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Intéressement, Actionnariat et Conflits dans l'Entreprise: Études sur Données d'Entreprises Françaises

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Dédicaces

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Intéressement, Actionnariat et Conflits dans l'Entreprise: Études sur Données d'Entreprises Françaises

Résumé:

L'idée de base des contrats incitatifs est celle de la réalisation d'intérêts communs provoquant des changements dans le comportement des salariés et l'amélioration de la performance de l'entreprise. Les résultats et les succès de l'entreprise dépendent également du climat des relations professionnelles. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière (l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. La recherche sur ces deux thèmes est d'une importance pratique et novatrice. Tout d'abord, il existe au sein de l'entreprise une multitude de types de conflits. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux conflits collectifs. Ensuite, la plupart des études sur les conflits collectifs se concentre uniquement sur les grèves, en ignorant les autres formes d'actions collectives, et très peu d'études font le lien avec les systèmes d'incitations collectives au sein de l'entreprise. Ainsi, ce travail se décompose en quatre études empiriques. La première vise à analyser les différentes formes de conflits au sein de l'entreprise. La deuxième analyse l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. La troisième étude s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Enfin, la dernière examine la performance des entreprises en fonction de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs. Nos recherches reposent sur des outils d'analyse multidimensionnelle et économétriques. L'approche multidimensionnelle fait appel à l'Analyse des Correspondances Multiples et à la Classification Hiérarchique Ascendante. L'approche économétrique fait usage de méthodes d'estimations classiques (OLS, Probit Simple, Probit Multinomial, Probit Ordonné), de modèles à sélection (Heckman), et des techniques d'estimations de modèles récursifs à équations simultanées traitant ainsi les problèmes d'endogénéité et la mixture (quantitative et qualitative) des variables dépendantes (Roodman (2011) Conditional Mixed Process).

Descripteurs: économie du travail, participation financière, intéressement, actionnariat salarié, grève, conflits du travail, résolution des conflits, syndicat, négociation, performance, économétrie appliquée, analyse multidimensionnelle

Profit Sharing, Employee Ownership and Conflicts in the Firm: Evidences from French Firms

Abstract:

The basic idea of incentive contracts is that of achieving common interests causing changes in the behavior of employees and improving firm performance. The firms' outputs and success also depend on the industrial relation climate. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership) and its links with the conflicts using data on French firms. Research on these topics is innovative and highly recommended. First, there exists within the firm a multitude of types of conflicts. We are primarily concerned with collective conflicts. Most of studies on collective conflicts focuses only on strikes, ignoring other forms of collective actions. Very few studies make the link between collective incentive schemes and collective conflicts. Thus, this work is divided into four empirical studies. The first one analyzes the different forms of conflicts within the firm. The second one analyzes the effect of financial participation on collective conflicts. The third study focuses on the impact of bargaining and financial participation on the resolution of collective conflicts. The last one examines firm's performance based on financial participation and collective conflicts. Our research is based on multidimensional analysis and econometric tools. The multidimensional approach uses the Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering. The econometric approach uses classical estimation methods (OLS, Probit, Mutinomial Probit, Ordered Pobit), selection models (Heckman), and methods estimating simultaneous and recursive equations, treating the endogeneity problems and the mixture (quantitative and qualitative) of the dependent variables (Roodman (2011) Conditional Mixed Process).

Keywords: labor economics, profit sharing, employee share ownership, strikes, labor conflicts, conflict resolution, union, negotiation, performance, applied econometric, multidimensional analysis

Principales abréviations

ACM: Analyse des Correspondances Multiples

ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution

CE: Comité d'Entreprise

CFDT: Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail

CFE-CGC: Confédération Française de l'Encadrement - Confédération Générale des Cadres

CFTC: Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens

CGT: Confédération Générale du Travail

CHSCT: Comité d'Hygiène, de Sécurité et des Conditions de Travail

CMP: Conditional Mixed Process

CRED: Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit

DARES: Direction de l'Animation de la Recherche des Etudes et des Statistiques

DSE: Direction des Statistiques d'Entreprises

EAE: Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise

ER: Employee Representative

ESO: Employee Share Ownership

ERMES: Equipe de Recherche sur les Marchés, l'Emploi et la Simulation

FO: Force Ouvrière

FP: Financial Participation

GHK: The method of Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane

IBIS: International Benchmarking of the Information Society

HAC: Hierarchical Ascendant Clustering

INSEE: L'Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques

JINT: Journées Individuelles Non Travaillées

MCA : Multiple Correspondence Analysis

MCO: Moindres Carrés Ordinaires

ML: Maximum Likelihood

MR: Management Representative

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares

PS: Profit Sharing

REPONSE: RElations PrOfessionnelles et NégociationS d'Entreprises

SIREN: Système d'Identification du Répertoire des Entreprises

SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions

WIRS: Workplace Employment Relations Study

2SLS: Two-Stage Least Squares

3SLS: Three-Stage Least Squares

Sommaire

Introduction Générale

"Nous travaillerons ensemble pour soutenir le courage là où il y a la peur, pour encourager la négociation là où il y a le conflit, et donner l'espoir là où règne le désespoir."

Nelson Mandela

Les économistes ne cessent de porter leur intérêt à l'étude de la théorie de la firme, et les pistes de recherche allant de l'étude sur les relations entre le marché et les hiérarchies (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1973), en passant par l'étude des systèmes de gouvernance et les problèmes d'agence (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Akerlof, 1984) provoqués par des conflits d'intérêt entre employeurs et employés qui composent l'entreprise. Les économistes montrent que l'un des facteurs importants affectant les changements dans l'entreprise est la structure incitative des salariés (voir Encadré 1 théorie des incitations ci-dessous).

D'une manière générale, l'incitation des salariés, source de motivation[1], recherchée par les employeurs, peut être réalisée de deux manières. La première façon est la rémunération incitative[2] dont les préoccupations concernent le salaire ou une partie du salaire. Dans ce cas, l'incitation est entièrement suscitée par des avantages économiques, symboliques ou sociaux tirés de l'activité professionnelle. La seconde manière est l'assimilation subjective par le salarié des buts de l'entreprise[3]. Il s'agit de conduire le salarié à faire siens les objectifs définis par l'employeur indépendamment des gratifications économiques et sociales qui en découlent ou des conditions de travail. L'essentiel, pour le salarié est la certitude d'être reconnu comme un facteur de la réussite collective.

[1]La motivation au travail est un phénomène qui se situe au cœur des recherches du comportement de l'entreprise. Rousseau (1990) défini la motivation au travail comme un processus qui implique la volonté de faire des efforts, d'orienter et de soutenir durablement l'énergie vers la réalisation des objectifs et de la charge du travail d'une part et d'autre part, la concrétisation de cette intention en comportement effectif, au mieux des capacités personnelles.

[2]La motivation extrinsèque qui relève des incitations extérieures (monétaires) qui peuvent amener l'individu à se motiver pour obtenir un élément extérieur au travail lui-même (Meyer-Waarden and Benavent, 2006). Ces éléments relèvent soit de la carotte (rémunération, délégation, promesses etc.), soit du bâton (surveillance, menace, sanction etc.) (Benabou and Tirole, 2003)

[3]La motivation intrinsèque qui soutient que les salariés entreprennent de nombreuses activités sans attendre une récompense extrinsèque. La motivation intrinsèque est donc considérée comme étant d'une importance majeure pour le comportement humain (voir par exemple Deci, 1971, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Ryan and Deci, 2000)

Une façon hybridant les proportions plus ou moins importantes des deux, est de faire participer les salariés aux fruits de l'entreprise. Cette façon consiste à proposer aux salariés un mécanisme d'incitation collective i.e une participation financière où une partie du salaire de l'employé est reliée à la performance de l'entreprise (un plan d'intéressement) et/ou une mise en place d'un plan d'actionnariat salarié par l'entreprise. Le modèle développé par Poole and Jenkins (1991) illustre bien l'influence de ce type d'incitation au sein de l'entreprise. Les auteurs expliquent que les entreprises mettent en place un système de participation financière dans le but de renforcer aussi bien l'engagement intrinsèque qu'extrinsèque des salariés, ce qui entraîne une amélioration de la performance économique.

Les études sur le partage du profit ont connu un regain d'intéret après les travaux de Weitzman (1984). Se plaçant dans un cadre macroéconomique, cet auteur suggère que le partage de profit pouvait conduire au plein emploi. Cependant, les études qui ont suivi ont délaissé l'aspect macroéconomique pour se focaliser sur les effets microéconomiques d'un tel dispositif incitatif. Dans cette thèse, nous nous plaçons dans un cadre microéconomique et nous étudions les effets de ce type de dispositifs incitatifs sur divers indicateurs de la performance sociale (conflits) et de la performance économique de l'entreprise (la productivité).

Plusieurs auteurs analysent les liens entre les dispositifs de participation financière, comme outils d'incitations collectives, et la performance de l'entreprise (voir Kruse et al., 2010, pour une revue). Ainsi, la participation financière conduit à des effets positifs sur la performance dans la mesure où les salariés vont ajuster leurs efforts pour maximiser leurs revenus et vont être incités à travailler de manière plus coopérative puisque c'est la performance du groupe qui compte, ce qui va permettre de réduire les coûts de monitoring (Kruse, 1993). Les salariés vont également se sentir plus engagés grâce à une meilleure communication sur la performance de l'entreprise et à une plus grande sensibilisation à l'importance de la notion de profit et d'efficacité (Blasi et al., 2008).

Les dispositifs de participation financière sont souvent plus efficaces que les incitations individuelles car ils permettent de contourner les problèmes de mesure de l'effort individuel. Selon Gibbs et al. (2009), les problèmes de mesure de l'effort liés aux incitations individuelles sont dus à la distorsion et à la manipulation de l'information. Certaines incitations individuelles telles que les primes liées à l'effort, génèrent des difficultés parce que l'évaluation de l'employé par le superviseur peut être relativement subjective, ce qui peut être

une source d'insatisfaction et de litige (Lazear, 2000). Les incitations individuelles doivent être principalement applicables à des emplois avec des caractéristiques très spécifiques car elles peuvent engendrer des problèmes quand un minimum de coopération est nécessaire au cours de l'activité de production (voir Lazear, 1989, Drago and Garvey, 1998).

Par contre, les dispositifs de participation financière peuvent faciliter davantage les relations de coopération des salariés en milieu de travail (Green and Heywood, 2010) compte tenu de la co-dépendance de leurs revenus pour chaque effort commun fourni (Drago and Turnbull, 1988). La participation financière peut accroitre la volonté des employés à "internaliser les externalités" lorsqu'ils travaillent avec des "amis proches" (Bandiera et al., 2005).

De plus, les dispositifs de participation financière permettent aux entreprises d'introduire de nouvelles technologies et d'obtenir des changements dans les règles de travail plus facilement (Cooke, 1994). L'efficacité de la participation financière dépend aussi de la capacité des salariés à instaurer et à contrôler un bon comportement collectif (Green and Heywood, 2010). En effet, les employés sont souvent mieux placés pour observer l'effort des collègues. Étant donné que la participation financière conditionne les récompenses des salariés non seulement à leur propre effort mais aussi à ceux de leur collègue, ils seront plus incités à se surveiller mutuellement afin de minimiser les comportements de "passager clandestin" (resquilleur)[4]. Ainsi, la surveillance horizontale suggérée par Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) et "la pression des pairs" pour Kandel and Lazear (1992) permettent aux employés de coopérer, de détecter et de prendre des mesures contre les resquilleurs (Freeman, 2010), ce qui réduit l'intensité du contrôle vertical tout en augmentant l'autonomie des employés.

Encadré 1 : La théorie des incitations

La théorie des incitations suppose d'une manière générale que les employés ne fournissent pas un effort maximum. Par conséquent, afin d'inciter les employés à fournir plus d'effort, les employeurs doivent fournir des incitations externes. Ainsi, la mise en place d'incitation implique que des employés supportent une partie du risque aléatoire sur les revenus présents et futurs. L'enjeu est donc pour les employeurs de concilier risque et incitation en proposant un contrat efficace dans lequel les coûts engendrés par la prise de risque soient compensés par les gains générés par les mesures incitatives.

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[4]Il pourrait être meilleur pour un employé isolé de ne pas contribuer à l'effort collectif, mais ce dernier vient finalement profiter des gains de cet effort collectif.

... Encadré 1 continued

La théorie des incitations

Cependant, l'objectif est d'inciter les employés à adopter un comportement conforme aux souhaits de l'employeur (Prendergast, 1999).

L'appareil théorique utilisé est le modèle standard principal-agent où généralement une seule partie, le principal, possède tout le pouvoir de négociation et l'autre partie, l'agent, a une information supérieure au sujet des déterminants importants de la production tels que son effort et/ou sa productivité.

En général, dans le modèle standard de la théorie des incitations, les décisions de l'employeur (le principal) et de l'employé (l'agent) se prennent selon les étapes suivantes :

- Etape 1 : L'employeur décide d'une structure de rémunération qui maximise son profit.
- Etape 2 : L'employé décide de travailler ou non selon la structure de rémunération choisie par l'entreprise.
- Etape 3 : L'employé décide de l'effort fourni au travail étant donnée la structure de rémunération choisie par l'employeur.

Évidemment, il n'est pas possible pour l'employeur d'observer, à un coût minime, l'effort fourni par les employés. Selon Williamson (1973), les individus sont supposés être opportunistes, parce qu'ils sont prêts à tricher en vue de satisfaire au mieux leur propre intérêt. Puisque l'agent est supposé posséder des informations qui ne sont pas connues du principal, le problème à résoudre consiste à expliciter comment le principal peut concevoir un système de rémunération (en procédant par contrat) qui peut inciter un autre individu (l'agent) à agir dans son intérêt. Cependant, il ne permet pas de connaître les véritables préférences de l'agent lors de la délégation. Par conséquent, il a pour intérêt de susciter, en quelque sorte, des informations sur ces préférences. Le principal étudie la façon de construire un mécanisme, à savoir un système décisionnel de génération d'information et un système de transfert. Le but pour le principal est de se rendre compte d'une décision rationnelle pour chaque agent à révéler ses véritables préférences et à donner des signaux qui fournissent une base suffisante, pour lui, afin de prendre des décisions. La difficulté est que l'agent peut donner des faux signaux au sujet de ses préférences dans la tentative de manipuler le principal afin de gagner le transfert maximum.

Dans les modèles standards de l'aléa moral (Laffont and Martimort, 2002), les incitations pour exercer un niveau d'effort approprié sont livrées en liant la rémunération de l'agent à sa performance. Généralement, les systèmes de récompense analysés dans les modèles théoriques sont des fonctions linéaires de la performance. Lorsque la production est parfaitement observable, comme dans le cas d'un résultat monétaire, la valeur de la production fournit un indicateur parfait de l'effort de l'agent, donc payer un individu à la pleine valeur de sa production va induire le niveau d'effort "Pareto optimal". Lorsque l'output dépend aussi de certaines composantes aléatoires, le principal n'est pas en mesure de déduire l'effort de l'agent avec précision. Si l'agent a une aversion au risque, le régime optimal implique des incitations moins fortes. Le système de récompense est constitué d'un terme constant - une prime de risque - pour compenser l'agent pour le risque intrinsèque du processus de production et une récompense marginale proportionnelle à l'output produit, qui mesure l'intensité du système d'incitation.

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... Encadré 1 continued

La théorie des incitations
Ce modèle est également utilisé par de nombreuses études existantes telles que celles de Baron and Myerson (1982), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Laffont and Martimort (2002).

En général, la réglementation en matière de participation financière implique fortement la négociation collective dans la mesure où ces dispositifs sont nécessairement mis en place par voie d'accord conclu entre les employeurs et les employés. Dans cette perspective, cela suggère un changement dans la nature de leur relation. Ce changement peut aboutir soit à une amélioration du climat de travail soit, au contraire, à une dégradation du climat de travail pouvant aboutir aux conflits.

Le conflit est certainement l'un des phénomènes majeurs dans l'entreprise. Tandis que les uns le considèrent comme une situation, d'autres le considèrent comme un type de comportement. Baron (1990), après avoir examiné un certain nombre de définitions du conflit, conclu que bien que les définitions ne sont pas identiques, elles se chevauchent en ce qui concerne les éléments suivants : (1) le conflit comprend des intérêts opposés entre les individus ou les groupes dans une situation à somme nulle, (2) ces intérêts opposés doivent être reconnus pour que les conflits existent, (3) le conflit implique que les intérêts d'une partie vont déjouer les intérêts de l'autre partie, (4) Le conflit est un processus qui se développe à partir des relations existantes entre les individus ou les groupes et reflète leurs interactions passées et les contextes dans lesquels ils ont pris place, (5) les mesures prises par une partie peuvent contrecarrer les objectifs de l'autre.

Des théories classiques aux approches les plus récentes, la place accordée par les différents auteurs à la problématique du conflit au sein de l'analyse économique traditionnelle a subi de diverses transformations. Pendant que certains niaient son existence, d'autres le considéraient comme néfaste. Actuellement, les conflits dans l'entreprise sont considérés comme inévitables et ne sont pas toujours jugés indésirables. Rousseau (1990) souligne que "le conflit n'a de caractère positif que s'il est résolu pour certains, prévenus pour d'autres, maîtrisés pour tous" (page 7). Trois différentes visions émergent en ce qui concerne la prise en compte des conflits dans l'entreprise (voir Robbins, 1974).

La première vison concerne celle des théoriciens classiques (Fayol, 1947, Taylor, 1957, Weber, 1978). Ces théoriciens de l'entreprise semblaient négliger les différents impacts que

peuvent avoir les conflits dans l'entreprise[5]. Ces auteurs considéraient l'entreprise comme un tout intégré dans lequel le conflit constitue une menace pour son existence. Ils ont prescrit des structures organisationnelles mécanistes avec des lignes claires de l'autorité, des structures hiérarchiques, une division du travail, etc., qui favoriseraient l'harmonie et la coopération. Ils ont implicitement supposé que le conflit était préjudiciable à l'efficacité de l'entreprise et devrait donc être réduit au minimum. Cette approche de la gestion des entreprises est fondée sur l'hypothèse que l'harmonie, la coopération et l'absence de conflit étaient appropriées pour atteindre l'efficacité.

