government did not have the tools to deal with that reality and that a lot of people were scared with that situation. According to her, that generated a negative vision of social media. To Abramo, social media was seen with “mistrust” and as something “accessory”.

Gabriel Medina, the Youth Secretary of the City Hall in 2013, also gives attention to the role of Facebook events in the search for information by the government. According to him, they tried to see “the level of adhesion to the events, the tags that were mostly used and to have a little information about the profile of the users that were involved”, but he highlights “it was nothing sophisticated”.

So, in both levels of government, these dimensions seem not to have been very deeply explored. If the perception that social media could give valuable information to the governments seems clear, the ways to get and follow that information were still being discovered and built on at that time. It was through non-systematic and non-sophisticated monitoring of social media that this information arrived to the decision makers during the 2013 protests.

If, on the one hand, that may seem as a missed opportunity, since these governments could have used the new tools to try to understand the movement’s demands and functioning more closely and precisely, on the other hand, the erratic works also shows no clear sign of systematic government prosecution against activists, as seen in other countries (Garcia & Tréré, 2014; Lotan et al., 2011).

When talking about the difficulties of the governments to deal with the amount of information on social dynamics available on social media, it is important to highlight that this new communicative ambiance marks an important difference in terms of access to public opinions, in comparison to previous realities. The idea is that social media allow a direct access to an “authentic” opinion, generated spontaneously, what clearly differentiates it from opinion polls for example (Kotras, 2018). That represents an important change in terms of inputs to political decision. Kotras (2018) explains that, while opinion polls present a public opinion based on the addition of individual opinions, all with the same value, the monitoring of social media will frequently show opinions as an imminently collective and socialized phenomenon with significant inequalities between different social actors.

In his historical reconstitution of the different ways to measure public opinion, Kotras (2018) remembers a strategy used by the French monarchy of the XVIIIth century, that consisted in spreading unidentified officers in different places of the town to identify circulating discourses, opinions and mobilizations against the government. These agents were called as “flies”. The strategy aimed to provide the government with elements and indications that could base their actions in order to prevent from or deal with eventual contestation.

We can make a parallel between that practice and the actions of the local government of São Paulo and the national Brazilian government during the 2013 demonstrations, regarding social media. Deprived from more organized structures to follow and measure the online conversation, they were fed by information from multiple sources, that were in different places of social networks and, thus, had access to a diversity of conversations regarding what was going on. Yet, there is a sensible difference here that regard the capacity of measuring the impacts of certain opinions and points of view. Different from the “flies” that reported on opinions and dialogs from random people that came across, without having any measure of their influence, there is a significant amount of data on social media that can be retrieved in that sense.

Being able to know the impact of a certain opinion (in terms of likes, shares, retweets, comments, etc.), adds another level of knowledge to those information. In that sense, it approaches another ancient method of measuring public opinion, used since the XIXth century, that of considering the opinion of the notables (Kotras, 2018). Kotras explains that

once the governments wanted to extend their knowledge of public opinion to a national level, the opinion leaders became an important intermediary. They were considered as privileged observers of social dynamics, thus more able to picture it. The press was the priority medium through which they expressed their perceptions and were read by a larger public, in a dual movement of picturing and influencing public opinion.

Transposing that idea to the reality of social media, we can say that, while regarding the opinions of a diversity of actors in that communicative environment, the fact that there are explicit repercussion measures available, also creates a differentiation of certain opinions that would be more important than others. So, actually, the new ambience through which governments and political leaders may watch social dynamics also presents important mediation process that will not only be done by technology, but also by the actors that actually became visible in these environments, where inequalities continue to exist.

More than trying to follow what was going on on mainstream social media, the 2013 process also encourage the creation of specific governmental platforms to try to access the population's opinions regarding certain issues. We highlight that, in this case, we are talking specifically of initiatives designed by governments to promote civic participation (Monnoyer-Smith, 2007). Although they may be seen as a space of information and discussion that goes beyond the mediation of mainstream media – and that is why we explore them here -, the objectives of these spaces are very specific in regard to more general social media communication. They seem to be aligned with the demands of the activists, which frequently expressed an appreciation for models of direct democracy (Mendonça, 2018).

Regarding the Federal government, two initiatives were mentioned. Diogo Santana highlights the more institutional use of social media in the communication with society and in the formulation of public policies. He remembers, for example, that digital communication was being incorporated as a form of participation in the National Conferences, particularly in relation to the Youth, even before the movements of 2013 erupted. The National Conferences were a mark of the Worker's Party governments, as they consolidated a space of civic participation that went from the local to the national level, going through many different moments of proposal, discussion and election of priorities on public policies. The Conferences were organized thematically. Instituted in 2003, the Conferences initially relied

strongly on organized civil society-organizations that were already engaged in certain topics. The latter incorporation of instruments of digital communication helped to enlarge the comprehensiveness of these Conferences.

It [social media] was used both to the election of delegates and to the production of content, that created a pre-June 2013 critic mass. In the Youth Conference, which happened before 2013, there was an acceleration of the use of social media. But, as I told you, it was a little secondary to the main communication strategy of the government. Everything was still rather improvised.

Santana also remembers the creation of the platform *Participatório* – Participatory Observatory of the Youth that, according to him, was supposed to be “a tool for more social participation. Our desire was that all the ministries used of it, so it would become something bigger in terms of government”. The website was launched on July 17th 2013.

Image 3– Printscreen¹⁰⁸ of the homepage of the *Participatório* website



The *Participatório* was a website built in the form of a social network that initially aimed at the discussion of youth-related public policies. It was launched as an initiative of the Youth Secretary of the Presidency, but, as reported by Santana, the intention was that it would be used by all the ministries in order to cover all the front of public policy of the government. According to Sousa (2018), the website had the following functionalities: social network, space for public consultation, thematic communities, live streaming, digital library, virtual

¹⁰⁸ Since the website is no longer available, this print screen was retrieved from the dissertation “Processos tentativos de interação entre governo e sociedade: casos e percalços comunicacionais nos Governos Dilma Rousseff”, defended in 2018 by Marcelo Igor de Sousa (p.146).

repositories, thematic bulletins and magazine, data about the government and interaction with other networks.

Studies point that, on the one hand, the initiative attained low participation in its first months of use (Rothberg, Luvizotto, & Vanzini, 2014) and also that it was strongly restricted to the dialog with organized social groups around the topic of youth policies (Sousa, 2018).

The proposal of dialoging with the whole youth could not be materialized because the website was mainly dedicated to the dialog with groups, movements and representations. The main problem was that it did not know how to dialog with the “non-represented” citizens. (Sousa, 2018, p.152)

Sousa’s evaluation is in accordance with what Gabriel Medina, responsible for the relations of the Presidency with the Youth from 2015 to 2016, told us in his interview. He considered that it seemed a little strange to create a social network from the government. “Finally, it became a space for the people that were already strongly related with the formulation of policies for the youth”, he evaluates.

According to Sousa (2018), in 2015, the website loses its initial structure and is incorporated by the *Portal da Juventude* (Youth Portal).

In the case of the City Hall of São Paulo, the only initiative in this dimension, very briefly mentioned in the interviews, was the public consultation about the city’s master plan. Abramo remembers it was one of her first challenges, when she had just arrived at the City Hall. At the end, the consultation had more than 4.400 contributions done through the digital platforms, in a total of 10 thousand inputs.

6.3.2 Becoming more visible through social media

Regarding the second dimension we propose, we now move on to the analysis of the elements about the use of social media to make the government and their actors more accessible to society, as mentioned in our interviews.

It was only at the end of September 2013 that the Dilma Rousseff's Twitter profile was reactivated¹⁰⁹. It had been inactive since the end of her electoral campaign in 2010. Diogo Santana points out that, not having the president on social media was one of the major problems to push the advancement of the government in the topic of digital communication. According to him, "social media had gained an exponential space in the government from when I started to work in the Presidency in 2008 to 2012. At that time [2012], the political importance of social media was evident". Santana remembers that some ministers already used social media on a frequent basis, but that the fact that the main leader of the government did not, served as a negative incentive to the creation of other initiatives.

Traumann explains that, after the creation of the profile, with little time, the use of the platform had been incorporated in the president's daily activities. "It was something quick, that we did on the airplane, for example", he remembers. And the use of that platform changed the speed and the channels through which the official communication took place. "It became a communication that was made public much sooner than the official statements".

Especially in regard to mainstream media, Traumann highlights it became much easier to point errors in media articles, without having to call a journalist and demand for a correction. And, according to him, the media also started to give visibility to what was said on Twitter. What the president said on Twitter started to guide the news coverage of the media, serving as a powerful tool to influence the coverage. But the journalists were not always happy to receive information about the government together with the millions of Twitter followers of the president. Traumann remembers that there were "various complaints because we released new information via Twitter" on the press committee of the Presidency.

The former speaker of the Brazilian Presidency also brings our attention to the effort that using social media represented to the president herself. He attests that, at the beginning, she did not understand the dynamics very well, not knowing how to follow the discussion on the mobile phone and with difficulty to limit messages to 140-characters. But with the time and

¹⁰⁹ The post on Lula's Facebook page about Dilma Rousseff's return to Twitter appears among the posts we presented on Chapter 3.

the growth in the number of followers¹¹⁰, it became a real and effective communication tool. “She really became proficient on the network”.

Another problem for the appropriation of the government of that new communicative space, still according to Traumann, was that its vision of digital communication was very strongly related to bloggers. He explains blogs had been very important in 2010 elections, and for that reason, any conversation about the internet was automatically related to them. So, it took time for the president and her advisors to understand that the conversation on social media was broader than that, involving a greater variety of actors, with more diverse points of view about the government.

Regarding the City Hall of São Paulo, it was only at the second semester of 2014 that official profiles of the mayor and of the City Hall were created – reactivated in the case of the Twitter profile of Fernando Haddad – in social networks. To Dafne, who worked in the communication team of the City Hall, the creation of these channels had a very high importance in terms of service to the citizens, but were more crucial because of the profile of the government that was in place.

We need to be our own voice. We can't expect dialog or clarification from Folha, Estadão, Jovem Pan, those that are not going to hear us, that will distort what you say. So, we have to communicate directly, to cut off the intermediary.

Bia Abramo explains that the management of these networks was not easy, especially because some people of the communication department did not have any personal experience with social media. Another difficulty pointed by Fernando Busian, former press officer of the São Paulo City Hall, was that the government had the culture of the “*textão*” (a heavy text, usually long, full of different points of discussion) rather than “that of the meme”. He evaluates that it poses a problem in regard to the digital culture. To him, the communication department was excessively centered on the traditional press with a “very narrow view of communication”. In the case of the São Paulo City hall, it was the institutional profile on Facebook that gained a lot of attention due to the information it provided and also due to its humoristic tone.

¹¹⁰ Dilma had 6 million followers on Twitter on January 25th 2019.

Abramo remembers that, at first, only some autarchies of the City Hall had their social media profiles. “They had more money, a bigger communication team and more autonomy”, she explains. Then, some Secretaries started to create their networks and, only after that, the official page of the City Hall was created. She also remembers that the actions on digital communication started with a need to reformulate the website and that the part of the team who was pro-social media convinced the mayor to create the profiles, even if it was not a consensus amid the communications team.

Taking into account both dimensions, we have a picture of how the federal and local governments of São Paulo used digital media at the moment of the 2013 protests. All these initiatives were attempts to establish more direct communication channels with society at that moment. Those governmental and political uses of social media are one more element of complexification to the different levels of gatekeeping that are at place with digital media.

On the one hand, it is clear that citizens now have more direct access to certain information about governments and politicians’ activities, since they do not need to depend on journalists reporting on that. Accessing a profile on social media may be sufficient for gathering some information. But that does not mean that governments are automatically becoming more transparent (Almada, 2017), meaning that the level of mediation, in this case, did not disappear, but actually went back to the hands of the political arena¹¹¹. They choose what information to disclose and when to do so in this communication environment. Yet, we have to consider that, as already explained, this process of gatekeeping is not working in isolation, and has to deal with the traditional mainstream media and other alternative mediations – such as those from activists and other social actors. The other mediations should be viewed not only as elements of pressure and balance on the political system, but also as complements to the official political communication choices. It is the inter-relation between all different mediators, the technological platforms in which they interact and the reception process that different levels of political information gatekeeping take place.

¹¹¹ As explored in section 1.1, Bernard Manin proposes that the shift from a democracy of parties to the democracy of the public is founded on the separation of the structures that seek for votes and that produces information. In that sense, the creation of official governmental profiles on social media may be seen positively only as a part of a larger communication system. The existence *per se* of official communication channels of governments (on or offline) should not be seen as a democratic improvement, although it may become a very positive initiative in combination with other sources of information.

6.4 Multi-level mediation and the invisibility of the process

After analyzing the discourses of our three groups of interviewees, the different ways in which social media are being used to defy mainstream media and establish other patterns of mediation of information become quite clear, which responds our initial research question. In this fourth section of the chapter, we are going to discuss the elements to which point the analysis of our interviews in the light of the theoretical approaches we presented.

Before the existence of social media, and the web 2.0 in a more general sense, we can say that the mediated access to reality was done almost exclusively through media (Gomes, 2009). Of course, people could experience a certain fact or social event, or hear about it from friends or family, but the way of making an information reach a large number of people was the media and, especially, mainstream media that worked in the broadcasting logic. That means that there were a few centers that selected facts worth reporting and a large public that received information from them. That also means that we had an almost exclusive mediation role of the journalism and of the technical platform in which the information was to be diffused (a television, a radio, a newspaper and so on). The journalist selected the information from the sources he had and produced a message that was adapted to a certain type of communication technology and diffused to the public. After that, we can consider the reception as an additional mediation level, not only by the choice of media consumption, but also by the social and cultural backgrounds that function as filters (Voirol, 2005). A classic mass communication model, as described by Laswell model (McQuail, 2003) and developed by Westley and MacLean (1957).

With social media, we have a complexification of that model, with several new elements. The first one is the multiplication of the mediators. If journalists still have a crucial role in the diffusion of information, other mediators emerge and challenge the choices made by them. More than that, these different mediators not only exist, but are in constant connection. That is what is expressed by the notion of networked gatekeeping proposed by Meraz and Papacharissi (2013). That does not mean an increase in mediation, but rather a diversification of it.

Further on, these multiple mediators will interact in social media platforms that themselves act as mediators with their own internal logics. So here we approach Jouët's (1993) proposition of the technic as a mediator. It is important to highlight that these mediations will happen in very different ways depending on which social media platform we are talking about. The affordances and constraints (Cammaerts, 2014) of these platforms will vary and help to shape the information flows that take place in it. Following the notion proposed by Segerberg and Bennett (2011), that social media both embed and are embedded in gatekeeping process, we can say that there is a new level of mediation that appear here. Now, some social media platforms are able to select what to show or not to a certain user, mainly based on social behavior. This does not consist in a choice done by the user – we will get to that – but in automated selections done by some social media choices based on private algorithms. That means that, if before making your article fit in the space provided, the newspaper guaranteed it would be printed in all copies, on social media it is not. It will appear to certain accounts according to a logic that we do not precisely know.

There is still a last level of mediation that is done by each user. Differently from broadcast media, where all the audience receives the same content, in social media the process is much more personalized. The choice of whom to follow, or who to be friends with and what pages to like will created a unique combination of information for the user. And that process will happen in an overlap with the affordances and constraints of each platform. For example, on Twitter, a user will normally see a timeline with all the tweets from the users they follow organized in inverse chronological order, but content can also be accessed by search, when it may be organized by the most popular or the most recent. While on Facebook, a user's timeline won't even show all the posts from its friends or liked pages.

Then, there is a last level of mediation that we could identify, that is related to sociability ties. Social networks are built on social ties and those connections also have a central role on the information mediation, especially through the replication practices that social media allows users to do. Even if you do not follow or is not friend of a certain account, you can end up having access to its content because someone in your network interacted with it. That interaction may be the replication of the message (a retweet on Twitter or a share on Facebook, for example), but may also be the fact of liking or commenting a certain post, that will make it appear to you and/or to me as recommendation (someone you interact with liked

this content). In the end, the sociability ties also function as an information filter and organizer, adding yet another level of mediation.

So, we can say that, actually, what we have with social media is a much more complex mediation environment with different levels of mediation. The idea that social media would provoke a disintermediation seems to emerge more from the fact that these mediations become more pulverized and less visible, than from an actual decrease in mediators. If in an initial moment, what calls for attention is really the possibility of going beyond the information produced by mainstream media, in the following moment, these new mediators of information need to be analyzed and scrutinized.

What seems to be an issue is that these multiple levels of mediation that, in a certain way, divide the mediation power among different actors – what does not mean that we can attribute equal power to the different levels – also seem to function as a way of making the mediation role invisible or less visible. If before it was clear that journalists had this social role of selecting, shaping and presenting parts of reality to a larger public, with social media it is no longer the case. The multiplicity of actors involved and the different levels in which the process takes place make it more difficult to identify these mediation roles. That also means it becomes more difficult to hold these actors accountable¹¹² for their choices or through direct criticism to them. This invisibility of mediators seem to become apparent in some specific moments – in the discussions about fake news, for example –, but usually not as part of the discussion.

So, going back to Jouët's (1993) proposal for a two-level mediation, it seems that today we can point towards a much more complex process. This process would combine gatekeeping of the social media platforms themselves, from the users that publish on them – including here individuals, but also mainstream and alternative media outlets and politicians and governments – and from the user that receives the information, which has the liberty to choose what he/she wants to see in a much more personalized way if compared to the broadcast model. And we also have to consider that a significant part of the content shared on social media comes from other sources of information, introducing yet another level of selection in the process. These three or four instances are not isolated, neither sequential.

¹¹² In the case of the platforms themselves, we would also need to consider that they are global companies, very lightly subject to national regulations in most countries.

They are in permanent interaction and will interfere multiple times and in different orders in the information flow.

If we consider, for example, the case of the coverage done by the Facebook page *Dilma Bolada* during the 2013 protests (as seen in topic 6.1.1), the process starts with two kinds of mediation. On the one hand, Jeferson Monteiro – author of the page – is watching television to see what the main TV channels air. Thus, he is subject to the traditional journalistic mediation. On the other, he receives information from multiple sources that are on the streets, passing on information to him, according to their own views. Based on that, Monteiro will then produce his own content, which not only contains a selection done by him of the different information he received, as it will also be done in a suitable manner to the platform in question, as Facebook. So, he will decide to add or not multimedia content, the length of the text, the time to post and several other elements, according to the dynamics of the platforms. Once posted, the post could potentially appear to all who follow his page – a mediation level controlled by the user -, but will actually be shown only to those that the platform identifies as matching certain criteria. It is a long way of choices and selections, controlled by different actors, that will determine the final content seen by the users.

The measure of visibility is one way of evaluating what really emerges from this complex mediation process. Among all these actors producing information and passing through multiple levels of choices done by platforms and users, the search for the messages and actors that are gaining more attention and diffusion in the networks can help us understand the phenomena. That is what we are going to discuss in the next Chapter.

7. New visibility dynamics: who and what is really gaining attention

If on Chapter 6 we focused on the emergence of new mediators of information and the different roles this new mediation process played for different social actors, we are now going to investigate more closely the visibility dynamics that emerges from that.

As we saw on section 5.2, among the main discourses of the actors we interviewed on the use of social media during the 2013 protests in Brazil, one of them emphasized that this use had given voice to a number of new actors that could now publish and disseminate their own version of the facts. This emergence of new voices would create a bigger kaleidoscope of voices talking about the protests. However, the diversity of voices do not imply that they will have the same - or even any - impact on the debate about the meaning of the movements.

Social movements in general, and protest movements more specifically, have always considered the dispute over the construction of their social images as an essential part of the movement (Champagne, 1984; Voirol, 2005). As the movements become visible to a larger public, beyond the immediate people involved in their organization, different meanings and interpretations about them emerge. While movements try to control the meanings that may be assigned to them, the media play a central role in constructing and diffusing a certain public image of them.

The changes brought by the inclusion of social media in the communicative landscape imply changing the way this dispute is going to take place: the mass media outlets, that had before little competition from other media logics, now have to share the same communicative space with other actors. This coexistence does not take place without various inequalities and differences between the actors, but it does pose a challenge to mass media as well as offer an opportunity to other media logics.

To explore those inequalities and try to understand how and why different narratives become more or less prominent, we will use the concept of visibility, as defined by Thompson (2005). To this author, “the visible is that which can be seen, that which is perceptible by the sense

of sight; the invisible is that which cannot be seen, is imperceptible or hidden from view” (p.36). To Hannah Arendt (1958) this space where people can be seen and heard is the *polis*. It is not a concrete space, but a virtual one that arises with the use of collectively shared knowledge of actions and words.

The *polis*, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. (Arendt, 1958, p.198)

To Arendt, the constitution of the *polis* goes together with the constitution of a common world.

It is the existence of the common world that makes a collectivity of action possible because it constitutes the background of language and norms from which the action will proceed. But it is also, according to Arendt, a dynamic coexistence of diverse points of view that collide and feed one another. (Voirol, 2005)

What we argue is that in the era of social media the mere publishing of an opinion or of an information not necessarily makes one’s point of view visible in to the *polis*. If an article on a newspaper or an interview on a television channel attracts a certain attention to what is being said in that space, the same cannot be attested for a post on Twitter or Facebook, for example. What we imply here is that even though more people can publish on social media, not necessarily more people are going to be listened to on public debate. To better explore that discussion, we will start by briefly reviewing the different types of visibility that have existed over time.

Thompson (2005) explains that the visibility that emerges from mediated interaction differs in many aspects from the one that happens on face-to-face interaction. While the latter presupposes an immediate presence and the sharing of a common spatial-temporal framework among its participants and is generally dialogical, the former does not require co-presence, its participants may send and receive messages in different temporalities, and it is not necessarily dialogical. The term “mediated interaction” (or “quasi-mediated

interaction¹¹³) is used by the author to deal with very different phenomena such as letter writing, telephone calls, or television programs. When he analyses the internet, Thompson will use the term “computer-mediated interaction” and highlight that it includes very different dynamics of interaction, ranging from e-mails to chat rooms.

In the same sense, Cardon (2011) also highlights this functioning of the internet that fluctuates between light and darkness. At the same time as it gives new forms to the closed dialogic exchanges, it also creates new forms of “being seen” by a public that is not directly implicated on the narrative exchange.

Thompson (2005) explains that this passage from face-to-face to mediated interaction also changes the patterns of visibility. Whereas before the visible was what the eye could see and the visibility was bidirectional (if one could see the other, the reverse was also true), now visibility has no (or little) space and time constraints and it is unidirectional.

Seeing is never ‘pure vision’, it is never a matter of simply opening one’s eyes and grasping an object or event. On the contrary, seeing is always shaped by a broader set of cultural assumptions and frameworks and by the spoken or written cues that commonly accompany the visual image and shape the way in which the images are seen and understood. (Thompson, 2005, p.37)

Olivier Voirol (2005) explains that with the mediated interaction “the sense of the world becomes inseparable from the mediatized appearances and the horizon of visibility is extended correlatively” (p.97). He argues that even if the media are not the only way to gain attention in that scenario, they nevertheless play a central role in creating and maintaining the space of visibility. According to him, the media would be the main means through which social actors become known beyond their immediate circle of attention (Voirol, 2005)

¹¹³ Thompson (2005) creates a sub-category to explain more specifically the phenomena of mass media. According to him, it creates an “quasi-mediated interaction”. That would differ from the general category of mediated interaction because of two factors: “First, in the case of mediated quasi-interaction, symbolic forms are produced for an indefinite range of potential recipients. It is, in other words, relatively open-ended. In a telephone conversation, utterances are produced for specific others, but a newspaper or a television programme is produced for anyone who has the means (cultural and material) to receive it. Second, whereas the kind of interaction involved in writing a letter or using a telephone is generally dialogical in character, mediated quasi-interaction is predominantly monological, in the sense that the flow of communication is largely one-way” (p.34)

Thompson (2005) argues that “to achieve visibility through the media is to gain a kind of presence or recognition in the public space which can help to call attention to one’s situation or to advance one’s cause” (p.52). That is why the struggles for visibility have become central in societies. Particularly regarding social movements, Gitlin defends that they rely on large-scale communications in order to matter, to be able to say who they are and what they aim to publics they want to sway. (1980)

To Thompson (2005), digital technologies complexify this new visibility dynamics, considering that it increases the flow of information and makes it possible for a wider range of people to produce and disseminate content.

Although social media may be seen as an environment that increases possibilities to fight inequalities in terms of expression and participation on the public debate (Castells, 2013), it is still full of inequalities. At the same time that this new possibility gives voice to a number of social groups that did not have a stage before, it does not guarantee an equitable division of visibility. Making something visible also implies in choices that make many other things invisible. So the visibility scene is marked by power struggles, mechanisms of domination, and struggles for the visibility (Voirol, 2005).

The new visibility dynamics described by Thompson (2005) has a strong influence on how activism will take place on the digital era. If visibility and image were always an issue to social movements and activism in general (Champagne, 1984), in the multiplicity of information of the digital era, they become even more central (McCosker, 2015; Voirol, 2005). To Cardon (2011) this emancipation of the public on the internet does not mean the extinction of the press or of the cultural industry, but it does mean a new interdependence that forces them to interact with the amateur production.

To Bennett, Segerberg and Yang (2018) the issue of visibility has its importance renewed in the context of multimedia ecologies. According to them, in contrast with the official framings that were disseminated to mass audiences “through traditional journalistic gate-keeping in highly-institutionalized media systems” (p.660), multimedia ecologies are more porous, mixing flows of traditional and social media, which offer new opportunities in gaining the public attention.

McCosker (2015) will argue that the new communication environment of social media will, indeed, enable a higher visibility for certain protests, even though they organize themselves apart from the traditional political and social institutions. However, visibility remains a goal rarely achieved by many movements, particularly the more peripheral ones. Even for movements that do gain attention with the use of social media, that does not necessarily mean they will succeed in gaining the social meaning they desire. The question is not only about gaining attention, but also about how these complex visibility dynamics work and how they impact the negotiation of meaning (Bennett, Segerberg, & Yang, 2018).

The new and multiple flows of information that exist on social media will in fact create different and possibly dissonant meanings for the same social event. So, as for politicians in office that have increasingly less control of the flow of information about their acts (Thompson, 2000), activist movements are also subject to this multiplicity of narratives (Bennett et al., 2018). The latter authors argue that “movement messages were both amplified and transformed in the networked flows” (p.662).

The puzzle of the Occupy legacy, therefore, revitalizes a classic set of questions to do with communication between movements and broader society. In the mass media age, impressions of protest movements formed by spectator publics were often cued by officials in mainstream news reports that typically framed protests in negative terms (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gitlin, 1980). In the multimedia age, as Tufekci (2013) has argued, the capacity of movements to shape public attention has changed with access to social media by citizens. Activists have, in some ways, gained more control over their public messages, yet the processes shaping societal understanding of events are complex and require better understanding. (Bennett, Segerberg, & Yang, 2018, p.661)

We also must consider that specificities from the Twitter platform interfere in how this visibility dynamics works. The existence of hashtags and trending topics, for example, helps the public to detect where the attention is concentrated in a given moment and creates a sense of participation in a wider movement (Gomes, 2016). Anyway, these functionalities are not only forms of identifying and measuring visibility, but they also function as elements of influence in the visibility distribution.

To investigate how these visibility dynamics took place on the 2013 Brazilian protests, we will analyze our Twitter corpus by way of two measures of visibility: retweets and shared links. They follow a similar logic, but in opposite senses: the retweeting measure allows us to see messages from one source that were replicated a number of times – that replication usually takes place through the networks of followers of the original Twitter account and the subsequent accounts that replicate it – while the measure of replication of a link measures a unique hyperlink published from different sources, meaning different Twitter accounts. In the latter case, the replication is done not through the network of followers, but through the original source of the link. While the former can indicate the strength of a certain Twitter account and message, the latter can be seen as a demonstration of influence of the external source of content. Both result in the replication of a message/content in the network disseminating it to a greater number of people, what we considered as a process of visibility generation.

7.1 Retweeting as a practice of visibility

The use of retweets as a visibility measure is quite common in Twitter studies (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Zago, Recuero, & Bastos, 2015; Neumayer & Rossi, 2018), although there are limitations to this choice. Neumayer and Rossi (2018) argue that the exact visibility of a content in social media may never be exactly quantified, considering that:

Metrics such as number of followers, number of retweets, and combinations of these two are affected by well-known problems (e.g. non-human actors, dead or inactive accounts), and the numbers should be understood as potential viewers rather than as actual viewers (Davis et al., 2016). More precisely, the number of followers is strongly affected by Twitter's large number of inactive users and large number of bots and fake accounts (Davis et al., 2016). At the same time, more activity-based metrics, such as the number of retweets or interactions, fail to include lurkers and less active users (Bernstein et al., 2013) (p.5)

The logic of retweets is similar to that of the broadcasting (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013): the message of a certain center of information gains attention through the audience it reaches.

Reasons for retweeting are diverse and may include amplifying and spreading thoughts, starting conversations, validating opinions (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013).

It is also important to consider that we are talking about visibility dynamics in a specific context: an enormous social outbreak. In those situations, the functioning of the visibility dynamics on Twitter may be very different from less intense situations (McCosker, 2015) specially when considering we are talking about a hybrid media system.

What we want to investigate with the retweeting dynamics are two specific issues: what type of actors are being retweeted and whether their number of followers is crucial to that dynamic. Firstly, we will identify the actors behind the most retweeted messages in order to establish more clearly if new actors are really gaining the public scene. Secondly, we will investigate one of the possible reasons for that gain of visibility, the number of followers, trying to establish if that is a predictor of the visibility a tweet may get through the retweeting dynamics.

7.1.1 – Who’s being retweeted?

In order to look into who were the actors that became most visible in the debate about the 2013 protests on Twitter, we analyzed all the tweets there were retweeted at least 10 times in our corpus. That gave us a sub corpus of 358 tweets. We then visited each of these profiles to see who they were, if they were still active, how many followers they had. It is important to highlight that this analysis was done 5 years and 6 months after the outbreak of the protests¹¹⁴.

From the 358 tweets, we excluded 90 that were from profiles no longer available. Those profiles had either been deleted, suspended by Twitter¹¹⁵ or had all their tweets deleted, so we no information could be collected from them. That high number of tweets from accounts no longer available (25% of our corpus) is sign of the volatility of digital data and one of the major difficulties of doing this type of research. We also excluded 10 accounts that were

¹¹⁴ This data collection was done between January 3rd and 6th 2019.

¹¹⁵ According to Twitter’s official information: “In order to maintain a safe environment for users on Twitter, we may suspend accounts that violate the Twitter Rules. Common reasons for suspension may include: Spam, Account security at risk, Abusive Tweets or behavior”.

private, which prevented us from accessing their data, and 2 accounts that were no longer written in Portuguese. Their tweets in our corpus, at the moment of the protests, are in Portuguese and their profile names are in Portuguese, but, at the moment of the analysis, their description and all their tweets are written in Russian, which prevents us from analyzing them. Other tweets in Spanish, English and Italian that were found in the corpus were maintained.

The last kind of tweets discarded from our corpus of analysis were tweets from fake accounts. We considered as fake only those accounts that used names of people or organizations which they were clearly not related to. Other types of fake, such as automated or semi-automated accounts (Cresci et al, 2014; Haustein et al., 2016; Ruediger, 2017; Ross et al, 2019) and humoristic or satirical characters (Ferrari, 2016; 2018), were not excluded from our corpus. In that sense, we identified only one fake account named “@whatsappbr” clearly trying to be identified as the account of the WhatsApp application, which was not the case. Three tweets from this account were also excluded. Those exclusions resulted in a final corpus of 253 tweets, posted by 182 different users.

To create a categorization of the users of those tweets we mixed the categories proposed by Bennett, Segerberg and Yang (2018)¹¹⁶ and those presented by Newman (2016)¹¹⁷ and adapted them to our corpus. We did an exploratory categorization of 80 tweets in six categories (mainstream media, alternative media, individual, public figure, political party/politician and organization) that emerged from the literature and then decided to add another one, which was relevant to our corpus and analysis (humoristic profile).

We considered as mainstream media all the profiles related to the major Brazilian media outlets and as alternative media, as explained before, all media that has dissident origins or approaches in regard to mainstream media. In this analysis, we took into account the description of the Twitter profiles. Among these profiles we identified a number of humoristic ones and decided to separate them in a specific category. Humor is very present

¹¹⁶ The authors use six categories to analyze their Twitter users: alternative media, mainstream media, core group protest, public figure, individual and other.

¹¹⁷ To categorize his 100 top tweets, Newman (2016) used six categories: journalist, media, governmental/NGO, political/advocacy, scientist, non-elite, or N/A.

in the Brazilian political discourse (Chagas et al, 2019) and it has specificities that may impact the dissemination of their content, so we decided to treat them separately.


Accounts from political parties or politicians were also identified in a specific category. All corporate profiles that were not from the media nor from institutional politics were considered as “organizations”. The further exploration of their internal differences and patterns will be explained during the analysis.

Personal profiles were categorized either as public figures or individuals. We considered as public figures well-known people in the Brazilian media scenario, such as singers, actors, football players, UFC fighters and other personalities.

Table 37 shows the result of this categorization. Individuals are by far the most representative category with 118 profiles, which represent 65% of the corpus. Organizations come in second, with 25 accounts (14%), while public figures are responsible for 14 profiles (8%). Although mass media come only in fifth position here, with 6 profiles and behind alternative media, that has 8 occurrences, we highlight the fact that their tweets are at the top of the most retweeted. The three most retweeted messages were from mass media profiles, and five from the ten most retweeted were also from those outlets. This suggests that their messages are frequently going further than any other, but many other types of user are more frequently being seen. Humorous profiles are as frequent as the mass media ones, and politicians and political parties are the least frequent category, with 5 profiles.

Our findings differ from the results found by Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) that found among the most retweeted messages during the Egyptian Revolution a majority of mainstream media messages with an informative tone.

Table 37 – Categorization of the users of the most retweeted tweets



It is interesting to see that individual profiles may have completely different forms: from those that are frequent political commenters to those that predominantly talk about sports, an idol or day-to-day life, and only for a brief moment post about political topics. But it is also interesting to observe that for the majority of these profiles, the entrance in the visibility arena is a very brief moment. From the 118 profiles categorized as individuals, 100 appeared only one time among the most retweeted (85% of the category). That shows that visibility for messages from individuals occur in very specific circumstances that, in most cases, do not become frequent.

Table 38 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for individual profiles

Individuals	
One tweet	100
Two tweets	14
Three tweets	3
Five tweets	1

The individual profile that appeared most among the most retweeted was “@turquim5”, with five different tweets. The profile has a photo of a man and describes itself as “social justice.

I fight for the good of the country. Media for the coup does not represent me! I'm Lula and Dilma. The best social policies in history. Peace and Light...". It had 45.300 followers at the day of our analysis. Considering that the average of followers among our corpus was around 345.000, it is far below that margin, which shows that that was not the reason it gained visibility. The number of followers will be further discussed. From the five tweets from this profile that appear among the most retweeted, four are criticizing the Globo media outlet. Although there were tweets from other profiles about this topic, in general they were convoking people to descend on the streets or discussing about the Brazilian political scene, especially about corruption episodes.

As for the 25 organizations that appear as the second most frequent type of author, we would like to highlight several internal divisions of that category. Two of the profiles of organizations that appear among the most retweeted (@vemprarua and @vempraruaja) relate directly to the main slogan of the protests suggesting a relation with the organization of the mobilization. However, there are no direct indications (description, hyperlinks or tweets) that precise their role in the movement. At the same time, four profiles related to the Anonymous organization appear here (@anonbr4sil2, @anonbrnews, @anonmanifest, @fawkesbrasil). Since the Brazilian protests gained a larger dimension in terms of participants and demands, the Anonymous group appeared as one of the major organizations diffusing information about the protests (Bringel & Domingues, 2013). They rapidly gained space as one of the actors convoking the protests and also claiming the demands were not only about public transportation, but about the political system in general. Their content was diffused online through multiple decentralized profiles in several social networks, sometimes in Portuguese, sometimes in English. They were also responsible for the hacking of several websites and Twitter accounts as a form of protest and of dissemination of their message (Torinelli, 2015).

Demands against corruption also appeared here. Two of the profiles were directly related to that agenda (@faxinanopoder_ and @mensalaonao). The username of the first of these profiles means something as "cleaning the power", and the second refers to one of the recent Brazilian corruption scandals, known as Mensalão¹¹⁸. The profile @mensalaonao was also

¹¹⁸ This corruption scandal emerged in 2005, during the Lula government and consisted of the payment of deputies and senators to have their vote in certain bills. The affair is highly controversial, and the trial of the accused took place only in 2012, what made it a very sensitive topic in 2013.

the one that had the highest number of messages, eight in total, among the most retweeted. And the profile had only 16.900 followers, far below the average of our corpus. There are also two other profiles that make direct and negative reference to the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT), the party that was in power during 2013. The profiles @pt_nunca and @ptnuncamais (PT never and PT never more) also posted most of its content about corruption scandals and related them directly to that party.

Two international organizations were also among the most retweeted. Profiles from the Occupy Wall Street movement (@occupywallstnyc) and from the Spanish 15M movement (@takethesquare) posted messages about the protests that were going on in Brazil. That indicates a role of the international solidarity regarding those events happening in the country and also of international media coverage on the affair (Mattelart, 2008). As we will see further, international media also appear among the authors of the most retweeted messages.

Only one public organization appeared among the most retweeted. It was the National Association of Public Defenders (ANADEP – Associação Nacional das Defensoras e Defensores Públicos - @anadep_brasil). Four of their tweets were among the most disseminated.

If we regard the patterns of tweets among the most retweeted per organization, we will see that they are a little more concentrated than in the individual category. While in the latter, 85% of the profiles had only one tweet among the most disseminated, in the former, the percentage is 72%. More than that, while the individual that had the most tweets had five, we have one organization with eight tweets among the most retweeted.

Table 39 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for organization

Organizations	
One tweet	18
Three tweets	2
Four tweets	1
Five tweets	3
Eight tweets	1

The third category that appears is formed by public figures. From the 14 profiles that appear on that category, 8 are from the music scene (singers or bands), 3 are from sports (volleyball, football and UFC), 2 are actors and 1 is a digital marketing consultant. One of the singers (@christoferdrew) is not Brazilian nor his tweets are in Portuguese, which once more accounts for the international dimension of the event. Also, one of the sportsmen, the UFC fighter Wanderlei Silva (@wandfc), decided to present himself as a candidate to the Brazilian National Chamber of Deputies in 2018, but was not elected. Silva was strongly supporting the September 7th protest and helping to convoke people to the streets. Although with minor degrees of involvement, all the other public figures we identified were also supporting the protests.

Wanderlei had the higher number of tweets among the most retweeted in the category of public figures: four. After him, the singer Lua Blanco had two tweets highly retweeted and all the other registered only one message in this sub corpus.

Table 40 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for public figures profiles

Public Figures	
One tweet	12
Two tweets	1
Four tweets	1

Among the eight profiles identified as alternative media, there is also a great diversity of proposals and sizes. The biggest alternative media is the weekly magazine Carta Capital (@cartacapital), a traditional Brazilian left-wing publication. We hesitated to categorize it as alternative media, since its size of distribution and structure is compatible with mainstream media, but since it is the only national printed publication with a left-wing approach, we decided it did represent a dissent from mainstream Brazilian media. The number of Twitter followers account for the distance between this profile and the other ones in this category: while Carta Capital has 1.9 million followers, the second most followed alternative media has 153 thousand followers. Both the tweets posted by the magazine were publicizing a book and a debate about the protests.

The second most followed profile considered as alternative media is Flávio Morgenstern, editor of the website *Senso Incomum* (Uncommon sense). He is also the author of a podcast called *Guten Morgen*, related to the website. The Twitter profile of the website (@sensoinc) presents the following description: “news, articles, and opinions against the stream. Become intelligent and lose friends”. It is interesting to see that not only who appears among the most retweeted is the personal profile of the editor of the site, and not the profile of the website itself, but also that the editor has 50% more followers than the media (153 thousand versus 100 thousand). The most retweeted message from him referred to the fight against corruption and quoted the national anthem.

The third alternative media with the most followers is *Tijolaço* (@tijolaco), which describes itself on its Twitter profile as: “politics without controversy is a weapon of the elite”. The *Tijolaço* website is a well-known left-wing site that frequently criticizes the mainstream Brazilian media and offers alternative points of view on political issues. Its most retweeted message was informing about a protest against a corruption scandal that involved the São Paulo state government.

Coronel do Blog is the fourth alternative media that appears among the most retweeted. Its profile is no longer active – the last tweet is from 2016 – and it could identify it was close to the right-wing, with a strong discourse against corruption and the government of the Worker’s Party. The profile is mostly used to share links to the blog articles. The blog is still online but hasn’t been updated since 2016. The last post dates from March 15, 2016 and announces the death of its author. The same way as Flávio Morgenstern, his message also included national symbols, but this time it was an invitation for people to carry the Brazilian flag as they descended on the streets “against the Worker’s Party”.

Rio News (@rio_news) describes itself as: “News from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the World”. It is also inactive, since 2014. In this case, the website it is linked to is no longer active, so we cannot retrieve much information about it. From the tweets, we can see that is posted practical information about the protests, but also general information about Rio de Janeiro city, such as traffic updates and news about the local government. The most retweeted message from this account was informing about a protest that was happening against the governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral.

The sixth most followed alternative media is Observatório do PIG (@observatoriodopig). The name is a clear criticism against Brazilian mainstream media, that is often called by the left-wing as *PIG – Partido da Imprensa Golpista* (Party of the coup-supporting media). Its Twitter description is: a coup is really a coup. And it has no external links. As the name suggests, its most retweeted message criticized the Globo media outlet.

Eduardo Nino (@eduardonino) appears as the seventh most followed alternative media. He is the author of the *Blog do Eduardo Nino* (Eduardo Nino’s blog). The cover photo of his Twitter profile as well as the logo of the blog are clear about its political orientation: it supports the Worker’s Party. The cover photo is an image of Eduardo side by side with Lula da Silva, while the logo of the blog is the red star, which is also the Worker’s party’s symbol. There is no description on the profile, just a link to the blog, the posts being predominantly links to media sites and social media posts. Both most retweeted messages from this profile were also criticizing the Globo media outlet.

The last alternative media that appeared among the most retweeted was Openermedia (@openermedia) that entitles itself “Dissent and pax” and stamps the following description: “MAXIKOANS - This Tool Wants to Open Corporate Media and Their Hidden Interests. Protected ARTICLE 19LAW Freedom of Expression and Information”. The profile, that exists since November 26th, 2012, also shows a hyperlink to the website of the organization, registered under the blog host Blogspot (openermedia.blogspot.com). Its timeline is composed by tweets about articles from their website, but also by retweets of various profiles. The tweet from this profile that was mostly replicated was in fact calling attention to climate change issue, which was far from being at the center of the protests.

In regard to the number of tweets each alternative media succeeded in making appear among the most tweeted, the majority (75%) of the media had only one tweet in the corpus. Only Carta Capital and Blog do Eduardo Nino registered two messages among the most retweeted.

Table 41 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for alternative media

Alternative Media	
One tweet	6
Two tweets	2

Six mainstream media messages were also among the most retweeted. Four of them were from national media, while one was from the *Jornal O Dia* (@jornalodia), a Rio de Janeiro’s local newspaper, and one was from the English newspaper *The Guardian* (@guardian). From the national media, two outlets were from the Globo group, the biggest Brazilian media group, the newspaper *O Globo* (@jornaloglobo) and the website *G1* (@g1). The two other messages were from two presenters of the TV show *CQC*, broadcasted by the channel Band. *CQC* was a humoristic and satirical political show that made fun of politicians, and Marcelo Tas (@marcelotas) and Rafinha Bastos (@rafinhabastos) were two of the presenters of the show. The most replicated tweets from the media outlets were mainly informing about the protests or presenting analysis of specific aspect of them. The exceptions were the tweets posted in the *G1* Twitter profile, while it was hacked by the Anonymous group. These two tweets are convoking people to participate on the protests. Also, the tweets from the TV presenters Marcelo Tas and Rafinhas Bastos did not have an informative tone but were rather commenting or expressing opinion on the protests.

In the case of mainstream media, the frequency of tweets among the most retweeted is slightly different from the previous categories. Only 33% of the media had only one tweet among the most diffused, while for the previous categories that number was between 70% and 80%. The *O Globo* newspaper was the one with most messages among the most retweeted: five of them.

Table 42 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for mainstream media

Mainstream media	
One tweet	2
Two tweets	1
Three tweets	2
Five tweets	1

When analyzing the mainstream and alternative media profiles, we identified the need to create a separate category for the humoristic profiles. Some of them are related to big humoristic websites, other are just Twitter accounts, but they have the specificity of treating the political topics with humor. We follow the perception of Chagas et al, 2019 that this kind

of content deserves a specific treatment. According to them, “political humor on the Internet contributes to the creation and consolidation of a web of shared meanings, which absorbs and re-frames content from popular culture”. To the authors, the consequence would be that the humor would function as a stimulus for content sharing (Chagas et al, 2019).

The category is composed firstly by two of the biggest Brazilian humor websites: Kibe Loco (@kibeloco) and Não Salvo (@naosalvo), both with millions of followers. The other four profiles are smaller. One of them is linked to a website with multimedia content (texts, memes, videos) and the other three do not present a hyperlink in their description. The smallest profile, with only 10 followers, is completely written in Spanish and does not seem to have a direct relation with Brazil.

Only one of these profiles had two messages among the most retweeted. Surprisingly it was neither among the biggest profiles, but the account @frasestransa that published messages related to sex and posted two messages with the hashtag #vemprarua.

Table 43 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for humoristic profiles

Humoristic profiles	
One tweet	5
Two tweets	1

Our last category is composed by five profiles from the institutional political arena. Three of them were from political parties: two related to the Worker’s Party (@ptnacional and @pt_brasil) and one related to the Pirate Party (@partidopiratabr). While the profile from the Pirate Party was official, the two profiles related to the PT were not official, administered by their supporters. The two others were from two deputies. Protógenes Queiroz (@protogenesq), from the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil – PC do B) was a member of the Brazilian National Chamber of Deputies in 2013, and Rogério Correia (@rogeriocorreia), from the Worker’s Party, was a state deputy for the state of Minas Gerais. It is interesting to see the political figures and parties from the left are far more visible here than the right-wing ones. We highlight that the messages from the politicians and political parties that achieved most visibility were mostly publicizing news about the protests.

One of the profiles from the PT supporters succeeded in having 6 messages among the most retweeted, while all the other profiles only had one.

Table 44 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted for politicians/political parties

Politicians	
One tweet	4
Six tweets	1

7.1.2 – Followers: facilitators but not decisive to gain visibility on Twitter


Now that we have a more precise idea of who are the actors that were most retweeted in our corpus, we cannot avoid questioning the reasons for those retweets to occur. That point is not only important to understand the dynamics of the conversation about the protests on Twitter, but also to test the real possibilities that social media would open for new voices. If the number of followers is the main reason to explain why messages get retweeted, it is expected that patterns of mass media will be more easily reproduced, since again the main motive to gain attention would be the size of the audience. In that case, it is probable that mass media have more easiness also in this new environment, since their already structured public is also online. If the number of followers is not decisive, it means that the new sociability of social networks (Gomes, 2016) are allowing the creation of different paths to visibility that do not necessarily imply having a big audience, but rather consist in attaining a big audience.

The number of followers from the profiles in our corpus of the most retweeted shows a significant variation¹¹⁹. The least followed profile is the individual account @oikeridinho, that registered only one follower, while the most followed is the TV presenter @rafinhabastos with 11.600.000 followers. The average of all the follower numbers stays around 345.800, but that does not tell us very much about its dynamic, since the standard variation is huge.

¹¹⁹ The follower numbers considered here were collected in January 2019.

If we take a look at the average number of followers per category (Table 45), we will see that mainstream media is by far the category with the greatest number of followers while the individuals are those with the least. That corroborates the assumption that, if the number of followers was the main reason to gain attention on Twitter, mainstream media would be the most benefited and the space for new voices would be reduced.

Table 45 – Average number of followers per category



However, the comparison of this table with Table 38, which shows are the most frequent types of profiles among the most retweeted, makes it clear that the number of followers is far from being the only predictor. While mainstream media have the biggest average of followers, they are only the fifth most frequent actor to be retweeted. In the other words, individuals appear more often among the most retweeted, although they have the lower average of followers.

On Table 46 we stratified the number of followers of each category in different levels of number of followers, in order to better see the phenomenon. The mainstream media category is that with the higher number of profiles with more than one million followers (83,4%), while that number is 33,4% for the humoristic profiles, 14,4% for public figures and 4% for organizations. The other categories do not register profiles with this quantity of followers.

In the other extreme, Individuals is the category to have the higher percentage of profiles with 0 to 1 thousand followers. That range represents almost half of that category, while it is only 20% for organizations, 16,7% for humoristic profiles and 12,5% for alternative media.

Table 46 – Ranges of number of followers per category

	Mainstream Media	Humoristic Profiles	Public Figures	Alternative Media	Organizations	Politicians/ Political Parties	Individuals
0-1K	0	16,70%	0	12,50%	20%	0	45,80%
1K+1-5K	0	0	0	0	16%	0	16,90%
5K+1-10K	0	0	0	12,50%	8%	0	14,40%
10K+1-50K	0	49,90%	21,40%	37,50%	20%	80%	16,90%
50K+1-100K	0	0	7,10%	0	20%	20%	2,50%
100k+1-500K	0	0	35,70%	25%	12%	0	3,50%
500K+1-1M	16,60%	0	21,40%	0	4%	0	0
>1M	83,40%	33,40%	14,40%	12,50%	0	0	0

Although the number of followers does not seem decisive on the number of retweets a message will have, we decided to question if it might influence how many times a same actor will enter this space of high visibility. Even if, by a combination of different factors, profiles with few followers can eventually be highly retweeted, maybe that was a rare phenomenon for them, while it would be more frequent for users with a higher number of followers to get that amount of attention.

But analyzing the ten users that most appeared among the most retweeted, that assumption appears to be false. The profile that most appeared among the most retweeted (8 times), has 16.900 followers, far below the most followed accounts in our corpus. Among the ten profiles that appear most as highly retweeted, only one has more than a million followers (@jornaloblogo) and another has more than 100 thousand (@wandfc).

Table 47 – Number of followers of the ten profiles with most tweets among the most retweeted

<i>user</i>	<i>frequency</i>	<i>type</i>	<i>followers</i>
<i>mensalaonao</i>	8	organization	16900
<i>ptnacional</i>	6	political party/politician	99000
<i>turquim5</i>	5	individual	45300
<i>jornaloglobo</i>	5	mainstream media	5700000
<i>faxinanopoder_</i>	5	organization	88600
<i>ptnuncamais</i>	5	organization	17800
<i>anonbr4sil2</i>	5	organization	136
<i>anadep_brasil</i>	4	organization	3200
<i>wandfc</i>	4	public figure	794000
<i>mirandasa_</i>	3	individual	5600

If we do the contrary, that is to say, look at the ten profiles with the bigger number of followers and analyze their number of tweets among the most retweeted, the result is slightly different. Half of them had only one tweet among the most retweeted, while the other half had more than that. Considering that, among the 182 users of our entire corpus, 147 had only one tweet (80,8%) among the most retweeted, this proportion may be considered high in our data.

Table 48 – Number of tweets among the most retweeted of the ten profiles with most followers

<i>user</i>	<i>frequency</i>	<i>type</i>	<i>followers</i>
<i>rafinhabastos</i>	1	mainstream media	11600000
<i>gl</i>	2	mainstream media	10000000
<i>marcelotas</i>	3	mainstream media	9600000
<i>guardian</i>	1	mainstream media	7500000
<i>jornaloglobo</i>	5	mainstream media	5700000
<i>kibeloco</i>	1	humoristic profile	3100000
<i>cartacapital</i>	2	alternative media	1900000
<i>naosalvo</i>	1	humoristic site	1800000
<i>agiarthur</i>	1	public figure	1700000
<i>lua_blanco</i>	2	public figure	1200000

These results seem to indicate that, if on the one hand those that most frequently succeed to have highly tweeted messages not necessarily have a great number of followers, those that

have a lot of followers do seem to have more access to this sphere of visibility. Although the number of followers is not decisive for a message to be highly retweeted, having a great number of followers does facilitate the entrance on this sphere of high visibility.

To analyze more precisely this influence of the number of followers on the visibility a message may get, we also ran two correlations. The first one relates the total number of followers of each types of users we identified (mainstream media, alternative media, humoristic profile, politician/political party, organization, public figure and individual) to the total number of tweets of those categories among the most retweeted. We found a correlation of $-0,22571$, meaning that there is an inverse relation of the number of followers against the number of tweets among the most retweeted. That finding corroborates our perception that the number of followers is not a good predictor to the visibility a certain message may get.

The second correlation we ran related the average number of followers of each of our user categories with the average number of their tweets that appeared among the most retweeted. The idea here is to understand whether the number of followers influences the frequency with which a certain category succeeds in having a tweet among the most visible ones. The first correlation is about the phenomenon, while this second one is about the frequency of the phenomenon. In this case, we found a correlation of $0,664001$. That means that there is actually a positive relation, so the number of followers does have a positive influence on the number of times a user will appear among the most retweeted.

We have no intention here to point the number of followers as an isolated cause of visibility. Many other causes could be pointed, such as those related to the content of the tweet, to the time of posts etc. We chose one of those factors – the number of followers – because we understand its dynamics could approximate or distance the visibility logics of Twitter of that of broadcast media.

As explained, the logic behind broadcast media is to diffuse a message to a large public all at once. Broadcast media reach directly their full audience. If that logic was reproduced on Twitter, we could say that messages coming from users with the most followers would be those to get more visibility. But what our results show is that the Twitter visibility logic is more complex than that. Although the number of followers does facilitate the more frequent

entrance in this high visibility sphere (we could say those messages depart from a higher baseline), there are other elements that may make a tweet very visible.

We consider that the explanation to this phenomenon has a clear relation with the logic of multi-level mediation we described on section 6.4. The last two last steps of the mediation process described there, those that are in the hands of the social media users, have a direct relation with what we have been discussing here. The first of these steps relates to the choice of whom to follow/friend on these networks. If on the one hand that choice determines the content that the user will see on his personal network, on the other hand it creates a public for the different users of the platforms. The numbers of Twitter followers that a certain account will have, for example, is directly related to that choice. But, as we identified in our analysis, that audience is not sufficient to explain how much visibility a content may get. In fact, there are posterior levels of mediation that do not depend on the producer of information, but rather on the public that will either interact with it or not. This second, third, fourth... infinite action of resending a certain message to one's personal audience will build the final audience it may achieve, and that final audience may be infinitely higher than the original audience of the message producer. It is this role of the sociability network around messages that will mark the difference of the visibility dynamics on broadcast media and social media.

7.2 Hyperlinks: where to and where from – Twitter in a hybrid media system

We also analyzed the most used hyperlinks in our corpus. As we explained, unlike the retweets, this measure is based on how many times a same link was used on Twitter in different tweets. As Twitter automatically shortens all urls used on the tweets and usually shortens the same link to the same shortened address, it is possible to count how many times the same shortened address appeared.

In our study, we have considered the repetition of the same hyperlink in our corpus as a measure of visibility, since it indicates that a unique source of content is being used multiple times by different people (Segeberg and Bennett, 2011). As we said at the begging of this Chapter, in measuring the most used hyperlinks, the diffusion of a certain content is not measured through a network of followers, but rather through the notoriety of the source to

which the hyperlink points. That is why Segerberg and Bennett (2011) suggest that “looking at links not just with respect to information flow but also in their role as organizing mechanisms, and more abstractly as windows on surrounding players and links among diverse information flows” (p.203).

We analyzed all links that were shared at least 10 times in our corpus. From that list, we merged 9 links that were duplicated (they referred to the exact same web address but were shortened in two different ways¹²⁰, which generated two different measures of use), which resulted in a final list of 124 web addresses to be analyzed.

We visited each of the hyperlinks and identified what kind of websites they referred to. We classified the websites in six categories: mainstream media, alternative media, organization, political party – the definitions of these four categories is the exact same we used in section 7.1 -, social media and media repositories for Twitter. This last category refers to sites used to publish content that was not supported by the Twitter platform. We will see that was the case for live streams of the protests, for a list of links and for images, although it was already possible to publish them directly on Twitter at that time¹²¹. Also, three hyperlinks could not be identified at all¹²².

It is important to highlight that several of the links were no longer completely functional, but we used their url addresses to track the kind of website they originated from. So, for some cases, even though we couldn't have access to the complete content of the hyperlink that was shared, we succeeded in identifying their origin.

Table 50 shows that the majority of the most shared links lead to social media websites (70 links or 56,4% of the total). Mainstream media appear in second position, with 30 mentions (24,2% of the total) followed by the Media repositories for Twitter with 9 links (7,4% of total). Alternative Media and Organizations both appear with 5 links (4% of the total). The


¹²⁰ Twitter automatically shortens the urls that are shared in the social network. Normally, the automatic process leads to a same web address being shortened always in the same manner, but we identified some flaws in that process. That is why we had to merge the links.

¹²¹ When Twitter was created, it was not possible to add an image to a tweet, so people used external services to host them and created a link that was then shared on Twitter. Even after the addition of that functionality to the Twitter platform, some people kept using external services.

¹²² They were no longer available and we were unable to find information that could help us identify the type of source they were.

links that could not be identified appeared 3 times (2,4% of the total) and websites of political parties had two occurrences (1,6% of the total).

Table 49 – Most shared links classified by type of website



We will further explore the two biggest categories, but before doing that, we will briefly explain the composition of the other ones.

7.2.1 Alternative media, organizations, political parties and media repositories

Three different websites composed the media repository category: Twitpic, Twitcasting Live and PasteBin. All of them were used to store specific formats of content in order to diffuse them on Twitter. Twitpic appeared five times in our corpus, being the website that allows users to publish images. It had been highly used before Twitter integrated the functionality into its own platform, but even after that there was a reminiscent use we have been able to identify. Images posted on Twitpic are still online and can be accessed, even though they do not identify the user who has posted it.

The images shared usually assemble photos of the protests or politicians and messages encouraging people to go to the demonstrations. Image 8 shows two examples of those images. The first one, on the left, shows a photo of the Paulista Avenue, in São Paulo, full

of people with a quote attributed to Emiliano Zapata¹²³ saying: “If there is no justice for the people, may there be no peace for the government”. The image also contains the hashtag “#BrasilAcordou” meaning “Brazil woke up”. The second image, on the right, shows a photo of a demonstration where people use the Guy Fawkes mask, that became mostly known in Brazil by the Anonymous movement. The text convokes people to participate on the protests of September 7th saying: “The biggest protest in Brazilian history”. It uses another hashtag “#OperacaoSeteDeSetembro”, meaning Operation September seventh. It is interesting to notice the use of hashtags on these images, where the main functionality of the hashtag (to aggregate posts and make them accessible through a same search) is not useful. When used in images, hashtags are not identified by Twitter nor are they clickable. That shows that the communicative logic of the platform disseminated to other formats.

Image 4 – Examples of images posted on Twitpic




Twitcasting Live, in its turn, appeared three times among our tweets and was an external platform that allowed live broadcasting. The 2013 Brazilian protests were the first major demonstrations to be live broadcasted in Brazil. Although Twitter was the service through which people learned and had access to the broadcasting, the platform itself did not allow this functionality. Through the links we identified two users that used the platform to diffuse live streams. The first one posted two links, and is called *Trilha e cia.*, but we have no trace of what it was linked to. The second posted only one link present in our corpus and is called *Mídia Ninja*, an alternative media that emerged during the protest, which explored in depth on topic 6.1.2.

¹²³ Emiliano Zapata was one of the leaders of the Mexican Revolution. He inspired the creation of the Zapatista movement, one of the most important social movements in Mexico.

Midia Ninja is also the author of a list of links to different live streams of the protests from the different Brazilian cities posted to PasteBin, the third website we found in this category.

Image 5 – Printscreen¹²⁴ of the PasteBin post



In the alternative media category, only two of the five hyperlinks were still online. For the other three we could identify through their url the address they pointed to, but we could not have access to its full content. Two of the inaccessible links pointed to the *Blog do Tato* (Tato’s Blog), described on google as a “blog that speaks without constraints about politics, culture, economy, behavior and tendencies”. The third link is from a blog called *Aposentado Invocado* (“a pissed off retired”) and the name of the post (also identified through the url) was “Protests in front of Rede Globo”, which leads us to assume it was about the protests done against the major Brazilian media outlet. It is interesting to see that the mediactivist practices we identified in Chapter 5 also appear here, among the most visible messages.

From the active links, one was from the website *Congresso em Foco*, a “journalistic media that makes a non-partisan coverage of the National Congress and of the main political facts, with the aim of helping the voters and readers to follow the work of the elected representatives”¹²⁵. The highly shared link led to an article published by them about the costs of a national deputy in Brazil. The other link led to the *Blog do Miranda Sá* (Miranda Sá blog), written by a journalist that worked in major Brazilian newsrooms, who then created

¹²⁴ Printscreen done on January 9th 2019.

¹²⁵ Description provided by the *Congresso em Foco*’s website.

the blog. The text that was highly shared was called “September 7th: the march of the excluded”.


Regarding the organizations’ websites that appeared among the most shared links, none of the five links are accessible, but we could identify the organizations anyway. Two of them are national federations, one belonging to physicians and another one to federal police officers. A third website belongs to a digital government initiative from the government of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, called *Gabinete Digital* (Digital Cabinet). Unfortunately, we could not have access to the specific content it led to. We also identified one link to the association *Contas Abertas* (Open Accounts) that is devoted to the “social control of public budgets”. The last link in this category led to a website called *Alertas247* (Alerts247) that publish alerts regarding earthquakes, tsunamis and natural disasters in general.

Regarding the political parties, two mentions were directed to the São Paulo section of the Worker’s Party and to the Green Party. As the links are no longer available, we could not access the specific content they referred to.

7.2.2 Social Media

Passing to our two major categories, we will first take a closer look into the links that led to social media content. In order to do that, we separated them by social media platform as shows Table 50.

Table 50 – Most shared links to social media by social media platforms



We identified five different digital social networks to which the most shared links led to: Twitter, Youtube, Facebook, Instagram and Keek. That does not show any surprises, considering that they are the biggest social media in Brazil, except for Keek, virtually unknown. According to Wikipedia, Keek “was a free online social networking service that allowed its users to upload video status updates”¹²⁶. It was created in 2011 and discontinued in 2016.

Twitter appears as the most referenced social media, with 42 hyperlinks leading to it, which represents 60% of the total mentions to social media sites. That number of mentions to Twitter itself can be explained partly by the dynamics of the platform itself, so it cannot be fully considered as an indicator of the relevance of the platform. Since we are analyzing the most used links in a corpus of tweets, some of the references to the content in Twitter is simply a consequence of the dynamics of the platform itself. Youtube appears in second place with 16 links, or 23% of the total. Facebook comes next with 8 mentions, which represents 12% of the total. In fourth position comes Instagram¹²⁷, with 3 links, or 4% of the total. And Keek appears in the last position with one link, or almost 1% of total. From a total


¹²⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keek>

¹²⁷ Instagram is a more recent social network than Twitter and Facebook, having been created only in 2010. In 2013 it was not yet among the major social networks in use in Brazil. According to Statista, in June 2013 Instagram had 130 million users globally (the specific number for Brazil are not available), much less than the 1 billion it registered in 2018 (Statista, 2018).

of 70 links directed to social media, 27 were no longer fully available at the moment of the analysis.

But the mere identification of the social networks these links point to is not sufficient to explain who is producing those contents that are gaining visibility, considering the variety of actors that use those communication environments. Stating that a social media link was highly used may mean that a mainstream media article has been diffused on Twitter as well as an opinion expressed by an ordinary citizen. So, we once again used the classification of actors that we developed on section 7.1 to analyze the type of actor that is producing these social media contents that are gaining attention. The classification was applied to the 46 links to social media of which we could identify the producers.

Table 51 – Types of content producers of the social media most shared links



As Table 51 shows, individuals are the most important content producers, either regarding the most retweeted messages as well as the most shared links. Actually, if we compare Table 52 with Table 38, which shows the most frequent authors of the most retweeted messages, we can see that the composition is similar for the three biggest categories: individuals in first place, organizations in second and public figures in third. From the fourth position on, the order is different in the two analyses: while in the most retweeted messages, alternative media appears ahead of mainstream media and humorous profiles; in the most shared links, humorous sites gain space over mainstream and alternative media. We also have to consider

that in the case of the most shared links, 34% of the corpus was no longer accessible at the moment of the analysis.

Another difference between the two analyses that deserves a comment is the fact that among the most retweeted messages, individuals represent 65% of the actors gaining visibility, but when we look at the most shared links that number is lower: 42%. That may suggest that the practice of retweeting is more favorable to the inclusion of voices of individuals in the public debate than the decision to share a link. We also have to consider that the reasons to retweet a message are different than those to insert a certain link in a tweet, even though both practices may generate high levels of visibility.

For the posts that were still accessible, it is also interesting to see the division of the actors that produced the links by each type of social media platform, as shows Table 52.

Table 52 – Types of content producers of the social media most shared links per social media platform

Platforms	Individuals	Organizations	Public Figures	Humoristic Sites	Mainstream Media	Alternative Media
Youtube	2	4	1	0	0	1
Twitter	27	4	0	3	2	0
Instagram	0	0	2	0	0	0

Although our corpus is not large enough to draw general conclusions, the results indicate that Twitter is both the platform that hosts a bigger diversity of actors that are able to gain visibility and that mostly favors the gain of visibility by individuals.

If we take a closer look at the most shared links that point to Twitter, we can see that the humoristic tone is very present. The jokes around the protests generally involve topics related to sex or to the singer Justin Bieber. This finding corroborates the one in Chagas et al. (2019), that points to the importance of humor in Brazilian politics and to the different appropriations of this kind of approach on social media. You can see two examples below:


Image 6 – Print screen¹²⁸ of two examples of the most used links pointing to Twitter with humoristic tone



Among the most shared links we also found messages calling for different protests in different cities and criticizing the government. A campaign of the Public Defender's office also appears with four different posts with quotes from congressmen and congresswomen about a law project that would affect the functioning of that office.