La deuxième vision est celle des béhavioristes et peut être décrite comme la reconnaissance que le conflit est inévitable dans les entreprises (March and Simon, 1958, Cyert et al., 1963, Pondy, 1967). Les béhavioristes acceptent la présence des conflits et même parfois préconisent leur amélioration pour augmenter l'efficacité organisationnelle. Mais, ils n'ont pas activement analysé les conditions qui génèrent des conflits dans les entreprises. March and Simon (1958) définissent le conflit dans leur analyse comme étant un phénomène déviant à une structure normale de l'entreprise. Si les études des béhavioristes ont le grand avantage de montrer la nécessité de reconnaître l'existence des conflits dans l'entreprise, elles ne mentionnent pas la nécessité de reconnaître la normalité des conflits, ni surtout leur éventuelle utilité.

La troisième vision est celle des intégrationnistes (Whyte, 1967, Putnam and Poole, 1987, Rahim, 2010) qui diffère sensiblement des deux précédentes. Pour ces auteurs, le conflit est un ingrédient indispensable de la vie de l'entreprise. Cette vision est caractérisée par les éléments suivants : (1) la reconnaissance de la nécessité absolue des conflits, (2) l'encouragement explicite à l'opposition, (3) définir la gestion des conflits afin d'inclure les méthodes de résolution, (4) considérant la gestion du conflit comme une responsabilité majeure de tous les administrateurs. Whyte (1967) souligne que l'harmonie est un objectif souhaitable pour le bon fonctionnement d'une organisation. L'objectif ne doit pas être seulement de construire une entreprise harmonieuse, mais de construire une entreprise capable de reconnaître les problèmes auxquels elle est confrontée et le développement des

[5]Parmi les théoriciens de l'organisation classique, Follett (1926/1940) a été une exception notable. Son comportement à forte orientation de gestion et d'organisation dans les années 1920 l'a placé de plusieurs décennies d'avance sur son temps. Elle a noté la valeur du conflit constructif dans une organisation. Elle a fermement défendu la nécessité d'une intégration, celle de la résolution de problèmes comme une méthode de gestion des conflits organisationnels.

moyens permettant de les résoudre. Puisque les conflits sont une partie inévitable de la vie des entreprises, il est important que les procédures de résolution de conflits soient intégrées dans leur conception.

Le conflit au sein de l'entreprise tel qu'il est actuellement, est considéré comme légitime, inévitable et dans certaines conditions essentiel à la performance des entreprises. Dans cette perspective, deux hypothèses théoriques émergent en ce qui concerne le lien entre les conflits et la performance. Les partisans de la première hypothèse soulignent que le conflit est la principale source de stress et diminue la productivité de tous les managers et les employés d'une entreprise. En effet, pour ces auteurs, le conflit se termine presque toujours par affecter la qualité des produits ou des services (McDonald, 1972, Sexton, 1996). Ces auteurs estiment que les coûts liés aux conflits, notamment les grèves, peuvent à un moment donné, dépasser les coûts supportables par l'entreprise ce qui peut compromettre leur survie. Cependant, les partisans de la deuxième hypothèse soulignent qu'il est non seulement impossible d'éliminer les conflits au sein de l'entreprise, mais aussi le fait que les employeurs tentent d'éliminer tous les conflits peut entraîner des répercussions négatives sur la productivité à long terme de l'entreprise (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Rahim, 2010). Pour ces auteurs, le conflit peut être positif, car il peut conduire à la formation et à la création de solutions pour les employés où la réalisation effective des objectifs de l'entreprise qui auparavant, n'aurait pas été possible.

Plan de thèse

L'idée de base des contrats incitatifs est celle de la réalisation d'intérêts communs provoquant des changements dans le comportement des salariés et l'amélioration de la performance de l'entreprise. Les résultats et les succès de l'entreprise dépendent également du climat des relations professionnelles. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. La recherche sur ces deux thèmes est d'une importance pratique et novatrice. Tout d'abord, il existe au sein de l'entreprise une multitude de types de conflits. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux conflits collectifs. Ensuite, la plupart des études sur les conflits collectifs se concentre uniquement sur les

grèves, en ignorant les autres formes d'actions collectives, et très peu d'études font le lien avec les systèmes d'incitations collectives au sein de l'entreprise. Ainsi, ce constat soulève plusieurs questions : Existe t-il une forme de conflit ou doit-on parler de plusieurs formes de conflits en fonction de la nature et des thèmes de conflits dans les entreprises ? Quelles est l'influence de la participation financière (ainsi que celle des conflits individuels) sur les conflits collectifs ? La participation financière participe t-elle à la résolution des conflits collectifs ? La participation financière et les conflits collectifs affectent-ils la performance des entreprises ?

Ces questions sont traitées autour de quatre chapitres correspondant chacun à une étude empirique distincte[6]. Le premier chapitre vise à analyser les différentes formes de conflits au sein de l'entreprise. Le deuxième chapitre analyse l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Enfin, le chapitre quatre examine la performance des entreprises en fonction de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs.

Chapitre 1 : Analyse des Différentes Formes de Conflits

Le premier chapitre de cette thèse à pour objectif de rappeler le contexte des conflits de travail en France avant d'éclairer le débat sur le lien pouvant exister entre les conflits collectifs et individuels grâce à une rétrospective des travaux de recherche existants. Ensuite, nous mettons en évidence une typologie des entreprises en fonction des formes de conflits collectifs d'une part et d'autre part de conflits individuels.

Le volet représentant de direction de l'enquête REPONSE (2008-2010) renseigne sur deux familles de conflits : les conflits collectifs et les conflits individuels. Huit formes de conflits collectifs sont proposées dans le questionnaire. Nous distinguons d'une part les conflits collectifs avec arrêt de travail (les débrayages, les grèves de moins de deux jours, les grèves de deux jours et plus) et d'autre part, les conflits sans arrêt de travail (les grèves perlées, les grèves de zèle, les refus d'heures supplémentaires, les manifestations et enfin

[6] A part le chapitre un, chaque chapitre de la thèse constitue un papier de recherche autonome. Par ailleurs, les principaux résultats obtenus (notamment dans les chapitres un et deux) avec l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010 sont conformes à ceux obtenus avec celle de 2002-2004

les pétitions).

En ce qui concerne les conflits individuels, six formes sont proposées dans le questionnaire : les conflits individuels liés à des mesures disciplinaires prises par l'entreprise (les avertissements, les mis à pieds, les licenciements pour faute, les rétrogradations et les démissions) et le recours aux prud'hommes lorsque l'employé pense qu'une action disciplinaire est inacceptable.

Nous faisons le choix d'utiliser les méthodes d'analyses multidimensionnelles pour réaliser cette typologie : l'Analyse des Correspondances Multiples (ACM) et la Classification Hiérarchique Ascendante (CHA). Ces deux méthodes nous ont permis d'établir les probables proximités entre les entreprises en fonction des formes de conflits qu'elles ont connues (les conflits individuels d'une part et d'autre part les conflits collectifs).

Notre typologie se compose de cinq groupes d'entreprises pour les conflits collectifs (allant de sans conflits aux conflits avec des arrêts de travail de longues durées), et de quatre groupes d'entreprises pour les conflits individuels (allant de sans conflits individuels à tous les conflits individuels). Nous nous basons sur cette typologie dans le cadre de l'étude des conflits collectifs dans le deuxième et le quatrième chapitre.

Chapitre 2 : Participation Financière et Conflits Collectifs

Le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. Nous examinons plus spécifiquement, l'effet de l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié sur les conflits collectifs dans les entreprises françaises.

La plupart des études empiriques montrent que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié améliorent la productivité de l'entreprise (Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Kruse et al., 2010), augmentent les salaires et rendent le marché de l'emploi plus stable (Kruse, 1998, Kruse et al., 2010), réduisent l'absentéisme (Brown et al., 1999, Wilson and Peel, 1991), et participent à la stabilité de l'emploi dans l'entreprise (Wilson and Peel, 1991, Azfar and Danninger, 2001, Fakhfakh, 2004). Mais aucune étude ne fait de liens avec les conflits, surtout lorsque ceux-ci sont collectifs. Par ailleurs, il est reconnu que la participation financière rend les employés plus sensibles aux objectifs de l'entreprise. Cela peut générer un

changement dans l'attitude et le comportement des employés. Ainsi, partant du postulat que la participation financière permet d'aligner les intérêts des employés et des employeurs, certains auteurs n'hésitent pas à mettre en relation la participation financière et les conflits.

Cable and Fitzroy (1980) soulignent que la participation financière peut transformer fondamentalement l'atmosphère dans l'entreprise en réduisant le conflit traditionnel entre les employés et les employeurs. Kruse (1996), quant à lui, souligne que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié sont promus pour leur potentiel à réduire les conflits en milieu de travail en améliorant la performance des entreprises.

Cependant, d'autres auteurs prennent une position un peu prudente. Kelly and Kelly (1991) soulignent que la participation financière ne permet d'améliorer les relations entre les employeurs et les employés que s'il y a une réelle confiance i.e que si les employés sentent qu'ils sont traités équitablement dans l'entreprise et sont susceptibles d'avoir des informations concernant les bénéfices de l'entreprise. Cette vison est aussi partagée par Wadhwani and Wall (1990).

A notre connaissance, seulement deux études empiriques (Heywood et al., 2005, Cramton et al., 2010)[7] se sont penchées sur ces questions et ont montré que la participation financière réduit la survenance globale des conflits. Cependant, non seulement aucune de ces deux études n'a considéré conjointement l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié (l'intéressement pour Heywood et al. (2005) et l'actionnariat salarié Cramton et al. (2010)) mais, aussi, elles se sont plus axées sur les conflits individuels employé-employeur que sur les conflits collectifs dans toutes ces formes.

Ainsi, l'une des nouveautés de cette analyse empirique est justement de considérer conjointement l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié comme des facteurs possibles pouvant expliquer la baisse de la probabilité de survenance des conflits collectifs dans l'entreprise. Nous complétons cette analyse (en guise de test de robustesse) en prenant aussi en compte les conflits individuels[8]. Plusieurs études analysant les conflits montrent que les conflits individuels conduisent à des conflits collectifs (Klaas et al., 1991, Lewin and

[7]Nous pouvons ajouter une troisième étude Stévenot and Guery (2013) qui analyse le lien entre l'intéressement et le climat social à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. Les auteurs montrent que l'intéressement influence positivement le climat social, sans pour autant faire un lien direct entre climat social et conflits collectifs dans l'entreprise

[8]Les liens entre les conflits individuels et les conflits collectifs sont discutés dans le premier chapitre

Peterson, 1999, Dixon et al., 2004). Cependant, d'autres études montrent que les conflits individuels sont des substitues aux conflits collectifs (Ozaki et al., 1988, Sapsford and Turnbull, 1994, Hebdon and Stern, 1998, Jefferys, 2011).

Ces arguments contradictoires à travers la littérature empirique nous permettent ainsi d'examiner la manière selon laquelle les conflits individuels affectent les conflits collectifs (complémentarité ou substitution) d'une part, et d'autre part de tester la manière dont les effets de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs peuvent varier lorsque les conflits individuels sont pris en compte[9].

Nous exploitons dans ce chapitre la richesse statistique du volet représentant de la direction de l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010. Nous nous basons sur la typologie (réalisée dans le premier chapitre) des entreprises en fonction des conflits collectifs qu'elles déclarent avoir connus. Nous décidons de construire une mesure exclusive et multi-catégorielle qui reflète la gravité des types de conflit. Cette mesure va de "Strong conflits" (les grèves de deux jours et plus), "Less strong conflict" (les débrayages et les grèves de moins de deux jours), "Overtime" (les refus d'heures supplémentaires), "Petition" (pétitions) au "No conflict" (les entreprises sans conflit collectif). Nous utilisons l'approche proposée par Roodman (2011) pour contrôler l'endogénéité de l'intéressement et de l'actionnariat salarié afin d'expliquer les déterminants de chaque catégorie de conflit collectif[10].

Nous montrons surtout que participation financière (l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) participe significativement à la réduction des "Strong conflits" (conflits avec les grèves de deux jours ou plus). La participation financière est également un outil efficace contre les "Overtime" (les refus d'heures supplémentaires) en particulier lorsque les heures supplémentaires sont considérées comme un moyen augmentant la productivité de l'entreprise. Par ailleurs, la participation financière augmente la probabilité de l'émergence des "Less strong conflit" (les débrayages et les grèves de moins de deux jours) et aussi la probabilité de l'émergence des pétitions.

La prise en compte des conflits individuels (en plus de la participation financière) nous

[9]Nous retenons quatre confits individuels : trois liés à des mesures disciplinaires (les avertissements, les mis à pieds, les licenciements) et le recours aux prud'hommes lorsque l'employé pense qu'une action disciplinaire est inacceptable.

[10]Pour donner plus de robustesse à nos résultats, nous contrôlons aussi l'endogénéité pour les conflits individuels.

amène à conclure qu'il semble exister davantage une relation de complémentarité entre les conflits collectifs et les conflits individuels en France qu'une relation de substitution.

Chapitre 3 : Négociation, Participation Financière et Résolution des Conflits Collectifs

Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Une autre originalité de cette thèse est qu'aucune étude empirique n'a examiné cette question sur les données françaises.

La littérature sur la résolution des conflits collectifs est beaucoup alimentée par des travaux anglo-saxons et est principalement basée sur les modes alternatifs de résolution de conflits collectifs et la complémentarité entre ces modes : la négociation, la médiation (ou la conciliation) et l'arbitrage.

La procédure de négociation porte sur les efforts déployés par les employeurs et les représentants des employés (généralement le syndicat) pour résoudre les conflits eux-mêmes sans intervention d'un tiers (Lewicki et al., 1999). La procédure de négociation, en cas de succès, est clairement l'approche la plus efficace et la moins coûteuse dans la résolution des conflits dans l'entreprise. Elle permet aux employeurs et aux employés d'obtenir des solutions plus intégrées, à savoir des solutions gagnant-gagnant (Harinck et al., 2000). Toutefois, la procédure de négociation ne parvient pas toujours à résoudre tous les conflits. Les différences de pouvoir de négociation peuvent exister dans un conflit (le pouvoir peut être du côté de l'employeur ou de celui des employés). Dans ce cas, la procédure ne garantit pas à la partie qui a peu ou pas de pouvoir de négociation (Bendersky, 2007).

En cas d'échec, la procédure de négociation entre les employeurs et les employés peut évoluer vers une approche plus interactive de la résolution des conflits, nécessitant l'intervention d'un tiers, c'est à dire que la résolution du conflit peut être soumise soit à la procédure de médiation (conciliation) soit à la procédure d'arbitrage[11] (en cas d'échec de la procédure de médiation). Cependant, la médiation et l'arbitrage ont très peu de place dans

[11]Selon Le Flanchec and Rojot (2010), la différence entre les procédures de médiation et d'arbitrage est que l'arbitre a le pouvoir de décider après avoir entendu les parties (la prise de décisions), tandis que le médiateur aide seulement les parties à parvenir à un accord (même si les parties restent libres de consentir)

le système français de relations professionnelles, contrairement à d'autres pays de l'Europe et des pays d'Amérique du Nord (Le Flanchec and Rojot, 2010). L'une des principales raisons est que la médiation et l'arbitrage sont des procédures facultatives en France.

Par ailleurs, la littérature anglo-saxonne souligne que le non-recours aux procédures de médiation et d'arbitrage peut être imputé à la présence de la participation financière au sein de l'entreprise (Hammer, 1988, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991, Colvin, 2004). Plusieurs arguments ont été avancés pour expliquer pourquoi les programmes de participation des employés peuvent réduire les conflits et l'utilisation des procédures alternatives de résolution des conflits (i.e la médiation et l'arbitrage).

Un élément central est que les dispositifs de participation financière donnent aux employés des gains aussi bien intrinsèques qu'extrinsèques. Ces gains permettent aux employés d'adopter un comportement plus coopératif, en améliorant leur productivité et les relations du travail (Cable and Fitzroy, 1980, Hammer, 1988, Kruse, 1996). Cette amélioration des relations de travail suppose que les employés sont en mesure de résoudre eux-mêmes quelques problèmes de façon informelle, ce qui permet d'augmenter leur satisfaction à l'issue du conflit. Cable and Fitzroy (1980) soulignent que la participation financière peut transformer fondamentalement l'atmosphère de l'entreprise en réduisant le conflit traditionnel entre les employés et les employeurs.

En outre, en adoptant les dispositifs de participation financière, l'entreprise indique qu'elle apprécie la contribution des employés (Allen et al., 2003, Pendleton and Robinson, 2011), qui à son tour améliore l'engagement lié à l'entreprise (Mayer and Schoorman, 1998, Park et al., 2010). Cela peut augmenter le sentiment d'auto-efficacité des employés, ce qui rend plus facile l'acceptation du changement organisationnel et donne une meilleure structure pour résoudre les conflits du travail (Hammer, 1988, Alper et al., 1998).

La conclusion qui se dégage de ces arguments est que cet effet de réduction des conflits, à son tour, permet de réduire le taux global d'utilisation des procédures de résolution des conflits. Cependant, ces discussions n'ont pas été associées à une réelle analyse empirique. La résolution des conflits collectifs implique fortement la négociation tandis que la participation financière favorise le dialogue, donc la négociation. Il est alors pertinent d'analyser conjointement l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs.

Afin de bien mener cette analyse empirique, nous combinons l'information fournie par le volet représentant de direction et celui du personnel de l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010 pour ainsi confronter les points de vue. Quant à la résolution des conflits, nous retenons la satisfaction à l'issue du conflit en fonction des thèmes qui ont provoqué le conflit collectif en France afin d'analyser la résolution des conflits. Nous nous inspirons de l'approche d'estimation proposée par Heckman (1978) (voir Greene and Hensher, 2010) et celle de Roodman (2011) pour respectivement contrôler la sélection (due à l'absence des entreprises sans conflit) et l'endogénéité de la participation financière.

Au-delà des différences de perception entre les représentants de direction et ceux des employés, les résultats mettent en évidence que l'existence des négociations sur les thèmes comme le salaire, l'emploi et l'égalité professionnelle homme-femme n'engendre pas de satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif. Par contre, les programmes de participation des employés influencent positivement la satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif.

Chapitre 4 : Participation Financière, Conflits Collectifs et Performance de l'Entreprise

Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse analyse l'impact de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs sur la performance des entreprises françaises et constitue l'une des originalités de cette thèse.