¹²⁸ Print screen done on January 10 2019.

Image 7 – Print screens¹²⁹ of tweets from the Public Defender’s office



A common point in all the tweets that appeared among the most shared links was the fact that they had images. This characteristic seems quite surprising since Twitter is not a social network mainly based on the use of images. Besides that, from the 33 tweets that were still accessible at the moment of the analysis – all of them containing images – only 3 contained photos of the protests.

¹²⁹ Print screen done on January 10, 2019.

Image 8 – Photos of the protests from the most shares links pointing to Twitter



All the other images were assemblies of phrases or quotations with background images, mixing texts and visual content.

Image 9 – Memes of the protests from the most shares links pointing to Twitter



Considering the same issue of the use of images on Instagram – a network completely based on the sharing on images – one of the two occurrences of Instagram posts is a photo from the protests, while the other one is a photo of people with no direct relation to the demonstrations. Unfortunately, the links to the Facebook posts are no longer accessible, so we cannot analyze the use of images in that social media. From the url address to Facebook posts we can identify that five from the eight posts were images.

The visual aspect of these most shared links can also be explored on the Youtube, a social network based on the sharing of videos. We found eight links to Youtube that were still active. The most viewed of them had 2.776.309 views¹³⁰, was called Anonymous and made

¹³⁰ Data collected on January 10, 2019.

references to supposed lies in Dilma Rousseff's discourses. It is an assemblage of images from President's Dilma Rousseff announcements on national television with critics accompanying each point of her speech. The opening image is a figure dressed in black and wearing the Guy Fawkes mask reading a statement about how Brazil "woke up" and won't believe Dilma Rousseff's lies.

The second most viewed video accounts for 460.095 views¹³¹ and is called "Anonymous unmask's Dilma Rousseff's pacts". The title is a clear reference to the five pacts proposed by President Dilma Rousseff in her announcement on national television during the protests. The video starts in a similar manner to the previous one, with a character representing the Anonymous reading a statement. Again, images of her discourses are mixed with criticisms directed to her, vocalized by this character with the Guy Fawkes mask that remains on the screen during the whole video.

Both videos were posted by a user named *Muda Mesmo* (Really Change it) that has 11 thousand inscriptions on its channel and has posted 62 videos from 2013 to 2015. All videos are criticisms directed to the Worker's Party or its members. The description of the channel is simple: "The fake of the fake".

The third most viewed video is completely different. It shows images of a protest in London supporting the Brazilian demonstrations where reporters from Globo TV had been harassed. The title of the video is "Protesters harass Rede Globo's journalists in demonstrations in London" and was viewed 187.734 times¹³². The 3 minutes and 59 seconds of the video is non-edited and shows the protesters shouting against Globo and the reaction of the reporters facing the activists. It was posted by an account called *Imprensa Livre 2013* (Free Press 2013) that has 327 inscriptions on its channel and only posted this video. It is another content among those with high visibility that show the mediactivist practices we talked about in Chapter 5.

With 115.228 views, the fourth video comes from the channel belonging to the UFC fighter Wanderlei Silva. It mixes images of the protests to those of the national flag with Silva himself speaking and convoking people to descend on the streets on September 7th. He

¹³¹ Data collected on January 10, 2019.

¹³² Data collected on January 10, 2019.

speaks very aggressively against the government, the politicians and the “corrupt” of all sorts and calls “the people” to descend on the streets to demand immediate measures. The video is called “Wanderlei Silva – To the streets Brazil. The giant woke up - Message to the Brazilian People (this last part is originally written in English)”. In addition to the part of the title written in English, the video is also completely subtitled in English, which gives an idea of an international ambition of the piece. His channel has 33 thousand inscriptions and posted 169 videos from 2008 to 2017.

The fifth most viewed video is the longest one: 56 minutes and 46 seconds. It is the filmed open class given by the Professor in Law Tulio Vianna about the demilitarization of the police. It was viewed 13.537 times¹³³ and was published by the channel *Ocupa Sampa* (Occupy São Paulo) that uploaded five videos on Youtube, all of them in 2013. All the videos are either classes or seminars.

The sixth video has quite the same number of views as the previous one, 13.309 views, but it is just one minute and ten seconds long. It shows a part of an interview with the president of the Worker’s Party, at the time, Rui Falcão, where he mentions the group *Fora do Eixo*. That group was responsible for the creation of the *Mídia Ninja*, the main alternative media group that emerged during the protests and was responsible for many live streaming of the events and also for several criticisms against the traditional media. The title of the video is: “Confirmed: Fora do Eixo is a base of political activism of the Worker’s Party”. The video was published by a profile called *Blogueiros do Brasil* (Brazilian Bloggers) that uploaded 119 videos on Youtube from 2013 to 2019.

The seventh video is a musical clip done by three singers of the Brazilian hip-hop movement talking about the Brazilian political situation and convoking people to the protests of September 7th. The video was seen 9.241 times¹³⁴ and is the only video related to the protests that was published on an individual channel. The channel is called Jalzério Figueira and published 19 videos from 2019 to 2014. The video is called: “Operation September 7th Together we are strong Flowzen, Michael Puga and Facbio FG”.

¹³³ Data collected on January 10, 2019.

¹³⁴ Data collected on January 10, 2019.

And the eighth video has no direct relation to the protests, although it was shared with the hashtag #vemprarua.

7.2.3 Mainstream Media

From the 30 mainstream media links we identified, 23 were still accessible. These 23 links pointed to 16 different mainstream media websites from national and international newspapers, magazines and news websites. Table 53 shows the full list of media that were mentioned:

Table 53 – Most shared links to mainstream media per media

Media	Type of media	Geo	Number of links
O Globo	Newspaper	Brazilian	6
G1	News website	Brazilian	5
O Dia	Newspaper	Brazilian	3
Folha	Newspaper	Brazilian	3
Veja	Magazine	Brazilian	2
The Guardian	Newspaper	International	1
Globo.com	News website	Brazilian	1
Estadão	Newspaper	Brazilian	1
UOL	News website	Brazilian	1
Diário de Pernambuco	Newspaper	Brazilian	1
Valor Econômico	Newspaper	Brazilian	1
Diário de Santa Maria	Newspaper	Brazilian	1
Exame	Magazine	Brazilian	1
El País	Newspaper	International	1
A Tarde	Newspaper	Brazilian	1
Carta Capital	Magazine	Brazilian	1

Reading the mainstream media articles allowed us to identify five major topics around which the texts are organized. The main topic deals with the issue of violence. From the defense of one of the Brazilian most known singers, Caetano Veloso, to pacific protests¹³⁵, to coverages

¹³⁵ <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/de-rosto-coberto-como-black-bloc-caetano-pede-manifestacoes-pacificas-9853069>

of violence against the activists¹³⁶ or general cases of violence in Brazilian day-to-day life¹³⁷. An interesting aspect of the articles about violence in our corpus is that all of them were published by media [outlets](#) based in Rio de Janeiro, indicating that maybe the topic is especially sensitive there.

Another main topic of the mainstream media articles is the Brazilian political system. This theme mainly concerns news about politicians and political parties, especially the Worker's Party¹³⁸. This coverage is highly centered around corruption episodes. News about the parliamentary activities also appear in our corpus¹³⁹.

We also identified articles that specifically explored the relations between the political system and the protests. One of them is about a President Dilma Rousseff's speech defending the right of people to protest¹⁴⁰. Another one focuses on a young man that had organized a dinner for people involved in the *Mensalão* corruption scandal and, according to the newspaper, was trying to become one of the leaders of the protests¹⁴¹.

Two articles discuss the possible relations of the Worker's Party with protests. The first of them was published on July 6, 2013 by the newspaper *Valor Econômico's* website. It is called "PT adopts strategies to try an alliance with the demonstrations". The text explains that the protesters were being hostile to the members of the party but, despite of that, according to the media, it had not given up the attempts to participate on the demonstrations¹⁴². The second text about this topic that appears among the most reproduced link is actually an article published on September 8, 2005 by the newspaper *Folha de S.*

¹³⁶ <https://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2013-09-07/batalhao-de-choque-acompanha-manifestantes-que-sao-hostilizados-por-moradores.html>

¹³⁷ <https://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2013-09-07/quatro-bombas-caseiras-nao-detonadas-sao-encontradas-na-av-presidente-vargas.html>

¹³⁸ <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2012/05/petista-envia-sms-para-cabral-e-diz-nao-se-preocupe-voce-e-nesso.html>

<https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/america-latina,lula-sugere-as-farc-criar-partido-para-chegar-ao-poder,362096>

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/125726-petista-teria-oferecido-propina-em-nome-da-oi.shtml>

¹³⁹ <http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/brasil/2013-07-03/comissao-do-senado-aprova-fim-do-voto-secreto-no-congresso.html>

<http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2013/08/veja-quaes-deputados-nao-registraram-voto-na-sessao-do-caso-donadon.html>

¹⁴⁰ <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2013/09/dilma-prega-humildade-do-governo-e-direito-de-populacao-se-indignar.html>

¹⁴¹ <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/jovem-que-organizou-jantar-para-mensaleiros-tenta-liderar-protestos-8730222>

¹⁴² <https://www.valor.com.br/politica/3188966/pt-adota-estrategias-para-tentar-se-aliar-manifestacoes-de-rua>

Paulo's website. The text is called “PT’s flags disappear from protests”, but it is actually about the September 7th 2005 demonstrations, when, after the disclosure of the corruption scandal known as *Mensalão*, according to the media, people avoided to use the party’s flags¹⁴³.

The date of September 7th was also important in 2013, date of an important protest. The media coverage appeared significantly in our corpus of most shared links. But the scheduled protests were only the topic of one of the articles, which is actually announcing that they had been convoked in 172 cities¹⁴⁴. The three other articles we identified were about the traditional demonstrations called *Grito dos Excluídos* (Scream of the excluded), that happens every year and is a space of mainly used by the left¹⁴⁵.

Two of the most shared articles also discussed the use of social media during the wave of protests. The first one is called “Social media predict the biggest protest in history on Saturday” and accords to the social media the capacity of predicting the success of the protests based on the number of confirmations on Facebook events¹⁴⁶. The second one was published by the website of the English newspaper The Guardian and is called “How Brazilian protesters are using Twitter”¹⁴⁷.

Also, four of the texts were not news related to the protests, but actually opinion articles about what was happening in Brazil. Two of them were published by the same columnist, Reinaldo Azevedo, from *Veja* magazine¹⁴⁸. Both texts are critical to the left-wing parties.

¹⁴³ <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc0809200520.htm>

¹⁴⁴ <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/manifestacoes-marcadas-em-172-cidades-no-sete-de-setembro-9846864>

¹⁴⁵ <http://g1.globo.com/bahia/noticia/2013/09/paralelo-ao-desfile-da-independencia-grupo-se-reune-para-protestar.html>

<http://g1.globo.com/minas-gerais/triangulo-mineiro/noticia/2013/09/grito-dos-excluidos-abre-espaco-para-grupos-se-expressarem-em-mg.html>

http://www.diariodepernambuco.com.br/app/noticia/vida-urbana/2013/09/07/interna_vidaurbana.460961/grito-dos-excluidos-chega-ao-fim-com-professor-amordacado.shtml

¹⁴⁶ <https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/redes-sociais-preveem-maior-protesto-da-historia-no-sabado>

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jul/04/brazilian-protesters-twitter-microsoft>

¹⁴⁸ <https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/o-mito-lula-precisa-morrer-se-o-brasil-contemporaneo-quiser-nascer-ou-desencarnalula>

<https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/comunismo-de-resultados-8211-empresario-diz-que-fraude-envolvendo-ong-do-pcdob-chegava-a-90-do-convenio>

The other two were published in the website of the O Globo newspaper¹⁴⁹ and in that of the Spanish newspaper El País¹⁵⁰.

7.3 Twitter’s visibility dynamics: what and who does it favor?

Analyzing the results of the two measures we used to identify the visibility dynamics (retweets and shared links), it becomes clear that the issue is extremely complex and demands conclusions that take into account multiple factors. A first conclusion that our data seems to indicate is that the retweeting process is more open to promote the emergence of new actors than the shared links process.

If we compare the two measures of visibility we used (the retweets and the shared links), we can see that they favor different visibility dynamics. We standardized our data to enable a more precise comparison of what the two dynamics favor. On one side, we took the percentage of tweets among the most retweeted per types of user and on the other the percentage of links among the most shared per types of users and compared them, as shown on Table 54. In order to do that we had to adapt the categories used on the analysis of the most shared links¹⁵¹. It is important to remember that our basis of comparison are all the tweets retweeted more than ten times, as well as all the links shared more than ten times.

Table 54 – Percentage of most retweeted messages and most shared links per types of actors

	RTs	Links
Individual	56%	34%
Organization	20%	15%
Public Figure	7%	3%
Mainstream Media	6%	33%
Alternative Media	4%	9%

¹⁴⁹ <https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/cidadania-vemprarua-9338153>

¹⁵⁰ https://elpais.com/ccaa/2013/07/27/catalunya/1374938675_852943.html

¹⁵¹ We merged the two-step categorization process into one to allow the comparison. We also eliminated one non-existing category in the analysis of the most retweeted messages, so the “media repository for Twitter” was considered to be part of the Social Media category. We added the number of links leading directly to websites of one category and the ones leading to social media links of that same category. For example: the 30 links to Mainstream media contents were added to the two links leading to social media contents of the mainstream media profiles. The percentage was calculated from the total of the two measures.

Politician/Political Party	4%	2%
Humoristic profile	3%	3%

The table shows clearly that the space each actor occupies in each category is very different. While individuals account for 56% of the most retweeted messages, they are only responsible for 34% of the most shared links. When we take a look at the percentages for mainstream media, the difference is even bigger: while they are responsible for only 6% of the most replicated tweets, they are the source of 33% of the most shared links. Stier, Schunemann, Steiger (2018) consider that this preponderance of mainstream media, especially regarding the most shared links, may be explained by their comparative advantage in terms of political, financial and organizational resources. Santos, Lycarião and Aquino (2018) also identify specific and complex strategies that news media might use to increase the diffusion of their content. Although their study was made on Facebook, it clearly shows that having more resources may generate a clear difference in the attention an actor gains on social media.

It is also interesting to see that alternative media more than double their percentage of the RTs to the links (4% on the first one, while 9% on the second one). Public figures and politicians/political parties do the reverse movement, reducing to half the percentage when passing from RTs to most shared links.

Previous work done (Santos, 2012) corroborates this finding, showing that the retweeting process tends to deconcentrate the power of giving visibility to a certain topic from few nodes and dissipate it among a larger number of users.

Although the causes of those findings would have to be further investigated, one possible explanation is that while when retweeting, people tend to pay less attention to the author of the message and thus reproduce messages from a greater diversity of users; contrarily, when inserting a link, people tend to restrict them to reputed sources of information. If that is the case, this finding would be an important addition to the more recent studies about fake news (the issue of fake news will be further explored on topic 5.1). Previous work about source credibility on social media showed that the personalness of the source creates a greater willingness to participate on collective action, when compared to organizational and non-personal sources (Nekmat et al., 2019). That may add another element to this explanation.

A second conclusion that our analysis allows us to draw refers to the role that the number of followers of a certain profile plays in the level of visibility it may attain. As we saw in topic 7.1.2, the number of followers is not enough to explain why a certain message gains visibility through retweeting. That finding is extremely important and corroborates the idea that social media, and more specifically Twitter in this case, allow the emergence of new actors in the public debate. As we saw, the categories with the greatest number of followers are those that traditionally have the higher visibility: mainstream media and public figures. The correlation between the total number of followers of our categories and the total number of tweets among the most retweeted showed to be negative, proving that those two measures cannot explain one another. Establishing that there is no direct relation of the number of followers and the level of visibility a message gets is an indication that there is a new visibility dynamics in place on the network.

Nevertheless, we cannot completely disconsider the role played by the number of followers. If they are not a predictor of visibility a message may get, they do seem to influence the frequency in which an actor may succeed in entering the public debate. Although actors with low levels of followers may have their messages highly spread through retweets, that phenomenon seems to be the result of a specific combination of factors that does not happen frequently. So, most of these actors have only one message among the most retweeted. As for the actors with a higher number of followers, it seems to be more frequent to attain high visibility levels for their messages. The correlation between the average number of followers of each category and the average frequency they appear among the most retweeted show that there is indeed a positive relation between the two variables.

Another important conclusion is not about the dynamics of the platform, but rather about the issues that emerged among the content with high visibility. During the analysis we could identify that certain topics appeared very frequently among the contents with more visibility. It was the case of messages and texts about violence and corruption, that appeared both among the most retweeted messages and the most shared links and were also spread among the different content producers. It was also interesting to notice that contents about the functioning of the state also gained great visibility. It was specially the case regarding the alternative media links that appeared among the most shared links. References to the website *Contas Abertas*, about the control of public budget, to the project *Congresso em Foco*, that

proposes an independent coverage of the work in Congress, and to the *Gabinete Digital*, an electronic government initiative from the government of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, may point to an special interest of people to understand, follow and participate more in the government dynamics.

Another element that must be highlighted about the most visible contents in the 2013 protests is the humoristic tone. It is so present that we decided to create an exclusive category for this type of content. Humor was frequently used both to talk about the protests themselves, the government, the media, among other topics. The very significant number of followers of the humoristic profiles we identified among the most retweeted also attests to the adhesion of this kind of approach of the reality. The humoristic tone was also expressed both in texts and images.

It is also important to consider the visual aspect of the contents that gained visibility. All the tweets ranked among the most shared links had photos and the other accessible social media contents were from Instagram and Youtube, extremely visual social media platforms. The formats that assembled together text, images, and videos were especially important in gaining attention on the network.

A last aspect that caught our attention in the analysis of the most visible contents on Twitter was the international linkages of the movement. That became evident in several moments, starting from the appearance of the profiles of Occupy Wall Street movement (@occupywallstnyc) and from the Spanish 15M movement (@takethesquare) among the most retweeted. International media such as The Guardian and El País also appeared in our corpus. In the case of the English newspaper, it appeared both among the most retweeted messages and among the most shared links; and in the Spanish case, one of its opinion articles appeared among the most shared links. When analyzing the Youtube links among the most shared, we also found a video from the channel of the UFC fighter Wanderlei Silva that had a part of its title in English and was also completely subtitled in English. That indicates a dual movement of some actors related to the protests that seek foreign recognition or support and of the media and social organizations from abroad that are somehow interested in what was happening in Brazil.

Final remarks: what did 2013 tell us?

This last part of the dissertation is an effort to connect the findings of our research about the 2013 protest movement with more recent developments of the Brazilian political arena. As explained before, we do not intend to attribute any predictive sense to the linkages presented here. Our intention is not, in any sense, to conclude that looking differently at the 2013 movements would have allowed predicting what was to come. On the contrary, what we do here is to position this work in 2019, aware of the major developments in the Brazilian political arena after 2013, and try to link these events to some of the results we identified in our research.

The topics we are going to explore here are not at the center of the subject of this dissertation, but they all emerged from reflections in connection with the findings of our research about 2013. The discussions we are going to propose are based on the data we used to analyze the 2013 movement and on other studies and news that were produced about more recent developments in the country.

We consider that, although it may seem unusual, the effort to establish these links is important for two main reasons. The first is the effort to broaden the discussion on the impacts of important social events, such as protests. We do not consider these events as isolated and localized political actions, but rather as singular moments of mobilization that summarize and give visibility to dynamics, practices and demands that are last much longer than the event itself (Hardt, 2017). In that sense, if protest movements can rarely be pointed as the unique cause of a subsequent political development, the particularities they reveal may be a promising path to understand what is yet to come. That being said, what this last chapter propose is not a vast discussion on the Brazilian current political situation, but rather specific connections between the results pointed during our analysis of the 2013 protests and some of the political events that took place after that moment.

The second reason is much more personal. As a Brazilian, as a researcher, as someone that follows closely the Brazilian day to day political life, it makes no sense for me not to analyze 2013 without trying to establish relations with what is going on today. Although I could not state that the recent political developments were a complete surprise, they did mark an

important reversion of course in the Brazilian society. The phenomenon, that happened in multiple stages and is yet ongoing, was in many moments perplexing, troubling and provoking to me. That is why, while analyzing my data and writing my results on the discussions I propose here, it was impossible to not reflect on the current Brazilian situation.

Recent political developments in Brazil and links with the 2013 protests

After the 2013 protests, the Brazilian political life went through a series of developments. We will briefly present a historical timeline of the major political events in the country on that period, in order to contextualize the discussions we are going to propose further.

In October 2014, almost one year after the 2013 protests, Dilma Rousseff was re-elected as president by a very thin margin of advantage. The electoral campaign and the election in itself marked the beginning of an important polarization process that dominated the country (Bringel, 2016). If on 2013 we could see the coexistence of diverse and sometimes conflicting demands on the same demonstrations, after 2014 society became strongly divided.

A campaign that started with the support of the defeated candidate Aécio Neves questioning the results of the election, became stronger with the outbreak of a major corruption scandal involving the Brazilian semi-public petroleum Company Petrobras. In 2015 and 2016, this movement took to the streets demanding for Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, although she was never charged for any involvement in corruption. Yet, the erosion of the parliamentary basis, lack of media support, inaction of the justice system and the beginning of an economic crisis allowed the impeachment process to take place.

Vice-President Michel Temer took office in August 2016 and, during almost two and a half years, approved measures that were a total opposite to the agenda of the Worker's Party – agenda that had granted him with victory, since in Brazil the election for president and vice president is done together, in the same ticket. It was also during Temer's government that the former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was imprisoned in the course of the *Lava Jato* (Car Wash) operation, in a very controversial process. Many Brazilian jurists have expressed their criticism to different points of the process and the case also gained international

visibility in the legal world, with a document organized by the French lawyer William Bourdon and signed by nine other jurists from several countries, addressed to the Brazilian Supreme Court asking for a revision¹⁵². According to the critics, the lack of concrete evidence of his culpability is striking. The UN Human Rights Committee recommended that the Brazilian government should guarantee Lula's right to run for election, but no action was taken by the government in reaction to that. With Lula out of the presidential run – he was number one in the vote intention pools –, 2018 presidential elections were won, by the first time in Brazilian history, by a far right-wing candidate, Jair Bolsonaro.

This is a very brief summary of the major political developments in institutional Brazilian politics from 2013 and 2019. Yet, we cannot disregard another dimension of political action that was extremely important in this period and did not happen within the institutional boundaries of the State, but on the streets. It seems that the 2013 reminded the Brazilian society that the streets were an important place of dispute. Different movements would actively occupy them in the following years to express their demands, call for governmental actions and for changes in behaviors. The use of social media as an important communicative environment would be a constant in all of them.

It would be impossible to do an extensive description of the social mobilizations that took place in this period, so we would like to focus on three main movements: those related to the impeachment of the President Dilma Rousseff, the students' and the women's movements.

The movements demanding for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff mobilized an important part of Brazilian society. They succeeded in taking more than a million people to the streets in many cities of the country. These movements, which based their discourse on the fight against corruption and on the use of national symbols, such as the Brazilian flag or the t-shirt of the Brazilian national soccer team, were mainly led by recently-formed movements. Mainly, three groups gained visibility, the *Movimento Brasil Livre – MBL*¹⁵³ (Free Brazil Movement), the *Vem Pra Rua*¹⁵⁴ (Come to the Streets) and the *Revoltados*

¹⁵² https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/08/09/politica/1533836703_194165.html

¹⁵³ The MBL was founded on November 2014 as was very active during the protests for Dilma Rousseff's impeachment. The group is formed mainly by young leaders, but frequently associated with traditional politicians from the right-wing Brazilian political spectrum. Their most visible leader, Kim Kataguiri, was elected in 2018 for the Chamber of Deputies. In that same election, he supported the candidate Jair Bolsonaro.

¹⁵⁴ The Vem Pra Rua movement was also founded in 2014 and, as the MBL, strongly fought for the Dilma Rousseff's destitution, mainly based on an anti-corruption discourse. The movement became close to the

*Online*¹⁵⁵ (Online Revolted). They all identified as non-partisan. In opposition to them, traditional social movements and parties aligned with the left-wing – such as the *Central Única dos Trabalhadores – CUT* (Unified Workers Union), the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra - MST* (Landless Workers Movement) and the Worker's Party – lead the campaign against the impeachment of the president. It is important to notice that the campaign that opposed the impeachment did succeed in broadening its support beyond the participants of long standing movements, but the organization was led by them. The two opposite campaigns occupied the main streets in many Brazilian cities in alternate dates during the end of 2015 and 2016. That opposition was also very present on social networks, where the two groups fought over hashtags and the public opinion (Segurado et al., 2018).

In that period, a strong mobilization could also be seen in the schools of the country. The student mobilization started in São Paulo, with the objective of blocking a project from the state government that intended to reorganize the education system (Corti, Corrochano, & Alves da Silva, 2016). The change would force more than a million students to change schools and would affect the functioning of 150 education institutions. The students started to express their discontent online, especially on Facebook, and decided then to occupy the schools, preventing all personal from entering, thus suspending all activities (Altheman, Martino, & Marques, 2017).

During school occupations, the students organized a series of activities to ameliorate the conditions of the classrooms, to discuss Brazilian current affairs, to cook their meals and to involve the local communities in the effort to build a healthier education environment. Protests were also organized on the streets, in which students simulated classrooms and did artistic performances (Altheman et al., 2017). It was also impressive to see the articulation between the groups that occupied different schools. Social media, and Facebook in particular, were heavily used to organize the movement and to discuss the issues at stake¹⁵⁶.

Partido Novo (New Party) to which some of their most visible leaders became affiliated. The most visible leader of the *Vem Pra Rua* movement, Rogério Chequer is affiliated to the party and ran as candidate for Governor of the state of São Paulo in the 2018 elections, but was not elected.

¹⁵⁵ The Revoltados Online movement is the oldest and the more extremist of the three movements. It was founded in 2004 and was initially dedicated to chase pedophiles. In 2015 and 2016 it not only supported Dilma Rousseff's impeachment but some of its members openly defended the return of a military dictatorship to the country. They were supporters of Bolsonaro as of the beginning.

¹⁵⁶ For an analysis of the online conversation by the students, see Altheman, Martino, & Marques, 2017.

More than 200 schools were occupied in São Paulo in 2015 and, in 2016, the movement expanded to other states. The movement succeeded to stop the changes in the educational system and the Education Secretary of the state government handed over his resignation.

The third movement we would like to highlight is the women's mobilization. Although that issue is not new on Brazilian society, it gained new strength with a movement that started in 2015 and gained force in the following years, bringing historical fights of the feminist movements to the center of public debate (Freire, 2016; Moraes, Boldrin, & Silva, 2017). Many different moments of mobilization could be seen, both in the streets and on social networks. Many online campaigns discussed the topic, but two hashtags that denounced harassment got a lot of attention, helping women to talk about their traumatic experiences and also raising awareness to the fact that harassment was a more common and spread crime than imagined. The two hashtags were: #meuprimeiroassedio (my first harassment) and #meuamigosecreto (my secret santa). They became viral in Brazil in 2015, even before the outbreak of the #metoo movement in the United States, in 2017. Women were also strongly mobilized during the political campaign of 2018, notably against the candidate Jair Bolsonaro, which presented misogynistic statements and more general prejudiced positions. The mark of this mobilization was the hashtag #elenão (not him), that was not only heavily used online, but also stamped t-shirts and posters in vast demonstrations that occurred in the country.

That brief historical reconstitution of the period aims to establish the institutional conditions and the social climate in which the country was immersed. Those are important contextual elements for the discussion we present here.

From a non-partisan movement to the 2018 elections

The first discussion we want to propose is the passage from a discourse of defense to non-partisan positioning in 2013 (Locatelli, 2013; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2014) to the situation of a very polarized Brazilian society in 2018 (Bringel, 2016; Bringel & Pleyers, 2015; Solano, Ortellado, & Moretto, 2017). To do that, we are going to use the data we explored in Chapter 7 and add new elements to the discussion.

As we already characterized, the 2013 movement emerged from an initial mobilization of the movement *Movimento Passe Livre* (Free Fare Movement), but that grew way beyond its

boundaries to include a diversity of social groups. None of the Brazilian political parties were among the main organizers of that movement, although some of them participated in the demonstrations.

The journalist Piero Locatelli reports that, from the 5th act on (June 17th 2013), there was a strong discourse against political parties (2013). On that day, he heard shouts of “no political party” or “no flags”, referring to political parties’ symbols. He also saw members of two left-wing parties (PSOL¹⁵⁷ and PSTU¹⁵⁸) being expelled from the demonstrations. Five days later, in the 7th act, activists from political parties and traditional social movements were not only shouted at and expelled from it, but they were also beaten and their flags burned (Locatelli, 2013).

Although that moment of the protests does not represent the totality of it, we can say that the political parties never fully integrated in the dynamics of the 2013 protests. In a text written a few months after the wave of protests, Mische (2013) describes a shift from the non-partisan option of the MPL - which was not attached to any political party, although it had the support of some of them and was not opposed to their participation - to an anti-partisan sentiment, that appeared once the movement grew and diversified. The author also identifies that shift in the in Turkish protests, where, as in Brazil, protesters claimed for unity for the country, or the nation, beyond party-related preferences.

Mendonça (2018) relates this critic vision of political parties to broader demands for direct democracy. Political parties would be seen by activists on the streets in 2013 as intermediaries that denature the political representation. But Mische (2013) alerts to the fact that the refusal towards political parties rapidly translated into rejection for the Brazilian institutional political system in a more general sense. That development would be an important element to the following elections, where discourses about politics renewal and candidates that presented themselves as new in the political field were favored.

According to Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2014), the rates of none partisanship in Brazil – people that declared not being identified with any political party – went from 51.6% in May 2013 to 56.9% in July of the same year. An increase of 5.2% in only two months. The authors

¹⁵⁷ *Partido Socialismo e Liberdade* (Socialism and Freedom Party)

¹⁵⁸ *Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado* (Unified Worker’s Socialist Party)

attribute that to a disenchantment with the Worker’s Party, which led the national government since 2003, and to the inability of other parties to attract these citizens. They also show that the identification with parties was even lower among protesters. 61% of people that declared having participated on the demonstrations said not to be identified with any party. The difference of the perception towards political parties between protesters and non-protesters is also significant when related to specific parties. The Worker’s Party, for example, had the preference of 23% of non-protesters, but had that rate dropped by ten points when expressed by people who were on the streets. In contrast, the *Partido Verde* (Green Party) and the *Partido Socialismo e Liberdade* (Socialism and Freedom Party) had higher rates among protesters if compared to the general population.

A few years later, the country would go through highly polarized moments (Bringel, 2016; Bringel & Pleyers, 2015; Solano et al., 2017) that would lead to the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. In this context, we cannot help to wonder what position key actors involved in 2013 took at a the subsequent moment.

In that sense, when analyzing the profiles that were the most replicated in our corpus of tweets of 2013, we decided to identify if and how they took position in the 2018 election. We took the same 253 profiles identified as authors of the most retweeted messages (Chapter 7) and observed if they were still active. We identified 123 profiles that were still active at the date of our analysis¹⁵⁹, what represents 67.6% of the total. Seven of the most retweeted profiles were only active until 2013, the same year of the protest wave, and 52 profiles stopped posting in some moment between 2014 and the first semester of 2018.

Table 55 – Number and percentage of active and inactive profiles per year

	Total	Percentage
active	123	67,60%
inactive since 2018	5	2,80%
inactive since 2017	12	6,60%
inactive since 2016	19	10,40%
inactive since 2015	7	3,80%
inactive since 2014	9	5,00%
inactive since 2013	7	3,80%

¹⁵⁹ We considered as active profiles those who had posted a tweet (original, reply or retweeted) in the six months prior to the analysis. As mentioned earlier, the collection of this data was done between January 5th and 6th, 2019.

We also used the categorization of profiles we developed in section 7.1 to refine the analysis of this data. We then identified that the individual's profiles were the most affected by the inactivity. A total of 42 accounts were discontinued, 35.6% of the total. Among the organizations, that number was 11, what represented 44% of total profiles in that category. It is interesting to see that the two accounts directly related to the expression “vemprarua”, one of the main slogans of the 2013 protests, are no longer active. Also, three of the four accounts related to the Anonymous group were also inactive. Two of them stopped posting in 2014 and the other in 2017.

Although the volatility of Twitter data does create difficulties for an analysis being carried out almost six years later, it also puts us at a privileged place in time to follow the development of these actors. We decided then to analyze the political position of these profiles, responsible for the most retweeted messages in 2013, after the protests.

Considering that, we did a simple text analysis on the tweets of the highly visible profiles in 2013 that were still active, looking for elements that indicated their position in the 2018 election. We searched for references for or against Bolsonaro's election, categorizing them in four categories: for his election, against his election, without mention to the election or “isentão”. *Isentão*¹⁶⁰ is a term that became popular in Brazil in the 2018 presidential elections to identify those people that did not position in one side or the other of the political debate. It is not about people that do not mention politics (that's why we have another category for them), it is really for those profiles that criticized and/or supported both sides at one moment or another, trying to have opinions while remaining neutral.

We excluded from this analysis profiles from mainstream media outlets – because the aim here was not to discuss their coverage of each political event – and the politicians and political parties' profiles – since they had already taken institutional positions. That resulted in a total of 113 profiles that were classified in regard to their political position in the 2018 election.

¹⁶⁰ Something as “very exempt”.

From those profiles, we identified 41 accounts (36%) that supported Bolsonaro's election while 48 (43%) expressed themselves against his election. At the same time, 18 accounts (16%) positioned themselves as *isentões* and 6 (5%) did not mention Bolsonaro.

Although we cannot say that these specific profiles defended a non-partisan or anti-partisan position in 2013 – because we cannot have access to the full extension of their messages back then -, it is interesting to see that those that were highly visible in a movement that, in general, tried to move away from political parties, in 2018 are, for the most part, taking positions in favor or against of a candidate.

Table 56 – Position taken towards Bolsonaro's election by the most retweeted profiles of 2013, by category

	For Bolsonaro	Against Bolsonaro	No mention	<i>Isentão</i>
Alternative Media	1 (17%)	5 (83%)	0	0
Humoristic profiles	0	1 (20%)	3 (60%)	1 (20%)
Individuals	30 (39%)	36 (47%)	6 (8%)	4 (6%)
Organizations	6 (43%)	4(29%)	0	4 (28%)
Public figures	4 (33%)	2 (17%)	5 (42%)	1 (8%)

It is important to highlight that we are comparing two different political moments here, the first being a wave of protests and the second an electoral campaign. It can be considered natural that, facing an election, the actors tend to regroup around the actual political forces that running the election. Yet, it is curious to see what happens when the discourse expressed on the streets has to face the concrete challenges of the institutional political system.

We can see in Table 57 that, only among the humoristic profiles and the public figures, the majority did not take a clear position in regard to the election of Bolsonaro. Alternative media was the only category where there was a clear majority of one side of the political dispute – in that case, against Bolsonaro. Among individuals and organizations, the division between the two sides of the dispute was very tight. The number of *isentões* was mostly significant among the organizations.

The results show that, among the most retweeted profiles in 2013, which were still active in 2018, 79% took position for one or the other side of the electoral dispute. However, there

was not a clear ideological tendency among our corpus, showing that a certain diversity present on the streets in 2013 is sustained six years later, although in a different manner.

The phenomenon of fake news

The second discussion we would like to propose is also related to the 2018 elections and tries to link the conclusions we draw on Chapters 5 and 6 to the phenomena of dissemination of fake news during the 2018 Brazilian elections.

Before going into the topic, we clarify that we adopt here the definitions of Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, according to which misinformation is the unintentional spread of false beliefs, while disinformation would be the intentional manipulation of beliefs. Fake news is a form of promoting either of these two processes.

The 2018 election was marked by widespread dissemination of fake news¹⁶¹. Although the sharing of false information is not a novelty (Valero & Oliveira, 2018), the proportion it took during this specific election was significant. The Brazilian phenomenon is not an isolated case. The American 2016 presidential election, the Brexit campaign and the French 2017 presidential Election, as well as other cases mentioned in the literature (Badouard, 2017, Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, Cardon, 2019) are episodes where the circulation of false information on social media was significant.

Scholars (Badouard, 2017, Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018) point the individualization of news consumption on the web and especially the filters created by many of networks, such as Google and Facebook, as related to the phenomenon of the circulation of fake news. According to Badouard (2017), the discussion about that topic starts with the personalization of Google searches in 2010, and continues with the algorithm EdgeRank, that ranks Facebook content according to the interaction between users. Badouard highlights that those processes came to the center of public discussion both during the 2016 American presidential campaign and the Brexit campaign, mainly because they had three points in common: the

¹⁶¹ As the phenomenon is very recent, there is not much academic studies yet published on the topic, but it was well documented by media articles. We suggest the reading of the piece published by The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/10/brazil-fake-news-presidential-election-whatsapp-facebook>

opinion polls did not succeed in predicting the results, the loss of influence of journalists regarding their publics was accentuated, and social media were accused of promoting a sort of large scale ideological confinement.

Although the author admits that digital media are not responsible for creating this phenomenon, he argues that it would have gained new proportions with the structure of social media. His argument is that the political propaganda¹⁶² does not depend on the content of messages anymore, but rather it is embedded in the architecture that organizes its diffusion. According to him, it is this process of ideological confinement would support the actions of companies interested in massively spreading disinformation.

That becomes even more significant when we consider that one of the most used platform to distribute this kind of content during the Brazilian 2018 elections was Whatsapp¹⁶³, making it considerably more difficult to have a global vision of the phenomenon. In 2018, Whatsapp had 120 million active users in Brazil¹⁶⁴ and, according to the Digital News Report 2018¹⁶⁵, between 2017 and 2018, 65% of Brazilians used smartphones to keep informed, while 62% used a computer. In the same period, Whatsapp was used by 46% of Brazilians to receive news.

It is important to notice that, in Brazil, Whatsapp is used not only for one-to-one private communication, but often is the place for group conversations. If, generally, people enter a group because they know someone that is already a part of it, that does not mean that all people in one group know each other personally. Also, the broadcast list tool, that allows a user to send the same message to various contacts, is vastly used. A last particularity of the Brazilian use of this network we would like to highlight is that an important part of the mobile users in Brazil have limited data packages. For many of them, once their data package is over, the only application that runs is Whatsapp, making that network even more important in the cycle of information. More than that, the fact that they only have internet access to use

¹⁶² Badouard (2017) considers as propaganda “a regime of information dissemination that does not admit pluralism. It resides less in a form of manipulation than in an oriented presentation of reality” (p.39).

¹⁶³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45956557>

¹⁶⁴ Further information on: <http://www.cbicdados.com.br/menu/emprego/pnad-ibge-arquivos-resultados-brasil>.

¹⁶⁵ Full report on: <http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/>.

Whatsapp, many times prevents them from opening external links or searching for confirmation of a received information.

If the Brazilian dynamics of Whatsapp use may have facilitated the spread of false information, the extent of the phenomenon cannot be attributed only to that. The newspaper Folha de S.Paulo discovered that businessmen were paying companies to send false information against the Worker's Party¹⁶⁶ via WhatsApp. They did not comply with Brazilian electoral legislation, that forbids companies to invest on political campaigns, and such businessmen would have signed contracts with communication companies worth 12 million *reais* (Brazilian currency) for the spread false information. The disclosure of that scheme makes it clear that there are two parts of this phenomenon that must be taken into account. There is a dimension that concerns the citizens' communication practices and knowledge in interaction with digital media and another with regards to automated and artificial processes that are intentionally done by an interested part.

Although these two dimensions of the phenomenon are interconnected, our interest here resides on exploring the first one. Following the premise established in the introduction of this dissertation, we consider that more than attributing to technology the cause of a social phenomenon, we need to understand the complexity of the human interaction with the technology in question. In that sense, massive paid and automated campaigns on Whatsapp are not sufficient to explain the consequences of this phenomenon. As explains Badouard (2017), it is important to understand not only the process through which fake news are created and inserted in the communicative arena, but also why they are reproduced by the public. "Looking from this point of view, the real problem is not the one of the production of rumors, but rather of their reception" (p.42).

Also, the use of automated accounts to diffuse political information in Brazil is not a novelty of the 2018 elections. A report produced by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (Ruediger, 2017) showed that the action of bots¹⁶⁷ could already be perceived in many political Brazilian

¹⁶⁶ <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contr-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml>

¹⁶⁷ This study considers as bots "accounts controlled by software that artificially generate content and establish interactions with non-bots. They seek to imitate human behavior and pass as humans in order to interfere with spontaneous debates and create forged discussions" (Ruediger, 2017, p.9).

events since 2014. They tracked Twitter political conversations on different political events (from electoral debates, to demonstrations and Congress voting) and used an automated algorithm to identify profiles with behaviors that pointed them to be automated accounts. They succeeded in showing that bots were used in different degrees and by different parts of the political arena¹⁶⁸. The conclusion of the report, published in 2017, adverts to the risk those practices represented to the electoral process of 2018. Again, the novelty of what happened in 2018 was the widespread false information and the use of a semi-private network for this purpose.

Regarding the communication practices that might have led to this phenomenon, we believe that the discredit of mainstream media outlets is an important element to be taken into account. As we saw on Chapter 5, in 2013, there was a strong critic discourse towards the mainstream media outlets. If that was a historical issue in Brazil in 2013 and, with the new possibilities of social media, it became even stronger. Activists saw social media as a possibility to denounce the media bias and to produce alternative information. The role of journalists as mediators of information was highly criticized and pointed as source of distortion of reality. That perception was present all along the political spectrum.

If, on the one hand, that opened spaces for the emergence of new information mediators that could bring new points of view to the public debate, on the other it also might have contributed to a general sense of not knowing in what information to trust. That is not an exclusive Brazilian phenomenon. When Bennet and Livingstone (2018) analyze Donald Trump's election in the United States, they also point to the "breakdown of trust in democratic institutions of press and politics" (p.127) as an issue at the core of misinformation and disinformation processes. They highlight that, even the work of fact-checking journalists and agencies showing that a certain content was not true, sometimes did not work to discredit them. Badouard (2017) goes even further in considering that the phenomenon is "a virulent expression towards the political and intellectual elites" (p.44). To him, this process questions journalists and intellectuals, those that detain the authority to speak.

¹⁶⁸ Details of the methodology and results of the study may be consulted here: https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/18695/EN_bots-social-networks-politics-brazil-web.pdf

Bolsonaro himself frequently criticizes mainstream media and qualifies information published by them as fake news. He declares to be persecuted by these media. Studies show that, during the election, the groups of Bolsonaro supporters on Whatsapp were those that most shared fake information¹⁶⁹. According to a poll done by the institute IDEIA Big Data/Avaaz, 98.21% of the people that voted for Bolsonaro and were interviewed by them had been exposed to at least one false information¹⁷⁰. In an analysis of the circulation of fake news on the period immediately before the official campaign period, Ferreira (2018) also identified that the engagement towards false information was higher than with news from established media outlets.

Yet, it is also necessary to carefully assess the consequences of this phenomenon. Cardon (2019) highlights that the reactions to the fake news phenomenon may sometimes bring back a long-abandoned theory of the communication as a hypodermic needle, as if media of any kind would be able to inject opinions and perspectives into people. He calls for a displacement on the analysis of the consequences of this process, from technology to social reality. “The old tendency to technological determinism, that puts on technology the responsibility of a political climate change, risks of deflecting attention from social political transformations that are much more important” (p.266). He argues that, even if the amount of false information circulating is very high, it is not significant when we consider the totality of communicative exchanges online¹⁷¹. Cardon (2019) also explains that researchers are not yet able to precisely measure the impact of this phenomenon and that the sharing of a certain content does not necessarily mean that a person believes in it. Also, according to him, the public that is most exposed to fake news is the highly politicized one, that has already formed opinions around certain issues.

If, to Cardon (2019), the effect of singular fake news does not seem as able to significantly change a political outcome by itself, the scenario changes when we consider their interaction

¹⁶⁹ <https://apublica.org/2018/10/grupos-pro-bolsonaro-no-whatsapp-orquestram-fake-news-e-ataques-pessoais-na-internet-diz-pesquisa/>

¹⁷⁰ <https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/eleicoes/pesquisa-mostra-que-84-dos-eleitores-de-bolsonaro-acreditam-no-kit-gay/>

¹⁷¹ The author uses as an example the fact that the 20 most shared fake news during the 2016 American presidential campaign generated 8,7 million likes, reactions and shares, but that represents only 0,006% of the actions of American Facebook users in that same period.

with major mainstream media and other actors with high visibility. He argues that, if actors with a high visibility on social media do not reproduce these false information, their circuit of influence remains restricted, but the reality changes when the contrary happens. The author also points that there are alternative circuits, which are not anchored in spaces of visibility, such as Twitter or websites, and that rather work with the logic of semi-public, semi-private spaces, in groups based on conversational proximity. That seems to be the case of the Brazilian Whatsapp groups.

Cardon (2019) concludes that “the circulation of fake news did not make internet users irrational or naive” (p.274) and that the communication system would be able to protect from disinformation by the actions of its most visible actors. What Cardon proposes is a systemic view of this phenomenon, as something that arises in a complex communication system where many actors are interconnected.

The capacity to oppose a certain information and even to question it is highly related to how traditional institutions that should provide trustworthy information are pictured. So, it is not the same to, in the personal or institutional level, resist or oppose the circulation of fake news in different media environments. As Benkler, Faris and Roberts (2018) put it, “the fundamental mistake of “the internet polarizes” narrative is that it adopts a too naïve view of how technology works and understates the degree to which institutions, culture, and politics shape technological adoption and diffusion patterns” (p.8). In that sense, the high level of critics to mainstream media we identified may function as an element that decreases media trust and opens space to an easier circulation of false information.

The discussion we proposed on Chapter 6 has also a clear relation with that phenomenon. Particularly in the Brazilian reality, if the discussions about the growth of the fake news phenomenon evidences problems with the pluralization of the mediation role, it should not be used to simply reinforce the power of mainstream media. It is important to remember that Brazilian traditional mainstream media system is commercial in its almost totality and highly concentrated in the hands of few families.

The characteristics of this system also brought deformations to electoral processes in the past, as in the well documented case of the edition of the electoral debate between Lula and

Collor in 1989¹⁷². So, the discussion should not be limited to the binary options of reinforcing the credibility of a malfunctioning mainstream media system or encouraging the dissemination of information with no credibility. The moment should rather be used to rethink the communication system in general including the new possibilities it offers and the stands and criteria that need to be considered.

The unmediated leader

The third discussion we would like to propose is also about the mediation dynamics we discussed on Chapter 6, but from another angle. The pluralization of mediators is related to the phenomenon of fake news, but the new mediations enabled by social media also open new possibilities for the communication between political leaders and citizens. Mainstream media was pointed for a long time as the main source of information where citizens looked for news about their elected representatives (Santos, 2010), but a new phenomenon that emerges from social media is exactly the fact that these political leaders can now speak for themselves and achieve a numerous audience.

The use of social media by political leaders, on the one hand, opens the possibility of a more direct and personal communication between representatives and represented, but recent experiences have shown that it can also represent risks. Various studies (Aharony, 2012; Sobaci and Karkin, 2013) show that social media is actually mostly used by political leaders to share locations and political activities or to publish statements and not to increase transparency or participation. A study conducted by Park, Kang, Rho and Lee (2015) tries to connect the use of these communicative forms with the establishment of trust in government and leaders. Their findings actually show that this relation is intrinsically dependent on the kind of use of the platforms. According to them, “citizens display more trust in the Twitter account of a leading officer who is able to offer a direct response to and take responsibility for citizens’ individual requests than in the account of an agency” (p.16). Yet, “Twitter’s ability to deliver real-time communications can easily result in the spread of inaccurate information, wrong social perception and thus lower the tweeting public’s

¹⁷² In 1989, the Globo TV channel edited a debate between the two candidates on the second round of the presidential election – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Fernando Collor de Melo – in clear favor of Collor. The material was released just days before the elections. The episode is well document and even the TV channel publicly admitted its wrongdoing in the case.

perceived credibility of relevant accounts” (p.17). So, once more, it is clear that the technology itself does not automatically lead to an increase or decrease of democratic characteristics.

If our analysis of the 2013 actions of political leaders and government directly concerned by the demonstrations seemed not to be ready to take advantage from the new possibilities of mediation enabled by social media, the situation changed in the years that followed. The learnings from the 2013 movement reflected on the attitude of politicians afterwards. The main Brazilian example of the use of social media to speak directly to citizens is the President Jair Bolsonaro and that is why we think this topic deserves discussion. But he is not the only politician to fully embrace these new possibilities and we had the chance of interviewing a São Paulo city councilor that strongly uses this kind of communication strategy.

Janaína Lima and the cabinet 24/7

In 2017, when we interviewed Fernando Busian, who had worked in the communication team of the São Paulo City Hall during the 2013 protests, he was working in the communication sector of the São Paulo City Council. There, he could see closely how the use of social media influenced the relationship between citizens and political representatives. He explains there were “four or five” city councilors in that term, who had been “elected by social media”. He meant that these politicians heavily used these media and had an important part of their recognition due to that visibility. Busian also highlighted that those practices were changing the day-to-day work at the City Council, as many councilors wanted to have people filming and doing live streams of their actions during the sessions.

Since he pointed us to that direction, we contacted the city councilors and had the chance to interview one of them. Janaína Lima, one of the City Councils of São Paulo that became known in connection with new movements created from the 2013 protests. As a city councilor, she fully embraced the new possibilities of directly speaking to citizens.

She explains that she used to be a member of the movement called *Vem pra Rua* (Come to the Streets), but now she is no longer one of their leaderships because the movement “is not apolitical, but it is supra partisan it does not support candidates”. Lima told us that many members of the movement supported her campaign personally and that she continues to participate on the actions of the movement, but that institutionally it is not directly linked to

any mandates. Accordingly, it does not have the aim to support or to become a political party.

The *Vem Pra Rua* movement became known in 2014 as one of the three main organizers of the protests for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. It was not associated with any political party or existing social movement and heavily used social networks to convoke people to go to the streets and protest against the president. The Brazilian flags and its colors, as well as the t-shirt of the national football team, were symbols used to identify members of the movement. Its name is a direct relation to the 2013 protests, since it retakes one of the hashtags mostly used in 2013 (Segurado et al., 2018). To Janaína Lima, it was because of the 2013 protests that the leaders of the *Vem Pra Rua* movement “perceived the potential of the engagement in the streets”. She considers the 2013 movement was “decisive” to the existence of the posterior mobilization for the impeachment. Lima also explains that after the impeachment, the two main topics for the movement were the fight against corruption and for political renewal. “The movement stimulates people to be candidates and to vote on non-politicians in the upcoming elections”, said Lima, when we interviewed her, in 2017.

She also told us about her path until she arrived at the City Council. Janaína Lima is from the extreme south of the city of São Paulo, specifically from the very poor neighborhood of *Capão Redondo*. Her mother was a communitarian leader, responsible for a nursery of the neighborhood, where she rapidly learned to read and started to help her mother. When asked about her initiation in the political activities, she explains that “politics is very present in the life of those who live in the peripheries. Politics is in the organic life of the community. Demands for improvements in the community, organizing ourselves, protesting are parts of our day-to-day life”. Lima explains that politics has always been something very natural to her and that she grew up seeing political mobilizations as something very common. To her, the *Vem pra Rua* movement was only the possibility to live in greater scale what she had already experienced before.

About the movement, she remembers the mobilizations started in the second turn of the 2014 elections, when Rogério Chequer and Colin Butterfield – two leaders of the movement - started to mobilize “a group of friends” to a demonstration in São Paulo. She received a printed pamphlet inviting to this demonstration and started to help with the mobilization. It was from that moment on that she states to have started to engage in the movement. In regard

to their communicative strategies to engage more people, she states that “social media has always been the strongest tool”, but there was a combination of online and offline communicative strategies to reach different publics.

When asked if the use of social media as the center of the communication strategy did not expose the movement in some way, she stated:

We were a group of people with integrity and committed to Brazil. We had nothing to hide. Nobody had nothing that couldn't be revealed to the public. Our had the noblest aim: to change Brazil. We have always been careful, but that was never an obstacle.

The central use of social media she saw in the movement was also used in her campaign for the City Council. She says she did an “innovative campaign using social media” and she attributes the success of the campaign mainly to Whatsapp. “If you have a cell phone and an idea and this idea has a powerful message, you can connect all the people you need to make that idea come true”.

This conception of directly talking to the citizens is not only present in the communication strategies, but also in the function of her cabinet in a more general sense.

We cut 70% of the team we had the right to, as all the City Councils have. All the City Councilors have around 18 advisors, we have only 6. We cut half of the expenses of our cabinet and gave up the official car and the chauffeur. We are showing how to do politics without privileges and with the spirit of serving the population.

Besides being in “all social networks” as a city councilor, Lima explains that her website also has a digital employee called Eva, to answer the simplest questions made by citizens. It is also a strategy to create the atmosphere of a “24/7” cabinet, that works the whole day, all days of the week. “In our Facebook, we try to inform everything that happens in real time, so that people can follow what's happening and understand how the parliamentary life is”. She explains that the final goal of all these actions is to “break this model of distance between the representatives and the represented. Politics should be a channel of relations and not of separation between the population and the politicians”.

Image 10 – Printscreen of the Eva, the digital employee of Janaína Lima’s mandate



This example of the Janaína Lima experience raises some important points to discuss the current Brazilian political situation. We could debate how practices that emerged from the action on the streets, in the mobilization for protest movements, interact with institutional political arena, but the essential question that emerges from those practices is what are the consequences of those new communicative and political dynamics to democracy.

If, on the one hand, they may be pointed as possibilities of invigorating the ties between representatives and represented, on the other, they may also represent a danger by the consequences it may have on public debate (Santos, 2010). That discussion becomes even more important when we consider that this phenomenon is now present in the highest Brazilian political office. The new president of the Brazil is a heavily active Twitter user and uses the platforms to announce government measures, to fire ministers and especially to share his thoughts on a diversity of topics.

A study published by the political website Poder360¹⁷³ showed that, from January 1st 2019 until March 4th 2019, President Bolsonaro made 326 tweets. It also shows that the main proposition of his government, as important and very controversial reform of the social security system, was mentioned only six times in that period. Instead of discussing the government’s actions, Bolsonaro publishes comments on various topics. The last of his messages that generated strong reaction was about the carnival. He shared a video with an

¹⁷³ More information can be consulted here: <https://www.poder360.com.br/governo/apos-2-meses-de-governo-bolsonaro-pouco-fala-sobre-reforma-da-previdencia-no-twitter/>

obscene scene registered in the São Paulo carnival¹⁷⁴ saying that he was not comfortable showing that, but that he had to “expose the truth” about Brazilian carnival. We could spend pages discussing why the president of a country would share this kind of content, but what really interests us is how this kind of direct communication influences the establishment of priorities on public debate.

It is important to remember that, according to Manin (2012), one of the marks of the passage from the democracy of parties to the democracy of the public is exactly the separation of the social structures that seek for votes and the one that forms public opinion. In that sense, the phenomenon of direct communication between political representatives and citizens need to be regarded in as a critical issue. If, on the one hand, these practices may, in some ways, reinforce democratic ties between those elected and those responsible for their election, on the other, they may dangerously bring closer the logic of political campaign and personal propaganda and the logic of public interest.

Again, this phenomenon is not a *jabuticaba*¹⁷⁵. The American President Donald Trump is another example of a political leader that frequently resorts to Twitter to communicate. In a critical paper about the effects of Twitter’s political use, Ott (2017) analyses Trump’s tweets and defends that “Twitter infects public discourse as a social cancer” (p.60). We do not share this vision, which we consider very techno-determinist and simplistic. But Ott (2017) does raise two important points concerning this issue. The first one is that Twitter has become a major source of information and news to people. We would add to that the fact that many times political personalities achieve higher audiences in social media platforms than media outlets themselves. The second is that mainstream media frequently treat tweets as news and that reinforces the strength of these messages.

Once more, it is the systemic dimension that may allow us to better understand the possible consequences of these practices. Even though this issue is directly related to the use of social media done by politicians, the appropriations that mainstream media - and other actors that

¹⁷⁴ The video showed a man that introduced his finger in his anus and then another man urinated in the hair of the first one.

¹⁷⁵ Jabuticaba is Brazilian fruit that is very rare in other countries and the word is thus used to refer to things that only exist in the country or that were originated in the country.

more frequently attain high visibility levels - chose to do with it may be decisive on the impact of these messages on public debate.

The consequences of this issue seem far from consensual and further research is needed to better access them. Case studies may be a particularly interesting choice, since many contextual characteristics need to be taken into account – the different social media platforms; the different levels of government; the differences of executive and legislative work; the ideological choices, among others -, to deepen the discussion on this topic that poses a new challenge to the democratic dynamics.

Conclusion

The purpose of the present dissertation was to discuss the social media use during the 2013 protests in Brazil and the respective consequences to the communication system. In order to do that, we analyzed both data from social media, Twitter in particular, and from interviews we made with different actors that participated on the protests. We departed from an analysis aimed at understanding how mainstream media was seen with this new communicative possibility brought by social media. Alternative mediations to mainstream media and how that would be established were also investigated. Finally, diving into the visibility logics, we questioned who is actually gaining attention in these new media.

This path of analysis allowed us to draw some interesting conclusions about what the social media use in the 2013 protests represented for the communication system. We present the main points of our conclusions in a way to better articulate the results we have found.

Mainstream media continue to be important drivers of conversation yet not as before

One of the issues that most intrigued us in this research was the role of mainstream media. We wanted to see what role did they play in this new scenario, where social media use is very relevant. We tried to distance ourselves both from the idea that social media would represent a completely alternative media in regard to mainstream media, or from the perception that social media simply reproduced the broadcast model. It was also relevant to question the idea that the same media that were taken into account before now guide the online debate. In order to do that, we pursued different paths to access what this role really was and two main findings in that matter were achieved.

The first one is that mainstream media as content are still important sources and topics of conversation. The visibility analysis here presented showed that they were responsible for 6% of the most retweeted messages and 33% of the most shared links. That means that, when we consider the tweets that become the most visible on the discussion, the role of mainstream media cannot be disregarded. The difference between the results about most retweeted messages and most shared links also show that social media data may be measured in different forms, as they entail different media and sociability practices. It is clear that people

resort to mainstream media more often when searching for links to be shared than when replicating messages.

Anyway, if mainstream media remain important drivers of conversation, they now have to share this space with many other actors. In the two visibility measures we used, individuals were the most prominent category. Particularly regarding the most retweeted messages, organizations and public figures categories also appear as more relevant than mainstream media. That is, in the ambience of social media, the diversity of actors that have the possibility to produce and share information do have an impact on the role of mainstream media as central mediators of information that becomes visible to a large part of society. That shows that social media, on the one hand, may not be considered in its integrality as an alternative media, but on the other hand, that its logic does challenge the communication system is in place.

In this sense, we could say that, with social media, the *polis* proposed by Arendt (1958) as the place of formation of the common world is functioning and being fed in a more diverse manner. More actors achieve visibility and help to shape this common notion of things than before. Yet, the role of mainstream media is still central. We also have to consider that the diversification of actors also come with very strong criticism to mainstream media.

Twitter is a new space of contestation of the established media system

As we explained, the critics to Brazilian mainstream media is not a novelty, but the new possibilities of social media give them a new life. Activists consider that, with this new media, they can not only reveal their own voices, but also oppose and denounce mainstream media behaviors that they see as problematic. In the analysis of the mainstream media mentions in our corpus, it was manifest that the critical tone dominated largely over the others. It was also interesting to perceive that many of the mentions to media were not directly related to their content, but rather to the media outlets themselves. That was especially strong in the case of the TV channel Globo. The Globo group, with its many different media, showed to be the main target of the critics during the 2013 protests.

Another interesting characteristic of this critic is that it was coming not only from the progressive movements – as privileged by Cardon and Granjon (2010) in their proposal of the concept of mediactivism -, but also from right-wing ones. Globo was accused of

completely opposite behaviors. It would have, at the same time, supported and contributed to the fall of the Dilma Rousseff's government and encouraged people to go to the streets and discredited the activists. These critics from all the length of the political spectrum show that the level of criticism to mainstream media is general in society.

So, at the same time this notion of a common world is built in a more diverse manner, a major actor in that construction is extremely discredited. On the one hand, that loss of power has very positive consequences, especially regarding the Brazilian reality, where mainstream media are commercial in almost its totality, very concentrated in the hands of a few families and with very low internal diversity (Azevedo, 2006). The fact that those media outlets have to share the power of making a certain information visible is certainly beneficial to democracy in terms of plurality and diversity. But, on the other hand, there are some issues that emerge from these new information producers, especially related to the credibility of the information they diffuse.

New social actors on the streets and on digital networks

The analysis of these communication dynamics, in the context of protest movements, allowed us to perceive a relation between the emergence of new social actors on the streets and on social media. We have no intention of drawing a causal effect in any direction, but the fact is that, in 2013, Brazil experienced a social uprising that presented new features, forms of mobilization and protests and, specially, new social actors that gained prominence in relation to traditional political organizations, that became auxiliary or contested lines to the action. At the same time, the intense use of social media also propelled new actors in the communication arena.

These two groups (the new groups that gained visibility in the streets and on social networks) are not necessarily the same, but we cannot disregard the fact that the moment of the 2013 protests serves as a temporal mark to see evident changes in both arenas of political dispute.

With social media, mediation processes have more dimensions rather than less

Journalists are no longer the sole gatekeepers of information that deserves to be largely diffused. In social media, other actors may assume that role, what creates new dynamics in the information flow. These new mediation opportunities will be appropriated in different manners by different actors, but it will frequently be seen as a chance to decrease the level

of mediation. Perceived in a simplistic manner, it is as if the role of the journalists was erased from the equation of the information flow, making it simpler, quicker and with less disturbances.

We observed that new actors will assume this role of mediators in different manners. And this activity in itself may become an essential part of activism, overcoming the traditional notion that sees social media communication as a way to generate actions outside these media, on the streets. What we propose is that there is an important dimension of activism that takes place online.

The *Dilma Bolada* Facebook page case we explored is the base to this argument. The author of the page's work during the protests consisted in staying at home, gathering information from different media and people and producing his own coverage of what was going on to his large audience. Not only this activity did not include being on the streets, but the author of the page also reported that, actually, being on the streets was prejudicial to the work he proposed to do. So, the fact that new mediations are now possible also opens a new space of dispute for attention where activism can make a difference.

The fact that activists or politicians no longer have the need to pass through the journalistic filter to transmit their messages is seen by many activists as a possibility of increasing the quality of information. That perception must be considered together with the discussion we just made about the discredit of mainstream media. If the media are seen as responsible for "manipulating" and "distorting" information, the possibility to bypass their action on the information flow would be positively seen. From that assumption, emerges a discourse about the benefits of disintermediation.

We could even reintroduce the discussion if disintermediation processes are really beneficial to democracies, but our argument here is different: we believe that social media as communicative environment in fact increases the levels of information mediation in regards to mass media, based on the broadcasting model. What we argue is that the logic of social media will in fact act in increasing and rendering the levels of mediation of information more complex.

On the broadcasting model, we can think of the journalist role as a mediator – by selecting what in the reality deserves coverage and with which frame – and then of a technological

mediation done by the media in which the journalist publishes. Those two levels compose the dual mediation process presented by Jouët (1993). After that, we shall also consider the reception as an additional mediation level, not only by the choice of media consumption, but also by the social and cultural backgrounds that will function as filters (Voirol, 2005).

When thinking about the social media context, that equation becomes more complex. The role of the journalist to choose what in reality would deserve attention is now done by a multiplicity of actors that are in interplay in that ambience. That does not mean an increase in mediation, but rather a diversification of it. The problem is that, thus it is no longer concentrated in one actor, the identification of this process becoming more difficult and naturalized. The idea of disintermediation comes from the invisibility of these new diffused mediators of information that are not professional journalists but do the work of selecting parts of reality to be made visible to their networks.

Then we have, as in the broadcast model, the technological mediation shaping the information to be shared to certain affordances and constraints of the social media platforms (Cammaerts, 2015). As explained, we do not see the conception and design of social media platforms as exterior to their use (Jouët, 1993), thus they are an essential part of the mediation process.

But here we have to add a new level to this technological mediation that did not exist before. Now, some social media platforms are able to select what to show or not to a certain user, mainly based on its social behavior. This does not consist in a choice consciously done by the user – we will get to that – but in automated selections done by some social media based on private algorithms¹⁷⁶. That means that, if before making your article fit in the space the newspaper had was a guarantee that it would be printed in all copies that publication, the same does work on social media. A publication done on Facebook, for example, in a page that has 1 thousand likes, will appear only to certain accounts according to a logic that we do not know precisely.

¹⁷⁶ Mattelart (2013) calls our attention to the fact that this “collaborative web” frequently seen as in opposition with the market and merchandise logic, should in fact be seen as a part of the cultural and communication industries. This aspect may not be forgotten especially when we are talking about building different information paths.

After that, we have what, in the broadcast model was called the reception level of mediation. In the case of social media, it becomes much more active than before¹⁷⁷ incorporating to the idea of receiving information also the ability to redistribute it to one's own network.

First, it consists in the power of the users to choose the content they want to have access to. The choice of pages or profiles to follow or who to become friends with will build a personalized feed of information the user will receive. This process seems similar to that of choosing which television channel to watch or newspaper to buy, but with an infinity of choices. Again, we would say it does not mean an increase in mediation, but rather a diversification of it. An interesting aspect in this composition of the informational basket of each social media user is that it will probably mix institutional sources of information with sociability ties. That does not mean they will be used in the same manner, nor that they will have the same credibility to the user, but they will be together in his newsfeed. Then, there is a last level of mediation that we could identify that is exactly the one related to sociability ties.

Social media are not mainly news media, they are sociability media in which news are only a part of the information that circulates. So, as we just said, the personal information package of each user will combine both dimensions. That becomes more important when we take into account the replication practices that social media allows users to do. So, even if I do not follow or am a friend to a certain account, I can end up having access to its content because someone in my network interacted with it. That interaction may be the replication of the message (a retweet on Twitter or a share on Facebook, for example), but may also be other kinds of interactions (such as liking or commenting) that will make it appear to me as recommendation (someone you interact with liked this content). So, the sociability ties also function as an information filter and organizer, adding yet another level of mediation.