La participation financière tels que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié ont reçu une grande attention dans la littérature (pour un survey voir Kruse et al., 2010). Kruse (1996) suggère que la participation financière a des effets positifs sur la performance de l'entreprise dans la mesure où les employés vont ajuster leurs efforts pour maximiser leur revenu et être encouragés à collaborer davantage. Plusieurs études analysent l'impact de l'introduction de la participation financière et leurs relations avec la coopération et la productivité des employés. Cependant, la grande majorité de ces études montrent que la participation financière améliore la performance de l'entreprise (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987, Cable and Wilson, 1990, Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Burgess et al., 2010, Williams, 2016).

Hormis son caractère à encourager les employés à l'effort et à la coopération, la partici-

pation financière est montrée par certains auteurs comme un mécanisme pouvant réduire les conflits dans les entreprises (Heywood et al., 2005, Cramton et al., 2010). Cable and Fitzroy (1980) suggèrent que la participation financière peut transformer fondamentalement l'atmosphère du lieu de travail en réduisant le conflit traditionnel entre les employés et les employeurs. Kruse (1996) souligne que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié sont tous deux connus pour leur potentiel à réduire les conflits en milieu de travail tout en améliorant la performance des entreprises.

La littérature empirique (principalement anglo-saxonne) a en effet des résultats mitigés en ce qui concerne l'impact des conflits collectifs sur les performances des entreprises. Bien que certaines études montrent qu'un niveau modéré de conflit (principalement la grève) au sein de l'entreprise peut améliorer les performances dans certaines circonstances (Knight, 1989, Tanguy, 2015), d'autres travaux indiquent que les conflits (principalement la grève) entravent la performance des entreprises (Neumann and Reder, 1984, Becker and Olson, 1986, Davidson et al., 1988, Naples, 1988, Kramer and Vasconcellos, 1996, McHugh, 1991, Schmidt and Berri, 2004). D'autres études empiriques s'intéressant aux effets indirects des conflits, montrent que les conflits collectifs (notamment les grèves) affectent négativement la performance propre à l'entreprise, mais positivement la performance des entreprises concurrentes (De Fusco and Fuess, 1991, McDonald and Bloch, 1999).

Nous proposons dans ce chapitre un appariement du volet représentant de la direction de l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010 avec l'enquête FARE 2008 afin d'analyser empiriquement la performance des entreprises françaises. La valeur ajoutée est retenue comme mesure objective de la performance des entreprises. Elle est souvent utilisée pour mesurer la productivité d'une entreprise, en dehors de l'acquisition de matières premières et avant toutes opérations d'amortissements ou de provisions. Une fonction de production à deux inputs (capital et travail) est alors suggérée pour mesurer les effets de la productivité des différentes variables retenues.

Nous menons aussi une analyse complémentaire de l'effet de la participation et des conflits collectifs en s'appuyant sur une mesure subjective de la performance. Cette mesure de la performance correspond à la perception subjective du représentant de direction, de la rentabilité de l'entreprise par rapport à ces principaux concurrents. Dans les deux cas, nous utilisons l'approche d'estimation proposée par Roodman (2011) pour contrôler l'endogénéité de la participation financière ainsi que chaque catégorie de conflit collectif

(en se servant de la typologie des entreprises réalisée dans le premier chapitre).

Les résultats d'estimations mettent en évidence que l'effet positif de la participation financière sur la performance des entreprises françaises n'est pas affecté par la présence des conflits collectifs. Ainsi, l'existence des plans d'actionnariat salarié et d'intéressement augmente significativement la performance, ce qui suggère que les entreprises françaises peuvent faire appel à ce type d'incitation afin d'améliorer leur performance. Les résultats révèlent également que tous les conflits collectifs ne portent pas atteinte à la performance des entreprises françaises, certains participent à l'amélioration de la productivité de l'entreprise.

Encadré 2 : L'approche de Roodman pour les modèles récursifs mixtes Conditional Mixed Process

La principale méthodologie économétrique utilisée dans cette thèse fait appel aux systèmes d' équations simultanées. Notre système d'équations simultanées est récursif. Dans ce cas particulier de système d'équations avec variables dépendantes qualitatives, nous ne pouvons plus utiliser les techniques d'estimation standard (2SLS, 3SLS) puisque notre but est de trouver des probabilités conditionnelles plutôt que des relations linéaires.
Amemiya (1978) a déjà établi certaines propriétés de l'estimateur en deux étapes dans le cas de deux équations avec une variable endogène entrant dans la deuxième équation comme exogène. Greene (2003) a également suggéré cette estimation en deux étapes comme estimateur efficace. Roodman (2011) généralise cette procédure d'estimation en deux étapes pour le cas où un grand nombre de variables endogènes ne sont pas toutes quantitatives. Le modèle doit être alors récursif pour permettre l'estimation.
Le modèle structurel est ainsi estimé par la technique d'estimation développée par Roodman (2011) qui présente un avantage supplémentaire puisqu'elle permet de résoudre des cas inévitables de variables endogènes qualitatives parmi les variables explicatives.
La commande "cmp" a été suggérée par Roodman (2011) sous Stata pour estimer les modèles mixtes à processus récursif.
"Mixed Process" signifie que les différentes équations peuvent avoir différents types de variables dépendantes (types de réponse). Les modèles disponibles sont : les modèles classiques de régression linéaire, Tobit, Intervalle Censuré, Probit, Probit Ordonné, le Probit Multinomial etc.
Il convient également de noter que le CMP est basé sur le maximum de vraisemblance (utilisant une méthode de simulation) et par conséquent il partage tous les avantages associés à l'estimation ML. En outre, l'approche CMP a l'avantage d'être asymptotiquement plus efficace que toutes les autres méthodes d'estimation (Roodman, 2011).

1 Analysis of the Different Forms of Conflicts

1.1 Introduction

In France, the main indicator of labor conflicts is the number of working days not worked per employee called "JINT"[1]. However, labor conflict measured through "JINT" often obscures other forms of conflict, because it reduces the apprehension of conflict in the only legal definition of a strike i.e "collective cessation of work" (other forms of collective protest are excluded) (Beroud et al., 2008*b*). Thus, according to DARES, in 2005 there were about 164 days lost per 1000 employees. In 2011, this figure was 77 days lost per 1000 employees. Although statistics show a significant reduction of strikes between 2005 and 2011 probably due to crisis, it does not mean that we are seeing only a decline of strikes[2]. We are also witnessing a transformation of strikes to other forms of conflict (Beroud et al., 2008*b*, Howell, 2009).

Most of the existing quantitative literature analyses conflicts, taking into account only one type of conflicts, which is the strike and ignoring all other forms of collective conflicts. Strike is not only the most visible form of conflicts but it also represents the most severe form in terms of a cessation of work, of production or services. However, in addition to the strike, there are other forms of collective that employees adopt to show their displeasure

[1] "Journées Individuelles Non Travaillées". This measure is calculated by multiplying the number of days of strike by the strikers. A critical work conducted by Beroud et al. (2008*b*) shows the importance of the underestimation of labor conflicts generated by the "JINT"

[2] The decrease of conflicts is found in most industrialized countries, mainly due to the deteriorating economic situation in these countries (Amadieu and Rojot, 1996)

and discordance to their employers. Sapsford and Turnbull (1994) emphasize that models dealing with conflicts should have at least three characteristics: individual or collective nature, attention to collective bargaining institutions in the firm, and finally the strike is not the only form of conflict in the firm.

However, it should be noted that the conflicts can be approached in many ways. Faced to the importance of this literature, we orient our analysis on two points. First, we consider conflict from the time it is manifested, unlike some studies consider when it is latent. Second, we restrict our analysis to the level of employee-manager conflicts. There are two families of employee-manager conflicts in the firm: individual conflicts concerning individual employees and collective conflicts[3].

Since there are many kind of conflicts, it is difficult to study all forms of conflicts separately. The reason is some of them are very rare and some conflicts are related. In this chapter, we explore the patterns among the different forms of conflicts and categorize conflicts into different clusters, using the REPONSE (2008-2010) survey. We use multidimensional analysis methods, which are the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) and hierarchical ascendant clustering (HAC) to achieve the typology. This typology serves us in the second and fourth chapter where our studies will focus on collective conflicts.

The chapter is organized as follow: in the second section, we present a literature review to understand the context of labor conflicts in France before to open the debate on the possible links between collective and individual conflicts with a retrospective of existing research. In the third section, we present the data used. We then analyze in the fourth and fifth section, the different types of conflicts that firms have experienced (collective and individual conflicts) as well as the main characteristics of these firms using clustering techniques. Some concluding and remarks are presented at the end of this chapter.

[3]Collective conflicts may be localized or generalized. According to Beroud et al. (2008*b*) a conflict is considered localized when the call for strike concerns only one or more establishments of the same firm. Whereas a conflict is considered generalized when the call for strike concerns many establishments.

1.2 Workplace Conflicts

In this section, we present first a literature review to understand the context of labor conflicts in France. We then open the discussion on the possible links between collective and individual conflicts with a retrospective of existing research.

1.2.1 Industrial Relation in the French Context

In France most of collective conflicts are triggered on union initiative, (as indicated by the Ministry of Labor statistics). French syndicalism turns out to be, a minority phenomenon in firms. Until the late 1970s, nearly one over three employees were unionized in France. Currently, the unionization rate for French employees is one of the lowest of all OECD countries, falling below 8% since 2000 (7.7% in 2013 according to OECD statistics; Figure 1.1 and 1.2). (Andolfatto and Labbé, 2006) points out that this low unionization of workers can be explained, among other things, by a typically French tradition of unions to recruit employees primarily activists and also by the low incentive for French employees to join a union.

Unlike other countries (e.g USA or UK) whose membership in a union is sometimes a necessary condition for employment in the firm, French employees have no obligation to join a union[4]. Thus, French workers have a little incentive to unionize because the terms and conditions negotiated between the unions and the employers applies to all employees, whether unionized or not. Thus, these provisions explained conversely, that the coverage by collective agreements is particularly high in France (see also Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2009), Tanguy (2013)).

However, it is not provided that the power of the union in French firms should be underestimated. According to Laroche (2015), the situation in France is hardly comparable to that of Anglo-Saxon countries where only union members benefit from the signed agreements. For the author, the decline in union density in France is therefore does not

[4]The preamble to the Constitution of 27 October 1946, induces two principles that structure social relations in France: "(1) Any man or woman can defend his rights and interests through trade union action and join the union of their choice. (2) The right to strike is exercised within the laws which regulate it."

have the same consequences as in the US for example.

Figure 1.1: Evolution of unionization rate in France (1965-2014)



Source: OECD 2015

Until the passage of the law of August/20/2008, only five unions (CGT, FO, CFTC, CFDT, CFE-CGC) were considered representative, which gave them the right to appoint any employee consent as a steward in firm with more than 50 employees. These five French trade union confederations enjoyed an irrefutable presumption of representativeness. They therefore did not have to prove their representativeness, which was assumed in the order of March/31/1966 complementing the decision of April/8/1948. Only employees designated by one of the five unions automatically had a right to negotiate with the employer, regardless of the actual level of representativeness of the union in the firm. So other unions should attest to their representativeness to be recognized as a partner of public authorities or firms. In firms with fewer than 50 employees, proxying is possible.

Until 2004, the signature of one union was enough for an agreement to be applied to the entire firm or the establishment concerned. This allowed firms to avoid negotiations with some opposition unions by giving priority to other trade unions which were likely to sign the agreements (even if they were in the minority). The results of these negotiations were fragile and often encourage the protesters unions, which did not sign the agreements,

Figure 1.2: Unionization rate in France and OECD Countries (1990-2014)



Source: OECD 2015

to express their dissatisfaction through conflict (Laroche, 2015). The laws of May/4/2004 and of August/20/2008[5] establish that an agreement is only valid if it is signed by one or more unions obtained more than 30% of the vote in professional elections and no right to object is exercised.

Recent developments in terms of trade union action in France clearly shows the rise of negotiations at firm level and the decline in the conflict. However, before collective bargaining was largely driven by branch agreements, but nowadays, collective bargaining is organized mostly at the firm or the establishment level. Laroche (2015) highlights two main reasons explain this evolution: the first is that each firm has its own constraints and has to make specific strategic choices and the second is that the balance of power between social partners is more favorable to employers.

In the absence of union representatives, it is possible to reach an agreement with elected officials: staff delegates, members of the Works Council (CE), members of the committee on health, safety and working conditions (CHSCT). However, union representatives are the only employee representatives to have the right to bargain with the employer. Elected

[5]The law of August 2008 also established that 10% of the employee votes is required for a union to be recognized as representative in the firm.

officials essentially have the right to information and consultation within the firm. In practice, however, the delegates of the staff and union representatives are often provided by the same people in the firm.

1.2.2 Links Between Collective and Individual Conflicts

Several studies have attempted to examine the relationship between individual and collective forms of conflict. For Gall (2013), "the simple framework for understanding relationship among various forms of conflict has been developed based upon the exit-voice model by Hirschman". Hirschman (1970) argues that, in a situation of dissatisfaction within a firm, the employees have two possible reactions. The first is "exit" (p.34), i.e the employees will leave the employment relationship and the second is the "voice", i.e the employees attempt to explain their opinions in order to affect change on the source of dissatisfaction. The key variable that predicts whether voice or exit behavior should be observed, is the employees' loyalty to the firm. The author argues that employees who have a high level of loyalty to the firm will attempt to remedy the problem rather than to leave but only when they have formal avenues for speaking out. Hirschman's model offers little guidance on the occurrence of collective conflicts (Dowding et al., 2000) but it permits or facilitate understanding the occurrence of individual conflicts.

We can distinguish two main hypotheses regarding the relationship between individual and collective forms of conflict at work. The first hypothesis considers that the individual conflicts are substitutes or alternatives to collective conflicts (Knowles, 1954, Ozaki et al., 1988, Sapsford and Turnbull, 1994, Hebdon and Stern, 1998). This hypothesis assumes that individual conflicts are negatively associated with collective conflicts because considered as the result of a compromise between the costs and benefits of each expression. Dix et al. (2009) emphasize that individual conflicts such as industrials tribunals and collective conflicts can not be interchangeable in the case of the UK. According to the authors, these two types of conflict (individual and collective) do not involve the same actors, and do not address the same issues. A well known study, highlighting the substitution hypothesis is that of Turner et al. (1967). These authors examined the car industry in Britain and showed that the managing "à la Ford" by forbidden strikes was followed by an increase of absence and quitting. Hebdon and Stern (1998) examined public sector workers in Ontario

whose use of the strike was constrained by no-strike laws. They showed that the grievance arbitration were relatively higher where strike was prohibited than where it was permitted. The authors argued that the use of arbitration may have been an alternative to strikes.

The second hypothesis is the complementarity between individual and collective conflicts (Klaas et al., 1991, Lewin and Peterson, 1999, Dixon et al., 2004). This hypothesis assumes that collective and individual conflicts are complementary in the way that an increase in collective conflicts are accompanied by an increase in individual conflicts (positive correlation). Thus, in this theoretical framework, different forms of conflict have an interdependent relationship in such a way that conflict launched at one level is likely to stimulate other levels. Several empirical studies provided evidence for hypothesis showing that collective and individual conflicts go together. Jefferys (2011) studied strikes and the pursuit of grievances in labor courts in five European countries (Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal). He found different relationships between collective and individual action, which he explained in terms of the national institutional regime of each country. He found in France, for example, that the right to protest is embedded in legal institutions. Such contextual factors shape how collective and individual actions are connected. Another study which considers the complementarity hypothesis between individual and collective conflicts in the workplace is Roscigno and Hodson (2004)'s study. One of the main results of these authors is that in places of contentious workplaces, strikes and individual conflicts go together, and unionization promotes these activities.

These contradictory arguments in the literature (substitution or complementarity) leads us to examine empirically the links between individual conflicts and collective conflicts **in the second chapter**.

1.3 Data

The data used in this study are obtained from "the industrial relations and bargaining at the firm"RElations PrOfessionelles et NégociationS d'Entreprises " (REPONSE) 2008-2010 in France. REPONSE survey, similar to the British WIRS survey (Workplace Industrial Relations Survey), is an important tool for understanding the performance of industrial relations system. This survey was conducted by the French Ministry of Labor through the Department of Research and Statistical Studies (DARES). Four surveys have been published and each survey is related to the three-year period preceding the administration of the questionnaires (respectively 1990-1992, 1996-1998, 2002-2004 and 2008-2010). Given the originality of the areas it addresses, the REPONSE survey acquired a special place in the field of statistical surveys in France. Conducted among a representative sample of 4023 establishments, mainly in the private sector firms and non-agricultural employing at least 11 employees, the REPONSE survey 2008-2010 proposes to cross the views of stakeholders by interviewing both a management representative, an employee representative (if there is one) and a sample of employees.

Not limited to only work stoppages, REPONSE survey gives a much more complex information of the state of the multiple forms of conflicts. The focus on these multiple forms of action has several interests. First, it can reproduce the dynamic nature of the conflict and in particular of the strike. But it makes possible the identification of conflicting less visible forms of conflicts. The richness of REPONSE (2008-2010) serves to finally consider the continuities and the transformations of mobilization techniques in firms[6]. However, another particularity of this fourth edition of REPONSE (2008-2010) is that it corresponds to the periods of the economic recession. According to Laroche (2015), the majority of conflicts for this period results from job cuts, relocation or plant closures.

In this study, we focus mainly on the manager questionnaires because it has the advantage to cover all workplaces in the sample including those who have no employee representative. This questionnaire includes the largest number of questions such as the occurrence of collective and individual conflicts, the economic and industrial relations context of the firm, on pay practices etc.

[6]For a more details on labor conflicts in France see Amossé et al. (2008), Beroud et al. (2008*b*).

The sample is representative of the french economy. On size, each firm has its own "sampling weight". Several authors have highlighted the interest of using weighted descriptive statistics including Cahuzac and Bontemps (2008). According to these authors, when it comes to descriptive statistics, not weighting can lead to changes in the distribution structures studied.

There are two families of conflicts in this questionnaire: collective conflicts (including all or most employees) and individual conflicts concerning individual employees. In the following section, we analyze each family of conflicts that firms have experienced as well as the main characteristics of these firms.

1.4 Types of Collective Conflicts

In this section, we first describe collective conflicts and then we build the clusters of firms depending on collective conflicts.

1.4.1 Descriptive Analysis of Collective Conflicts

Eight forms are suggested in the questionnaire. All responses are binary (1 if yes, 0 if no) and non exclusive i.e an establishment can experience from one type of conflict to all types of conflicts. The occurrence of collective conflicts is summarized in Table 1.1. We also report the distribution of collective conflicts in the preview wave of REPONSE (2002-2004) to look at the evolution over the time and the effect of 2008 crises.

- **Two-day strikes or more**: Total cessation of work for two days or more to support some claims.
- **Less than two-day strikes**: Total cessation of work for less than two days to support some claims.
- **Walkouts**: Total cessation of work for a few hours to support some claims.
- **Refusals of overtime work**: Employees refuse to work overtimes by the way of showing their discontent.
- **Work to rule**: It is the exaggeration application of all employer directives, all the

clauses of the collective agreement and the task definition.

- **Go-slow strikes**: Lower rates and a slowdown at work.
- **Demonstrations**: Events of employees to show their discontent.
- **Petitions**: Written request by employees to their employer to claim their discontent.

Table 1.1: **Collectives conflicts statistics**

Variables	**2002-2004**	**2008-2010**
Two-day strikes or more	2.5	1.2
Less than two-day strikes	9.2	7.3
Walkouts: stop working for few hours	10.7	6.7
Refusals of overtime work	9.8	6.3
Work to rule: exaggerated application of all employer directives	1.5	1.1
Go-slow strikes: slowdown in work	1.2	0.9
Demonstrations	6.6	4.9
Petitions	10.5	6
No conflict	72.75	79.85

Source: REPONSE survey 2002-2004, 2008-2010

We can make a distinction between collective conflicts with work stoppage including walkouts, less than two-day strikes, two-days strikes or more, and other collective conflicts without work stoppage that are go-slow strikes, work to rule, refusals of overtime work, demonstrations and petitions.

From Table 1.1, we notice that all types of conflict are lower in 2008-2010 than in 2002-2004. Both employees and union seem to consider the economic situation of the firm. The negative impact of 2008 crisis (on employment, wages,...) may then not favor the voice option reducing by that the emergence of the visible component of collective conflicts, even if the latent nature of conflicts could be reinforced during crisis.

The main result is that 80% of the firms declare having experienced no form of conflict. Firms that declare to have a work stoppage, choose less than two-day strikes (7.3% against 6.7% for walkouts and 1.2% for two-day strikes or more). Less than two-day strikes is less expensive and sometimes considered as effective from the point of view of employees and that's probably because a work stoppage can have serious repercussions on production and turnover. It is also a real signal of a potential capacity to use stronger conflicts.

Regarding collective conflict without work stoppage, refusals of overtime work are the

most frequent (6.3%), then petitions and demonstrations (respectively 6% and 4.9%). However, work to rule and go-slow strikes are rarely mentioned by firms as a form of collective action (less than 1% each). These last two forms of conflict, a kind of slow down pace of work, are from the point of view of employees not very effective in their struggle. This probably explains their low percentages in collective actions without work stoppage in particular and in general in all the conflicts that firms have experienced during the period 2008-2010.

Table 1.2: **Cross tabulating forms of collective conflicts (%)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Average	(1.2)	(7.3)	(6.7)	(6.3)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(4.9)	(6)
1 Two-day Strikes or more								
2 Less than two-day strikes	0.61							
3 Walkouts	0.79	3.46						
4 Refusals of overtime work	0.21	0.68	0.85					
5 Work to rule	0.15	0.42	0.50	0.49				
6 Go-slow strikes	0.25	0.52	0.51	0.19	0.24			
7 Demonstrations	0.64	2.39	2.79	0.68	0.42	0.43		
8 Petitions	0.55	1.89	2.17	0.81	0.24	0.33	1.79	

Source: REPONSE survey 2008-2010

Table 1.2 gives a cross tabulate of all types of collective conflicts. It shows that walkouts are associate with less than two-day strikes, demonstration and petitions. Demonstrations seem also to be associated with less than two-day strikes. But this cross tabulate does not allow us to suggest a strong association between two or more types of conflicts. To do so, we suggest to build a typology of firms with respect to collective conflicts that they have experienced during 2008-2010. We have first chosen to use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and then clustering techniques to realize this typology. These two tools are closely linked and allow us to establish the best similarities between firms regarding the forms of conflict. This also help us to suggest a grouping of some types of conflicts rather than elimination the rare ones or grouping arbitrarily.

1.4.2 Multiple Correspondence Analysis of Collective Conflicts

The multiple correspondence analysis has been the subject of study by several authors such as Guttman (1941), Burt (1950), Escofier and Pagès (2008), Lebart (2013). The multiple correspondence analysis is used to analyze a set of observations described by a set of qualitative variables. This is one of the only methods that can analyze the relationship between different categories of qualitative variables. Each qualitative variable may include several categories and each of these categories is encoded as a binary variable. Thus in our case, each variable is of a dichotomous kind (1 if the form of conflict exists and 0 otherwise).

In this analysis, we include six forms of collective conflicts: walkouts, less two-days strikes, two-day Strikes or more, refusals overtime work, demonstrations and petitions. The go-slow strikes and work to rule are just added as supplement variables. Supplementary variables used to enrich the interpretation of the axes without having participated in their construction (see Lebart, 2013). We consider (first) go-slow strikes and work to rule as active variables. This lead to two axes, characterized simply by the rarity of these two forms of collective conflicts. This is the reason why we consider go-slow strikes and work to rule as supplementary variables[7].

Table 1.3: **Joint correspondence analysis (percentage)**

Dimension	**Principal Inertia**	**Cumul. Contribution**
Dim 1	37.18	37.18
Dim 2	16.53	53.71
Dim 3	14.18	67.89
Dim 4	13.18	81.08
Dim 5	10.40	91.47
Dim 6	08.52	100
Total	100	

Source: REPONSE survey 2008-2010

By examining the cumulative percentages of explained inertia in table 1.3, the first four axes represent 81.08% of the total inertia. Table 1.4 summarizes the qualities of representations of different four factorial axes and the relative contributions of each axis

[7]We decide to keep two-day strikes or more as active variable, because we believe that firms who have experienced this type of conflict can constitute a class, without this distinction is related to rarity.

to total inertia.

Table 1.4: **Variable coordinates and contributions**

	Dimension 1		**Dimension 2**		**Dimension 3**		**Dimension 4**	
	Crd.	**Ctr.**	**Crd.**	**Ctr.**	**Crd.**	**Ctr.**	**Crd.**	**Ctr.**
Two-day Strikes or more	-7.429	0.068	0.388	0.000	20.155	0.311	-3.433	0.009
Less than two-day strikes	-4.028	0.121	-1.444	0.010	-3.017	0.042	-2.748	0.033
Walkouts	-4.748	0.154	-0.748	0.003	-1.484	0.009	-1.683	0.012
Refusals of overtime work	-1.029	0.007	9.265	0.364	-0.871	0.003	-1.381	0.007
Petitions	-3.714	0.085	0.794	0.003	-0.184	0.000	8.727	0.278
Demonstrations	-5.297	0.140	-0.534	0.001	-1.009	0.003	-0.804	0.002
Work to rule	-3.243		2.924		2.737		-0.859	
Go-slow strikes	-4.583		0.375		0.181		-2.592	

Source: REPONSE survey 2008-2010

Factorial axis 1 and 2 (Figures 1.3)

The first axis is the single most useful of which inertia is highest (37.18%). It disperse more points along the first axis as following. It expresses the most decisive information for understanding the structure of the cloud, resulted in the organization of the points on graphs. We find that the forms of conflict as walkouts (15.4%) demonstrations (14%), less two-day strikes (12.1%) participate the most to the inertia of this axis. Moreover, we note along this axis, an opposition between firms that have experienced at least one form of conflict and those which have experienced any form of conflict. This result seems very logical because firms without conflicts are different than firms with conflicts.

Axis two explains 16.53 % of the total inertia and is almost completely characterized by the refusal of overtime (36.4%). This axis is mainly characterized by the refusal of overtime work (on the positive side), which is opposed to less than two-day strikes and walkouts. The contribution of all other variables is almost zero. This is the first opposition between collective conflicts with action (strikes, walkouts demonstrations) and the refusal of overtime.

Factorial axis 3 and 4 (Figure 1.4)

The axis three represents 14.18% of the total inertia. This axis is mainly characterized by the two-day strikes and more (31.1%). On this axis, we also see a strong opposition between long collective conflict (two-day strikes and more) and short collective conflict (strikes and work stoppages in less than two days). In this case, we conclude that this axis could leave firms when salaries express their discontent by hard ways.

Finally, the axis four explains 13.18% of the total inertia and is almost completely represented by petitions (27.8%). However, we notice an opposition between petitions and the other types of collective conflicts. Petitions seem to be a very particular form of collective conflicts since it does not impact directly firm's activity.

We can then make a summary of these results (1.3 and 1.4) by saying that we observe:

- Group of firms that declare to have experienced any form of conflict;
- Group of firms that declare having experienced at least one form of conflict. Among those which reported having experienced at least one form of conflict, we observe:
  - A group characterized by two-day strikes and more and even the additional variables (go-slow strikes and work to rule);
  - A group characterized by strikes of less than two days walkouts and demonstration;
  - A group characterized only by refusals of overtime work;
  - A group characterized only by petitions.

The multiple correspondence analysis provides a preliminary arguments regarding the possible grouping of firms related to collectives conflicts. In order to be confident about such a grouping of firms according to conflicts, we now look at the typology of firms obtained by the hierarchical ascendant classification.

Figure 1.3: Factorial axis 1 and 2



Figure 1.4: Factorial axis 3 and 4



1.4.3 Clustering of Firms Experiencing Collective Conflicts

This is the major statistical tool of building clusters (or groups) of relatively homogeneous firms based on measured characteristics. Clustering is a procedure that splits the population into a small number of classes in the way that individuals of a same class are similar to each other and dissimilar to individuals in other classes. It starts with each firm as a distinct class, that is to say there are as many classes as firms, then groups the classes sequentially, which reduces the number of classes at each step until at the last step, all firms are gathered in a single class (see Figure 1.5). At each step, we can calculate the less in inertia that results from gathering two groups. We can stop grouping when we observe a big jump in the loss of inertia.

The method of hierarchical ascending classification we have privileged here uses the Ward's method, which is one of the most common method of aggregation used[8]. In general, this method is very effective because it has the advantage to easily detect the number of classes to retain (variation of the total inertia with respect to the residual inertia, where a possible abrupt change is observed).

We obtain a hierarchical tree diagram to show the points of connections. Although, we can get help by looking at the diagram, we decide also to take into account the multiple correspondence analysis we have studied beforehand.

Hierarchical ascendant clustering leads us to consider five clusters of firms regarding collective conflicts (see the tree in figure 1.5). Table 4.9 summarizes the different clusters with respect to collective conflicts. It gives in detail the distribution of forms of collective conflict in each group[9]. The description of each cluster can be summarized as follow:

Cluster 1: This is the group of firms which have experienced no form of conflict. It represents 79.9% of the sample weighted. This result is in accordance with the first axis of our multiple correspondence analysis where we obtain an opposition between firms that declare having experienced conflicts and those who have not experienced conflicts. Call this cluster **No Conflict**.

Cluster 2: This is the group of firms (3.2% of the sample) which have all experienced

[8]We also tried other aggregation criteria and we got similar or close results
[9]The last column called "Firms with conflicts", compares the distributions of conflicts between clusters

Table 1.5: **Collective conflicts clusters description (%)**

	Cl 1	Cl 2	Cl 3	Cl 4	Cl 5	Firms with conflicts
Observations	*79.85*	*3.18*	*5.15*	*8.24*	*3.57*	***20.15***
Two-days strikes or more	0	0	0	0.01	**34.11**	**6.05**
Less than two-day strikes	0	19.53	0	**58.55**	**52.44**	**36.34**
Walkouts	0	0	0	**46.08**	**82.20**	**33.43**
Refusals of overtime work	0	0	**100**	1.26	30.98	**31.10**
Work to rule	0	0	0	6.97	**15.73**	**5.64**
Go-slow strikes	0	0	0	6.16	**10.6**	**4.4**
Demonstrations	0	7.98	2.42	**31.41**	**54.65**	**24.42**
Petitions	0	**100**	8.33	1.79	**63.78**	**30**

Source: REPONSE survey 2008-2010

petitions but have less experienced less than two-day strikes and demonstrations (other forms of conflict are totally absent). Call this cluster **Petitions**

Cluster 3: This is the group of firms (5.1% of the sample) which have all experienced refusals of overtime work and very few in demonstrations and petitions (strikes, walkouts, work to rule and go-slow strikes are totally absent). This group is made by firms which have only known forms of collective actions without work stoppages. The isolation of the refusals of overtime work compared to other conflicts could be explained by the fact that this form of conflict remains relatively intermediate in collective action and individual action (Beroud et al., 2008*a*). According to Carlier and Tenret (2007), this type of conflict is the main form of collective actions in firm of less than 100 employees. In these small firms, open conflict, especially the strike is rare. Call this group cluster **Overtimes**

Cluster 4: This group, representing 8.2% of the sample, is constituted of firms that have more experienced walkouts, less than two-day strikes and demonstration (others forms of conflict are very few in this cluster). In referring to the results of the MCA, we find that these forms of conflict are almost inseparable. According to Carlier and Tenret (2007), walkouts and less than two-day strikes are forms of conflicts which degrade less the social climate. However, this group is characterized by firms where employees adopt as collective action, conflict with the form of short work stoppages. Let's call this cluster **Less Strong conflicts**.

Cluster 5: This is the group of firms that have experienced very frequently almost

all forms of conflict and represents 3.6% of the total sample. Compared to column "Average within firms with conflicts", this group present on average more walkouts, more frequency of less than two-day strikes, more two-day strikes or more, more go-slow strikes, more demonstrations and petitions. This group is characterized by firms where employees demonstrate their disagreements and their discontent towards the direction using several form of conflicts including strong ones. Call this cluster **Strong Conflicts**.

This typology leads us to the classification of firms according to the "severity of conflicts" that we can summarize as follows:

cluster 1 < cluster 2 < cluster 3 < cluster 4 < cluster 5

Figure 1.5: Collective Conflicts AHC



1.5 Types of Individual Conflicts

In this section, we first describe individual conflicts and then we build the clusters of firms depending on individual conflicts.

1.5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Individual Conflicts

The REPONSE survey also gives us information on the occurrence of individual conflicts. We have disciplinary action taken by the firm, we know also if, in case of dispute, employee enter industrial tribunals when he/she thinks that a disciplinary action is unacceptable (see Sisson, 2010). Industrial tribunals are competent to hear individual disputes arising in connection with an employment contract under private law. As part of this mission, industrial tribunals are responsible for the reconciliation of the parties and, failing that, the adjudication of cases. The table 1.6 shows the distribution of all types of individual conflicts that managers say they have experienced during the 2008-2010 period. Each individual type of conflict is defined in a binary way (1 if the firm has experienced or employee has used industrial tribunal, 0 otherwise). We notice that the written warnings are the most common of disciplinary action that the firms have experienced (approximately 48%), then come industrial tribunals, dismissals for fault, suspensions (respectively 28.3%, 19.5% 18.3%). The mutations and demotions are the less common with only 1.7% and 0.9% of the sample. However, it should be noted that the written warning is the only sanction which does not affect the salary or career and the presence or the position of the employee in his work (Tanguy, 2013).

1.5.2 Clustering of Firms Experiencing Individual Conflicts

Since there are many kind of individual conflicts, and that some of them are very rare, we suggest to build a typology of firms with respect to individual conflicts that the french firms have experienced during 2008-2010. We have chosen clustering techniques (Hierarchical Ascendant Classification) to build this typology. We get four clusters of firms regarding individual conflicts. The table 4.10 summarizes the different clusters. As for collective conflicts, it gives in detail the distribution of different forms of individual conflict in each

Table 1.6: **Individual conflict statistics**

Variables	**Definition**	*%*
Disciplinary action	**Sanction applied against at least one employee**	
Written Warning	Letter written to an employee as a disciplinary measure	*47.9*
Suspension	Temporary removal of an employee from performing his/her work duties	*18.3*
Dismissal for fault	Termination of employment by an employer against the will of the employee	*19.5*
Mutation	Transfer from one job to another at the same firm against the will of the employee	*1.7*
Demotion	Reduction in an employee's rank within the organizational hierarchy	*0.9*
Industrial Tribunal	**At least one employee application**	*28.3*

Source: REPONSE survey 2008-2010

group. The last column "At least a individual conflict" allows to compare the distributions of individual conflicts between clusters. We can summarize each cluster as follow:

Cluster 1: This is the group of firms which have experienced no form of individual conflict. Contrary to collective conflicts where 80% did not observe any form of conflicts, we notice now that only 46% of the sample of firms have no form of individual conflicts. Call this cluster **No Individual Conflict**.

Cluster 2 (18.9% of the sample): This is the group of firms which have experienced only written warnings, other forms of individual conflicts are totally absent. Call this cluster **Written Individual Conflicts**.

Cluster 3 (9.6% of the sample): This is the group of firms which have all experienced written warnings and industrial tribunals but have less experienced dismissal for fault (other forms of individual conflicts are totally absent). Call this cluster **Written and tribunal Individual Conflicts**.

Cluster 4: This is the group of firms that have experienced very frequently almost all forms of individuals conflicts and it represents 24.8% of the total sample. Compared to column "At least a conflict" this group observes on average more suspensions, dismissals for

fault, mutations, demotions and industrial tribunals. Call this cluster **Strong Individual Conflicts**.

Table 1.7: **Individual conflicts clusters distribution** (%)

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	At least a conflict
Observations %	*46.6*	*18.9*	*9.6*	*24.8*	***53.4***
Written Warning	0	**100**	**100**	77.79	**78.65**
Suspension	0	0	0	**73.42**	**29.97**
Dismissal for fault	0	0	25.75	**68.21**	**31.92**
Mutation	0	0	0	**6.37**	**2.60**
Demotion	0	0	0	**3.56**	**1.45**
Industrial Tribunal	0	0	**100**	**44.50**	**34.76**

Source: REPONSE survey 2008-2010, management representatives.
weighted statistics

Figure 1.6: Individual Conflicts AHC



Contrary to collective conflicts where the size of some clusters were extremely low (3%), we notice here that the size of the clusters with respect of individual conflicts is sufficiently high.