It is also important to consider that another difference between this model and the broadcasting model is that the mediation steps are not sequential; they may happen various times in different orders. There is no linearity. It is a continuous and multifaceted process.

¹⁷⁷ As exposed by Voirol (2005) and by a variety of scholars, reception has never been a place of passivity, but rather a space of construction and dispute of significances. Our argument is that if the broadcast media model allowed a more or less clear differentiation between two poles, one that chose what information would be produced and distributed and the other that received that information, that is no longer the logic on social media.

To summarize, after comparing the information flow on social media to that on broadcast model, we identified two points where the mediation process was complexified and two others that were added. We consider that, both the diversification of the actors that select facts that deserve attention and the multiplicity of choices users have when they fill their information basket are potentially positive elements to democratic systems. They both have the possibility of bringing new voices and points of view to public debate. However, there are also potentially harmful points that may arise out of this process. The first one is that, with the discredit of mainstream media, the diversification of mediators favors the emergence not of legitimate social voices, but rather of information produced with the intention of spreading misinformation and disinformation. The second would be an excessive fragmentation of public debate (Lycarião, 2009; Wojcik, 2011) that would negatively affect the capability of producing a common world.

There are also two levels of mediation added, the first of them being associated with the role of social network platforms. As these media detain private algorithms capable of shaping the access to information, their uses will be based on criteria that are not publicly known, what seems dangerous to democracies. Professional media have editorial principles and professional ethical boundaries. Although in Brazil that does not guarantee neither that they are followed nor that infractions will be punished, these outlets are socially obliged and held accountable for their actions. That is not (yet) the case of social media platforms, that take advantage from the level of invisibility of this kind of mediation in social debate. They are able to choose what one sees or not with no explanations about what principles guide that process¹⁷⁸.

The second level of mediation that is added to the process is the one that relies on sociability, which means that our social ties are now shaping in a more systematic way our access to information. If, on the one hand, that may create a bubble effect, reinforcing points of view already present in a certain group, on the other, it may create alternative paths where information become visible.

Sociability is building a new information path to visibility

¹⁷⁸ We can relate this discussion with the fact that, in Brazil, radios and televisions are public concessions, thus they should have, theoretically, a clear public oriented responsibility supervised by the State, while completely private and commercial companies such as the social media platforms have none.

Our visibility analysis showed that the number of followers of a certain profile is not decisive on the visibility its messages may get. Although the size of the audience is correlated to the frequency that a certain profile appears among the most viewed, it is clear that there are other elements that explain why a certain message gains visibility on social media. So, we can say that the visibility logic on social media differs from that of broadcast media, where the size of the audience is essential to determine the visibility of a certain content.

We believe that the element that makes a difference here may be precisely the sociability these platforms entail. As proposed by Gomes (2016), social media allow the “‘bleachers’ effect”, when those supposed audience also participate in the action by interacting with content. In our opinion, that interaction will generate the necessary repetition, that structures these networks (Boullier, 2013b). In that way, a content is spread not by the audience of the initial account that posts the message, but by the sociability network around it.

In that sense, each individual can be considered as a kind of media, to the extent that they have their own public, to which they diffuse information. That idea seems to fit the logic of social media, where we could say that every profile has its audience. So, the visibility dynamics, rather than being based on a single-step diffusion to a large public, would be built through a multiple-step diffusion to successive audiences that would receive the content through sociability ties. This dynamics can be seen as the consequence of the last level of mediation we identified previously, the one where users are capable of choosing whether to interact or not with a certain content and, thus, influence its diffusion.

In that sense, we could even say that the participation of the supposed audience is so important that it would be necessary to go beyond considering them as an element outside of the field, on the bleachers, as proposed by Gomes (2016). The diffusion of information through sociability ties seems to be so central in the information flow on social media that this dimension becomes another field where the game is played.

We would also like to highlight that the decision to work with visibility measures in this dissertation considers that they are essential to the construction of a common knowledge in a society, but there are other points of view to look at this phenomenon. Even contents that do not achieve great visibility may play an important social role of diffusing specific points of view or giving voices to underrepresented communities.

Final remarks

These main conclusions of our research refer to new challenges of the Brazilian democracy. Although, at first, the creation of social media was acclaimed as the possibility of reinvigorating democracy, today the reality seems much more complex. If, on the one hand, new voices seem to have found themselves some room to enter the public debate and challenge the mainstream media narrative, on the other, it also became clear that the broadening of voices that influence public debate is not only positive to democracy (Coleman, 2017a; Wojcik, 2011). That perception shall not make us diminish the many positive initiatives that emerged from that, but it must lead to a reflection about the requirements for a high-quality public debate and the way social media can contribute to that.

If the results presented here are based on the analysis of a specific moment of Brazilian political life, they show to be highly related to processes that took place afterwards. The changes in the communication system we identified here are not isolated in time, but are rather a part of a long and complex process still in progress. The continued search to better access those phenomena increases our capabilities of understanding the changes the Brazilian democracy is undergoing.

Although we believe the present research brings important contributions both to the academic field of the studies in digital communication and democracy and to the general understanding of the Brazilian contemporary reality, we would like to point some limitations of the study as well.

The first element regards our work with the Twitter data. Since an important part of the analysis we propose here is based on a corpus of tweets, it is important to put the use of this data in perspective. As highlight Segerberg and Bennet (2011):

(...) data from Twitter streams only contain a slice of the collective action space, and that what the slice looks like may change as other elements in the evolving environment interact with the users and managers of the stream. Depending on where one cuts into a Twitter stream, then, one may find different actors and different kinds of activity going on (...). (p.202)

So, it is important to consider that the data we present here represent a specific picture of the conversation around the protests. That picture is shaped by the period of the collection, by the keyword used to gather the data and by the tools used to build the collection. More than that, we cannot consider that the Twitter users in Brazil are representative of the whole population. We consider that this social media is especially suitable to the kind of study we developed here, since it is highly used by the traditional actors of the media system, but that also adds a limitation to the study. Although we can identify clues to discuss broader phenomena, results from a specific social media can never be generalized to all social media platforms since their internal logics are very different.

Another limitation we would like to register is our point of view of the 2013 protests, which reflected on the methodological and theoretical choices done here, and of the Brazilian political scene in broader sense. Although, as researchers, we adopt a distanced point of view to be able to present nuanced analysis of the reality, our aim in this dissertation was not to present an impartial view of the Brazilian reality. The fact that we focused our interviews almost exclusively on left-wing actors may have prevented us from shedding light to other practices and dynamics that did not appear in our corpus.

Results presented here point to important changes in the communication dynamics, which may have significant consequences in democratic societies. Future research is needed to deepen the knowledge on these changes. There are two specific points that, in our opinion, especially deserve further work. The first one would be the role of sociability in the information flow on social media. That seems a promising approach yet to be explored, both in terms of mediation levels and as a process of generating visibility. The study retweets (Twitter) and shares (Facebook) can be a starting point to do that, but it would also be interesting to include other kinds of interaction. A second research path that would deserve future investigations is on mediation levels. More precise descriptions of how those mediations work in specific cases can generate enough knowledge to produce more generalizations.

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Résumé en français

Introduction

Le Brésil connaît actuellement une période politique troublée. La toute récente démocratie brésilienne - rétablie en 1985 après 21 ans de dictature militaire, est en train de se confronter à des situations qui peuvent la remettre en question. Si les forces conservatrices (politiques, économiques, culturelles, religieuses et militaires) ont un rôle essentiel dans l'explication des menaces qui la guettent, certains changements profonds dans la sphère politique semblent ne pas avoir encore été complètement compris.

Les mouvements de protestation de 2013 montrent que la société civile a découvert de nouvelles formes d'organisation et d'expression de son mécontentement (Judensnaider et al., 2013). Les acteurs traditionnels de la vie politique brésilienne tels que les partis politiques, les syndicats et les associations de classe sont devenus des acteurs secondaires, certes participants, mais sans être aux commandes des mouvements qui ont lancé des millions de personnes dans les rues du pays tout entier. Les gens se sont mobilisés en utilisant d'autres moyens, d'autres mots d'ordre et d'autres intermédiaires. Bien que l'explication du phénomène soit complexe et implique différentes causes politiques, économiques, culturelles et sociales, l'une d'elles en particulier a attiré notre attention : l'utilisation massive des réseaux sociaux.

Si cette utilisation a pris une ampleur particulière dans la vie politique du Brésil en 2013, elle a continué à le faire dans les années qui ont suivi. Et comme cette thèse a été écrite au cours des années 2018 et 2019, il nous a été possible d'accompagner les changements de discours sur ce rôle des médias sociaux : de largement favorables - en tant qu'instruments ayant permis une grande visibilité de ces mouvements - à des visions très négatives - en tant que milieu de communication qui facilite la désinformation, l'infox. Mais il faut reconnaître qu'aucun de ces extrêmes n'explique totalement le rôle politique des médias sociaux ; c'est pourquoi cette thèse s'appliquera à analyser de près à la fois l'usage de ces médias sociaux et l'environnement social dans lequel il s'insère, pour pouvoir comprendre la complexité de la question.

Cette thèse se situe à la croisée de trois champs thématiques : étude des médias, étude des mouvements sociaux, et étude de la démocratie. Ces trois domaines constituent les références théoriques de notre recherche et les différentes parties de notre sujet d'étude, mais se mélangent aussi dans l'approche que nous proposons, ce qui n'est pas la démarche la plus courante.

Pour tracer les grandes lignes de la recherche sur cette relation entre manifestations et médias numériques, nous pourrions dire qu'un premier axe principal, qui réfère essentiellement aux études sociologiques, essaie de comprendre comment l'utilisation des médias sociaux a changé la logique de l'action collective. Des organisations moins structurées et plus horizontales, une absence de leadership, le caractère éphémère de l'organisation et des actions plus individuelles sont les caractéristiques les plus souvent citées de ces nouvelles formes d'expression politique (Bringel & Domingues, 2013 ; Pleyers & Glasius, 2013). Une deuxième approche, correspondant plutôt à une optique de sciences politiques, cherche à étudier et discuter l'impact de ces nouveaux mouvements sur le système politique institutionnel, dans leurs relations avec les partis politiques, les élections et les mouvements sociaux traditionnels (Alonso & Mische, 2017 ; Scherer-Warren, 2013). Une troisième approche, concentrée sur le champ de la communication, essaie d'identifier, de décrire et d'analyser plus précisément les pratiques et les acteurs impliqués dans ces mouvements dans les médias sociaux (Malini, 2016 ; Medeiros, 2016 ; Zago, Recuero & Bastos, 2015). De la cartographie des réseaux sociaux à l'analyse des contenus et discours, différentes méthodes ont été utilisées pour classer les contenus repérés, décrire les différents types de conversation et les réactions qui en découlent, identifier les acteurs principaux des flux d'information dans ce nouveau environnement de communication.

Notre recherche ne suit pas intégralement les lignes de ces approches, bien que nous pourrions la définir comme plus proche de la troisième, celle qui va scruter plus profondément les pratiques sur les réseaux sociaux pour comprendre la spécificité du phénomène. Mais il y a une différence claire dans ce que nous proposons. Notre objectif principal n'est pas de comprendre l'utilisation des médias sociaux en soi, mais plutôt de saisir les changements que cette utilisation va apporter au système de communication au sens large.

Nous considérons les médias sociaux comme un élément nouveau dans le paysage de la communication, non seulement par leurs spécificités mais aussi par les changements qu'ils

entraînent chez tous les autres acteurs du système pour s'adapter à une nouvelle dynamique. Cette recherche est guidée par des questions sur un possible nouveau fonctionnement de ce système : quels changements dans la production d'information dans le contexte d'un mouvement de protestation ? Comment les médiateurs d'information vont défier les grands médias et avec quelles conséquences ? Est-ce que ces nouveaux acteurs sont en effet inclus dans la partie la plus visible du débat public ? Nous considérons que l'usage des réseaux sociaux est central pour discuter ces changements.

Pour cela, ce qui semble le plus évident à première vue pour expliquer ce phénomène serait une étude comparative entre les différents acteurs qui participent à ce système. Nous pourrions par exemple comparer la couverture des manifestations sur les réseaux sociaux et sur les grands organes de presse ou la presse alternative traditionnelle. Toutefois nous avons choisi les réseaux sociaux comme milieu d'étude pour comprendre les changements du système.

Énoncés théoriques et problématique

Un tel choix se fonde sur notre perception que les réseaux sociaux ne devraient pas être vus comme un média de plus, mais plutôt comme un système en soi où différentes logiques de médias interagissent. Notre approche à cette question se fait par le concept de système hybride de communication, développé par Chadwick (2013). Pour l'auteur, l'hybridité est comprise comme une caractéristique qui résulterait des «luttres de pouvoir et de la compétition pour la prééminence lors de périodes de transition, de contingence et de négociabilité inhabituelles» (p.15). Cette notion semble appropriée pour appuyer la discussion que nous voulons proposer.

Il est également important de clarifier certaines notions de base de ce travail. En ce qui concerne les médias sociaux, nous adoptons le concept proposé par boyd et Ellison (2007), qui les définissent comme des «services Web permettant aux individus (1) de créer un profil public ou semi-public dans un système délimité, (2) d'articuler une liste d'autres utilisateurs avec lesquels ils partagent une connexion, et (3) d'afficher et parcourir leur liste de connexions et celles établies par d'autres utilisateurs du système¹⁷⁹». Nous ne considérons

¹⁷⁹ Selon ce concept, les médias sociaux sont différents des réseaux sociaux. Ces derniers seraient les réseaux de relations entre les personnes, qui ne dépendent pas des plateformes numériques pour se réaliser. Les réseaux sociaux ne sont pas un phénomène nouveau, ils gagnent simplement des nouvelles formes et possibilités avec les médias sociaux.

pas que les médias sociaux soient complètement opposés ou alignés avec les médias alternatifs ou les médias traditionnels¹⁸⁰. Nous considérons plutôt que la conversation sur les médias sociaux aura la participation des deux, avec une pluralité de voix individuelles et collectives qui se somment.

L'environnement des réseaux sociaux va donc absorber la logique des médias déjà existants et d'autre part ouvrir un nouvel espace pour une grande diversité d'acteurs, créant un nouveau système de communication interactif et complexe.

En conséquence, la vision systémique des réseaux sociaux à la fois de l'intérieur et vers l'extérieur sera le premier élément guidant notre recherche. Une telle approche vient également de la littérature académique où divers auteurs montrent la nécessité de dépasser la séparation des médias sociaux du plus large environnement de communication (Couldry, 2009 ; Chadwick, 2013 ; Mattoni & Treré, 2015). Ils soulignent l'importance d'intégrer l'analyse de ces nouveaux médias à d'autres acteurs de la communication. C'est donc à partir de notre propre compréhension du phénomène et des indications trouvées dans la littérature, qu'émerge cette première perception qui va structurer notre recherche.

Mattoni et Treré (2015), par exemple, soulignent que de nombreuses études dans le domaine des médias et mouvements sociaux présentent ce qu'ils appellent un «biais d'un seul média» (p.4). Les auteurs expliquent que la tendance à ne se focaliser que sur un média ou une plateforme produit fréquemment une fracture dans les domaines universitaires entre des études portant soit sur la couverture médiatique traditionnelle soit ceux qui portent sur les médias alternatifs. L'absence de dialogue entre ces deux domaines est un défi à relever. Ce défi devient encore plus évident étant donné que, conformément à la notion évoquée de système multimédia hybride (Chadwick, 2013), l'interaction entre les différents médias et les citoyens est constante et dynamique. Seule une analyse plus large - qui inclut à la fois les

¹⁸⁰ Nous adoptons ici la définition de médias alternatifs en tant que média ayant des origines ou des approches dissidentes vis-à-vis des grands médias. Notre objectif avec cette conceptualisation très large est de caractériser toutes les expériences médiatiques offrant des alternatives (en termes d'acteurs qui les produisent ou de la ligne éditoriale du contenu qu'elles produisent) aux grands médias brésiliens. Ces derniers étant principalement formés par tous les principaux groupes de presse et de médias audiovisuels. Notre option n'est donc pas d'avoir un concept plus spécifique et universel de médias alternatifs - c'est pourquoi nous ne les voyons pas forcément attachés au militantisme (Cardon & Granjon, 2010) ou à des luttes sociales (Suzina, 2018) - mais plutôt de les identifier toujours en opposition à la réalité concrète des grands médias brésiliens.

médias traditionnels et alternatifs et qui cherche à comprendre leurs interactions - semble capable de fournir une meilleure compréhension de cet environnement.

Nous pensons que notre approche de l'utilisation des médias sociaux va dans le sens de surmonter cet écart. En abordant nos données Twitter, nous ne nous limitons pas à enquêter sur l'utilisation des médias, nous nous intéressons plutôt aux relations entre les différents médias et les acteurs présents dans ce réseau. C'est également dans le sens d'élargir la compréhension de l'utilisation des médias que nous avons également interviewé des acteurs clés de l'activisme, des médias et du monde politique au sujet de leurs pratiques médiatiques. C'est donc à la fois par notre compréhension du phénomène des médias sociaux et par les indices fournis par la littérature que se dégage cette première perception qui structurera notre recherche.

Un deuxième aspect essentiel de notre point de vue est de comprendre le rôle de la technologie dans ce processus. Nous essayons ici d'éviter les approches simplistes sur la technologie et les médias sociaux en particulier, qui considèrent ces technologies comme de simples outils de communication ou des accessoires aux structures déjà existantes. Comme indiqué par Della Porta (2013), il existe une lacune dans les études sur les médias numériques et la démocratie, ce qui fait qu'ils ne sont généralement pas en mesure d'approcher correctement le rôle de la technologie. En conséquence, «le débat sur le Web a tendance à être hautement normatif ou plutôt technique, avec même certaines nuances de déterminisme technologique» (p.27).

Pour cela, il nous faut éviter deux types d'erreur de lecture du phénomène : celle d'une nouveauté radicale, et celle d'une caractéristique intrinsèque de la technologie qui jouerait soit en faveur soit contre la démocratie. Nous considérons plutôt que ces nouvelles technologies créent de nouvelles pratiques qui leur sont spécifiques, des logiques de sociabilité et des flux d'information qui demandent un entendement particulier.

Nous considérons que la dynamique et les pratiques de communication qui s'établissent sur les réseaux sociaux vont reproduire certaines des pratiques déjà existantes tout en en introduisant de nouvelles. La nouveauté ne vient pas seulement des nouvelles possibilités qui s'ouvrent, mais également des nouvelles formes d'interactions constantes que ces espaces vont entraîner (Chadwick, 2013). Et c'est en ce sens que, même si ce que nous proposons ici n'est pas une étude comparative, nous considérons qu'il est important d'avoir présent à l'esprit ce qu'étaient les dynamiques et les logiques avant l'avènement des réseaux sociaux pour pouvoir

saisir ce qui a réellement changé et ce qui perdure mais en ayant à s'adapter au nouvel environnement (Clavert, Grandjean & Méadel, 2018).

La seconde erreur de lecture que nous voulons éviter à propos de la technologie est le caractère essentialiste qu'on pourrait lui attribuer. L'objet de notre étude n'est pas les médias sociaux mais leur utilisation. Nous partons de la considération que la valeur sociale de la technique vient de l'usage que nous en faisons (Santos, 2000). Technique et usage sont, alors, des parts profondément imbriqués de la réalité sociale. Comme nous explique Jouët (1993), les déterminismes sociaux et techniques doivent être évités. Suivant son argumentation, nous ne considérons pas les pratiques de communication comme des produits des transformations des technologies de la communication, ni comme complètement déconnectées de ces technologies et dépendantes uniquement de l'action sociale.

La conception et le design des plateformes de médias sociaux ne peuvent pas être considérés comme extérieurs à leur utilisation. Ils sont plutôt conçus et transformés par l'usage, en même temps qu'ils impactent et modifient les usages qu'ils entraînent (Jouët, 1993). Comme proposé par Jouët, il y aurait un double effet de médiation à la fois technique et social qui se produit à la « rencontre des évolutions techniques et du changement social » (p.101). Dans cette perspective, les pratiques de communication constituent « un terrain d'observation privilégié pour cerner le tissage de cette convergence. » (p.101).

Ce postulat théorique trouve un appui aussi dans la nécessité de discuter les discours populaires au sujet de l'utilisation politique de la technologie au Brésil. Au début des années 2000, jusqu'au moment des manifestations de 2013, tout comme dans de nombreux mouvements de protestation dans le monde à la même époque, on notait clairement un discours positif sur le rôle de ces technologies pour les démocraties (Morozov, 2011). Les médias sociaux étaient souvent présentés dans les ouvrages académiques comme étant capables de renforcer la participation politique et de donner une voix aux sans-voix (Castells, 2013). Quelques années plus tard, avec l'élection de Donald Trump, la campagne pour le Brexit et, au Brésil, après la forte mobilisation qui a réclamé la destitution de la présidente Dilma Rousseff (2016), puis avec l'ample diffusion de "fake news", d'infox, et l'élection du premier président d'extrême-droite Jair Bolsonaro (2018), la narrative s'est inversée (Benkler, Faris and Roberst, 2018; Chadwick, Vaccari, Loughlin, 2018). Les médias sociaux sont passés sur le banc des accusés pour avoir dévoyé la démocratie brésilienne. Nous pensons

qu'aucune de ces affirmations ne rend compte de la complexité du phénomène, et que ce n'est qu'en considérant les spécificités de l'utilisation de ces espaces de communication, qui changent constamment tout au long du temps, que nous pourrions être en condition d'appréhender plus précisément leurs conséquences.

Un troisième postulat guidant notre recherche est que les systèmes de communication et les flux d'information sont essentiels pour comprendre les systèmes démocratiques. Donatella della Porta (2013) fait remarquer que la dissociation des études de mouvements sociaux et de médias sociaux d'avec une vision analytique de la démocratie est un problème. Elle argumente que dans la plupart des études, la démocratie et le système des médias ne sont vus que comme un contexte dans lequel vont se développer les mouvements sociaux et non pas comme des éléments dans la dispute et la construction engagées par ces mêmes mouvements.

Nous pensons que le travail sur le système de communication et ses transformations avec l'apparition des médias sociaux va en ce sens. La compréhension de ce système nous permet d'avoir une meilleure vision de la façon dont les gens sont informés, avec quels types d'informations et de quels types de producteurs d'informations. Cette dynamique a un rôle essentiel sur les systèmes démocratiques (Gomes & Maia, 2008 ; Keane, 2013), à la fois sur les choix électoraux et sur l'exercice quotidien de la citoyenneté. Nous adoptons une compréhension selon laquelle l'utilisation des médias sociaux a une incidence sur les relations entre les citoyens, les médias et la démocratie dans leurs instances les plus différentes - des élections à l'*accountability* des représentants, en passant par les mobilisations sociales (Gomes, 2016). Les changements dans la manière dont l'information est produite, diffusée, partagée et reçue modifient des éléments essentiels de la vie démocratique. Ainsi, une modification du système de communication est intrinsèquement liée aux modifications des systèmes politiques.

Considérant l'approche systématique proposée par Chadwick (2013), le rôle de la technologie évoqué par (Jouët, 1993) et la dynamique de la communication en tant qu'élément essentiel des systèmes démocratiques (Gomes & Maia, 2008; Della Porta, 2013), , nous pouvons dire que la problématique principale de cette thèse est de comprendre quels sont les changements entraînés par les médias sociaux dans le système de communication, et quelles dynamiques de communication ils ont favorisés lors des manifestations de 2013 au Brésil. Nous pensons que l'analyse de ces phénomènes partant de ces prémisses peut apporter un éclairage qui va

nuancer le tableau de la vie politique brésilienne de cette période et qui nous aide à mieux comprendre les médias sociaux eux-mêmes.

Notre hypothèse est basée sur la proposition de Scolari (2012), qui atteste que l'inclusion d'un nouveau élément dans l'environnement de communication apporte pas seulement des nouvelles particularités, mais aussi un changement à l'environnement il même. Alors, on suppose que, en entrant dans le système de communication, les réseaux sociaux y apportent une nouvelle logique qui leur est propre, mais aussi changent l'importance et la place de chacun des acteurs préexistants. Ces acteurs qui sont, au même temps, dans et en dehors de ces réseaux incorporent des changements amenés par ce nouveau paysage médiatique, qui a un sens propre de fonctionnement. Bien que les manifestations de 2013 ne peuvent pas être considérées comme le premier moment de ce phénomène au Brésil, nous pensons qu'elles constituent un repère important de son intensification et de sa visibilité.

Trois concepts principaux guideront notre approche pour étudier cette hypothèse. Nous aborderons d'abord les relations entre l'utilisation des médias sociaux et les discours sur les médias traditionnels à travers le concept de médiactivisme (Cardon et Granjon, 2010). Cette approche nous permettra de relier les pratiques des activistes aux points de vue et pratiques des acteurs vis-à-vis du système de communication. Après cela, nous étudierons d'autres voies d'information rendues possibles par l'utilisation des médias sociaux, où de nouveaux médiateurs émergent. Se concentrer sur les médiations et non sur les médias (Martín-Barbero, 1987) inclut dans la discussion une réalité sociale et culturelle plus large qui intègre les pratiques de ces acteurs. Enfin, nous cherchons une compréhension des conséquences de la pluralisation des médiations sur la construction du monde commun, telles que définies par Hannah Arendt (1958). Pour elle, c'est à cette instance que les personnes et les problèmes deviennent socialement visibles sur la scène politique et nous souhaitons voir quels acteurs influencent cette construction du monde commun avec l'utilisation des médias sociaux.

Structure de la thèse

Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres plus une partie finale qui discute les liens entre quelques éléments de notre corpus avec des phénomènes politiques postérieurs à 2013.

Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, nous avons réservé une première partie de la thèse à formuler clairement les bases sur lesquelles se fonde la recherche. Et pour cela, nous explorons quatre dimensions essentielles dans la formulation et l'exécution de cette recherche.

Le chapitre 1 est dédié au contexte dans lequel les manifestations ont lieu. Nous reprendrons l'argument montrant pourquoi les mouvements sociaux sont importants pour les démocraties et nous observerons comment ils se sont structurés au Brésil, depuis la dictature militaire de 1964 jusqu'au mouvement de 2013. Cette approche historique doit nous permettre de mieux comprendre ce qui était réellement nouveau en 2013. La chronologie du mouvement ainsi qu'une première description des principaux acteurs participant à la conversation seront présentées ici.

Le deuxième chapitre cherche à établir un état de l'art de la littérature sur l'interface entre mouvements de protestations et communication numérique. Notre intention est de présenter les principaux points de discussion dans la littérature qui nous aident à définir les approches que nous allons adopter dans notre analyse. Nous dédions aussi un espace à la discussion des particularités du Twitter puisque nous travaillons sur des données récoltées de cette plateforme.

Le chapitre 3 est dédié à mon histoire personnelle et à mes expériences qui sont intimement liées au thème de recherche de cet ouvrage. L'expérience personnelle comme éditeur de médias sociaux de l'Institut Lula m'a permis de vivre les événements de 2013 d'un endroit très particulier. À ce moment-là, le fait de travailler avec les médias sociaux dans un environnement politique traditionnel m'a placé singulièrement à la fois comme participante et en tant qu'observatrice des changements en cours dans les domaines social, politique et de la communication. C'est de cette expérience que la problématique de ce travail a émergé.

Cette partie de la thèse est écrite à la première personne lorsque je me remémore, j'explique et je systématise mon expérience en tant qu'éditrice de réseaux sociaux de l'Institut Lula. C'est à partir de cette expérience que de nombreuses questions et problèmes que j'ai abordés dans ce travail ont émergé.

Le dernier chapitre de cette première partie (chapitre 4) est dédié aux questions méthodologiques. Nous exposons de façon détaillée les choix faits pour les interviews et les données du Twitter sur lesquels nous avons travaillé. Nos analyses sont basées sur un

ensemble de 23 interviews partiellement structurées avec d'activistes, de journalistes et de conseillers de communication auprès des gouvernements. Ces groupes sociaux ont été choisis à partir de la proposition de Peter Dahlgren (2009), pour qui les logiques médiatiques sont co-construites par les médias, le public et les acteurs politiques.

En plus, nous avons travaillé avec un *dataset* de 97 mille *tweets* collectés entre le 1er. Juillet et le 30 Septembre 2013. Les *tweets* ont été collectés à partir du *hashtag* #vemprarua, l'un des mots d'ordre le plus utilisé pendant les manifestations. Ces deux sources de données seront notre fil conducteur dans l'analyse.

Il n'a pas été simple de traiter ces deux différents ensembles qui apportaient des contributions différentes à notre travail. En ce qui concerne Twitter nous présentons une vue générale de notre ensemble de données et passons à l'analyse dans les chapitres suivants.

Dans une deuxième partie de la thèse, trois chapitres analytiques cherchent à répondre aux différentes problématiques et aux questions de recherche déjà mentionnées dans l'introduction.

Ce panorama général du phénomène sera développé en trois phases de l'analyse. La première s'adressera précisément à une partie centrale du système de communication déjà en place : les grands médias traditionnels (Chapitre 5). Au Brésil, il s'agit d'un milieu extrêmement concentré et très peu divers (Azevedo, 2006). Les critiques abondent à ce sujet, et tout en étant un sujet de discussion historique, elles ont gagné une importance particulière lors des manifestations de 2013. Nous cherchons donc à comprendre comment l'ouverture de nouveaux espaces médiatiques dans le débat public (Cardon, 2010) affecte la relation des gens avec les grands médias traditionnels. Nous utilisons le concept de médiactivisme (Cardon et Granjon, 2010) pour aborder ces pratiques. En d'autres termes, comment les réseaux sociaux interviennent dans la relation des gens avec les grands médias ?

Après avoir vu ce que devient la relation avec les grands médias après l'arrivée des réseaux sociaux, nous nous tournons vers d'autres formes de médiation qui peuvent émerger de cet environnement (Chapitre 6). En analysant le concept de médiation et de *gatekeeping* et les nouvelles possibilités qui se concrétisent avec les médias sociaux, nous regardons quels types d'appropriation de ces nouvelles possibilités se font selon les différents acteurs engagés dans les manifestations. Dans notre étude, nous questionnons la position commune selon laquelle

les technologies numériques diminueraient les niveaux de médiation à divers niveaux de la vie de la société. En accompagnant les discours des acteurs sociaux, nous nous demandons si le fait de pouvoir publier des informations et de les faire parvenir à un grand nombre de personnes sans passer par le filtre du journalisme, ou si le fait qu'un homme politique peut s'adresser directement aux citoyens sur les réseaux sociaux signifie réellement une diminution du rôle de la médiation. Deux questions structurent cette analyse : comment des médiations alternatives aux grands médias sont appropriées par les différents acteurs ? De quel type et de quels niveaux de médiation parlons-nous à propos des médias sociaux ?

Au chapitre 7, au lieu d'identifier les différents parcours possibles empruntés par les flux d'information, nous proposons d'analyser les parcours réellement effectués. Nous considérons que bien que de multiples acteurs soient présents sur les réseaux sociaux, il y a des asymétries significatives entre eux qui définiront leur visibilité de fait. Avoir la possibilité de publier sur les réseaux sociaux est bien différent du fait d'être entendu dans le débat public. En mesurant cette visibilité, nous sommes capables d'identifier qui et quoi affleure le plus dans la discussion et d'essayer d'en énoncer les causes. Enfin, ce qui nous intéresse c'est d'aller au-delà des possibilités offertes par les réseaux sociaux pour capter ce qui est concrètement la logique des flux d'information et ce qui est réellement une nouveauté. Dans cette partie il y a également deux questions qui guident notre recherche : qui sont les acteurs des manifestations de 2013 qui obtiennent une plus grande visibilité dans la discussion sur Twitter ? Est-ce que cela représente une logique différente de l'information traditionnelle ?

Contributions de la thèse

Nous pensons que cette approche qui commence en étudiant l'impact de l'usage des réseaux sociaux sur les grands médias, puis essaie de comprendre les spécificités que les chemins alternatifs d'information se sont frayés dans cet environnement, et finalement discerne qui gagne effectivement l'attention dans le débat, pourra apporter des éléments importants dans la compréhension du rôle que la communication peut avoir de nos jours. Sans doute, l'étude que nous proposons a ses limites que nous discuterons au cours du texte, mais elle avance également sur d'importantes questions permettant de comprendre l'actuelle réalité brésilienne.

Cette thèse a d'une part une valeur historique car elle offre un registre de discours et de pratiques de communication dans un moment singulier de l'histoire brésilienne, mais d'autre part elle indique une orientation vers le futur en identifiant des questions qui ne se limitent

pas à la vague de protestations de 2013. C'est pour cela que nous avons décidé d'inclure un dernier chapitre qui souhaite connecter les résultats de recherche sur 2013 à des phénomènes politiques plus récents au Brésil. Nous avons rédigé cette thèse entre 2015 et 2019 et par conséquent nous ne pouvions ignorer ce qui se passe dans le pays depuis.