This typology lead to the classification of firms according to the severity of individual conflicts that we can summarize as follows:

cluster 1 < cluster 2 < cluster 3 < cluster 4

1.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter consist to understanding the typology of firms according to the conflicts they have experienced by forming homogeneous groups of firms while not losing any information. The multiple correspondence analysis and clustering allow us to realize this typology. This leads us to perform a hierarchical clustering to confirm the groupings obtained with the latter. The classification confirm the multiple correspondence analysis. Thus, we can establish a typology whose of firms with respect to conflicts as follow:

- Five clusters when we consider collective conflicts: (1) cluster of firms without collective conflicts, (2) cluster of firms with Petition, (3) Cluster of firms with Overtime, (4) cluster of firms with Less Strong collective conflicts (two-day strikes and more) and (5) cluster of firms with Strong collective conflicts (walkout and less than two-day strikes).
- Four clusters when we consider individual conflicts: (1) Cluster of firms without individual conflicts, (2) cluster of firms with written, (3) cluster of firms with written and tribunal and (4) cluster of firms with strong individual conflicts.

In some French firms, the strikes are nonexistent, but the forms of conflict without work stoppages take place in the form of Petition and or Overtime conflicts. However, in other firms, short-term strikes occur at the expense of long-term strike and conflict without work stoppages. Moreover, the presence of work stoppages in certain firms (Less Strong and Strong conflicts), is accompanied by stronger demonstrations. The demonstrations may have a goal to defend several establishments belonging to the same firm. It's also a way for employees to enhance the visibility of the conflict.

Our analysis encourages, not to think in terms of strike only in the consideration of conflicts in the firm, but to consider all forms of conflict as a whole. We have, therefore,

to consider the relational mean of strikes as a form of collective action which is not enough itself, but is recorded in a mobilization process more or less cumulative.

Finally, this study allow us to bring closer the different firms, to classify them. We can use the clusters of firms regarding conflicts (mainly collective conflicts) as a multinomial categorical variable and then try to understand the determinants of each category (cluster) of conflict in the next chapter.

"Nous devons nous évertuer à réduire les conflits, mais non pas à les supprimer. Leur existence même est essentielle à la société ouverte"

Karl Popper

2 Financial Participation and Collective Conflicts

2.1 Introduction

Financial participation in its different forms (profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes), has been an emerging feature of remuneration packages throughout the world. At its heart is the theoretical principle that such schemes are a means of re-aligning the interests of employers and employers so as to maximize their joint welfare by encouraging employees to act in the best interests of the firm and solve the agency problems inherent in the firm (Akerlof, 1984, Lazear, 2000). As early writers in the field expressed (Putterman, 1982, Bradley and Gelb, 1983) in an environment of "positive collusion", conflict gives way to cooperation, with production methods, control structure and decision making apparatus chosen primarily to encourage human capital formation and utilization. The costs of monitoring and control will be reduced. Hierarchical structures of control and supervision will be unwarranted given the release of informational asymmetries and better communication. Such methods will be supplanted by peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992) and horizontal monitoring (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987). Such an environment will offer superior methods of conflict resolution with resources not being wasted in the struggle for control but will be focused on enhancing firm performance through effort that is volunteered rather than coerced (Kruse, 1996).

The benefits of this strategy of "positive collusion" have been the focus of a large body of empirical work. Most studies show that profit sharing and employee share ownership plans improve firm level productivity and performance (Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Pérotin and

Robinson, 2002, Kruse et al., 2010), reduce absenteeism (Peel and Wilson, 1990, Brown et al., 1999) and labour turnover (Wilson and Peel, 1991, Fakhfakh, 2004) as well as better training (Pendleton and Robinson, 2011). Surprisingly given the belief that some of these expected gains arise through the emergence of a less adversarial climate of industrial relations and more collaborative, it is perhaps surprising that there is very little literature looking at this issue (exception being Heywood et al. (2005) who look at the supervisory level). If the emergence of conflict between employers and employees arises from differences in their goals, interests or values (Baron, 1990) then something like financial participation which is believed to make employees more sensitive to the firm objectives (Pendleton et al., 1998) and generate attitudinal and behavioral change, would seem a natural fit and one possible factor in alleviating the emergence of (collective) conflicts in the firm.

In this chapter, we focus for the first time on the potential of financial participation to lower collective conflicts in France. The choice of France to investigate this issue is particularly salient. France has one of the most extensive incidences of financial participation use in the developed world. Secondly while collective conflicts such as strike action, walkouts etc. are generally in decline in many western economies, they persist at record levels in France. The main indicator of labor conflicts in France is the number of working days not worked per employee called

While the causes of collective conflicts have been investigated across a number of countries, primarily the UK (Blanchflower and Cubbin, 1986, Sapsford and Turnbull, 1994), France (Tanguy, 2013, Beroud et al., 2008*a*), Canada (Walsh, 1975, Godard, 1992, Harrison and Stewart, 1993) and Australia (Hodgkinson and Perera, 2004) their focus has tended to be on the role of trade unions within this process. Because of this focus they have tended to concentrate on the most costly and disruptive forms of collective conflict – strike action, to the neglect of other forms of collective conflicts such as walkouts, go-slows etc. Thus while our primary contribution is to explore the potential role of financial participation in lowering the incidence of collective conflicts in so doing we make an number of auxiliary contributions:

- Strikes are not the only form of collective conflict. In looking at the role of financial participation, we consider their impact on the full range of collective conflicts and not just strikes. Unlike much of the literature on collective conflicts which looks at strikes only, we consider short strikes, long strikes as well as conflicts without work

stoppages.

- Data and methodological contribution – in analyzing this relationship, we address the potential endogeneity and simultaneity of financial participation by modeling financial participation-Conflict as a (simultaneous) recursive system (CMP).
- Finally, as an extension to our main analysis, we consider whether the relationship between financial participation and collective forms of conflict is conditioned by the growing use of individual forms of conflict. This recognizes an emerging literature which explores the inter-connection between collective and individual forms of conflict and whether they act are complementary forms of conflict or whether they act as substitutes for one another(Tanguy, 2013).

This chapter is set out as follow: in the second section, we present a literature review and some empirical studies that address the issues of financial participation and conflicts within the firm. In the third section, we briefly present the data used and the econometric methodology used. This brings us to the fourth section where the probability to belong to a certain type of conflicts is explained by several factors, including financial participation (i.e Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership). In the fifth section, we consider profit sharing and employee share ownership as well as individual conflicts as determinants of collective conflicts. Some concluding remarks are presented at the end of this chapter.

2.2 Background

2.2.1 Sharing Schemes in the French Context

Born with De Gaulle under the philosophy of sharing the value, Profit Sharing ("Intéressement") was introduced in 1959. It concerns all the firms once a contract, after a bargaining process, is signed between the two parties (unions or workers' representative and the employer). The bonus depends on some objectives defined ex-ante. In any case, the bonus cannot be substitute to wages. The amount of the bonus cannot exceed 20% of wage (with a limit of 17.676 euros in 2011). Bonuses can be the same for all employees, or depend on wages (as stipulated in the contract). The legislation evolved several times since there (1994, 2006, 2012). There are a several fiscal advantages associated to Profit Sharing, both

for employees and for employers. For the firm, Profit Sharing bonus is deduced from the taxable profit and there is no wage tax associated to it. For the employees, the bonus is exempt from social security contribution and if the employee put it in a firm saving account (within 15 days), there is no tax on income. However, the employer can get immediately the bonus, in which case, he/she loses all the fiscal benefits. The December 2008 law encourages firms to adopt profit sharing since all contracts concluded between December 2008 and December 2014 can benefit from 20% credit tax. This law also extended the bonus to the manager in firms with 250 employees or less (it was 100 employees max). With the crisis, the fiscal benefits associated to Profit Sharing are reduced. To help financing social security, the 2009 law introduced the "social withdrawal" at 2%. Modified several times, the "social withdrawal" is now at 20% (august 2012 law).

The second participatory scheme is Employee Share Ownership. It was harmonized with the 1973 law. Employee share ownership covers all devices to grant employees shares in their firm on preferential terms and checking one of the three following conditions: filing actions on a firm savings plan or either a firm mutual fund, issuance of shares not transferable in a firm's privatization process, and finally distribution of shares as part of participation. Outside of these three terms, any other forms of holding of shares by employees enters the official definition of employee share ownership. The trade law 2001 stipulates that employee share ownership covers all schemes allowing employers to sell shares to employees at favorite conditions (usually 20-30% price cut, possible employers contribution, facilities of payment..). These conditions are usually conditional on a minimum detention period (two years).

There are also some other participatory schemes that we will not consider in this study. The first is "participation", a compulsory profit sharing scheme for firm with 50 employees or more (100 or more before 1990). The compulsory nature of the contract can rule out any possible employee incentive-motivation. The second is the so-called employees saving plan. The profit sharing and/or the participation bonuses and these plans are usually associated since the bonuses of the first are saved in the saving plans, which may introduce redundancy.

2.2.2 Theory and Empirical Studies

Over the last 20-30 years a growing empirical literature has emerged looking at different "performance" aspects of financial participation. Arguments that financial participation can alter the nature of the workplace, replacing traditional employee-manager conflicts and employee alienation with cooperation and increased employee responsibility, has from the earliest writings been a central tenet of the benefits of financial participation. Cable and Fitzroy (1980) in a series of influential papers develop arguments which posit that "minimizing" conflict and maximizing the surplus from productive cooperation, requires some sharing of the surplus (channels of participation to maintain trust and limit informational asymmetry) more continuity as well as peer group pressure, rather than traditional incentives, to avoid dysfunctional rivalry. Similar sentiments can be found in Cable and Fitzroy (1980), Kruse (1996) and Desbrières (2002) who highlight the potential of financial participation to transform the workplace from conflict to cooperation and in turn improve productivity.

Much of this argument rests on the expectation that as a consequence of the "coming together" of employees and employers, the participatory enterprise will be run and perform quite differently from a traditional firm. Resources will not be wasted in the struggle for control as prevails in the traditional firm, but instead through the lower incidence of conflict, will be focused on enhancing the overall performance of the firm through enhanced group dynamics and organizational norms (Park and Kruse, 2014, Child, 2015). Managerial control will give way to self-policing behavior through greater mutual monitoring and peer pressure. In turn financial participation creates a financial incentive to encourage more cooperative and productivity enhancing group norms and interactions (Heywood et al., 2005). In simple terms it pays to help and assist ones fellow employees.

Conflict may also stem from the relationship between employee and supervisor. As has been argued above, to the extent that financial participation creates an identity of interests and substitutes managerial control for workers self-management then tensions between themselves and their supervisor are likely to be mollified. It is also argued that profit sharing may negate allegations of favoritism and the unfair treatment of workers because as co-recipients of the financial incentives it does not pay supervisors to unjustly reward under performing workers (Laffont, 1990). Evidence backs up the general greater

sense of fairness, respect and favorable employee-management relations in shared capital firms (Kruse et al., 2010) as well as reduced supervisory conflict among "healthy" workers with no supervisory commitment (Heywood et al., 2005).

Another way of viewing the workings of financial participation is as a form of gift exchange (Akerlof, 1982) in which employees respond to the "gift" of shares by reciprocating with more conducive behavior and better performance. In this context financial participation may act to reduce conflict and workplace tension because employees feel that they owe the firm and have a duty of care to respond favorably. In the context of UK share purchase plans, Bryson and Freeman (2014) find support for this conjecture in that employees who accept the gift of subsidized shares work harder, put in extra hours, show less turnover and lower absenteeism than those who refuse the gift. As proposed by Freeman and Bryson these latter arguments suggest that employee share ownership may operate largely by creating a more cooperative psychological contract between employers and employees. This is possible through "getting employees to think like owners through a change in status rather than a change in direct financial incentives" (p.91).

Another strand to the financial participation-conflict linkage captures the changing cost-benefit dynamics that conflict entails for employees who engage in financial participation. Cramton et al. (2010) model this scenario formally using a wage bargaining model in which unions rather than employees hold an equity stake in their firm. The central feature of the model is that shareholding alter the incentives of the union as it no longer gathers its rents solely through wage negotiation, but also through it's ownership stake in the firm. Under joint ownership anything that hampers profitability, including higher wages and costly labor conflicts will have a detrimental effect on that rent collected through ownership. Increasing share ownership unions collect a higher share of its rents through its equity stake and hence become a "less demanding negotiator" as their preferences become more closely aligned with those of the firm. Joint ownership therefore provides strong disincentives to undertake costly labor conflicts suggesting towards not only lower dispute incidence and duration, but also the form "any dispute" may take shifting them away from more costly strikes towards less costly forms of holdout.

By and large these hypotheses are supported in Cramton et al. (2010)'s subsequent empirical work although counter to expectations the effects are largely concentrated in smaller employee ownership firms (less than 10% equity stake) that more closely resemble

the lower ownership stakes in our sample of firms. With the adoption of small-scale joint ownership strike incidence fell by 5.7 per cent while there was a 17.7 per cent shift in the composition of labor conflicts (ratio of strikes to disputes) away from strikes.

Nevertheless, financial participation is not without its critics. The realignment of interests, which is central to financial participation's role in reducing conflicts, may not be sufficient to motivate workers, in part because of their unwillingness to bear some of the risk of the firm but because there is an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of their fellow workers (Green and Heywood, 2010). It is a widely held belief that group incentive schemes may give each worker only a tiny fraction of any additional benefit due to their own effort, thus weakening incentives and thus realignment arguments. Even where financial participation does motivate worker, the increased monitoring and peer pressure may actually be counterproductive. Rather than leading to greater self policing and more cooperation the fear is than monitoring and control may become excessive, crowding out cooperation and trust within the firm (Orr, 2001) and greater conflict. In turn some workers may feel unable to respond to the need for greater alignment and effort as evidenced by Heywood et al. (2005) who fund greater conflict among "non-productive" workers, such as those in poor health, who are unable to respond to the introduction of profit sharing and supervisory staff who increasingly feel isolated given the demands of managers and workers under profit sharing. Wadhwani and Wall (1990) also argue that "far from reducing conflict between employers and employees, profit-sharing schemes will increase it, because there are incentives for managers to cheat in the definition of profits".

To summarize, there are arguments showing that financial participation lowers conflicts, but there are also few arguments where financial participation engenders conflicts. We suggest here an empirical framework where the probability of collective and individual conflicts emergence are explained by firm characteristics, including the presence of employee share ownership and profit sharing.

2.3 Data and Methodology

In this section, we first present our data. We then describe the econometric specification used in this study.

2.3.1 REPONSE

The data used in this study are obtained from "RElations PrOfessionelles et NégociationS d'Entreprises" (REPONSE) 2008-2010 in France (see the first chapter, section data).

In this study, we focus mainly on the manager questionnaires because it has the advantage to cover all workplaces in the sample including those who have no employee representative. This questionnaire includes the largest number of questions such as the occurrence of collective and individual conflicts, the economic and industrial relations context of the firm, on pay practices etc. This questionnaire allow us to identify firms with financial participation practices: profit sharing and employee share ownership. In the following subsection, we describe the types of all conflicts (collective and individual) that french firms are experienced.

Dependent Variable

To be confident about the main influential types of collective conflicts, we decide to run multiple correspondence analysis and clustering of firms. Using clustering, leads us to consider five clusters of firms regarding collective conflicts (see Table 1.5 in the first chapter). From this preliminary analysis, we notice that the main types of conflicts are: two-day strikes or more, short strikes (walkouts and less than two-day strikes), refusals of overtime work and petitions. We can then rank these most influential types from the most costly (two-day strikes or more) to the less costly types of conflicts (petition). However, one can wonder if short strikes are more or less costly than refusals of overtime work. If overtime work reflect a loss of an important customer, or a loss in the market share of the firm, then refusals of overtime work can be very costly. But if overtime work is about working few hours more, then short strikes can be considered as more damageable for the firm

especially in term of "image". Strikes are much more looked for, as an informative signal, than refusals of overtime work.

For these reasons, we decide to construct a multi-categorical exclusive measure that reflects the severity of conflict types. This measure ranges from the Strong conflicts (two-day strikes or more: 1.24%), Less strong conflicts (walkouts and less than two-day strikes: 9.80%), Overtime conflicts (refusals of overtime work (5.31%), Petition conflicts (3.65%) and finally firms with no conflict at all (80%). The frequency of the multi-categorical variables are the following.

Independent Variables

Our financial participation measure are profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership (ESO). The literature on financial participation, as a collective incentive scheme, has shown that profit sharing and employee share ownership have an impact on cooperation through horizontal monitoring of employees (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987). This better cooperation may then reduce conflicts possibilities. However, a better cooperation may also help employees to face conflicts. Furthermore, since employees are concerned by the performance of the firm when there is financial participation, we can assume that if employees can not avoid conflicts, they will probably choose the less costly and not the most costly type of conflicts.

Individual incentive or bonuses may also affect conflict. Bender and Moir (2006) suggest that individual bonuses may increase the pressure on employees. Gibbs et al. (2009) points out that individual bonuses may suffer from measurement problems (of individual productivity), noise, distortion and manipulation of information. In addition, individual bonuses are suspected to not favor cooperation between employees Lazear (2000) . We then control for the existence of individual bonuses in the firm.

We also control for a large number of factors, suggested by the literature, that may affect the emergence of collective conflicts (other firm's characteristics).

Organizational change is usually mentionned as one source of collective conflicts in the firm as discussed by Haveman (1992). This author considers that the change precipitates conflicts, but also that conflicts may lead to a change. So we construct a variable called change that equals 1 if the management representative declare having an "important

organizational change" (0 otherwise).

Godard (1992) showed that employees' autonomy reduces strikes in Canadian firms. Autonomy reduces the contact between the employees and the supervisor (and also between colleagues) which may result in less opportunities for conflicts. We suggest a dummy for autonomy taking the value 1 if "employees are allowed to resolve problems related to production process rather than consulting their supervisor" (0 otherwise). Consequently, supervision policy at the firm may then be an important factor explaining the emergence of collective conflicts. Three supervision policies are considered in our case and are related to the question "who control the work": supervisor, Customers & Specialized Service, colleagues.

Several authors have shown that industrial affiliation, the size of the firm and the union presence are related to strike (Blanchflower and Cubbin, 1986, Belot and Waxin, 2012, Tanguy, 2013). Campolieti et al. (2005) and Vroman (1989) showed that the incidence and duration of strikes varied between industrial affiliation. This size effect can be explained in part by a poorer communication between employees and employers in large firms. According to Beroud et al. (2008*a*), union representatives, firm size and industrial affiliation are proved to be key factors of labor conflicts in France. The authors showed that the union presence has increased particularly in establishments with 200 to 499 employees and that these establishments experienced the largest increase in labor conflict. These effects of union on collective conflicts confirm the theoritical results suggest by the bargaining model of Cramton and Tracy (1994) where conflicts can be higher if the union claim is not satisfied. Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) also obtain that union recognition for collective bargaining, involving the presence of union representatives in the workplace is associated with a higher probability of strike. They acknowledge that the effect of union delegates can vary greatly, depending on they ability to behave like a troublemaker, or conversely act as a vector for informal communication quality between the employer and employees. We then suggest to consider the opinion of the manager about the union by building a dummy equals 1 if the manager believes that the "union impede the firm activity" (0 otherwise).

Union is found to be a strong device for workers' voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). This voice possibility is expected to be higher when the unionization rate is important and also in larger firms than in smaller ones. We suggest then to control for the size of the firm and the unionization intensity. In France, if there is no union representative, then

bargaining can take place with workers' representative or work council members. We then suggest to control for the presence of the work council as an additional tool for employees' voice.

Table 4.17 (in appendix 2.5) gives description and the distribution of the set of variables that we suggest to use in explaining the types of collective conflicts.

2.3.2 Econometric Specification

There are several ways to consider collective conflicts. The first and naive way is to consider each type of conflict separately. We can then run a simple probit (or logit) regression to understand the determinants of each type of conflict. But this is not the best way of doing. Explaining one type of conflict, by ignoring all the remaining types, may lead us to inefficient or even biased estimates. The second way of considering conflict can be the use of Counts Model. We need only to know the number of types of conflicts, whatever there nature is. We discard this kind of modeling because conflicts are heterogeneous. For example petitions and two-day strikes or more are completely of different nature. Another reason for discarding Count Models is that we do not know the number of occurrence of conflicts, but we know only if the firm experienced this conflict over the period. The third way of considering the conflicts is to see if the establishment has experienced at least one form of conflict and run a simple probit or logit. This is also not the best way of doing. For example if two firms have experienced only one conflict, petitions for the first and strike for the second, it becomes completely unreasonable to consider this two situations as being equivalent. The next way of considering conflicts is then to use multivariate models to understand the determinants of each type of conflicts, considered all together at the same time. Unfortunately, we notice that some types of conflicts are either rare (less 1%) or are almost totally included in the other types. This is the case for establishments with walkouts that declare also less than two-day strikes. We notice also that in more than 80% of case firms with demonstration are also firms with strikes. Since we have more than two possibles discrete outcomes (five) for conflict clusters, we have to use a multinomial (logit or probit) models

Endogeneity : Financial participation (employee share ownership and profit sharing), may have as objective to align the interests of all employees with those of the firm by sharing the risk of overall performance with employees and should then lower conflicts (see Heywood et al., 2005). Several works mentioned the endogeneity of the decision to have such schemes Kruse (1996). We have then implemented a test for the endogeneity of ESO and PS using a residual regression based Hausmann test (see Wooldridge, 2010). ESO and PS are found to be endogenous. In that case, we obtain a block of three equations: Probit for ESO, Probit for PS and Multinomial probit for conflicts

Let X_1 and X_2 be respectively a set of explanatory variables of ESO and PS.

X_1= Activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, Product quality for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic situation of the firm, diffusion of information on firm strategy, size dummies, industry dummies.

X_2= Activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, price for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic situation of the firm, size dummies, industry dummies.

Let X_3 be a set of explanatory variables of the different clusters of conflicts.

X_3= individual bonus, union impede firm activity, work council, worker autonomy, unionization rate, who control the work, size dummies, industry dummies.

The recursive system we want to estimate is then the following:

$$\begin{cases} ESO_i = F(X_{i1}) + \epsilon_{i1} \\ PS_i = F(X_{i2}) + \epsilon_{i2} \\ Col.Conflict_{ij} = F(ESO_i, PS_i, X_{i3}) + \epsilon_{i3}, \ j = 1,2,3,4,5 \ is\ the\ cluster\ index \end{cases}$$

To give more robustness to our results, we suggest to include individual conflicts. Several studies analyzing conflicts show that individual conflicts lead to collective conflicts (for more details see the chapter 1). Following this literature, we suggest to take also into account individual conflicts as possible determinants of collective conflicts. This will allow

us first to estimate the effects of financial participation on individual conflicts and second to test for the possible complementarity between individual and collective conflicts.

Since there are many kind of individual conflicts, and that some of them are very rare (less than 2%), we suggest to keep individual conflicts with high proportions[1]. Thus, we get four types of individual conflicts which are: Written Warning, Suspension, Dismissal for Fault, and Industrial Tribunal.

We also keep the same structure of the econometric model as for the previews specification. We just add the four types of individual conflicts described before.

Let Z be a set of explanatory variables of individual conflicts.

Z= tensions between some employees and their supervisor, tensions between some employees and their colleague, repeated incident caused by some employee, repeated accidents at work, individual bonus, union presence, worker autonomy, who control the work, size dummies, industry dummies.

The recursive system we want to estimate is the following:

$$\begin{cases} ESO_i = F(X_{i1}) + \epsilon_{i1} \\ PS_i = F(X_{i2}) + \epsilon_{i2} \\ Written_i = F(ESO_i, PS_i, Z_i) + \epsilon_{i3} \\ Suspension_i = F(ESO_i, PS_i, Z_i) + \epsilon_{i4} \\ Dismissal_i = F(ESO_i, PS_i, Z_i) + \epsilon_{i5} \\ Tribunal_i = F(ESO_i, PS_i, Z_i) + \epsilon_{i6} \\ Col.Conflict_{ij} = F(ESO_i, PS_i, written_i, suspension_i, dismissal_i, tribunal_i, X_{i4}) + \epsilon_{i7} \end{cases}$$

Our simultaneous equations system for both specifications are recursive. In this special case of simultaneous equations system with qualitative dependent variables, we can no longer use the standard estimation techniques (2SLS, 3SLS) since we are getting conditional probabilities rather linear expressions. Newey (1987) suggest to use two steps

[1]Rare individual conflicts were found to be completely included in the other forms of conflicts. We also conducted clustering of firms depending on individual conflicts and found that written, suspension, dismissal and tribunal are main influential type of individual conflicts.

estimate based on minimum Chi-Square estimation. Amemiya (1978) had already established some properties of this two steps estimator. In the case of two equations with one endogenous entering as exogenous in the second equation, Rivers and Vuong (1988) had also suggested this two steps IV estimator. Greene (2003) suggested to estimate such recursive simultaneous equations system by multivariate probit model. This handles for the possible correlation between each pair of equation (the GHK algorithm is then used). Thus, Roodman (2011) generalizes the Rivers and Vuong (1988)'s two steps estimation procedure to the case where we have a larger number of endogenous variables that are not all quantitative. In this case, the model should be recursive to allow for starting point estimator in the simulation procedure. We are exactly in this case since our model is recursive.

Identification : In the case of linear simultaneous equations system, identification is a crucial issue (see Greene, 2003). However, Wilde (2000) argues that in this case of non linear simultaneous equations system , "no exclusion restrictions for the exogenous variables are needed if there is sufficient variation in the data" (p.312). Since there is no clear consensus on that, we suggest respecting identification (results did not change when we relax identification). In each equation, we use both specific explanatory variables as well as common explanatory variables compared to other equations. This guaranties identification[2].

2.4 Empirical Results

This section looks forward the result of the determinants of collective conflicts, by controlling for the presence of different forms of financial participation as well as controlling for other firm's characteristics. The main effects we are looking for the first specification (Table 2.1) are those of employee share ownership and profit sharing. Table 2.2 allows to examine the robustness of our results from the second specification. Specifically, this

[2]According to Heckman and Robb (1985), identification of parameters is possible because of the non-linearity of the Probit model and does not require the use of instruments or exclusion restrictions. Wilde (2000) shows that a general (recursive) multi-equation probit model is identified as long as each equation contains one varying predetermined variable.

table shows, how the effects of financial participation on collective conflicts may vary when individual conflicts are added among our explanatory variables.

2.4.1 Financial Participation and Collective Conflicts

The main result (Table 2.1 in appendix 2.5 for more details) concerning financial participation is that both employee share ownership and profit sharing participate significantly to reduce Strong conflicts with respectively a marginal effect of -2% and -1%. This is a major and novel result. Its is in favor of several arguments suggested by Cable and Fitzroy (1980), Kruse (1996), and Cramton et al. (2010). This results show that financial participation allows to avoid costly actions. The alignment of interests, which is central to financial participation's role, allows to employees better identification to the firm. Employees should also consider the image of the firm that may suffer from long strikes.

We also observe that employee share ownership and profit sharing reduce significantly the likelihood of Overtime conflicts with respectively a marginal effect of -0.8% and -0.5%. Employees are providing already higher productivity so that their firm is more productive. This productivity differential may help the firm to avoid using (or using less) overtime. Alternatively, only collective incentive schemes may make workers adhering to the objectives of the firm so that employees will not really disagree with overtime if it is necessary to the performance of the firm (since this higher performance will be shared with employees).

Employee share ownership and profit sharing affect positively the emergence of Less Strong conflicts (with respectively a marginal effect of 2.3% and 6%) and the emergence of Petition (with respectively a marginal effect of 0.5% and 0.2%).

The fact that financial participation increase the probability of Less Strong conflicts is not necessary a negative signal. Less Strong Conflicts have not to be avoided because they can be a source of a better "climate" if they are reasonably expressed. If financial participation succeed in avoiding very costly conflicts (two-day strikes or more), employees may substitute Strong conflicts by Less Strong conflicts to avoid the possible negative consequence of long duration strikes.

The results of financial participation on Petition is in favor of a more democratic work environment where employees can use this pacific way to show clearly their dissatisfaction. Since the success of sharing schemes depends on a better communication and information (Fakhfakh, 1997*a*), we can attribute part of these effects to positive changes in worker's attitudes and behaviors (Pendleton et al., 1991). Better communication and diffusion of information may allow to employees to depict in advance some conflicts and try to "alert" the managers (by petition) before going on less pacific way of conflicts.

The effects of individual bonuses are positive on all types of collective conflicts. Individual bonuses are efficient is individual performance is easily observable and if employees tasks are independent. But individual bonuses do not favor cooperation between employees and may even engenders some "jalousie" between employees. It is also well known that the unskilled workers are those who are under the supervision of other more skilled so that not sharing more bonuses or not participating in the process of decision-making could engender such conflicts (Heywood et al., 2005).

We then turn to the set of remaining factors that may effect the emergence of conflicts in the firm. The organizational change is one the main sources of conflicts. It increases all types of conflicts except Petition, which is consistent with Baillien and De Witte (2009)' study, who provide evidence that organizational change augment the probability of observing conflict as well as job insecurity. Organizational change needs usually a change in work structure, work chain, or a change in production process that needs to suppress (or to reduce) the number of employees (or the number of hierarchical levels). In one of these case, employees may react by showing their dissatisfaction. In general, decisions related to organizational change are in most cases imposed. Hence, to make themselves heard, employees prefer to contest through actions that may directly affect the production than Petition, which affect only little or not the production.

Work council affects positively the emergence of all types of collective conflicts. This result is not surprising in the French case. Indeed, in France not only the presence of the work council is not required in firms with fewer than 50 employees, but also the work council plays more a role as an advisory body rather than decision-maker (unlike other countries like Germany, for example). In this case, it is obvious that the probability of conflicts is high between decision makers (firm) and consulted (employees).

The unionization rate participates significantly in the emergence of all types of collective conflicts but it affect more the probability of the emergence of conflicts with strikes than conflict without strikes. The more the number of unionized employees in the firm is high, the more its effect is accentuated in the strikes. Union are mainly in the firm to protect employee's interest. It is then expected that the union presence is a significant factor in favor of the voice than exit behavior (Hirschman, 1970, Desage and Rosankis, 2013). Another explanation for this result could be found in Freeman and Medoff (1984)'s study, for whom union consider strikes as an effective way to convey their ideas to employer, which in tern can improve communication, employee morale and cooperation.

Employee autonomy is found to be a very significant factor in explaining conflicts. It reduces the probability of Strong and Overtime conflict's emergence (its effect on Petition is not significant). More autonomy mean less contact with others (mainly supervisor) and then less probability of conflicts. But more autonomy leads also to more short work stoppage because it increase the emergence of Less Strong conflicts. This result support Godard (1992)'s study who found that employee autonomy has significant negative effect on strike activity.

We also know about who controls employees. When employees are controlled by costumers or specialized service (and not by a hierarchical supervisor), we notice a significant decrease in the Strong, Overtime and Petition but increase the the emergence of Less Strong conflicts. This seems to be the best way of monitoring that the firm can use to avoid the most hard forms of conflicts. Finally when workers are under peer-control (horizontal monitoring) this generate less conflicts than when monitoring is made by a hierarchical supervision.

We also control for industry affiliation as well as size effects. As expected, the more the firm is large, the more the conflicts are probable. Voice is also associated to size: it is easier to show his/her dissatisfaction when the size of the group is large so that the managers can hardly identify each one beyond the conflict and try to punish them. Another explanation is that supervision is harder when the size of the firm is larger. Finally, some sectors seem to suffer more from conflicts than others. Compared to the sector of trade & auto repair, all conflicts are more frequent in sector of Food industry, Auto industry& equipment goods, Energy industry and Information, communication & financial. These sectors are under more competitive and international pressure, so that they may suffer more from

employment cuts (this is really the case of the car auto & equipment sector). The industry suffering less from conflicts is the sector of Accommodation & restaurant where it is more difficult to go on a complete strike without closing doors and causing more damage to the customers.

Table 2.1: **Financial participation and collective conflicts (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Employee Share Ownership	-0.020***	0.023***	-0.008***	0.005***
	(-6.30)	(7.72)	(-5.48)	(5.30)
Profit Sharing	-0.010***	0.060***	-0.005***	0.002**
	(-5.38)	(14.20)	(-5.37)	(2.06)
Observation		2430		

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

2.4.2 Financial Participation, Individual Conflicts and Collective Conflicts

The main conclusion is that these results (Table 2.2 see more detail in appendix 2.5) confirm what we get previously: both employee share ownership and profit sharing participate significantly to reduce Strong and Overtime conflicts but affect positively the emergence of Less Strong conflicts and Petition (a peaceful form of democracy).

We note that individual conflicts participate very significantly to the emergence of collective conflicts except suspension and dismissal for fault which reduce the likelihood of Less Strong conflicts and also except dismissal for fault which reduce Strong conflicts. The results are in favor of Klaas et al. (1991), Lewin and Peterson (1999), Dixon et al. (2004) and Jefferys (2011) findings for whom a complementarity seems to exist between individual

conflicts and collective conflicts. This complementary is very slightly contradicted by the negative effects of dismissal for fault on Strong conflicts and between suspension, dismissal for fault and Less Strong conflicts (rather a substitution). The effects of other variables are almost unchanged compared to table 2.1 (in appendix 2.5).

Table 2.2: **Financial Participation, individual conflicts and collective conflicts (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Employee Share Ownership	-0.011**	0.033***	-0.002**	0.004**
	(-3.21)	(9.31)	(-3.26)	(3.25)
Profit Sharing	-0.009**	0.073***	-0.001**	0.006***
	(-3.22)	(13.86)	(-2.24)	(5.91)
Individual Conflict				
Writen Warning	0.024***	0.030***	0.002***	0.003**
	(7.91)	(9.03)	(3.36)	(2.66)
Suspension	0.010**	-0.022***	0.001**	0.005***
	(3.19)	(-6.94)	(3.02)	(4.49)
Dismissal for Fault	-0.009**	-0.001	0.003**	0.014***
	(-2.81)	(-0.35)	(3.29)	(10.48)
Industrial Tribunal	0.027***	0.010***	0.000*	0.005***
	(8.24)	(3.52)	(2.07)	(4.70)
Observation		2419		

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter study the effect of financial participation on conflicts at the firm level. It offers a large set of results showing that financial participation helps in avoiding some conflicts. Using a cross-section of 4023 firms, we first use multiple correspondence analysis and clustering to characterize firms regarding collective conflicts. This permit us to suggest some grouping of conflict types. We also estimate the impact of employee share ownership and profit sharing on collective conflicts with considering individual conflicts by including among our explanatory variables individual conflicts.

Our results are almost in the same line and show that both employee share ownership and profit sharing participate significantly to lower Strong conflicts (with considering and without considering individual conflicts). They even lower the probability of Overtime. However, the effects of employee share ownership and profit sharing found to increase the probability of Less Strong and Petition conflicts. Petition could be considered as the "reasonable" kind of conflicts since it could also be considered as a democratic way of "voice" that does not affect the firm activity and that allows employees to express their dissatisfaction.

Finally, the effects of some control variables are also a great interest. While organizational change increase the probability of all forms of collective conflicts (except its effect on Petition), worker's autonomy is found to reduce the emergence of all forms of conflicts except Less Strong conflicts. At the same time, horizontal monitoring lower significantly the emergence of Strong conflicts. The unionization rate participates significantly in the emergence of Strong and Less Strong conflicts but reduces the probability of the emergence of Overtime and Petition conflicts.

Appendix 2.5

Table 2.3: **Variable Descriptions (Chapter 2) (%)**

Variable	**Variable definition**	**Average**
Employee Share Ownership	Binary variable that equals to 1 if employees have a share of the firm's capital, equals to 0 otherwise	15.06
Profit Sharing	Binary variable equals to 1 if the employees in the firm are covered by a profit sharing contract, equals to 0 otherwise	31.96
Individual Bonuses	Binary variable equals to 1 if the employees in the firm received bonuses linked to individual performance, equals to 0 otherwise	53.59
Organizational change	Binary variable equals to 1 if the firm has conducted at least one organizational change, equals to 0 otherwise	71.51
Work Council	Binary variable equals to 1 if the work council exists in the firm, equals to 0 otherwise	18.90
Unions impede the firm activities	Binary variable equals to 1 if the unions impede the progress of the firm's activities from the opinion of the firm's representative, equals to 0 otherwise	40.17
Worker Autonomy	Binary variable equals to 1 if an accident in production or of the service, employees are first encouraged to solve the problem themselves, equals to 0 otherwise	48.88
Unionization rate	Ordered variable (from 1 to 4) if the unionization rate of the firm belongs to one of the four classes: Less than 5%) 5% to 9% 10% to 20% More than 20%	 72.87 14.90 5.90 6.33
Who Controls the Work	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 3) if the employee's work is controlled primarily by: Superior Hierarchy Customers & Specialized Service	 88.30 7.25

Continued on next page...