La dernière partie du texte s'efforce, donc, de relier nos résultats de recherche avec les phénomènes politiques qui ont surgi plus récemment dans la vie politique brésilienne. Même s'il était impossible d'analyser tous les faits politiques de ces six dernières années, on ne pourrait éviter de trouver dans notre analyse des pistes nous permettant d'expliquer certains éléments de la réalité politique brésilienne du moment. Il ne s'agit pas de faire une lecture rétrospective dans une intention prédictive, comme si tout ce qui s'est passé après aurait pu être prédit à partir d'éléments présentés à ce moment, mais plutôt de comprendre que le présent a des racines profondes et des explications historiques qui échappent au seul moment de leur irruption.

Un an seulement après les manifestations de 2013, vient l'élection présidentielle où la présidente Dilma Rousseff, du Parti des Travailleurs (PT)¹⁸¹, gagne l'élection à une faible majorité. Comme le climat politique du pays commençait déjà à être très polarisé, les partisans de son adversaire battu, Aécio Neves, du parti de la Social-Démocratie Brésilienne (PSDB)¹⁸², n'ont pas accepté les résultats de l'élection et ont immédiatement commencé à questionner son droit à la présidence¹⁸³. Cette campagne a gagné en force quand un important scandale de corruption concernant la compagnie pétrolière semi-publique Petrobras¹⁸⁴ a éclaté.

¹⁸¹ Le *Partido dos Trabalhadores* - PT (Parti des Travailleurs) fondé en 1980, est le plus grand parti de gauche d'Amérique Latine. Sa fondation est fortement liée au mouvement syndical et à une tendance progressiste de l'Eglise Catholique appelée *Théologie de la Libération*. Le principal leader du parti, depuis sa fondation jusqu'à nos jours est Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, qui a été président du Brésil pendant deux mandats (2003 à 2010).

¹⁸² Le *PSDB* a été fondé en 1988 et peut être défini comme un parti de centre-droite libéral. Il a été le principal opposant du *PT* depuis les années 90.

¹⁸³ Non seulement Aécio Neves a critiqué son élection en l'accusant de *estelionato* pour avoir annoncé des mesures après l'élection qui étaient en contradiction avec ce qu'elle avait promis pendant la campagne, mais a également mis en doute la fiabilité du système électronique de vote. Il a fait aussi une dénonciation formelle en justice contre la présidente élue.

¹⁸⁴ L'opération "Lavage Express" (*Lava Jato*) a été lancée en 2014 et continue en vigueur en 2019. Elle est menée par la Police Fédérale et vise à dénoncer et démonter les scandales de corruption liés à la Petrobras et au monde politique. Selon le juge Sergio Moro, connu comme le personnage le plus important de cette opération et est maintenant Ministre de la Justice du gouvernement Bolsonaro, l'inspiration est venue de l'opération *Maini Propres* menée en Italie. Cette opération a mis à jour de nombreux niveaux de corruption au niveau national et régional, mais a été fortement critiquée par sa polarisation politique et son fréquent manque de respect des garanties constitutionnelles comme le simple droit à la défense et à la présomption d'innocence.

Rapidement, le mouvement s'est transformé en une immense vague de protestations réclamant la destitution de la présidente. Face à une base parlementaire érodée, sans support dans les médias et avec un système judiciaire inerte, le gouvernement Rousseff a été destitué.

Durant les presque deux ans de gouvernement du vice-président Michel Temer (du parti MDB, *Mouvement Démocratique Brésilien*)¹⁸⁵ qui a pris la suite, toutes les politiques principales du PT ont été inversées, avec une réduction des politiques sociales, la révocation d'importants droits des travailleurs garantis par la Constitution de 1988, et un virage libéral dans l'économie. C'est également durant son gouvernement que l'ex-président Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva a été emprisonné par l'opération *Lava Jato (Lavage Express)*, à la suite d'un procès extrêmement controversé parce qu'aucune preuve concrète n'a été fournie par l'accusation. Le fait a montré une extrême politisation d'un secteur du système judiciaire qui s'est permis d'ignorer nombre de droits de l'ex-président pourtant garantis par la Constitution. Une parmi les nombreuses indications du degré de politisation du procès peut être illustrée par le fait que le juge qui a mis Lula en prison, l'empêchant ainsi de se présenter aux élections présidentielles de 2018, est maintenant Ministre de la Justice du gouvernement Bolsonaro.

La prison de Lula est un élément clé pour comprendre l'élection présidentielle qui a suivi en octobre 2018. Lula était en tête dans cette élection comme le montre les sondages du 22 août 2018 (Datafolha, 2018) qui lui donnaient 39% des intentions de vote, plus du double de Jair Bolsonaro (19%). Le fait que le système de justice l'ait empêché de se présenter a radicalement affecté le résultat final de l'élection qui a été remportée par le candidat d'extrême droite Jair Bolsonaro.

Si d'un côté nous n'avons pas l'intention d'établir des liens directs entre les manifestations de 2013 et l'élection de Bolsonaro, ces deux moments étant séparés par cinq années d'événements extrêmement tourmentés et complexes, d'un autre côté, il nous semble clair que la vague de protestations a ouvert un espace social dans lequel se sont engouffrés et se sont articulés certains groupes sociaux qui vont être sur le devant de la scène dans les années qui suivent. Si le fait d'analyser des données de 2013 avec un certain recul dans le temps représente des difficultés, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les données en ligne, il représente aussi une possibilité d'observer ce moment historique en connaissant certains de ses développements à

¹⁸⁵ Le *Mouvement Démocratique Brésilien (MDB)* est un parti du centre fondé en 1965 et qui a participé à tous les gouvernements fédéraux depuis la redémocratisation du pays, dans les années 80.

plus long terme. Selon Hardt (2017), la temporalité d'un mouvement doit être analysée aussi en relation avec les faits qui l'ont précédé et succédé.

C'est en ce sens que nous avons décidé d'écrire cette partie final, qui tout en étant une exploration, indique des possibilités de liens intéressantes. Nous croyons que relier les choses peut aider à éviter de tomber dans des explications simplistes et fragmentaires de la réalité.

À la fin, nous délinéons nos conclusions sur le travail de recherche ici présenté, dans un effort pour expliquer l'impact de l'utilisation des réseaux sociaux dans les mouvements de protestation de 2013 sur le système de communication en général, ainsi que d'offrir une réflexion sur d'autres possibles directions de recherche future. Il s'agit, en plus, de faire le lien avec ce que le Brésil est en train de vivre actuellement.

Nous espérons que ce travail puisse représenter une contribution dans trois directions. Premièrement en apportant de nouveaux éléments pour comprendre la dynamique de communication brésilienne et ses relations avec le phénomène politique. Nous croyons que cela pourrait constituer un apport significatif au domaine d'études sur la démocratie et la communication numérique, alors que nous essayons de présenter une vision globale du système de communication brésilien actuel - axé sur les interactions entre les acteurs qui le composent - et ses impacts politiques. Cela pourrait mettre en évidence davantage l'approche systémique en tant que voie menant à une compréhension plus complexe de la réalité communicationnelle et politique contemporaine du Brésil.

La deuxième concerne l'arène politique, hommes politiques, partis et gouvernants, notamment les progressistes, en fournissant une vision complexe du système auquel ils participent. Cela leur permettrait de faire de meilleurs choix en ce qui concerne leurs stratégies communicationnelles et politiques et de construire une nouvelle perspective pour tenter de surmonter les défis historiques liés à la lutte pour un système de communication plus démocratique et pluraliste au Brésil.

Enfin, nous espérons que nos efforts seront également utiles aux mouvements sociaux et aux citoyens en général désireux de se mobiliser à ce moment de la vie politique brésilienne où la participation et la pression sociales paraissent si cruciales. Comprendre les relations complexes entre les différentes logiques médiatiques et le rôle et l'importance que la société civile peut y jouer peut être un premier pas vers l'élaboration de stratégies de mobilisation et

de protestation efficaces en vue de la construction d'une démocratie brésilienne plus représentative de ses citoyens.

Qu'y a-t-il de nouveau dans les mouvements de protestation de 2013 au Brésil ?

Les protestations de 2013 représentent la plus grande manifestation qui secoue le pays après son processus de redémocratisation dans les années 80/90. D'après Gohn (2013), on ne trouve que trois autres événements comparables dans l'histoire brésilienne : en 1992 lors de la destitution du président Collor de Melo ; en 1984 lors du mouvement pour les élections présidentielles au suffrage direct (*Diretas Já*), et dans les années 60, lors des grèves qui ont précédé le coup d'état militaire de 1964 et les mobilisations étudiantes de 1968. Le mouvement de 2013 a non seulement été un immense moment de mobilisation de la société civile brésilienne, mais il a aussi marqué la première fois où les réseaux sociaux numériques ont été intensément utilisés lors de mouvements de protestation au Brésil.

Comme les manifestations se sont déroulées dans un climat de grande hétérogénéité en termes de demandes et de participants, plusieurs auteurs (Locatelli, 2013 ; Gohn, 2014, Pinho et al. 2016) ont proposé des manières différentes d'expliquer leur déroulement. Nous avons choisi de diviser la vague de protestations de 2013 en trois moments distincts pour essayer de mieux les comprendre.

Le premier moment est caractérisé par un mouvement limité. Chaque manifestation est appelée "acte", et le premier a lieu à São Paulo le 6 Juin. Il s'agit d'un groupe réduit de quelques 2.000 manifestants, la plupart étudiants. C'est le mouvement *Movimento Passe Livre - MPL* (Mouvement pour des Transports Gratuits) qui convoque les premières protestations réclamant la révocation de l'augmentation de 20 centimes du billet de transport public dans la ville de São Paulo. Ce premier acte est parvenu à bloquer la circulation sur une grande avenue dénommée *23 de Março* (23 Mars), l'une des avenues de plus grand transit de la ville, et a été violemment réprimé par les forces de l'ordre qui ont utilisé des balles en caoutchouc et des gaz lacrymogènes.

Bien que les narratives présentées par la suite mettent en avant une supposée spontanéité du mouvement, comme s'il n'y avait eu aucune action planifiée, ce n'est pas totalement vrai. Le

journaliste Piero Locatelli (2013) qui a fait la couverture des événements explique dans son livre *#Vemprarua* que la scène d'un immense panneau noir écrit en lettres blanches : "Si le prix ne baisse pas, la ville s'arrêtera" dans la région du centre de la ville étonnait les gens qui passaient par là, mais avait été minutieusement préparé par les activistes. "C'était dans la tête des activistes du MPL depuis des mois. Ils avaient des photos de la place publique choisie, avaient étudié les voies de passage avec Google Earth dans tous les détails" (Locatelli, 2013, 1a protestation - jeudi 6 juin, 2ème paragraphe).

Les deuxième et troisièmes actes (8 juin ; 11 juin) continuent à peu près dans la même logique, juste un peu plus volumineux, avec environ 5.000 personnes. Jusque-là, les protestations avaient une demande bien spécifique : la révocation de l'augmentation du prix du ticket de transport. Y participaient principalement des étudiants qui avaient des rapports variables avec le MPL. Le quatrième acte commence de la même manière.

Ce quatrième acte commence le 13 juin réunissant 20.000 personnes selon les organisateurs. Le mouvement connaît un premier changement en conséquence de l'action extrêmement violente des forces de l'ordre. Et cette fois-ci les journalistes faisant la couverture de l'évènement sont également réprimés avec violence. Locatelli (2013) se souvient que jusque-là, la couverture des médias réclamait une plus grande fermeté de la police envers les manifestants qui perturbaient la ville. Les éditorialistes des deux principaux journaux de São Paulo, *Folha de S. Paulo* et *Estadão*, demandaient ce jour-là à la police et au gouvernement d'être plus fermes et de mettre fin à ce mouvement. Cette nuit-là, la police poursuivait des activistes et des journalistes et 61 personnes étaient arrêtées en flagrant délit et plus de 200 passaient par une vérification (Locatelli, 2013).

Il est important de remarquer que beaucoup de manifestants étaient arrêtés simplement parce qu'ils avaient du vinaigre - utilisé pour contrer les effets des gaz lacrymogènes - dans leur sac-à-dos. Cette ineptie de la police allait provoquer plus tard les "protestations du Vinaigre".

Les images de la violence se sont rapidement propagées sur les réseaux sociaux et ont fait de même l'objet d'émissions des médias de masse qui jusque-là se montraient très sceptiques envers le mouvement (Rolnik, 2013 ; Bringel and Pleyers, 2015). Commence alors une seconde phase caractérisée par l'amplification et la diversification. À partir de ce moment, la population va appuyer de plus en plus les protestations. Selon la *Datafolha* (2013), 55% étaient en leur faveur le 13 juin et moins d'une semaine plus tard ils étaient 77%, le 18 juin.

La solidarité née de ces circonstances pouvait être constatée en ligne mais aussi dans les rues au cours des protestations suivantes.

Le cinquième acte a mis dans la rue 65.000 personnes le 17 juin à São Paulo. Mais à partir de ce moment, les actes étaient coordonnés pour avoir lieu en même temps dans de nombreuses villes du pays. À cette même date, 12 capitales des états brésiliens connaissaient des protestations qui réunissaient un total de 215.000 personnes. La croissance du mouvement change alors certaines de ses caractéristiques. Le public qui participe au mouvement n'a plus de relation directe avec le mouvement MPL qui toutefois reste l'organisateur principale qui convoque les manifestations. Les réseaux sociaux gagnent de l'importance comme instruments de diffusion de l'information pour les gens qui ne sont pas nécessairement en relation avec l'organisation centrale.

Parallèlement à la diversification du public, les demandes se multiplient également. Les tarifs de transport public deviennent seulement l'un des nombreux thèmes abordés, comme on peut le voir sur les pancartes qui défilent, par exemple, l'argent dépensé pour préparer le pays à la Coupe du Monde de 2014, la qualité du système de santé publique et de l'éducation publique, et la lutte contre la corruption.

Le 19 Juin, les protestations atteignent leur but principal et le maire de São Paulo annonce la révocation de l'augmentation du tarif de transport public. Les gouvernements locaux des quelques autres capitales d'états telles que Cuiabá, Porto Alegre, Recife et João Pessoa avaient déjà fait la même chose. Mais les protestations ne s'arrêtent pas pour autant.

Le troisième moment des protestations commence alors, quand la principale demande avait déjà été satisfaite mais le mouvement de protestation continue. Le 20 Juin, la mobilisation atteint un million de personnes dans les rues de 75 villes. Ce nombre très élevé traduit la totale hétérogénéité des participants en termes d'occupation, de filiation politique et de réclamations.

Juste après cette manifestation, le MPL qui jusque-là avait été l'organisation principale mobilisatrice, annonce son retrait de la mobilisation. Son principal but étant atteint et le contrôle du mouvement de protestation lui échappant, il se retire de la rue.

Une partie des protestataires insiste à rester dans la rue, mais dans un contexte bien différent où il n'y avait plus d'objectif ou de leadership commun. S'est alors ouvert un espace pour l'émergence de groupes utilisant la violence comme tactique politique. Des membres de partis

politiques et de syndicats ont été agressés alors qu'ils voulaient participer aux manifestations. Des membres des Black Blocs ont commencé à pratiquer la destruction matérielle et la confrontation avec la police comme tactique d'action. Ceci a provoqué une diminution de l'appui de l'opinion publique et du nombre de participants. À des rythmes différents, les protestations ont peu à peu perdu de leur intensité dans toutes les villes. Cependant la société ne s'est pas complètement démobilitée et a connu des regains d'activité à différents moments entre le 7 Septembre (date de l'Indépendance du Brésil) de cette même année jusqu'aux mouvements pour ou contre la destitution de la Présidente Dilma Rousseff deux ans plus tard. L'impact des protestations a dépassé la question initiale. Un an plus tard, le Brésil a connu l'une des élections les plus serrées de son histoire résultant dans la réélection de la Présidente Dilma Rousseff. Mais la mobilisation sociale de la campagne électorale ne s'est pas arrêtée et a même augmenté après les résultats. Des groupes en faveur et des groupes contre la destitution de Mme Rousseff ont commencé à rivaliser dans la rue avant même du début de son second mandat. Le développement de cette pression sociale parallèlement à une investigation d'un scandale de corruption, le démantèlement de la base d'appui du gouvernement et une couverture médiatique extrêmement contestable se sont conclus par sa destitution effective en octobre 2016. Deux ans plus tard, en octobre 2018, le Brésil choisissait, dans une élection démocratique, un président d'extrême-droite.

La question des transports publics n'est pas nouvelle, elle est même récurrente dans l'histoire du pays (Pinho et al., 2016). Cependant le processus politique de 2013 présente des caractéristiques nouvelles. Gohn (2013) définit ce moment comme "une nouvelle forme de mouvement social" (p.317). Citons comme différences l'effacement des partis politiques en tant que protagonistes, une organisation non hiérarchique dirigée par des collectifs, l'utilisation des réseaux numériques et l'utilisation d'une esthétique différente dans la production des manifestations (Gohn, 2014).

Il est important de remarquer que les principes et les formes d'organisation de ces mouvements diffèrent de celles des acteurs politiques brésiliens traditionnels tels que les partis politiques ou les syndicats¹⁸⁶. Ainsi, lors des manifestations de 2013, seulement 4% des manifestants

¹⁸⁶ Bien que la relation entre ces organisations politiques traditionnelles et les mouvements sociaux aient déjà connu des changements à partir des années 80, comme les fait remarquer Sader (2001) dans son analyse de quatre mouvements populaires à São Paulo dans les années 70 et 80.

déclaraient appartenir à un parti politique et 83% disaient ne se sentir représenté par aucun des partis politiques (Ibope, 2013). Lorsque interrogés s'ils croyaient qu'un quelconque parti politique brésilien les représentaient, le taux montait à 89% (Ibope, 2013).

Gohn (2013) remarque également que les relations entre les individus et le mouvement ont changé. Si auparavant ils étaient vus comme des militants d'un mouvement, on les traite désormais comme des activistes. Les changements dans la composition et le fonctionnement du mouvement affectent aussi la conception de société qu'ils défendent et les modèles de développement qu'ils entraînent (Bringel, 2013).

Mais la modification principale que représente ce mouvement de protestation de 2013 et qui nous intéresse dans notre étude, est l'utilisation massive des médias sociaux numériques pour communiquer, organiser et diffuser les protestations. Cet élément nous intéresse non seulement parce qu'il est dans la ligne des différents mouvements qui surviennent dans le monde, mais aussi parce que nous croyons qu'il a un rôle essentiel dans la formation et le développement des mouvements sociaux.

Ces changements dans les flux d'information qui circulent ont introduit un nouvel acteur sur la scène de la communication. Dans un pays comme le Brésil où les grands médias sont fortement critiqués, que se passe-t-il lorsqu'ils cessent d'être les médiateurs presque exclusifs de l'information ? Est-ce que les nouveaux acteurs gagnent en force dans la construction des nouvelles narratives du mouvement ? Est-ce que le rôle des médias traditionnels change dans ce contexte ? De quelle manière les différents acteurs présents sur les médias sociaux numériques interagissent entre eux ? Est-ce que l'activisme passant par ces médias prend une importance centrale dans le militantisme en général ?

Pour traiter ces interrogations et essayer de comprendre le fonctionnement du processus, nous proposons trois grandes analyses. Avant d'exposer les résultats de ces études, nous allons présenter l'approche méthodologique choisie.

Du discours des acteurs à l'analyse des *tweets* : notre approche méthodologique

Notre analyse des manifestations de 2013 au Brésil repose sur un choix de différentes méthodes. Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, d'un côté nous avons fait 23 interviews

auprès de différents acteurs engagés dans les mobilisations, et d'un autre côté nous avons travaillé un *dataset* de Twitter de 97.000 *tweets* sur ces événements.

En réunissant ces deux éléments, nous avons voulu éviter le problème signalé dans différents travaux académiques (Couldry, 2009 ; Chadwick, 2013 ; Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014 ; Mattoni & Treré, 2015) : celui de traiter les médias sociaux comme un élément isolé sans considérer qu'ils ont un lien avec la réalité politique et sociale et avec les acteurs de tout le système de communication. En choisissant de nous adresser directement à certains de ces acteurs engagés dans les mobilisations, nous avons souhaité non seulement ajouter à notre analyse des éléments qui n'apparaissent pas dans l'analyse exclusive des données des réseaux sociaux, mais aussi complexifier le sens qu'on puisse donner à l'énorme masse de données de Twitter.

À une époque où une grande partie des interactions humaines laisse des traces et peut d'une certaine manière être quantifiée (Papacharissi, 2018), et quand il devient possible de traiter des grandes masses de ces données (Felt, 2016), il est nécessaire de trouver une ligne directrice à cette analyse. Nous ne pensons pas que les données parlent en elles-mêmes comme des représentations neutres de la réalité. Nous considérons plutôt ces données comme le produit de certains processus sociaux et technologiques (Felt, 2016) qui gagnent un sens non de par leur propre existence mais plutôt par l'utilisation qui en est faite. Et en ce sens, le discours des acteurs devient une source fondamentale d'information à la fois pour mieux interpréter l'analyse quantitative des données des médias sociaux et pour en faire une interprétation juste.

La narrative des acteurs

La première partie de notre recherche sur l'utilisation des réseaux sociaux dans les manifestations de 2013 au Brésil, porte sur 23 interviews semi-structurés en profondeur avec des acteurs ayant participé aux événements. Nous avons décidé d'interroger trois types d'acteurs: des activistes - ceux qui ont participé dans la rue ou sur le web à l'organisation, la mobilisation ou la couverture à titre personnel des manifestations ; des journalistes - ceux qui ont assuré la couverture des événements pour les grands médias d'information ; et les conseillers en communication des gouvernements - ceux qui avaient la responsabilité de mettre en place des stratégies de communication représentant le point de vue du système politique institutionnel, à la fois au niveau local et national.

Les acteurs ont été choisis avec l'intention de présenter différents points de vue sur le rôle des réseaux sociaux et sur la nouvelle dynamique du système de communication à ce moment. Tandis que les activistes voyaient le phénomène de l'intérieur du mouvement, à différents degrés d'engagement dans l'organisation des protestations et des nouveaux collectifs qui naissaient, les journalistes avaient pour rôle d'essayer de rapporter le mieux possible un mouvement qui défiait la routine traditionnelle du journalisme : il n'y avait pas de leaders évidents à interviewer, pas d'attaché de presse pouvant faire des déclarations, pas de discours pendant les événements. De leur côté, les conseillers de communication des gouvernements local et national qui avaient déjà créé ou étaient en train d'installer leur présence sur les médias sociaux, étaient face au défi de savoir comment agir envers le mouvement, comment établir un dialogue, et quelles mesures prendre.

Les interviewés ont été choisis initialement d'après deux critères : les organisations les plus connues engagées dans les manifestations (surtout utilisés pour recruter les conseillers de communication, les journalistes et certains activistes plus institutionnels), et les activistes n'ayant pas de liens avec les organisations formelles, choisis dans notre propre réseau social. Partant de ces interviews initiales, la stratégie boule de neige a été adoptée, qui consistait en une forme d'échantillonnage orientée vers une recherche qualitative demandant aux participants de recommander d'autres personnes pour la recherche (Creswell, 2004).

Nos interviews ne prétendent pas représenter tout le mouvement. Elles ont servi à approfondir notre compréhension des événements et à identifier les questions principales qui étaient en jeu dans cette étude de relations entre médias sociaux et mouvements de protestation. Les interviews ont été la première démarche de notre travail sur le terrain et ont servi par la suite pour guider le modèle de travail ultérieur sur les données Twitter.

Le point central de nos interviews était la ville de São Paulo, bien que certains journalistes et conseillers politiques aient travaillé sur la scène nationale. São Paulo a été choisi pour plusieurs raisons : c'est la plus grande ville brésilienne en termes de population et de territoire; elle a été, avec Rio de Janeiro, l'une des villes où les manifestations ont été les plus actives; c'est l'une des villes qui utilisent le plus densément les médias sociaux; et c'est la ville où j'habitais au moment des manifestations de 2013 et où j'avais donc une plus grande familiarité avec les événements et les acteurs.

Le résultat de cette stratégie a été 37 noms contactés dont 23 interviewés effectivement. Les interviews ont été faites personnellement ou par téléconférence entre janvier 2016 et juillet 2017. Une seule personne interviewée a demandé à garder l'anonymat, mais toutes les interviews ont été enregistrées sur audio avec l'autorisation des interviewés.

Chaque interview commençait par une question très générale sur l'engagement personnel dans le mouvement de protestation et était suivi de trois séries de questions. La première sur le regard de la personne sur les configurations générales du mouvement comme le leadership, la collaboration ou les disputes entre groupes, les stratégies de revendications et d'organisation. La seconde ciblait les stratégies de communication et cherchait à connaître les plateformes utilisées à ce propos, l'organisation interne et le processus de prise de décision dans les questions de communication, les changements que nous remarquions et les difficultés que représentaient l'adoption de différentes stratégies de communication et leur vision sur les grands médias brésiliens. La dernière cherchait à comprendre leurs vues sur les conséquences des protestations de 2013 à la fois sur les réalités institutionnelles et sociales du pays. Chaque interview terminait par des questions personnelles (nom, âge, occupation), si la personne acceptait d'être identifiée par son nom et si elle connaissait d'autres personnes qui pourraient intéresser notre enquête.

Notre échantillon d'enquête est très clairement situé du côté plutôt proche de la gauche et des gouvernements du Parti des Travailleurs. Orientation qui vient autant de la nature du mouvement de protestation lui-même que de l'auteur. En ce qui concerne le mouvement de 2013, il s'agissait au départ d'un mouvement autonome (*Movimento Passe Livre*) qui s'est diffusé d'abord dans la mouvance de gauche mais qui a connu par la suite une croissante présence de la droite. Pour ce qui est de l'auteur, son réseau social est majoritairement composé de personnes de gauche, et une partie de l'échantillonnage vient de ce réseau, le résultat n'étant pas donc représentatif du mouvement comme un tout. Ce n'était d'ailleurs pas notre intention. Une seule personne interviewée peut être considérée de droite bien qu'elle se déclare elle-même "ni de droite, ni de gauche".

Données Twitter

En ce qui concerne les données des réseaux sociaux, nous avons travaillé sur un ensemble de *tweets*. Nous avons fait ce choix pour différentes raisons. La première est l'historique de la plateforme dans la couverture des insurrections politiques (Seegerberg and Bennet, 2011 ;

Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013 ; Rogers, 2014). Avec le temps, Twitter émerge comme la plateforme préférée de l'information instantanée pour les événements sociaux, politiques et environnementaux. Bien que Twitter n'informe pas régulièrement son nombre d'utilisateurs, une enquête faite par la société française Semiocast¹⁸⁷ informe qu'en juillet 2012, 41,2 millions de comptes Twitter étaient géolocalisés au Brésil (Semiocast, 2012), ce qui fait du pays le deuxième utilisateur de la plateforme juste derrière les Etats-Unis qui en comptaient 141,8 millions.

Un tel chiffre montre l'importance de l'utilisation de la plateforme, surtout si l'on considère que la population brésilienne en juin 2012 (un an avant notre étude) était estimée à 194 millions de personnes (IBGE, 2012). Le rapport de cette société montre également que le Brésil avait un fort taux de croissance des profils Twitter à ce moment, ce qui laisse supposer que le nombre était encore plus élevé en juin 2013, bien que nous n'ayons pas de données précises.

Nous devons cependant faire quelques considérations sur ce nombre. Tout d'abord, nous ne pouvons affirmer que 41 millions de profils correspondent à la même quantité d'utilisateurs. Une personne peut avoir plus d'un compte et il existe des comptes fictifs ou faux. De plus, il y a un nombre expressif de comptes inactifs. À cette date, le Brésil représentait 8% des utilisateurs de Twitter dans le monde mais seulement 6,6% des *tweets* publiés, ce qui montre une différence entre les profils créés et leur utilisation réelle.

Il est aussi important de souligner que l'utilisation de la plateforme n'est pas homogène dans l'ensemble du pays. Toujours selon le rapport Semiocast, deux villes brésiliennes se distinguent parmi les 20 villes les plus actives au monde : São Paulo en quatrième position et Rio de Janeiro en seizième position. Mais il ne s'agit pas seulement de disparité géographique. Malgré l'absence de données sur le profil des utilisateurs de Twitter au Brésil, on les définit généralement comme concentrés dans les villes et parmi les jeunes Brésiliens les plus aisés et avec un haut niveau d'éducation.

La deuxième raison qui nous a fait choisir Twitter est la disponibilité de ses données. Bien que chaque utilisateur puisse décider de garder ses *tweets* privés, la plateforme les rend publics par défaut (Medeiros, 2016). En outre, l'API Twitter est le plus accessible aux

¹⁸⁷ Sur son website, la société se présente comme "Société d'Intelligence des Média Sociaux".

chercheurs, en comparaison à tout autre réseau social. Au moment des protestations de 2013, Facebook et Twitter étaient les plus utilisés parmi les médias sociaux au Brésil, mais les données du premier étaient difficilement accessibles.

La méthodologie d'analyse des données de Twitter que nous avons utilisée consiste en quatre étapes : la collecte de données encore appelée extraction de données ; le traitement des données qui consiste à créer des filtres et des catégories ; la création de graphiques pour présenter les données ; et finalement l'analyse et l'interprétation. Dans notre cas, nous avons fait une analyse à la fois quantitative et qualitative.

Le *dataset* Twitter que nous avons utilisé pour cette thèse a été collecté par le Laboratoire d'Études de l'Image et de la Cyberculture de l'Université Fédérale de l'état d'Espírito Santo (Labic/UFES¹⁸⁸). Les données ont été extraites de Twitter par l'utilisation du *yourTwapperKeeper* (O'BrienIII, 2012), qui est un outil open source qui traque les termes ou les mots-clés sélectionnés (Bruns and Liang, 2012). Il permet de capturer de multiples recherches en même temps. La collection de *tweets* démarre au moment de l'inscription de la recherche.

Créée par John O'Brien III, *yourTwapperKeeper* (yTK) est une solution open source compatible avec sa version antérieure et similaire : le *TwapperKeeper*. Cette dernière a été vendue à la société Hootsuite. La différence est que pour utiliser le yTK, un serveur doit rester en fonctionnement pendant 24 heures par jour pour une large capture de *datasets* (Brun, 2012).

L'instrument fonctionne avec deux APIs publics de Twitter : le *Search API* et le *Streaming API*, comme une forme de redondance. Le *streaming* est utilisé pour la collecte en temps réel et le *search* quand il y a des embouteillages qui gênent la collecte via l'autre API (Medeiros, 2016)

Notre *dataset* a été construit autour du hashtag *#vemprarua*, l'un des plus actifs pendant les manifestations. Cet hashtag signifie "viens dans la rue" et a été amplement utilisé dans la mobilisation. Le terme utilisé pour la collecte de données était "vemprarua". La non utilisation du signe # permet d'élargir la collecte de données ; d'autre part on peut élargir encore la

¹⁸⁸ Nous remercions encore le Labic et particulièrement son coordinateur Fabio Malini pour leur aide généreuse en nous donnant accès aux données et en nous aidant dans quelques analyses.

recherche en soustrayant la sensibilité aux majuscules et minuscule ce qui permet de capturer même les mots écrits en lettres capitales ou avec des accents. La recherche a donné un ensemble de 97.707 *tweets* collectés entre le 1er juillet et le 30 septembre 2013.

La collecte a été faite par yTK grâce à un algorithme de Labic qui nous a fourni les informations suivantes sur les *tweets* :

- Le texte du *tweets* : le message complet écrit par l'utilisateur ;
- ID du receveur (en cas de réponse) : dans le cas de *tweets* envoyés directement à un utilisateur, il est identifié par son ID (un chiffre qu'identifie l'utilisateur sur la plateforme du réseau social) ;
- Auteur du *tweet* : le nom du profile du Twitter qui a envoyé le message ;
- *Tweet ID* : numéro d'identification du message ;
- ID de l'envoyeur : ID de l'utilisateur qui a envoyé le *tweet* ;
- Langue utilisée sur le compte : information sur la langue que le compte qui a envoyé le *tweet* utilise dans son profile. Ce n'est pas la langue utilisée dans le *tweet* mais plutôt sur la plateforme du réseau social (Medeiros, 2016) ;
- Source : révèle quel est le dispositif de l'utilisateur pour poster le message (web, application pour iphone, application pour android etc.) ;
- Adresse web de l'image de profile de l'auteur : un lien vers l'image profile utilisée par l'envoyeur du message ;
- Géolocalisation : informe si le *tweet* contient metadata qui indique d'où il était envoyé. S'il n'y a pas d'information, les deux cadres suivants restent en blanc ;
- Latitude : le chiffre qui indique la latitude d'où le *tweet* a été envoyé ;
- Longitude : le chiffre qui indique la longitude d'où le *tweet* a été envoyé ;
- Date et heure de création : l'heure exacte du postage du *tweet*. Ex : mercredi
27 novembre 01:12:34 +0000 2013 ;
- Timestamp : nombre de secondes écoulées depuis le 1er. Janvier 1970 à 00:00:00 jusqu'à la date indiquée. Ce nombre est utilisé pour standardiser les dates et faciliter la manipulation au moment de leur traitement (Medeiros, 2016).