... table 2.3 continued

Variable	Variable definition	Average
	Colleague	4.45
Incidents at work	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 4) if one of the following problems occurred in the firm	
	Tensions between salaries & superiors	30.56
	Tensions between salaries & colleagues	38.09
	Repeated incidents caused by salaries	19.84
	Repeated accidents at work	8.67
Union Presence	Binary variable equals to 1 if there are union representatives in the firm, equals to 0 otherwise	
Firm activity's is easy to predict	Binary variable equals to 1 if one year to another, it is easy to predict the evolution of the firm's activity, equals to 0 otherwise	28.98
Single establishment	Binary variable equals to 1 if the firm is a single establishment, equals to 0 otherwise	55.77
The firm belongs to a group	Binary variable equals to 1 if the firm belongs to a group, equals to 0 otherwise	34.80
Price as a strategy to compete	Binary variable equals to 1 if the price is the main element on which is based the firm's strategy against the competition, equals to 0 other- wise	13.19
Product quality as a strategy to compete	Binary variable equals to 1 if the product quality is the main element on which is based the firm's strategy against the competition, equals to 0 otherwise	16.86
Service quality as a strategy to compete	Binary variable equals to 1 if the service quality is the main element on which is based the firm's strategy against the competition, equals to 0 otherwise	43.53
Market	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 5) if the main activity of the firm is:	
	Local market	36.05
	Regional market	22.15
	National market	24.02
	European market	6.47
	World market	11.30

Continued on next page...

... table 2.3 continued

Variable	Variable definition	Average
Information on economic situation	Ordered variable (from 1 to 3) if the information on the economic situation of the firm is shared to all employees:	
	Regularly	63.14
	Occasional	27.24
	Never	9.62
Information on firm strategy	Ordered variable (from 1 to 3) if the information on the strategies and orientations of the firm is shared to all employees:	
	Regularly	50.44
	Occasional	31.38
	Never	18.18
Number of employees	Ordered variable (from 1 to 6) if the size (number of employees) of the firm belongs to one of six classes:	
	Less than 20 Employees	39.65
	20 to 49 employees	37.05
	50 to 99 employees	12.76
	100 to 199 employees	5.86
	200 to 499 employees	3.46
	500 employees or more	1.22
Sector	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 10) if the firm belongs to one of the ten following sectors	
	Food industry	2.79
	Auto industry & equipment goods	2.47
	Energy industry	12.62
	Construction	11.30
	Trade & auto repair	19.36
	Transport & warehousing	7.54
	Accommodation & food	6.67
	Information, communication, financial & real estate activity	7.08
	Scientific & technical activities	11.67
	Public administration, health & social work	18.49

Table 2.1: **Financial Participation and Collective Conflicts (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Employee Share Ownership	-0.020***	0.023***	-0.008***	0.005***
	(-6.30)	(7.72)	(-5.48)	(5.30)
Profit Sharing	-0.010***	0.060***	-0.005***	0.002**
	(-5.38)	(14.20)	(-5.37)	(2.06)
Individual Bonus	0.003**	0.029***	0.010***	0.005***
	(2.47)	(10.51)	(5.80)	(8.75)
Organizational Change	0.005***	0.041***	0.003***	-0.005***
	(4.24)	(15.63)	(4.91)	(-8.58)
Unions Impede the Firm Activities	0.013***	-0.010***	0.002***	-0.004***
	(6.31)	(-5.51)	(4.60)	(-7.26)
Work Council	0.010***	0.051***	0.001**	0.002**
	(5.86)	(16.67)	(3.00)	(2.64)
Worker Autonomy	-0.004***	0.009***	-0.002***	-0.001
	(-4.07)	(5.51)	(-4.62)	(-1.45)
Unionization rate (Ref.: Less than 5%)				
5% to 9%	0.015***	0.130***	-0.000	0.006***
	(6.13)	(18.88)	(-0.34)	(8.80)
10% to 20%	0.034***	0.185***	0.003**	0.001
	(6.55)	(19.70)	(3.26)	(0.73)
More Than 20%	0.040***	0.202***	0.006***	0.004***
	(6.64)	(19.63)	(4.68)	(4.05)
Who Controls the Work (Ref.: Superior)				
Customers & Specialized Service	-0.025***	0.021***	-0.006***	-0.015***
	(-6.19)	(6.09)	(-5.03)	(-9.30)
Colleague	-0.002	0.024***	0.004***	0.009***
	(-0.77)	(5.77)	(4.38)	(9.19)
Number of Employees (Ref.: $<$ 20 Employees)				
20 to 49 Employees	-0.002**	0.032***	0.004***	0.000
	(-2.00)	(11.95)	(5.38)	(0.26)
50 to 99 Employees	0.015***	0.053***	0.010***	0.009***
	(6.07)	(16.33)	(5.66)	(11.36)

Continued on next page...

... table 2.1 continued

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
100 to 199 Employees	0.022***	0.065***	0.003***	0.013***
	(6.37)	(15.58)	(3.68)	(12.92)
200 to 499 Employees	0.045***	0.061***	0.013***	0.018***
	(6.71)	(13.61)	(5.22)	(14.11)
500 Employees or more	0.063***	0.095***	0.019***	0.025***
	(6.86)	(14.88)	(5.22)	(13.49)
Sector (Ref.: Trade & Auto Repair)				
Food Industry	-0.004	-0.017**	0.001	-0.018***
	(-1.60)	(-2.67)	(1.40)	(-5.24)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.011***	0.056***	0.006***	-0.015***
	(4.42)	(9.77)	(4.61)	(-6.21)
Energy Industry	0.015***	0.045***	0.004***	-0.006***
	(6.08)	(12.19)	(4.99)	(-5.29)
Construction	-0.018***	-0.036***	0.004***	-0.008***
	(-4.47)	(-7.67)	(4.78)	(-6.67)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.005**	0.008**	-0.003***	0.010***
	(-2.80)	(2.22)	(-4.14)	(9.85)
Accommodation & Food	-0.023***	-0.056***	-0.014***	0.004***
	(-4.56)	(-8.29)	(-5.55)	(3.76)
Info, Com, Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.003	0.064***	-0.021***	0.007***
	(1.78)	(13.23)	(-5.72)	(6.55)
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.019***	0.019***	-0.008***	-0.001
	(-5.84)	(5.29)	(-5.41)	(-0.58)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.011***	0.108***	-0.006***	0.021***
	(-5.00)	(16.61)	(-5.14)	(19.11)
N	2914			

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Table 2.2: **Financial Participation, Individual Conflicts and Collective Conflicts (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Employee Share Ownership	-0.011**	0.033***	-0.002**	0.004**
	(-3.21)	(9.31)	(-3.26)	(3.25)
Profit Sharing	-0.009**	0.073***	-0.001**	0.006***
	(-3.22)	(13.86)	(-2.24)	(5.91)
Individual Bonus	-0.001	0.032***	0.002***	0.003***
	(-0.62)	(12.08)	(3.43)	(4.22)
Individual Conflict				
Writen Warning	0.024***	0.030***	0.002***	0.003**
	(7.91)	(9.03)	(3.36)	(2.66)
Suspension	0.010**	-0.022***	0.001**	0.005***
	(3.19)	(-6.94)	(3.02)	(4.49)
Dismissal for Fault	-0.009**	-0.001	0.003**	0.014***
	(-2.81)	(-0.35)	(3.29)	(10.48)
Industrial Tribunal	0.027***	0.010***	0.001**	0.005***
	(8.24)	(3.52)	(2.07)	(4.70)
Organizational Change	0.006**	0.043***	0.001**	-0.009***
	(2.59)	(13.33)	(2.83)	(-11.89)
Unions Impede the Firm Activities	0.024***	-0.010***	0.000	-0.007***
	(11.21)	(-4.95)	(0.35)	(-9.22)
Work Council	0.014***	0.049***	0.000	0.003***
	(6.34)	(14.77)	(1.68)	(3.67)
Worker Autonomy	-0.005**	0.009***	-0.000	-0.000
	(-2.92)	(5.57)	(-1.46)	(-0.57)
Unionization rate (Ref,: Less than 5%)				
5% to 9%	0.042***	0.136***	-0.000**	0.007***
	(13.98)	(18.09)	(-2.84)	(8.66)
10% to 20%	0.091***	0.191***	-0.001**	0.002
	(20.72)	(17.44)	(-2.78)	(1.48)
More Than 20%	0.098***	0.214***	-0.000	0.009***

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... table 2.1 continued

Variables	Strong	Lestrong	Overtime	Petition
	(21.52)	(18.46)	(-0.68)	(6.71)
Who Controls the Work (Ref,: Superior)				
Customers & Specialized Service	-0.035***	0.025***	-0.001**	-0.019***
	(-8.52)	(6.91)	(-3.16)	(-8.88)
Colleague	-0.012**	0.033***	0.001**	0.015***
	(-2.41)	(7.81)	(2.63)	(10.17)
Number of Employees (Ref,: < 20 Employees)				
20 to 49 Employees	-0.034***	0.030***	-0.000	-0.004***
	(-9.85)	(11.20)	(-0.17)	(-4.54)
50 to 99 Employees	-0.002	0.046***	-0.000	0.005***
	(-0.62)	(14.17)	(-1.33)	(4.09)
100 to 199 Employees	0.006	0.059***	-0.003**	0.008***
	(1.41)	(14.06)	(-3.22)	(6.21)
200 to 499 Employees	0.059***	0.054***	-0.003**	0.014***
	(12.01)	(12.30)	(-3.11)	(7.93)
500 Employees or more	0.077***	0.092***	-0.003**	0.020***
	(11.95)	(14.76)	(-2.99)	(8.20)
Sector (Ref,: Trade & Auto Repair)				
Food Industry	-0.026***	-0.008	0.001**	-0.028***
	(-4.56)	(-1.15)	(2.68)	(-5.89)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.039***	0.074***	0.002**	-0.010***
	(7.96)	(12.00)	(3.24)	(-3.58)
Energy Industry	0.035***	0.055***	0.001**	-0.003*
	(11.64)	(13.24)	(3.11)	(-2.27)
Construction	-0.077***	-0.018***	0.001**	-0.007***
	(-10.15)	(-3.91)	(3.26)	(-4.01)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.007*	0.010**	-0.001**	0.014***
	(-1.92)	(2.49)	(-2.82)	(10.34)
Accommodation & Food	-0.041***	-0.043***	-0.004***	0.001
	(-4.72)	(-6.36)	(-3.35)	(0.62)
Info, Com, Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.024***	0.063***	-0.004***	0.012***
	(6.79)	(11.39)	(-3.37)	(8.20)

Continued on next page...

... table 2.1 continued

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.035***	0.022***	-0.001**	0.002
	(-8.36)	(5.67)	(-3.24)	(1.63)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.002	0.125***	-0.001**	0.031***
	(-0.54)	(16.35)	(-2.85)	(19.84)
N		2419		

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Table 2.6: **Determinants of individual conflicts**

Variables	**Written**	**Suspension**	**Dismissal**	**Tribunal**
Employee Share Ownership	-0.016	-0.079***	-0.194***	-0.169***
	(-0.87)	(-3.61)	(-9.77)	(-8.63)
Profit Sharing	-0.101***	0.330***	0.335***	-0.088***
	(-6.08)	(16.52)	(17.31)	(-4.33)
Individual Bonus	0.316***	0.241***	0.206***	0.226***
	(38.86)	(24.31)	(21.72)	(24.10)
Tensions Between Salaries and their Superiors	0.235***	0.205***	0.249***	0.339***
	(28.11)	(21.70)	(27.30)	(38.13)
Tensions Between Salaries and Their Colleagues	0.187***	0.120***	0.105***	0.135***
	(23.13)	(12.86)	(11.56)	(15.29)
Repeated Incidents Caused by some Salaries	0.358***	0.344***	0.353***	0.271***
	(37.72)	(34.26)	(36.12)	(28.04)
Repeated Accidents at Work	0.499***	0.225***	0.331***	0.410***
	(36.51)	(17.86)	(26.77)	(33.92)
Union Presence	0.187***	0.142***	0.006	0.114***
	(22.57)	(15.25)	(0.70)	(12.76)
Worker Autonomy	-0.025***	-0.270***	-0.095***	-0.096***
	(-3.56)	(-33.50)	(-12.28)	(-12.54)
Who Controls the Work (Ref.: Superior)				
Customers & Specialized Service	-0.267***	-0.016	0.034*	0.095***

Continued on next page...

... table 2.6 continued

Variables	**Written**	**Suspension**	**Dismissal**	**Tribunal**
	(-20.19)	(-0.96)	(2.23)	(6.42)
Colleague	-0.068***	0.060**	0.094***	0.096***
	(-3.96)	(3.01)	(4.79)	(5.02)
Number of employees (Ref.:< 20 employees)				
20 to 49 Employees	0.537***	0.786***	0.547***	0.585***
	(65.61)	(67.97)	(51.85)	(56.02)
50 to 99 Employees	1.028***	1.114***	0.986***	1.102***
	(87.79)	(78.10)	(72.27)	(83.99)
100 to 199 Employees	1.220***	1.432***	1.237***	1.254***
	(76.87)	(83.21)	(74.74)	(77.72)
200 to 499 Employees	1.479***	1.562***	1.630***	1.742***
	(70.25)	(77.59)	(81.70)	(89.77)
500 Employees or more	1.695***	1.955***	2.019***	2.133***
	(46.82)	(63.85)	(64.12)	(69.32)
Sector (Ref.: Trade & auto repair)				
Food Industry	0.160***	-0.020	0.012	-0.022
	(6.90)	(-0.79)	(0.49)	(-0.90)
Auto Industry & Equipment goods	-0.190***	-0.128***	-0.147***	0.156***
	(-8.93)	(-5.24)	(-6.63)	(7.09)
Energy Industry	-0.159***	-0.005	-0.508***	-0.180***
	(-13.02)	(-0.36)	(-35.98)	(-13.44)
Construction	0.132***	-0.138***	-0.220***	-0.247***
	(9.96)	(-8.52)	(-14.24)	(-15.61)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.041**	0.255***	-0.161***	-0.058***
	(-2.78)	(15.62)	(-9.94)	(-3.57)
Accommodation & Food	0.350***	0.583***	0.436***	-0.193***
	(21.52)	(33.83)	(26.82)	(-10.73)
Info, com, Financial & Real Estate Activ.	-0.427***	-0.461***	-0.355***	-0.009
	(-29.22)	(-25.44)	(-21.65)	(-0.56)
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.356***	-0.159***	-0.210***	-0.073***
	(-27.56)	(-10.54)	(-14.82)	(-5.15)

Continued on next page...

... table 2.6 continued

Variables	**Written**	**Suspension**	**Dismissal**	**Tribunal**
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.365***	-0.240***	-0.402***	-0.158***
	(-27.76)	(-14.99)	(-26.01)	(-10.59)
Intercept	-0.874***	-2.010***	-1.648***	-1.720***
	(-71.83)	(-125.74)	(-114.18)	(-117.64)
N		3266		

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Table 2.7: **Determinants of ESO and PS**

Variables	**ESO**	**PS**
Firm's Activity is Easy to Predict	0.058***	0.230***
	(6.93)	(30.90)
Mono-firm	-0.359***	-0.522***
	(-42.40)	(-72.06)
Firm Belongs to a Group	0.325***	0.514***
	(37.44)	(69.33)
Price to Competitive Strategy	-0.204***	-
	(-16.63)	-
Product Quality to Competitive Strategy	-	0.136***
	-	(14.03)
Service Quality to Competitive Strategy	0.043***	0.194***
	(5.22)	(25.91)
Market (Ref.: Local Market)		
Regional Market	0.179***	-0.162***
	(17.03)	(-17.08)
National Market	-0.009	0.148***

Continued on next page...

... table 2.7continued

Variables	**ESO**	**PS**
	(-0.87)	(16.09)
European Market	-0.070***	0.402***
	(-4.15)	(28.76)
World Market	0.300***	0.319***
	(23.76)	(27.06)
Information on Economic Situation (Ref.: Regularly)		
Occasional	0.410***	0.653***
	(26.80)	(42.49)
Never	0.238***	0.374***
	(14.70)	(24.12)
Information on Firm Strategy (Ref.: Regularly)		
Occasional	-	0.344***
	-	(23.17)
Never	-	0.206***
	-	(13.90)
Number of Employees (Ref.:< 20 Employees)		
20 to 49 Employees	-0.157***	0.170***
	(-17.65)	(22.03)
50 to 99 Employees	0.023	0.505***
	(1.91)	(46.99)
100 to 199 Employees	0.010	0.586***
	(0.65)	(41.56)
200 to 499 Employees	0.012	0.684***
	(0.63)	(38.40)
500 Employees or more	0.444***	1.041***
	(15.53)	(32.75)
Sector (Ref.: Trade & Auto Repair)		
Food Industry	-0.206***	-0.184***
	(-8.19)	(-8.38)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.300***	-0.126***
	(13.63)	(-5.86)
Energy Industry	0.090***	0.092***

Continued on next page...

... table 2.7continued

Variables	**ESO**	**PS**
	(6.90)	(7.89)
Construction	0.376***	0.419***
	(27.89)	(33.42)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.200***	0.162***
	(-12.24)	(11.61)
Accommodation & Food	0.025	-0.241***
	(1.55)	(-15.75)
Info, Com, Financial & Real Estate Activ.	0.037**	0.087***
	(2.38)	(6.40)
Scientific & Technical Activities	0.197***	0.028**
	(15.08)	(2.34)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.810***	-0.975***
	(-49.25)	(-75.20)
Intercept	-1.347***	-1.579***
	(-71.10)	(-81.74)
N	3897	

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

3 Negotiation, Financial Particpation and Resolution of Collective Conflicts

3.1 Introduction

The modern vision of conflict considers labor conflict as necessary for firms, but most recommendations concerning conflict are still in the context of it resolution. The conflict resolution involves the elimination, the reduction or the end of conflict. However, the current tendency to reduce (manage) rather than to eliminate conflict in the workplace is still based on the assumption that the interests of employees and employers can be aligned. Researchers from various disciplines have conducted conceptual and empirical studies to examine how conflicts can be managed or resolved efficiently. The effectiveness occurs when the conflicting party positively perceive the conflict and actively use the resolution options in relation to their satisfaction.