La deuxième étape de l'analyse commence par le traitement des données collectées. Le dataset créé via yTK a été exécuté selon la procédure appelée "parse-*tweets*", créée par Labic. Cette

procédure enclenche des mesures initiales qui permettent une analyse plus fine des données. Le résultat contient les fichiers suivants (en format.csv ou txt) :

- Dates.csv : nombre de *tweets* par jour ;
- Hashtags.csv : nombre d'utilisateurs distincts qui utilisent un certain hashtag ;
- Hashtags_without_accents.csv : comme le précédent, mais sans les hashtags contenant des accents graphiques ;
- Hashtags_network.csv : tableau indiquant la cooccurrence de hashtags, c'est-à-dire ceux qui apparaissent dans un même *tweet* ;
- Hashtags_network_without_accents.csv : comme le précédent, mais sans les hashtags contenant des accents graphiques ;
- Locations.csv : géolocalisation des *tweets* (très limitée en raison de la très faible utilisation de la fonction de géolocalisation de Twitter) ;
- Mentions.csv : les utilisateurs les plus cités dans le dataset ;
- Top_tweets.csv : les messages les plus retweetés dans le dataset ;
- Top_urls.csv : les urls le plus mentionnés dans le dataset ;
- Top_words.csv : liste des mots les plus cités et le nombre de fois où ils ont apparus ;
- Tweets_with_links.csv : liste de *tweets* contenant des liens ;
- Tweets_without_RTs.csv : liste des *tweets* qui ne sont pas *retweets* (messages originaux) ;
- Users_activity.csv : liste des utilisateurs classés par nombre de *tweets* envoyés dans le dataset ;
- Users_by_date.csv : nombre d'utilisateurs ayant tweeté chaque jour de l'ensemble de données ;
- Words_per_period.csv : les 10 mots les plus cités dans le dataset et son nombre d'occurrence chaque jour de l'ensemble de données ;
- Top_words_wordle.txt : fichier texte contenant les cent mots les plus cités dans le dataset. Il peut être utilisé pour créer un nuage de mots.

Sur la base de ces manipulations initiales, nous avons étudié et traité manuellement les données. Tout d'abord, nous nous sommes aperçus qu'il y avait une forme d'erreur dans la capture de certains *tweets*, en conséquence de quoi certains d'entre eux avaient été enregistrés

de manière partielle (texte ou metadata absent ou incomplet). Nous avons alors décidé d'exclure tous les *tweets* qui n'étaient pas correctement capturés pour préserver le modèle du *dataset*. Après nettoyage, ils sont restés 85.963 *tweets*.

Certains caractères d'orthographe ont été également affectés lors du processus de collecte. Tous les caractères particuliers (ã, à, á, â, é, è, ê, i, ó, õ, ô, ú, ç) ont souffert de distorsion. Cela n'a pas affecté la compréhension des textes, mais il a fallu en tenir compte dans la création des sous-corpus pour certaines analyses de la thèse. Après ces manipulations initiales, les données étaient prêtes pour les différentes analyses présentées dans cet ouvrage.

Dans le chapitre 5, nous avons créé un sous-ensemble de *tweets* en sélectionnant tous ceux qui mentionnaient les grands médias que nous avons décidé d'analyser. Nous avons formé ce *dataset* en utilisant le filtre Excel qui permet d'identifier des *tweets* contenant certains mots. Les *tweets* sélectionnés sont extraits du corpus principal pour en former un autre distinct. La recherche a été faite en prenant de multiples formes d'écrites des titres des médias avec lesquels nous travaillons, pour intégrer aussi des éventuelles mentions avec des erreurs d'orthographe. Les noms comportant des caractères orthographiques particuliers déformés lors de leur capture étaient également considérés. Nous avons alors procédé à une analyse de ces *tweets* en les classant selon différents éléments que nous avons considérés utiles pour notre analyse.

Dans le chapitre 7, nous avons travaillé directement sur deux des fichiers créés par le script "parse-tweet" : les *tweets* les plus répliqués et les URL les plus utilisés. Partant de ces deux listes, nous avons sélectionné tous les *tweets* qui apparaissent au moins dix fois (les messages qui avaient au moins dix *retweets* et les liens partagés au moins dix fois) et nous les avons utilisés comme base pour une classification des utilisateurs, et une analyse de source et de contenu.

Pour la visualisation, nous avons surtout utilisé des tableaux et des graphiques pour présenter notre analyse. Nous avons choisi le format le plus adéquat pour présenter chaque donnée, en accord avec les différentes analyses qui nous intéressaient et les données disponibles. Les visualisations de données étaient d'abord produites directement dans les fichiers .csv de données et ensuite adaptées pour mieux s'encadrer dans le texte.

L'analyse des données est basée sur les problèmes de recherche d'abord présentés puis discutés dans chaque chapitre. Les spécificités de chaque traitement de données seront expliquées tout au long de l'ouvrage. Chaque visualisation de données sera suivie d'une discussion des résultats qui essaie de les situer dans le contexte plus général de la politique brésilienne et dans le panorama plus ample de la recherche faite dans ce domaine.

Les grands médias comme cible et la reconfiguration du système de communication

Comme nous avons pu le voir à la fois dans nos interviews et dans les *tweets*, les critiques envers les grands médias sont un thème constant et central des discours sur l'utilisation des réseaux sociaux lors des protestations de 2013 au Brésil. L'usage de cette nouvelle technologie n'est pas seulement vu comme l'ouverture d'un nouvel espace où de nouvelles narratives peuvent être produites, mais bien plus que cela, un espace où ces narratives sont produites pour opposer, démasquer et dénoncer un certain système déjà en place.

D'un côté, les interviews ont montré clairement que l'usage des réseaux sociaux était vu par les acteurs des protestations de 2013 comme une occasion de faire contrepoids à la couverture des grands médias, et de l'autre côté les *tweets* montrent que ces mêmes grands médias étaient très critiqués sur les réseaux.

Il est important de rappeler que ce sous-corpus de 6 256 *tweets* mentionnant les médias correspond à 6,6% du nombre total de messages postés avec le hashtag #vemprarua au cours de la période. L'utilisation de cette nouvelle technologie est considérée non seulement comme un nouvel espace où des récits alternatifs peuvent être produits, mais plus encore, ces récits sont produits pour confronter, démasquer et dénoncer un système de médias qui déjà existant. Il est important de souligner que les médias n'étaient pas au centre de la discussion sur les manifestations, mais qu'ils étaient configurés comme l'un des sujets de discussion et d'actions de protestation.

Certaines conclusions peuvent être tirées de notre analyse dans le but de réfléchir à la conformation actuelle d'un système de communication brésilien et au rôle que les médias sociaux peuvent y jouer. La première est que le discours sur les médias traditionnels dans les médias sociaux est en grande partie guidé par une forte critique des premiers. Cette

critique s'adresse tout particulièrement aux entreprises de communication plutôt qu'aux contenus qu'elles présentent.

Dans cette discussion, la grande majorité des commentaires concernait la chaîne de télévision Globo, la plus grande chaîne de télévision brésilienne. Tant dans les commentaires sur le contenu spécifique publié par les médias sur la couverture des manifestations que dans ceux sur les médias eux-mêmes, le ton prédominant était le critique. Très peu de compliments et de commentaires neutres ont été détectés.

L'analyse qui nous a permis de voir plus de spécificités du discours sur les médias était celle des critiques adressées à Globo en tant que société de médias. Comme nous avons un corpus plus large (840 *tweets*), nous avons pu identifier plus précisément les motivations et les tendances de cette critique. L'analyse a révélé deux sujets principaux de critique des médias : la question de la soutenance ou non du gouvernement aussi bien que des manifestants, tous deux très caractéristiques de ce moment de la vague de protestations de 2013. Un deuxième aspect à souligner est que Globo a été critiqué pour des positions idéologiques opposées concernant ces deux questions. Le média a été accusée à la fois de soutenir et d'essayer de renverser le gouvernement ; et, d'autre part, d'encourager et de délégitimer les manifestants.

Loin de placer Globo dans une position innocente en raison d'attaques des deux côtés du spectre idéologique, ce phénomène témoigne d'un sentiment généralisé de méfiance à l'égard des principaux médias. La baisse de la confiance des médias a également été identifiée par le *Edelman Trust Barometer*¹⁸⁹, qui a montré en 2018 une baisse de la confiance des médias au Brésil, alors que la moyenne internationale est restée la même. Les principales raisons pour lesquelles les personnes interrogées ne faisaient pas confiance aux médias étaient l'utilisation de ressources sensationnalistes pour attirer davantage de publics, la publication rapide de nouvelles, sans vérification adéquate et le parti pris idéologique. Près de la moitié des personnes interrogées ont déclaré qu'elles ne savaient pas à quels médias faire confiance.

Ces données des manifestations de 2013 sont un indicateur clair d'un phénomène qui a éclaté quelques années plus tard dans l'histoire de l'utilisation des médias numériques à des fins

¹⁸⁹ Les résultats complets de l'enquête peuvent être consultés à <https://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2018-edelman-trust-barometer-brasil-report>

politiques au Brésil : l'énorme circulation de fausses informations - en particulier par le biais de Whatsapp - lors des élections de 2018. Si les motivations de ce phénomène semblent être multiples, la crédibilité extrêmement faible des médiateurs d'information traditionnels peut certainement être mise en évidence comme une donnée importante à prendre en compte.

Un troisième point que nous voudrions souligner est que l'utilisation de la conversation sur Twitter pour critiquer les médias représente une pratique très claire de médiactivisme, comme décrit par Cardon et Granjon (2010). L'environnement de communication de Twitter semble offrir des possibilités spécifiques pour ce type d'action, telles que l'articulation de différents messages autour des hashtags (comme les 22 hashtags critiquant Globo) et l'élargissement du débat autour de cette question. Cependant, le caractère progressiste du médiactivisme décrit par Cardon et Granjon (2010), que serait substantiellement différent des critiques aux médias faites par la droite, n'a pas été identifié dans notre corpus. Les pratiques de gauche et de droite envers les médias apparaissent comme semblables, mais dans des sens opposés.

Il convient toutefois de noter que les principaux médias continuent d'être des acteurs importants dans les discussions sur les médias sociaux. Il existe un double mouvement dans lequel les médias traditionnels continuent d'être des sources importantes d'information et de débat, mais ils subissent en même temps de nombreuses critiques provenant de tout le spectre idéologique. Cela signifie un changement dans le système de communication brésilien puisque, pour le moment, non seulement les médias traditionnels doivent rivaliser pour la production et la diffusion d'informations avec de nouveaux acteurs qui ont la possibilité de publier leurs propres informations et opinions sur les réseaux sociaux, mais ils doivent aussi faire face à une crise de crédibilité de plus en plus exposée. Cette réalité crée sans aucun doute de nouveaux défis pour la démocratie brésilienne.

Médiation multi-niveaux et invisibilité du processus

Après avoir étudié les discours de nos trois groupes d'interviewés, on comprend les différentes manières dont les réseaux sociaux sont utilisés pour défier les grands médias et établir d'autres formes de médiation de l'information, ce qui répond à notre question initiale de recherche.

Avant l'existence des réseaux sociaux et de l'internet 2.0 de façon générale, on peut dire que l'accès à l'information se faisait presque exclusivement par l'intermédiaire des médias (Gomes, 2009). Sans doute les gens pouvaient vivre directement certains événements ou en entendre parler par leurs proches, mais les médias, et spécialement les grands médias travaillant dans une logique de *broadcasting* étaient la voie pour atteindre le plus grand nombre. Cela veut dire qu'un petit nombre de centres choisissaient les faits que l'on jugeait intéressant de diffuser et qui allaient atteindre un grand nombre de personnes. Cela veut dire aussi que l'on avait une médiation presque exclusive du journalisme et de la plateforme technique qui allait diffuser l'information (télévision, radio, journal etc.). Le journaliste sélectionnait l'information à partir des sources dont il disposait et produisait un message qui était adapté à un certain type de technologie de communication, et le diffusait à l'adresse du public. Ensuite, on peut considérer la réception comme un niveau de médiation supplémentaire, non seulement par le choix du média consommé, mais aussi par l'aspect culturel et social des consommateurs qui va jouer un rôle de filtre (Voirol, 2005). Un modèle classique de communication de masse décrit par Laswell (McQuail, 2003) et développé par Westley and MacLean (1957).

Avec les réseaux sociaux, nous avons une complexification de ce modèle par plusieurs nouveaux éléments. Le premier est la multiplication des médiateurs. Si les journalistes ont encore un rôle essentiel dans la diffusion de l'information, d'autres médiateurs apparaissent et défient leurs choix. Mais plus encore, ces médiateurs différents existent et sont en constante connexion. C'est ce qui s'exprime dans la notion de *networked gatekeeping* proposée par Meraz and Papacharissi (2013). Cela ne signifie pas une augmentation de la médiation mais plutôt sa diversification.

Par la suite, ces multiples médiateurs vont interagir sur des plateformes de réseaux sociaux qui agissent eux-mêmes comme des médiateurs avec leurs propres logiques. Nous rejoignons ici la proposition de Jouët (1993) de la technique comme médiateur. Il est important de souligner que ces médiations vont se réaliser de différentes manières selon la plateforme de réseau social. Les possibilités et les limites (Cammaerts, 2014) de ces plateformes varient et vont contribuer à donner forme aux flux d'information qui les utilisent. Considérant la notion proposée par Segerberg and Bennet (2011), pour qui les réseaux sociaux englobent et sont

englobés par ce rôle processus de *gatekeeping*, nous pouvons dire qu'un nouveau niveau de médiation apparaît ici.

Maintenant, certaines plateformes de réseaux sociaux sont capables de choisir ce qui sera publié ou non à l'utilisateur, principalement en fonction de son comportement social. Ce choix est fait automatiquement par des algorithmes privés. Cela signifie que si un article destiné à la presse écrite avait la garantie de paraître dans tous les exemplaires du journal concerné, sur les réseaux sociaux il n'en est pas de même car il paraîtra sur certains comptes et pas d'autres suivant une logique que nous ne connaissons pas bien, parce que peu explicite et difficile d'atteindre.

Il y a encore un dernier niveau de médiation exercé par chaque usager. À la différence des médias de diffusion où toute l'audience reçoit le même contenu, le processus des réseaux sociaux est beaucoup plus personnalisé. Choisir qui suivre ou avec qui être ami et quelles pages aimer va créer une combinaison unique d'informations pour l'utilisateur. Et ce processus se superposera aux possibilités et aux contraintes de chaque plateforme. Par exemple, sur Twitter, un utilisateur verra normalement une *timeline* avec tous les *tweets* des usagers qui le suivent, organisés dans un ordre chronologique inverse, mais le contenu peut être aussi accédé par recherche, pouvant être organisé selon les plus populaires ou les plus récents. Par contre sur Facebook le *timeline* d'un utilisateur ne montrera même pas tous les posts de ses amis ou des pages aimés.

On peut alors identifier un dernier niveau de médiation qui est en relation avec les liens sociaux. Les réseaux sociaux sont construits sur les liens sociaux et ces connexions ont aussi un rôle central sur la médiation de l'information, particulièrement à travers les pratiques de réplication que les médias sociaux permettent. Même si vous n'êtes pas ami avec ou si vous ne suivez pas un compte donné, vous pouvez avoir accès à son contenu parce que quelqu'un de votre réseau est en interaction avec. Cette interaction peut être la réplication du message (un *retweet* sur Twitter ou un partage sur Facebook par exemple), mais aussi le fait d'aimer ou de commenter un certain post qui vous le fera paraître comme une recommandation (quelqu'un avec qui vous interagissez a aimé le contenu). Donc les liens sociaux finissent par fonctionner comme un filtre d'information et un organisateur, ajoutant un niveau supplémentaire de médiation.

Nous pouvons donc dire que les réseaux sociaux représentent un environnement de médiation très complexe et de différents niveaux. L'idée que les réseaux sociaux provoqueraient un recul de la médiation semble venir plutôt du fait que ces médiations sont pulvérisées et moins visibles, que d'une diminution effective de médiateurs. Si dans un premier temps ce qui attire l'attention est réellement la possibilité d'aller au-delà de l'information produite par les grands médias, il devient nécessaire ensuite d'étudier en profondeur ces nouveaux médiateurs.

Face à ces multiples niveaux de médiation qui dans une certaine mesure divisent le pouvoir de médiation entre différents acteurs - mais qui n'ont pas le même pouvoir à tous les niveaux -, il semble que le problème soit que cela rende la médiation moins visible ou même invisible. Si auparavant il était clair que les journalistes avaient ce rôle social de sélectionner, donner forme et présenter des parts de la réalité à un large public, ce n'est plus le cas avec les réseaux sociaux. La multiplicité des acteurs impliqués et les différents niveaux auxquels ils agissent rend plus difficile l'identification des rôles de ces médiations. Cela veut dire également qu'il devient plus difficile de demander des comptes à ces acteurs¹⁹⁰ pour leurs choix ou de les critiquer directement. Cette invisibilité des médiateurs fait parfois surface - par exemple à propos des fausses informations - mais bien souvent elle reste ignorée.

Ainsi, pour en revenir à la proposition de Jouët (1993) sur une médiation à deux niveaux, il semble qu'aujourd'hui on puisse affirmer qu'il s'agit d'un processus beaucoup plus complexe. Nous avons affaire à une combinaison de processus de *gatekeeping* des plateformes de réseaux sociaux eux-mêmes, des utilisateurs qui y publient - étant inclus ici les individus mais aussi les grands médias et les médias alternatifs, les acteurs politiques et les gouvernements - et des utilisateurs qui reçoivent l'information, qui ont la liberté de choisir ce qu'ils veulent voir d'une manière beaucoup plus personnalisée que dans le modèle de diffusion traditionnelle. Nous devons aussi considérer qu'une part significative des contenus partagés sur les réseaux sociaux provient d'autres sources d'information, ce qui introduit un niveau supplémentaire de sélection dans le processus. Ces trois ou quatre instances ne sont ni isolées ni séquentielles. Elles sont dans une interaction permanente et vont interférer en de multiples occurrences et en ordre variable dans le flux d'information.

¹⁹⁰ Pour ce qui est des plateformes, il faut aussi considérer qu'il s'agit de sociétés internationales peu soumises aux régulations internes de chaque pays.

Si nous considérons par exemple le cas de la couverture des protestations de 2013 faite par la page Facebook *Dilma Bolada*, nous voyons que le déroulement commence avec deux types de médiation. D'un côté, Jeferson Monteiro - auteur de la page - regarde ce que les chaînes principales de télévision diffusent, c'est à dire un contenu sujet à la médiation traditionnelle du journalisme. De l'autre, il reçoit une information provenant des multiples sources qui sont dans la rue et qui lui transmettent des informations en fonction de leurs vues personnelles. Sur cette base, Monteiro va alors produire sa propre narrative, qui contient la sélection qu'il a faite à partir des différentes informations qu'il a reçues et qu'il adapte à la plateforme de destination, Facebook dans ce cas. Il décide ainsi d'entrer ou non des contenus multimédias, adapte la taille du texte, l'heure de postage et d'autres éléments en fonction de la dynamique de la plateforme. Une fois postée, la matière est potentiellement disponible à tous ceux qui suivent la page - un niveau de médiation contrôlé par le lecteur - mais sera en fait réellement montré à ceux que l'algorithme de la plateforme reconnaît comme correspondant à certains critères. C'est donc après un long parcours de choix et de sélections contrôlés par différents acteurs que le contenu final parviendra à l'utilisateur.

La mesure de visibilité est l'un des moyens d'évaluer ce qui émerge vraiment de ce procès complexe de médiation. Parmi tous ces acteurs produisant de l'information et passant par les multiples niveaux de choix faits par les plateformes et les utilisateurs, identifier les messages et les acteurs qui atteignent une plus grande attention et diffusion sur les réseaux, peut nous aider à comprendre le phénomène.

Dynamique de la visibilité sur Twitter : quoi et qui y gagne ?

Considérant les résultats des deux mesures que nous avons utilisées pour identifier les dynamiques de visibilité (*retweets* et liens partagés), il a été possible de voir clairement que la question est extrêmement complexe et demande que l'on prenne en considération de multiples facteurs. Une première conclusion que semble indiquer nos données est que le procès de *retweeting* est plus ouvert à l'arrivée de nouveaux acteurs que celui des liens partagés.

Si nous comparons ces deux mesures de visibilité, nous voyons qu'elles favorisent différentes dynamiques de visibilité. Nous avons uniformisé nos données pour permettre une comparaison plus précise de ce que favorise chaque dynamique. D'un côté nous avons pris les

pourcentages de *tweets* parmi les plus retweetés par type d'utilisateur, et de l'autre les pourcentages de liens les plus partagés par type d'utilisateur et nous les avons comparés, comme le montre le tableau 1. Nous avons dû pour cela adapter les catégories utilisées dans l'analyse des liens les plus partagés¹⁹¹. Il faut rappeler que notre base de comparaison est formée de tous les *tweets* retweetés plus de dix fois et tous les liens partagés plus de dix fois.

Tableau 1 - Pourcentage des messages les plus retweetés et des liens les plus partagés par type d'acteur

	RTs	Links
Individual	56%	34%
Organization	20%	15%
Public Figure	7%	3%
Mainstream Media	6%	33%
Alternative Media	4%	9%
Politician/Political Party	4%	2%
Humoristic profile	3%	3%

Le tableau montre clairement que l'espace que chaque acteur occupe dans chaque catégorie est très différent. Tandis que les acteurs individuels représentent 56% des messages les plus retweetés, ils ne sont que 34% pour les liens les plus partagés. Quand nous considérons les pourcentages des grands médias, la différence est encore plus grande : ils représentent seulement 6% des *tweets* les plus répliqués, mais 33% des liens les plus partagés. Stier, Scunemann, Steiger (2018) considèrent que cette prépondérance des grands médias, spécialement pour les liens les plus partagés, peut s'expliquer par leurs avantages comparés du point de vue des ressources politiques, financières et organisationnelles. Santos, Lycarião et Aquino (2018) identifient aussi des stratégies spécifiques et complexes que les médias d'information peuvent utiliser pour accroître la diffusion de leur contenu. Bien que leur étude

¹⁹¹ Nous avons fusionné les deux étapes du procès de catégorisation en un seul pour permettre la comparaison. Nous avons aussi éliminé une catégorie n'existant pas dans l'analyse des messages les plus retweetés, ainsi le dépôt de médias a été considéré dans la catégorie Média Social. Nous avons ajouté le nombre de liens renvoyant directement à des sites internet d'une catégorie et ceux renvoyant à des liens de réseaux sociaux de la même catégorie. Par exemple : les 30 liens vers des contenus de grands médias ont été ajoutés aux deux liens renvoyant à des contenus de réseaux sociaux ayant des profils de grands médias. Le pourcentage était calculé avec le total des deux mesures.

porte sur Facebook, elle montre clairement que le fait d'avoir des ressources supérieures peut signifier une nette différence dans l'attention qu'un acteur va obtenir sur les réseaux sociaux.

Il est aussi intéressant de voir que les médias alternatifs ont presque le double de pourcentage de liens partagés que de *retweets* (9% et 4% respectivement). Les personnages publics, politiques et partis politiques représentent la situation contraire.

Une étude antérieure que nous avons menée sur la conversation sur Twitter autour de trois votes de la Suprême Court Brésilienne corrobore ces résultats. Il montre que le procès de *retweet* tend à diluer le pouvoir de donner de visibilité à une question qui avant été concentré en quelques nœuds et maintenant dépend d'un plus grand nombre d'utilisateurs (Santos, 2012).

Bien que les causes de ces constatations méritent un examen approfondi, une explication possible est que lors du procès de *retweeting*, on fait moins attention à l'auteur du message et on reproduit alors des messages d'utilisateurs plus divers, alors que lorsqu'on insère un lien, on s'en tient plus souvent à des sources d'information connues. Si c'est bien le cas, cette constatation viendrait s'ajouter comme un élément important aux études plus récentes sur les fausses informations. Une autre étude sur la crédibilité des sources sur les réseaux sociaux a montré que la personnalisation de la source augmente la volonté de participer à une action collective, si l'on compare avec les sources d'organisations et non-personnalisées (Nekmat et al., 2019). Ceci peut apporter un élément supplémentaire à l'explication.

Une deuxième conclusion que permet notre analyse est de tracer une relation entre le rôle du nombre de *followers* d'un certain profile et le niveau de visibilité qu'il peut atteindre. Comme nous l'avons aperçu dans nos données, le nombre de *followers* ne suffit pas à expliquer pourquoi un message gagne en visibilité grâce au *retweeting*. Cette constatation est extrêmement importante et confirme l'idée que les réseaux sociaux, et plus particulièrement Twitter dans ce cas précis, favorisent l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs dans le débat public. Nous avons vu que les catégories ayant le plus grand nombre de suiveurs sont celles qui traditionnellement ont la plus grande visibilité : les grands médias et les personnages publics. La corrélation entre le nombre total de *followers* de nos catégories et le nombre total de *tweets* parmi les plus retweetés s'est révélée négative, preuve que ces deux mesures ne peuvent s'expliquer mutuellement. Le fait de prouver qu'il n'y a pas de relation directe entre le nombre

de *followers* et le niveau de visibilité qu'un message obtient, est une indication qu'il y a une nouvelle dynamique de visibilité à l'œuvre sur le réseau.

Nous ne pouvons toutefois ignorer le rôle du nombre de *followers*. S'il ne détermine pas la visibilité que va avoir un message, il semble qu'il influence la fréquence avec laquelle un acteur va réussir à entrer dans le débat public. Bien que des acteurs avec un bas niveau de *followers* puissent avoir leurs messages fortement disséminés par *retweets*, ce phénomène semble être le résultat d'une combinaison particulière de facteurs qui ne se répètent pas souvent. Ainsi la plupart de ces acteurs ont seulement un message parmi les plus retweetés. Pour ce qui est des acteurs ayant un grand nombre de *followers*, il semble qu'il soit plus fréquent qu'ils atteignent un haut niveau de visibilité de leurs messages. La corrélation entre la moyenne des *followers* de chaque catégorie et la moyenne de la fréquence avec laquelle ils sont très retweetés montre en effet qu'il y a une relation positive entre les deux variables.

Une autre conclusion importante ne concerne pas la dynamique de la plateforme mais plutôt les questions qui émergent parmi les contenus de grande visibilité. Tout au long de l'étude nous avons pu remarquer que certains thèmes de discussion apparaissaient très fréquemment parmi les contenus de grande visibilité. C'est le cas des messages et des textes sur la violence et la corruption qui étaient entre les messages les plus retweetés et les liens les plus partagés et étaient également largement répandus entre les différents producteurs de contenu. Il est intéressant de remarquer aussi que les contenus sur le fonctionnement de l'état étaient parvenus à une grande visibilité. Tout particulièrement dans les liens des médias alternatifs les plus partagés. On trouve des références au site internet *Contas Abertas (Comptes ouvertes)*, traitant du contrôle du budget de l'État, au projet *Congresso em Foco (Parlement sur le focus)* qui propose une couverture indépendante des travaux du Parlement, et au *Gabinete Digital (Cabinet numérique)*, sorte de gouvernement électronique proposé par l'état du Rio Grande do Sul, tous révèlent un intérêt particulier des gens pour comprendre, suivre et participer plus à la dynamique gouvernementale.

Un autre élément à mettre en relief entre les contenus les plus visibles des protestations de 2013, est le ton humoristique. Il était même si présent que nous avons décidé de créer une catégorie exclusive pour ce type de contenu. L'humour a été souvent utilisé pour parler des protestations mêmes, du gouvernement, des médias entre autres. Le nombre très significatif des *followers* des profils humoristiques que nous avons repérés parmi les plus retweetés

reflète aussi l'adhésion à ce type d'approche de la réalité. Le ton humoristique était exprimé à la fois dans les textes et dans les illustrations.

Il est aussi important de considérer l'aspect visuel des contenus qui ont atteint une grande visibilité. Tous les *tweets* classifiés dans les liens les plus partagés avaient des photos et les autres contenus accessibles sur les réseaux sociaux venaient d'Instagram et Youtube qui sont des plateformes de médias sociaux extrêmement visuelles. Les formats d'agrégation de textes et d'images et de vidéos ont été très importants pour captiver l'attention sur les réseaux.

Un dernier aspect qui a attiré notre attention dans l'étude des contenus les plus visibles sur Twitter, était les liens internationaux du mouvement. C'était évident à différents moments, lorsque sont apparus les profils du mouvement Occupy Wall Street (@occupywallstnyc) et du mouvement espagnol 15M (@takethesquare) parmi les plus retweetés. Des médias internationaux tels que The Guardian et El País sont aussi entrés dans notre corpus. Dans le cas du journal anglais, il est à la fois entre les messages les plus retweetés et les liens les plus partagés, et dans le cas espagnol, l'un de ses articles d'opinion apparaît dans les liens les plus partagés. Parmi les liens les plus partagés sur Youtube, nous avons trouvé une vidéo de la chaîne du sportif Wanderlei Silva dont une partie du titre était en anglais et était entièrement sous-titré en anglais. Cela indique un double mouvement où certains acteurs en relation avec les manifestations, cherchaient à être reconnus et approuvés à l'étranger, et où des organisations sociales du dehors étaient dans une certaine mesure intéressées par ce qui se passait au Brésil.

Conclusion

Le projet de cette thèse a été d'étudier l'usage des réseaux sociaux pendant les mouvements de protestation de 2013 au Brésil et ses conséquences sur le système de communication. Pour cela nous avons analysé à la fois des données des réseaux sociaux, Twitter en particulier, et des interviews que nous avons faites avec différents acteurs de ces manifestations. Nous avons suivi une démarche qui a commencé par essayer de comprendre comment les grands médias étaient vus face à cette nouvelle possibilité de communication introduite par les réseaux sociaux, puis nous avons investigué les médiations alternatives aux médias dominants et leur mode opératoire pour entrer finalement dans les logiques de visibilité, en essayant d'identifier qui se distingue et qui gagne de l'attention dans ce nouveau média.

Cette démarche suivie nous a permis de tracer quelques conclusions intéressantes sur ce que les réseaux sociaux ont représenté pour les mouvements de protestation de 2013. Nos conclusions sont ici présentées non pas dans l'ordre que ces éléments apparaissent dans la thèse, ni dans l'ordre d'importance, mais plutôt dans une organisation qui présenterait le mieux possible les changements qu'ils annoncent.

Les grands médias continuent d'être d'importants conducteurs de conversation, même sur les réseaux sociaux, mais pas autant qu'avant

L'une des questions qui nous ont le plus intriguée dans cette recherche a été le rôle des grands médias. Nous voulions voir quel rôle ils ont joué dans ce nouveau contexte où l'utilisation des réseaux sociaux est extrêmement significative. Nous avons essayé de garder nos distances par rapport à l'idée que les réseaux sociaux représenteraient un média complètement alternatif par rapport aux médias hégémoniques, ou alors que rien n'avait changé en fait et que les mêmes grands médias dictaient le débat en ligne. Pour y parvenir, nous avons parcouru différentes pistes pour comprendre quel était leur rôle de fait, et nous pouvons présenter deux résultats en la matière.

Le premier est que la production des grands médias est encore importante comme source et comme thèmes de conversation. Notre étude de visibilité a montré qu'ils étaient responsables de 6% des messages les plus retweetés et 33% des liens les plus partagés. Cela veut dire que lorsque l'on considère les *tweets* qui ont atteint le plus de visibilité dans la discussion, on ne peut ignorer le rôle des grands médias. La différence de résultat entre les messages les plus retweetés et les liens les plus partagés montre également que les données des réseaux sociaux peuvent être mesurées de différentes façons puisqu'elles comportent des médias variés et des pratiques de sociabilité différentes. Il est clair que les gens ont recours plus souvent aux médias principaux quand ils recherchent des liens à partager que quand ils répliquent des messages.

De toute façon, si les grands médias restent des conducteurs importants de conversation, ils doivent partager cet espace avec de nombreux autres acteurs. Dans les deux mesures de visibilité que nous avons utilisées, les acteurs individuels représentaient la catégorie la plus importante. Considérant en particulier les messages les plus retweetés, les catégories des organisations et des personnages publics apparaissent aussi plus significatives que celle des grands médias. Cela démontre que dans le milieu des réseaux sociaux, la diversité des acteurs

qui ont la possibilité de produire et de partager l'information, a un impact sur le rôle des grands médias en tant que médiateurs principaux de l'information qui devient visible pour une large part de la société. Cela montre que si d'un côté les médias sociaux ne peuvent être considérés intégralement comme des médias alternatifs, d'un autre côté leur logique représente un défi au système de communication en place.

C'est en ce sens que nous pourrions dire qu'avec les médias sociaux, la *polis* proposée par Arendt (1958) comme espace public, lieu de l'être-ensemble, fonctionne et se nourrit d'une manière plus riche, plus diverse. Plus d'acteurs acquièrent de la visibilité et participent à cette construction d'être parmi les autres. Mais nous devons aussi considérer que cette diversité n'est pas sans causer de dommages à l'image des grands médias.

Twitter comme nouvel espace de contestation du système des médias traditionnels

Comme nous l'avons dit, les critiques aux médias hégémoniques du Brésil n'est pas chose nouvelle, mais les nouvelles possibilités offertes par les médias sociaux leur donnent un nouveau souffle. Les activistes considèrent que ces nouveaux médias leur permettent de faire entendre leur propre voix, mais ils dénoncent aussi et s'opposent aux comportements des grands médias. À l'encontre des grands médias mentionnés dans notre travail, nous voyons que le ton critique domine largement, qui plus est, ce n'est pas tellement leurs contenus qui sont critiqués directement, mais l'outil même d'information. Ceci a été particulièrement le cas de la chaîne de TV Globo, groupe propriétaire de différents médias, et qui a été l'une des cibles principales des critiques lors des protestations de 2013.

Un autre aspect intéressant de ces critiques est qu'elles ne venaient pas exclusivement des mouvements progressistes - comme mettent en évidence Cardon and Granjon (2010) dans leur proposition de leur concept de médiactivisme - mais aussi des milieux conservateurs. Les accusations envers les comportements de la Globo ont été extrêmement contradictoires : la chaîne TV aurait à la fois travaillé à la chute de Dilma Rousseff, encouragé les gens à descendre dans la rue, et discrédité les activistes. Ces critiques venues de tout l'éventail politique montrent que c'est le haut niveau de critique aux médias hégémoniques qui est généralisé dans la société brésilienne.

Par conséquent, au moment où cette notion d'espace commun est en construction d'une manière très diversifiée, un acteur majeur de cette construction fait l'objet d'un fort discrédit.

D'un côté, cette perte de pouvoir est bénéfique dans le contexte brésilien où les grands médias sont presque uniquement commerciaux, et très concentrés entre quelques familles de propriétaires avec une faible diversité interne (Azevedo, 2006). Le fait de devoir partager le pouvoir de décider de la visibilité de l'information est certainement bénéfique pour la démocratie en termes de pluralité et de diversité. Mais d'un autre côté, certaines questions vont se poser sur la crédibilité de l'information diffusée par ces nouveaux acteurs.

Avec les réseaux sociaux, les processus de médiation sont plus complexes

Les journalistes ne sont plus les seuls *gatekeepers* à définir l'information qui mérite d'être largement diffusée. Avec les réseaux sociaux médias, d'autres acteurs peuvent assumer ce rôle, ce qui crée une nouvelle dynamique des flux d'information. Ces nouvelles opportunités de médiation vont être occupées de différentes façons par différents acteurs, mais vont être essentiellement vues comme une chance de baisser le niveau de médiation. Comme si le rôle du journaliste aurait été effacé, laissant le flux d'information se faire de façon plus simple, plus rapide, avec moins de perturbations.

Il est important de remarquer ici que les nouveaux acteurs vont assumer ce rôle de médiateur de différentes manières, mais une des questions centrales est que cette activité peut devenir aussi une forme d'activisme. Au-delà de la conception traditionnelle qui voit la communication des réseaux sociaux comme une manière de générer des actions hors ligne - dans la rue - nous voulons rappeler qu'il existe une importante dimension de l'activisme qui n'implique pas nécessairement d'aller dans la rue. Prenons un des cas que nous avons analysés, la page Facebook *Dilma Bolada*. Le travail de Jeferson Monteiro, auteur de la page, pendant les protestations consistait à rester chez lui, recueillir des informations de différents médias et différentes personnes et produire sa propre couverture des événements. Son activité n'incluait donc pas d'être dans la rue, mais sur sa page Facebook. Il nous a dit même qu'en fait, il était préjudiciable d'être dans la rue pour le travail qu'il se proposait de faire. Ainsi le fait que de nouvelles médiations sont maintenant possibles, ouvre un nouvel espace dans la dispute pour l'attention où l'activisme peut faire la différence.

Le fait que les activistes ou les acteurs politiques n'ont plus besoin de passer par le filtre du journalisme pour transmettre leurs messages serait un gain dans la qualité des messages. Cette manière de voir s'ajoute aux considérations que nous venons de faire sur le discrédit des grands médias. Si ces médias sont accusés de "manipulation" et de "distorsion" de

l'information, cette possibilité de dispenser leur action sur le flux d'information serait vu de manière positive. Sur un tel postulat se forme un discours sur les bénéfices de la désintermédiation.

Nous pourrions bien sûr discuter si les procès de désintermédiation sont réellement bénéfiques pour les démocraties, mais notre argument ici est autre : nous pensons que les médias sociaux en tant que milieu de communication, augmentent en fait les niveaux de médiation de l'information par rapport aux médias de masse fondés sur le modèle de *broadcasting* de la radiodiffusion et télévision.

Dans le modèle de radiodiffusion et télévision, nous pouvons penser que le journaliste a un rôle de médiateur - dans la mesure où il sélectionne ce à quoi il va donner une couverture et comment. Ensuite il y a la médiation technologique faite par le média par lequel le journaliste publie, et qui demande une adaptation à l'outil en question. Et ensuite encore, nous pouvons considérer la réception comme un niveau de médiation supplémentaire, pas seulement par le choix de la consommation du média, mais aussi par le contexte social et culturel du consommateur qui va fonctionner comme un filtre.

Quand il s'agit du contexte des réseaux sociaux, l'équation se révèle plus complexe. Le rôle du journaliste qui choisit ce qui mérite l'attention passe maintenant aux mains de multiples acteurs qui interagissent entre eux, ce qui ne signifie pas une augmentation de la médiation mais plutôt une diversification. Le problème est que n'étant plus limité à un acteur, l'identification du procès devient plus naturalisée. L'idée de désintermédiation vient de la non-visibilité et la pulvérisation de ces nouveaux modérateurs de l'information. Nous avons alors, comme dans le modèle de *broadcasting*, la médiation technologique qui va conditionner l'information à certaines possibilités et contraintes des plateformes de réseaux sociaux (Cammaerts, 2014). Mais ici, nous devons ajouter un nouveau niveau à cette médiation technologique, qui n'existait pas auparavant. Maintenant, certains médias sociaux sont capables de faire une sélection de ce qui est présenté ou pas à un utilisateur donné, en fonction principalement de son comportement social. Ce choix ne vient pas de l'utilisateur mais d'une sélection automatique faite par un algorithme privé choisi par le média social. Ce qui veut dire que si auparavant un article écrit pour un journal par exemple, était nécessairement imprimé sur toutes les copies du journal, il n'en n'est pas de même pour les réseaux sociaux.

Le contenu apparaîtra sur certains comptes et pas sur d'autres, en fonction d'une logique que nous ne connaissons pas très bien, parce que peu explicite et difficile d'atteindre.

Après cela, nous entrons dans ce que nous appelions avant le niveau de réception de la médiation, mais que nous n'appelons plus réception parce qu'elle est devenue beaucoup plus active¹⁹². Nous l'appellerons ici le niveau d'interaction. Il est d'abord le pouvoir de l'utilisateur de choisir le contenu auquel il veut accéder. Le choix de pages ou de profils à suivre ou à être ami avec va constituer une source personnalisée d'information que l'utilisateur recevra. Un processus comparable à celui de choisir une chaîne de télévision à regarder ou un journal à acheter, mais avec un choix infiniment plus vaste. Nous répétons que cela ne veut pas dire une augmentation de la médiation, mais plutôt une diversification. Un aspect intéressant dans la composition du panier informationnel de chaque utilisateur de réseaux sociaux est qu'il mélangera probablement les sources institutionnelles d'information avec le tissu de sociabilité. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il les utilisera de la même manière ou qu'il leur accordera la même crédibilité, mais elles seront toutes présentes à sa disposition. Il y a alors un dernier niveau de médiation que nous définirons comme directement lié aux processus de sociabilité.

Les réseaux sociaux ne sont pas uniquement ni principalement des médias d'information, mais sont des médias de sociabilité par lesquels circulent les nouvelles, et comme nous venons de le mentionner, le bouquet d'information de chaque utilisateur comporte ces deux dimensions. Cela est important lorsque l'on considère les pratiques de réplique que ces réseaux permettent. Dans la pratique, cela signifie qu'un utilisateur de réseau qui ne suit pas ou n'est pas "ami" d'un certain compte, pourra accéder à ce compte parce qu'une autre personne de son réseau personnel interagit avec ce compte. Cette interaction peut être la réplique d'un message (un *retweet* sur Twitter ou un partage sur Facebook par exemple), mais peut être aussi le fait d'un "j'aime" ou d'un commentaire d'un post qui va apparaître comme recommandation à cet utilisateur (quelqu'un avec qui vous interagissez a aimé ce contenu). Donc à la fin, les liens de sociabilité fonctionnent comme un filtre et un organisateur d'information, ajoutant un niveau supplémentaire de médiation.

¹⁹² Comme l'explique Voirol (2005) ainsi que d'autres chercheurs, la réception n'a jamais été un espace de passivité mais plutôt un espace de construction et de dispute de significations.

Il faut remarquer aussi une autre différence du réseau social avec le modèle de *broadcasting* : les étapes de la médiation ne sont pas séquentielles mais peuvent se produire plusieurs fois dans un ordre différent. C'est un processus continu.

Dans les grandes lignes, si nous comparons le flux d'information sur les réseaux sociaux à celui du modèle de *broadcast*, nous pouvons dire que nous avons identifié deux points où le procès de médiation était rendu plus complexe et deux autres qui venaient s'ajouter. Nous considérons que la diversification des acteurs sélectionnant les faits qui méritent l'attention et la multiplicité des choix que les utilisateurs trouvent lorsqu'ils remplissent leur panier d'information représentent des éléments potentiellement positifs pour les systèmes démocratiques. Les deux ont la possibilité d'apporter de nouvelles voix et de nouveaux points de vue au débat. Mais il y a aussi des points potentiellement préjudiciables présents dans le processus. Le premier est qu'avec le discrédit des grands médias, la diversification des médiateurs favorise l'émergence de voix qui n'ont pas de légitimité sociale mais au contraire qui cherchent à propager la désinformation. Le second serait une fragmentation excessive du débat public (Lycarião, 2009 ; Wojcik, 2011) qui affecterait négativement la possibilité de produire un monde commun.

Il y a également deux niveaux de médiation qui s'ajoutent, le premier étant associé au rôle des plateformes de réseaux sociaux. Le fait que ces médias possèdent des algorithmes privés capables de définir l'accès que l'utilisateur aura à l'information à partir de critères qui ne sont pas connus publiquement, semble représenter une véritable menace pour les démocraties. Les médias ont des principes éditoriaux et des limites définies d'éthique professionnelle. Même si au Brésil il n'y a aucune garantie que ces règles seront respectées ou que les infractions seront punies, ces outils d'information ont des obligations sociales et doivent rendre des comptes de leurs actions. Pour ce qui est des réseaux sociaux, ces règles ne sont pas encore en usage à cause de la non visibilité de ce niveau de médiation - et ils en profitent - pouvant décider quoi offrir ou non sans aucune explication sur les principes qui les guident¹⁹³.

Le deuxième niveau de médiation qui s'ajoute au processus est celui qui est basé sur la sociabilité, et qui signifie que nos liens sociaux modèlent maintenant d'une façon plus

¹⁹³ Au Brésil, les radios et télévisions sont des concessions publiques et en conséquence devraient avoir une évidente responsabilité publique, tandis que les réseaux sociaux sont complètement privés et n'ont donc pas cette responsabilité.

systematique notre accès à l'information. Si d'un côté cela peut provoquer un effet boule de neige en renforçant des points de vue déjà présents dans un certain groupe, d'un autre côté cela peut créer des voies alternatives pour qu'une information accède à la visibilité.

La sociabilité construit une nouvelle voie de passage de l'information à la visibilité

Notre étude de la visibilité a montré que le nombre de *followers* d'un certain profile n'a pas un rôle décisif sur la visibilité qu'il peut obtenir. Bien qu'il y ait une corrélation entre la taille de l'audience et la visibilité, il est évident que d'autres éléments interviennent pour expliquer pourquoi certains messages gagnent de la visibilité sur les réseaux sociaux. On peut donc dire que la logique de visibilité des médias sociaux diffère de celle des médias de *broadcasting* pour lesquels la taille de l'audience est essentielle pour déterminer la visibilité d'un certain contenu.

Nous croyons ici que l'élément qui fait la différence est justement la sociabilité qui caractérise les plateformes de médias sociaux. Comme le dit Gomes (2016), les médias sociaux permettent un nouvel type d'action de ceux qui étaient vus avant comme des spectateurs. Ceux qui supposément consommaient le contenu produit par d'autres, maintenant participent à l'action en interagissant avec le contenu. A notre avis, cette interaction va générer nécessairement une répétition qui structure le réseau (Boullier, 2013). C'est à dire qu'un contenu est diffusé non seulement par l'audience du compte émetteur du message, mais aussi par le réseau de sociabilité qui forme son environnement.

Cette idée semble correspondre à la logique du réseau social pour lequel, pourrions-nous dire, chaque profil a son audience. Ainsi la dynamique de la visibilité, au lieu d'être basée sur un unique mouvement de diffusion vers un large public, serait plutôt un édifice de plusieurs étages de diffusion à des audiences successives qui recevraient le contenu à travers les liens de sociabilité. Cette dynamique peut être vue comme la conséquence du dernier niveau de médiation que nous avons identifié précédemment, celui où les utilisateurs ont la possibilité de choisir s'ils vont interagir ou non avec un certain contenu et donc influencer sa diffusion.

Nous voudrions aussi faire remarquer que nous avons décidé de travailler sur les mesures de visibilité parce que nous considérons qu'elles sont essentielles dans la construction d'une connaissance commune dans une société, mais il y a certainement d'autres points de vue d'où regarder ce phénomène. Même des contenus qui n'atteignent pas une grande visibilité peuvent

jouer un important rôle social en diffusant des points de vue spécifiques ou en portant la voix de communautés sous-représentées.

Considérations finales

Ces principales conclusions qui ressortent de notre recherche posent un nouveau défi à la démocratie brésilienne. Si dans un premier moment la création des réseaux sociaux a été saluée comme une dynamique capable de la revigorer, l'interprétation aujourd'hui semble plus complexe. Sans doute de nouvelles voix y ont trouvé un espace pour entrer dans le débat public et défier la narrative des médias hégémoniques, mais il est apparu clairement aussi que ce gonflement des voix qui influencent le débat public n'a pas qu'un effet positif sur la démocratie (Coleman, 2017a ; Wojcik, 2011). Ce constat ne doit pas diminuer les évaluations positives nombreuses qui accompagnent l'apparition des réseaux sociaux, mais doit nous inciter à une réflexion sur la nécessité de veiller à la qualité du débat public et à la manière dont les réseaux sociaux peuvent y contribuer.

Si les résultats ici présentés sont basés sur l'analyse d'un moment spécifique de la vie politique du Brésil, le phénomène montre une forte continuité dans le processus politique qui a suivi. Les changements du système de communication global que nous avons identifiés ici ne sont pas isolés dans le temps, mais sont une étape d'un processus long et complexe qui continue à se développer. Poursuivre la recherche pour mieux saisir ces phénomènes augmente notre capacité de comprendre les changements qui s'opèrent actuellement dans la démocratie brésilienne.

Nous croyons que la recherche ici présentée offre d'importantes contributions à la fois aux études académiques sur la communication numérique, sur la démocratie et sur l'entendement de la réalité brésilienne contemporaine, mais nous savons aussi que cette étude a ses limites que nous aimerions considérer.

Tout d'abord des considérations sur notre travail à partir des données de Twitter. Comme une part importante de l'analyse que nous proposons se fonde sur un corpus de *tweets* que nous avons travaillé, nous pensons qu'il est important de mettre ces données en perspective. Citons Segerberg and Bennet (2011) :

(...) des données des flux de Twitter ne contiennent qu'une tranche d'espace de l'action collective, et ce que donne à voir cette tranche peut changer en fonction de l'interaction

de nouveaux éléments de l'environnement avec les utilisateurs et les administrateurs de ce flux. En fonction de l'endroit où l'on coupe le flux, on peut trouver différents acteurs et différentes activités en cours. (...) (p.202).

Il est donc important de voir que les données que nous présentons ici sont une image d'un moment de la conversation des réseaux sociaux sur les manifestations de 2013. Cette image est dessinée, délimitée par la période de collecte des données, par les mots-clés utilisés et par les outils employés pour faire cette collecte. Nous ne pouvons prétendre que les utilisateurs de Twitter au Brésil représentent l'ensemble de la population. Nous considérons que le réseau social est particulièrement bien adapté au type de recherche que nous avons fait ici parce qu'il est intensivement utilisé par les acteurs traditionnels du système de média, mais nous savons qu'il a des limites. Même si nous repérons des indices qui permettent de tirer des conclusions plus larges que le cadre de la recherche, les résultats d'un média social spécifique en aucun cas ne pourront être généralisés et étendus à toutes les plateformes de médias sociaux car leurs logiques internes sont très différentes.

Une autre limitation que nous voulons mentionner, est notre point de vue du phénomène des protestations de 2013 qui s'est réfléchi sur les choix méthodologiques et théoriques de notre travail, et de notre point de vue sur la scène politique dans un sens plus large. Même si en tant que chercheur, nous adoptons un point de vue distancié, nous ne prétendons pas présenter une vue impartiale de la réalité brésilienne. Notre position politique imprime sa marque depuis le choix des personnes interviewées, à l'interprétation des données que nous avons pu faire et aux associations que nous proposons avec la situation politique brésilienne d'aujourd'hui. Le fait d'avoir concentré nos interviews presque uniquement sur des acteurs de gauche peut nous avoir empêché de discerner d'autres pratiques qui n'apparaissent pas dans notre corpus.

Les résultats de nos recherches indiquent d'importants changements dans la dynamique de la communication qui peuvent avoir des conséquences significatives dans les sociétés démocratiques. D'autres recherches seront nécessaires pour creuser la connaissance de ces changements. Nous pensons que deux lignes de recherche méritent une attention spéciale. La première serait celle du rôle de la sociabilité dans le flux d'information des réseaux sociaux. C'est une approche qui nous semble prometteuse et qui doit être explorée à la fois en termes de niveau de médiation et en tant que processus qui génère visibilité. Étudier les *retweets* (Twitter) et les partages (Facebook) peut être un bon point de départ mais il faudrait inclure

aussi d'autres types d'interaction. Une deuxième ligne de recherche à considérer serait celle des niveaux de médiation, savoir comment ils fonctionnent dans des cas spécifiques et si à partir de là on peut produire des généralisations justifiées.

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Appendix 1 – List of interviews

Activists

- Diego Soares, 27, member of the *Movimento Passe Livre* (Free Fare Movement), founded at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre (2005), which was the main movement to call for the initial June 2013 protests. Diego was, in 2016, one of the spokespersons designated by this movement. Interview done on January 19, 2017.
- Pablo Capilé, 36, is one of the founders of the *Fora do Eixo* group (Out of the Axis) and the most well-known and media-driven leader of this movement. This group was created in 2005 and its action was centered on cultural themes. The media branch of this group is the *Mídia Ninja* (Ninja Media), an abbreviation for "Independent Narratives, Journalism and Action". It is a "decentralized communication network that produces and disseminates content based on collaborative work and online sharing". In June 2013, *Fora do Eixo* had an important role in the mobilization of protests and especially in the mobilizations on social networks. *Mídia Ninja* was the main alternative media vehicle to broadcast live from the protests. Interview done on November 11, 2016.
- Paulinho Fluxus_, 31, artist and multimedia activist, known among student and artistic activism by his *Tanque Rosa Choque*. He participated in the June 2013 protests until he had a leg broken in confrontation with the police. He helped to carry out several artistic actions against mainstream Brazilian media. Interview done on April 27, 2016.
- Diná Ramos, 41, is a member of several collectives for the rights to the city, public transport and democratization of the media. She participated actively in the protests and also in the digital mobilization around the event. Interview done on April 25, 2016.
- Rebeca Lerer, 39, human rights activist, has participated in several environmental-related movements and has extensive experience with protests. During 2013, she helped create a medical center for injured activists and spread information about proper precautions and behavior when facing the police, since it was the first time that many protesters were on the streets. Interview done on April 28, 2016.

- Everton Rodrigues, 39, member of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party) and the *Coletivo Arrua* (Arrua Collective - a word game with "a rua" which means "the street"). This group is formed mainly by young people and they took part in the mobilizations of 2013. Interview done on May 5, 2016.
- Alfredo Santos, 35, former youth secretary of the *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* (United Workers' Central) from 2012-2015. Interview done on June 6, 2017.
- Leandro Fortes, 51, former social media reporter for the *Workers' Party* (2013-2016). Interview done on March 17, 2017.
- Breno Altman, 56, founder of the *Frente Brasil Popular* (Popular Brazil Front). Interview done on June 7, 2017.
- Janaína Lima, 33, first municipal councilor elected by the *Vem pra Rua* (Come to the Street) movement and one of the leaders of the movement during the demonstrations for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. Interview done on July 6, 2017.
- Laryssa Sampaio, 30, a former member of the *Levante Popular da Juventude* (Popular Youth Rising Movement), one of the most important Brazilian youth movements, founded in 2012. Interview done on March 3, 2017.
- Jeferson Monteiro, 27, author of the *Dilma Bolada Facebook page*, a humorous caricature of President Dilma Rousseff. Interview done on July 19, 2017.

Journalists

- Piero Locatelli, 29, was a journalist for *Carta Capital* during the 2013 demonstrations. He was arrested during the protests for having a bottle of vinegar in his backpack. Interview done on April 3, 2017.
- Bruno Lupion, 34, journalist in several major Brazilian media. During the 2013 demonstrations, he was head of coverage at the National Congress in Brasília for *UOL* (Online Universe, one of the major news websites in Brazil). Interview done on March 19, 2017.

- Journalist, 39, worked for one of the largest Brazilian media during the protests. Based in São Paulo (did not want to be identified). Interview done on June 13, 2017.

Communication and/or youth officers at political institutions

Presidency of the Republic

- Thomas Traumman, 50, former minister of the Communication Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic (2014-2015) and former spokesperson of the Presidency of the Republic (2012-2014). Interview done on June 5, 2017.
- Karla Correia, 41, former head of the Digital Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic. Interview done on March 29, 2017.
- Diogo de Santana, 37, former executive secretary of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic. This secretariat has the status of a ministry and, during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, it was responsible for the relations of the Presidency with the social movements. Interview done on March 13, 2017.
- Gabriel Medina, 35, former secretary of youth at the São Paulo City Hall (2013-2014) and, later, at the Presidency of the Republic (2015-2016). Interview done on March 6, 2017.
- Jefferson Lima, 30, former Secretary of Youth of the Presidency of the Republic (2016) and former Youth Secretary of the Workers' Party (2011-2016). Interview done on June 27, 2017.

São Paulo City Hall

- Bia Abramo, 53, journalist and former coordinator of social networks of the São Paulo City Council. Interview done on March 7, 2017.
- Dafne Sampaio, 42, journalist and former member of the social network team of the São Paulo City Council. Interview done on March 17, 2017.

- Fernando Busian, 42, journalist and former press officer of the São Paulo City Hall. He also worked in the communication teams of the campaign for the government of the state of São Paulo in 2014, and in the Municipal Council of São Paulo. Interview done on March 9, 2017.

Appendix 2 – Original Posts on Lula’s Facebook page related to the 2013 protests

Table 3 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page about the role of social movements

Post Message	Posted	Likes	Comments	Shares
“Está longe de acabar a missão para qual a CUT foi fundada. O que a gente queria lá atrás, é exatamente o que queremos hoje. À medida que os paradigmas são quebrados, as pessoas ficam mais exigentes e querem mais”, disse Lula, ontem, na comemoração dos 30 anos da CUT. http://bit.ly/157W1A4 Imagem: Partido dos Trabalhadores	29/08/2013	2200	108	1017
"Eu acho que nós estamos em um momento de descoberta de novas funções para o movimento sindical brasileiro", opinou Lula em entrevista à Rede Brasil Atual. Assista à íntegra da resposta dele sobre os desafios da classe trabalhadora hoje:	26/09/2013	1600	135	589
“Algumas das conquistas destes dez anos só foram possíveis por causa da intensa participação dos movimentos sociais”, afirmou Luiz Dulci, ex-ministro da Secretaria Geral da Presidência e atual diretor do Instituto Lula. Ele falou ontem à noite, em Salvador, no seminário em comemoração aos dez anos de governo em que também estiveram presentes Lula e Dilma. http://bit.ly/1blqgNi Foto: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	25/07/2013	785	67	242
Lula recebeu na tarde de hoje jovens de movimentos sociais e de coletivos independentes. Ao lado do governador da Bahia, Jaques Wagner, do secretário de cultura da cidade de São Paulo, Juca Ferreira e de diretores do Instituto Lula, o ex-presidente ouviu os jovens sobre os movimentos políticos dos últimos meses e também sobre temas como cultura, democracia, política e comunicação. Foto: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	16/07/2013	?	?	?

Table 4 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page about official governmental actions

Post Message	Posted	Likes	Comments	Shares
A presidenta Dilma Rousseff sancionou ontem a Lei Anticorrupção, que responsabiliza empresas que cometem crimes contra a administração pública e prevê novas punições. Dilma, quando era ministra da Casa Civil, participou da proposição da Lei, enviada pelo então presidente Lula ao Congresso no dia 8 de fevereiro de 2010. http://bit.ly/1b1hX5W Foto: Ricardo Stuckert/PR	02/08/2013	?	?	?

<p>A presidenta Dilma reativou hoje sua conta no Twitter com uma conversa muito bem-humorada com seu alterego mais famoso da web: a "Dilma Bolada". O encontro aconteceu no dia em que o Palácio do Planalto lança o novo Portal Brasil e sua conta no Instagram. Acompanhe e participe! Twitter da presidenta Dilma: @dilmabr Novo Portal Brasil: www.brasil.gov.br Instagram do Palácio do Planalto: instagram.com/palaciadoplanalto E para quem gosta de humor, vale acompanhar também a "Dilma Bolada": Facebook: Dilma Bolada Twitter: @diImabr Instagram: instagram.com/dilmabolada</p>	27/09/2013	5700	451	1330
<p>São fantasiosas, sem qualquer base real, as opiniões que me foram atribuídas pela Folha de S.Paulo, em matéria publicada hoje na página 4 do jornal. Não fiz qualquer crítica nem em público, nem em privado à atuação da presidenta Dilma Rousseff nos recentes episódios. Ao contrário, minha convicção é de que a companheira Dilma vem liderando o governo e o país com grande competência e firmeza, ouvindo a voz das ruas, construindo soluções e abrindo caminhos para que o Brasil avance, nossa democracia se fortaleça e o processo de inclusão social se consolide. Em particular, a presidenta mostrou extraordinária sensibilidade ao propor a convocação de um plebiscito sobre a reforma política. A iniciativa tem o mérito de romper o impasse nessa questão decisiva, que há décadas vem entrando e saindo da agenda nacional, sem lograr mudanças significativas. Ouvindo o povo, nosso sistema político poderá se renovar e aperfeiçoar. É o que se espera dele. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</p>	28/06/2013	4300	850	2456
<p>"Como presidenta, eu tenho a obrigação tanto de ouvir a voz das ruas, como dialogar com todos os segmentos, mas tudo dentro dos primados da lei e da ordem, indispensáveis para a democracia. (...) Vou convidar os governadores e os prefeitos das principais cidades do país para um grande pacto em torno da melhoria dos serviços públicos. O foco será: primeiro, a elaboração do Plano Nacional de Mobilidade Urbana, que privilegie o transporte coletivo. Segundo, a destinação de cem por cento dos recursos do petróleo para a educação. Terceiro, trazer de imediato milhares de médicos do exterior para ampliar o atendimento do Sistema Único de Saúde, o SUS.", afirmou Dilma, ontem à noite, em cadeia nacional. Assista ao pronunciamento completo da presidenta:</p>	22/06/2013	3500	1200	1768
<p>Já conhece os 5 pactos propostos pela presidenta Dilma? Informe-se e participe da luta por um Brasil melhor! Imagem: Exército das Estrelas</p>	27/06/2013	2900	436	2842

"O Brasil hoje acordou mais forte. A grandeza das manifestações de ontem comprovam a energia da nossa democracia. (...) Essas vozes das ruas precisam ser ouvidas. Elas ultrapassam, e isso ficou visível, os mecanismos tradicionais das instituições, dos partidos políticos, das entidades de classe e da própria mídia (...) Quero dizer que o meu governo está ouvindo essas vozes pela mudança. O meu governo está empenhado e comprometido com a transformação social.", afirmou Dilma esta manhã. Veja a declaração completa da presidenta:	18/06/2013	2600	1000	2429
Ontem, a presidenta Dilma Rousseff propôs cinco pactos nos seguintes temas: responsabilidade fiscal, educação, saúde, reforma política e transporte público. Entre as propostas da presidenta está um plebiscito para formação de uma constituinte específica para a reforma política e uma lei que torne a corrupção dolosa crime hediondo. Veja o discurso completo da presidenta em reunião com governadores e prefeitos de capitais:	25/06/2013	1800	325	866
Acompanhe ao vivo: o prefeito Fernando Haddad recebe o Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) em uma reunião extraordinária com o Conselho da Cidade para discutir o transporte público em São Paulo.	18/06/2013	1100	327	515
"A proposta da presidenta Dilma Rousseff sobre plebiscito para a reforma política tem gerado dúvidas quanto às diferenças entre referendo e o próprio plebiscito. Entenda quais as principais características dessas duas modalidades de consulta popular.". Leia a matéria completa do portal EBC:	26/06/2013	798	120	708

Table 5 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page about governmental measures taken in response to the protests

Post Message	Posted	Likes	Comments	Shares
Pesquisa realizada pelo Ibope/OAB mostrou que 85% dos entrevistados é a favor da reforma política (leia a pesquisa completa aqui: http://bit.ly/1bccSaW). E você, acha que o Brasil precisa de uma reforma política? Imagem: Partido dos Trabalhadores	13/08/2013	?	?	?
Você conhece as propostas da reforma política? A população está sendo convidada a participar dessa decisão. Não fique de fora! Imagem: PartidodosTrabalhadores	27/06/2013	3400	389	3086
"O que o Brasil deveria ter era compreensão de que não estamos querendo substituir brasileiros por nenhum outro médico, nós estamos apenas querendo levar médico onde os médicos brasileiros não estão", afirmou Lula sobre o programa Mais Médicos, ao falar com jornalistas na saída do almoço.	05/09/2013	2100	175	966

Ao final do seu discurso ontem, em Brasília, Lula falou da saúde pública no Brasil. Ele ressaltou que “é preciso cuidar dos pobres desse país” e que foi para isso que a presidenta Dilma criou o programa Mais Médicos. Ele falou da diferença de quantidade de médicos entre as grandes capitais e as periferias e interiores. “Essas vagas precisam ser preenchidas e (...) se médicos brasileiros não querem trabalhar no sertão, vamos trazer médicos do exterior”. http://bit.ly/13cUj0P Foto: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	24/07/2013	1200	123	496
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Table 7 – Posts on Lula’s Facebook page regarding the protests specifically

Post Message	Posted	Likes ¹⁹⁴	Comments	Shares
Ninguém em sã consciência pode ser contra manifestações da sociedade civil porque a democracia não é um pacto de silêncio, mas sim a sociedade em movimentação em busca de novas conquistas. Não existe problema que não tenha solução. A única certeza é que o movimento social e as reivindicações não são coisa de polícia, mas sim de mesa de negociação. Estou seguro, se bem conheço o prefeito Fernando Haddad, que ele é um homem de negociação. Tenho certeza que dentre os manifestantes, a maioria tem disposição de ajudar a construir uma solução para o transporte urbano. Lula	17/6/13	7100	2300	7589
O comentário do Julio Barros foi o mais curtido na postagem sobre o artigo do Lula sobre as manifestações que aconteceram no Brasil. Ainda não viu o texto? Leia aqui: http://bit.ly/12VPqck	19/7/13	1600	170	632
No seu discurso hoje de manhã, em Adis Abeba, na Etiópia, Lula também falou das manifestações que aconteceram recentemente no Brasil: “Nos últimos 15 dias vocês ouviram pela TV e leram pelos jornais muita movimentação no Brasil: passeatas, protestos e queria dizer a vocês que feliz é o país que tem um povo que tem liberdade de se manifestar. E mais feliz ainda é um país que tem um povo que se manifesta e que vai as ruas querendo mais. (...) A presidenta Dilma tem tido um comportamento extraordinário. (...) Ela tem sido solidária àqueles que pacificamente vão à rua reivindicar melhores condições de tudo que o povo tem direito.” #EndHungerAfrica Foto: Ricardo Stuckert/Instituto Lula	30/6/13	1500	268	1035
“Nós temos o direito de reivindicar tudo que falta, mas temos a obrigação de reconhecer tudo que conquistamos”, Lula, Salvador, 24 de julho de 2013. Imagem: Jaques Wagner	6/8/13	1200	135	116

¹⁹⁴ The number of likes, comments and shares was collected at the moment of this analysis, on February 14th 2019.

"O povo quer mais? É a nossa obrigação trabalhar para que o povo tenha mais", afirmou Lula ontem, ao lado da Nobel da Paz Leymah Gbowee. Veja o vídeo da fala completa do ex-presidente:	12/9/13	1100	65	413
Acaba de ser publicado no site do New York Times o artigo (em inglês) do ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sobre as recentes manifestações ocorridas no Brasil. A íntegra do artigo em português estará disponível no site do Instituto Lula na quinta-feira (18).	16/7/13	759	89	311