The labor conflict has an end. The end of the conflict does not mean that the conflict situation has completely disappeared. According to Sexton (1996) conflict resolution requires to be, at short term, in a context where the conflict is defined by specific goals that each party seeks to achieve. Touzard (1977) points out that the conflict is expected to be completed in one way or another because it is expensive economically and psychologically. According to Sexton (1996), the economic costs are lost of profits (for employers) and wages (for employees) such as the shortfall during a strike. There are also psychological costs because any conflict requires a mobilization of the energy of groups categories concerned.

But these economic and psychological costs may at some point exceed the bearable costs by the firm because the damages are very important, or because the continuation of the conflict risks compromising the survival of the firm. When the cost of the disagreement deflects greater than the cost of the agreement, most of the time the conflict ends[1]. However, these costs can be reduced if employers and employees adopt a constructive negotiation. Financial participation schemes can also reduce these costs because they create better environment to employers and employees to easily resolve conflict.

Negotiation is one of the best way to resolve a conflict by trying to find a satisfactory compromise for both employees and employers. But it is only one way to other means of conflict resolution. Financial participation is a compensation scheme whereby employees can share the financial results of the firm, for example, profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes. Although there have been a number of two types of practical studies, there are few studies that have examined the contexts in which these practices produce better results on the conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is a crucial issues for managers to avoid some possible too long duration and expansive conflict. Understanding how to solve conflict, with the help of financial participation become the key message of this chapter.

This chapter provides new evidence on the ways through which negotiation procedure and financial participation may affect the conflict resolution. To our knowledge, no empirical study has examined this issue on French data. The chapter is organized as follows: in the second section, we present a literature review and some empirical studies that address the issues of conflict resolution. In the third section, we briefly present the data and the econometric methodology used. The management representatives and those of the employees do not have the same perception of the conflict, which can give several recommendations to both management and employee representatives. In the fourth section, the satisfaction at the end of collective conflicts (both on management and employee representative views) is explained by several factors, including financial participation (i.e Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership). Some concluding remarks are presented at the end of this chapter.

[1]This implies that firms can implement conflict resolution systems gradually, choosing the specific components based on a cost-benefit analysis of the specific needs of the firm.

3.2 Background

3.2.1 Conflict Resolution in the French Context

Collective conflicts (especially strikes) are a right in the French constitution. It became the legitimate manifestation of collective conflicts. The best way to avoid conflicts is to negotiate regularly within the firm to maintain an acceptable social climate for all. In case of conflict, the interests of employers and employees is to negotiate to end the conflict quickly. In most cases, the conflict ends with a written agreement between the parties who set the terms of the compromise. This agreement (called "protocol of conflict end") leads the parties to accept reciprocal obligations. So many of them consider provisions on remunerations and working conditions, the payment terms of hours lost through strikes or clauses stating that the strikers will not be punished. However, first employers do not have the obligation to negotiate. Second, face to strikes, employers have the ability to implement organizational measures such as the use of subcontracting, temporary workers in order to replace the strikers. Employers may also, under certain conditions, decide the temporary closure of the firm in order to force employees to end the conflict (the lockout). In legal terms, there are three procedures for conflict resolution[2] descried as follows:

Conciliation : The conciliation procedure is to discuss the points of view of both employers and employees during a conflict. Employers and employees try to harmonize their points of view through a conciliation commission. This commission is made up of employers and employees representatives in equal numbers, as well as representatives of public authorities who may be freely chosen by the parties or provided for by collective agreements. The President of the Conciliation Commission invites representatives of the parties to a series of meetings. In light of these meetings, it is established a Minutes which notes either the agreement or the total/partial disagreement of the parties. If conciliation fails, the conflict may be submitted either to the mediation, or arbitration proceedings.

Mediation : The mediation procedure can be initiated either as a result to the failure of conciliation by the president of the Conciliation Commission, or directly if the parties

[2]According to the French labor Code (art.L. 2521-1 and next)

request it. The mediator is a qualified person designated according to his/her moral authority and his/her powers (law professor, expert in labor law...) and freely chosen by the parties or failing that by the administrative authority or national lists. The mediator is responsible for consulting parties and collecting their claims. After an analysis work, the mediator summons the parties to find a solution. If a deal is emerging, the mediator shall issue, within a month, a recommendation. This recommendation may then be accepted or rejected by the parties within eight days. If accepted, it becomes immediately applicable and has the same binding force as a collective agreement. In case of refusal, the mediator informs the Minister of Labor about the recommendation text substantially signed and motivated releases sent by the parties to the mediator. The administration makes public the recommendation of the mediator and the parties' positions. The solution of the conflict can only go through arbitration.

Arbitration : Arbitration procedure is a solution to conflict decided by a third party. It is a little-used procedure because the decision of the arbitrator is binding on the parties who are engaged in advance to accept it. The arbitrator is chosen freely by third parties who will take over the solution of the conflict. After hearing the parties to the conflict, he/she makes an award. This award applies to the parties but is not an obligation or rather its failure can not be sanctioned. However, it is likely to appeal against the Higher Arbitration Court composed of state councilors and senior judges.

However, it must be noted that mediation and arbitration procedures play a limited role in the conflict resolution in France. Le Flanchec and Rojot (2010) noted that despite the existence of certain procedures to use mediation or arbitration in the field of conflict in France, not only its use is low in the legal framework but it is very underdeveloped within the firms.

3.2.2 Theory and Empirical Studies

Labor conflict can have many causes, and many factors can help or hinder its solutions. In the firm most of collective conflict are triggered on union initiative. Kaufman and Lewin (1998) points out that union improves fairness in labor relations, and the increase in the cost of labor that follows, entice the employer to manage the firm more efficiently,

changing the structures of incentive to effort, working conditions, or supervision. Thus, without this institutional mechanism, employee will be disadvantage in terms of power and conflicts will always be resolved in favor of the employer (Duffy et al., 2000). Hence, taking into account the employees' preferences may improve performance, reduce turnover, and prevent potential conflicts. In addition, the firm's bargaining costs decrease since it can negotiate with the employee representatives (union) rather than with each individual. This positive vision (pluralist) of unionism assumes that union presence has to help effectively and equitably resolve conflicts within firms. By contrast, the impact is negative considering the unitarist vision of the union. In this case, the union will decrease the firm efficiency by affecting the choice of the employer on the number of workers and salary level and increasing income inequality. From this unitarist vision, unions have little or nothing to contribute to the employment relationship except, perhaps, heightened conflicts (Lewin, 2005).

Traditionally, three methods of conflicts resolution[3] are used in the literature: negotiation, mediation/conciliation[4] and arbitration. However, negotiation is the most discussed and the most used procedure for the resolution of collective conflicts.

The negotiation procedure covers efforts by employers and employee representatives (usually union) to resolve conflicts themselves without third party intervention (Lewicki et al., 1999). The negotiation procedure must be privileged in any conflict settlement[5]. The negotiation between employers and employees may experience voltage phases, which may lead to more strikes or other forms of conflicts. Conversely, conflicts can create conditions for negotiation. Through conflict, the parties evaluate their strengths, to test the other party, trying to impose a negotiation, out of a trading block or simply to improve their positions in the negotiation phase that follows.

The negotiation procedure found great attention in the literature. Unlike traditional opposition negotiations often focus on solutions loser-winner distribution, negotiations allow

[3]Also called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) see "Encadré 3" in appendix 3.5

[4]In most of the literature on the resolution of collective conflicts, there is no distinction between conciliation and mediation as the authors think they mean the same way of intervention (Lemieux, 1996)

[5]For this reason in some countries where the right to strike is in the law, the notice of conflicts with work stoppage in some sectors called "Essentials" (sectors that can create a danger to the population health and safety) can only be validated if employers and employees prior initiated the settlement of the conflict through the negotiation procedure. This is particularly the case in Quebec where in essential services, the Council of Essential Services may refuse to approve a strike if it finds a negotiating failure

employers and employees to achieve more integrated solutions, that is to say, to win-win solutions (Harinck et al., 2000). The negotiation procedure, if successful, is clearly the most effective and least costly approach to conflicts resolution in the firm. Following this line of thought, we must emphasize the role that can play the symmetry or asymmetry of information in negotiations between employers and employee representatives (union) during the conflict resolution process. It is often argued that employers avoid disclosure to not weaken their position during negotiation procedure, avoiding costly conflicts regulations (Elias, 1990). Since conflicts involve substantial costs and may affect the competitiveness of the firm, much work has studied, through game theory, the effects of information sharing on the behavior of conflicting parties in the negotiation (Roth and Malouf, 1979, Roth and Murnighan, 1982). Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1996) emphasized that the actual exchange of information between employer-employee conflict is a factor necessary to resolve problems and facilitate the negotiation. Elias (1990) studied the effects of the symmetry of financial information on trading behavior and the results in terms of conflict resolution. His conclusion is that information asymmetry generally resulted in higher initial expectations associated with greater optimism on the part of employee representatives (the union), and a greater divergence in the case of the symmetry of information. However, the author found that the information symmetry did not lead higher or lower resolutions during the post-conflict negotiations in relation to the case of asymmetric information.

However, the negotiation procedure is not always appropriate in resolving all conflicts. Power differences may exist in a conflict (power can be on the employer side or the union side). But Pohjola (1987) shows that union's bargaining power is influential in the bargaining process. Specially if the union is interested in wages and also employment, a Nash bargaining process will automatically leads to a profit sharing contract where the share of profit going to employees is exactly equal to the union bargaining power.

In this line, in addition to negotiation procedure, the presence of financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes) can also help to facilitate the conflicts resolution. Several arguments have been advanced to explain why financial participation can reduce conflicts and the use of traditional procedures of conflicts resolution (Levine, 1990, Duffy et al., 2000, Kruse et al., 2010).

Desbrières (2002), Poole and Jenkins (1991) showed from their theoretical models that firms implement financial participation schemes to enhance employees intrinsic as well

as extrinsic commitment, which facilitate the conflicst resolution. Cramton et al. (2008) is the only empirical study that looks at the impact of employee share ownership on labor conflict. Using data on major collective bargaining from USA, they found consistent evidence with the prediction of their theoretical model that employee share ownership reduces the overall incidence of conflicts. An assumption is that financial participation gives to employees extrinsic as well intrinsic gains[6]. These gains provide employees with more cooperative behavior, increasing their satisfaction while improving productivity and labor relations (Hammer, 1988, Cable and Fitzroy, 1980, Kruse, 1996). This improvement of labor relations assumes that employees are able to solve problems informally, which will increase the employee satisfaction after the conflicts. It may also reduce the impact of the use of traditional conflict resolution procedures (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991).

Also, by adopting financial participation, the firm reports that it appreciates employee contributions (Allen et al., 2003), which in turn improves the commitment related to the firm (Mayer and Schoorman, 1998, Park et al., 2010). Cooke (1994) studied the impact of employee involvement in making-decision and the impact of financial participation on firm performance based on the presence or absence of trade union. He empirically obtained two results: the employee involvement in making-decision contribute most to the performance of unionized than non-unionized firms and financial participation longer contribute to the performance of non-unionized than unionized firms. Thus, participation schemes are often essential to the establishment of a compensation structure at the firm level.

However, financial participation does not have only positive effects on conflicts and conflicts resolution. Some authors showed that financial participation can reduce the likelihood that employees leave their jobs (Exit) because they have the opportunity to express their opinions (Voice) about the decisions that directly concerns them (Wilson and Peel, 1991, Batt and Welbourne, 2002). The opportunity to "Voice" given to employees, in this case may increase the probability of occurrence of global conflicts. Other authors point out that financial participation can lead to more conflicts in the workplace and thus undermine the traditional conflict resolution methods such as mediation and arbitration procedures (Godard and Delaney, 2000). Some of them take an intermediate position by pointing out that the effect of participation schemes on conflicts resolution depends on the nature of the participation practices. For these authors, financial participation involving the empow-

[6]Human relations models (Miller and Monge, 1986, Allen et al., 2003).

erment of workers, can reduce conflicts, while other schemes, using labor intensification techniques can produce the intensification of conflicts (Colvin, 2004)

Financial participation can also have different effects on conflicts resolution as the firm is unionized or not. This is particularly the case in North America where there is a difference in conflict resolution procedures depending on whether the firm is unionized or not. In Canada, as in the US, unionized firms almost universally have the multi-step procedures (negotiation, mediation and arbitration) conflict resolution while in the non-unionized workplaces traditional resolution procedures are at the discretion of the firm, which may choose to have any procedure. Colvin (2004) found with Canadian data, that financial participation is associated with low conflict resolution rate in unionized and non-unionized firms. However, in non-unionized firms, the author found a strong negative link between the adoption of the financial participation schemes and traditional conflict resolution procedures.

Through this literature, we note that the traditional procedure of conflicts resolution (mainly negotiation) and financial participation can not be unidirectional, but their effects may depend on how they are used. Therefore, it is important to study a number of different characteristics of negotiation and financial participation in order to understand their effects on conflicts resolution. We suggest here an empirical framework where the probability of satisfying the claims at the end of collective conflicts is explained by negotiation topics and financial participation.

3.3 Data and Methodology

In this section, we first present our data. We then describe the econometric specification used in this study.

3.3.1 REPONSE

The data used in this study are derived from REPONSE survey in France ("RElations PrOfessionelles et NégociationS d'Entreprises", for the period 2008-2010) (The data used in this study are obtained from "RElations PrOfessionelles et NégociationS d'Entreprises" (REPONSE) 2008-2010 in France (see the first chapter, section data). REPONSE survey questionnaires include the largest number of questions such as the occurrence of conflicts, the economic and industrial relations context of the firm, on pay practices etc.

In this study, we focus on the management and employee representatives questionnaires. The management representatives and those of the employees do not have the same perception of the conflict end, which can give several recommendations to both management and employee representatives. In the following subsection, we describe our variables.

Dependent Variables

Our goal is to study the effects of negotiation issues and financial participation on the resolution of collective conflicts through two endogenous variables: the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict (1) from the point of view of employee representatives and (2) from the point of view of management representatives. The advantage of these variables is that they tell us about the level of satisfaction, in an ordered way, how the conflict was resolved in relation to the topics that caused the conflict. The response format for these variables was composed of four-point response of satisfaction at the end of the conflict: (1) no satisfaction, (2) no direct satisfaction, (3) middle satisfaction, (4) total satisfaction.

Independent Variables

Traditional methods of the resolution of collective conflicts (mediation and arbitrage)[7] have very little place in the French system of industrial relations, unlike other countries of Europe and North Americans countries. The culture of conflicts and the government's

[7]Le Flanchec and Rojot (2010) stressed that mediation and arbitration are otherwise more developed in the management of family or commercial conflicts resolution than the management of collective conflicts.

frequent intervention in conflicts are the main causes. Also, mediation and arbitration are not obligatory procedures in French firms[8]. We believe that there are possible negative stronger relationships between financial participation (innovative organizational practices) and the non-recourse to mediation and arbitration procedures (as we noted out in the literature from North American's case). Moreover, in REPONSE survey, no variable tells us information about mediation or arbitration procedures in resolving collective conflicts.

However, negotiation is the preferred procedure in resolving conflicts in France. Thus, eight variables measure the presence of the various negotiating issues that took place in the firm. Each captured by a single dichotomous variable indicating the presence (1 = yes) or absence (0 = no) of the negotiating issue. The questions addressed concern negotiations carried on topics such as salary, qualifications & careers, working hours, employment, working conditions, organizational change, professional training and finally professional gender equality. To this, we added information sharing with employees on the economic situation of the firm (1 = regularly, 2 = occasional, 3 = never).

Financial participation is represented by both profit sharing and employees ownership. Although the two practices have different criteria for rewards distribution, both practices are analyzed within the same theoretical framework (e.g Cooke, 1994, Kruse et al., 2010). Profit sharing measures whether or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) the firm's incentive system includes sharing profit program, which rewards employees based on "group output or performance". Employee ownership measures whether or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) the firm's incentive system includes employee share ownership plan.

In this study, we also consider the variables reflecting the innovative organizational practices in the firm: autonomy of employees in his work (1 = yes, 0 = no), problem solving groups (1 = yes, 0 = no) and direct expression groups (1 = yes, 0 = no). The problem-solving groups and direct expression groups are the most common form of consultative involvement practices and are composed of small groups of co-workers in similar jobs that meet regularly to improve and resolve work-related problems. An assumption of these schemes is that they encourage workers to benefit their superiors about their experiences and skills[9]. This can increase the sense of self-efficacy of employees, making it easier the

[8]French Labor Code

[9]Cognitive models propose that employees have more complete knowledge about their work than managers (Stevens and Gist, 1997, Wargner et al., 1997).

acceptance of organizational change and give a better structure to reduce conflicts (Stevens and Gist, 1997, Alper et al., 1998, Duffy et al., 2000). This conflict-reducing effect, in turn, may reduce the overall utilization rate of conflict resolution procedures.

In addition, variables reflecting, union presence (1 = yes, 0 = no), who participated to end the conflict, compagny size and business sector also may be important. Union action and firm size are presented as the main characteristics favoring the emergence of conflict and to explain largely the sectoral differences recorded (Blanchflower and Cubbin, 1986, Tanguy, 2013, Belot and Waxin, 2012). Union is a strong device for workers' voice (Hirschman, 1970, Freeman and Medoff, 1984) and this voice possibility is expected to be higher in larger firms than in smaller ones. Cramton and Tracy (1992) present a bargaining model between union and the firm which shows that conflicts can be higher if union's claim is not satisfied. Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) also obtain that union recognition for collective bargaining, involving the presence of union representatives in the workplace is associated with a higher probability of a strike. They acknowledge that the effect of union delegates can vary greatly, depending on the fact that they behave like a troublemaker, or conversely act as a vector for informal communication quality between employers and employees.

Descriptive statistics for the variables as well as the crossover point of view between management and employee representatives on the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict are respectively reported in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 in appendix 3.5.

3.3.2 Econometric Methodology

There are several ways to consider the soleution of collective conflicts. The first way is to consider ordered probit to understand the satisfaction of claims at the end of conflict. But this is not the best approch. The issue of sample selection arises because not all firms in our sample, reported having had at least one conflict. This may be a risk of selection bias if we do not take into account the selection problem. The second way is then the use of selection model[10]. We know that estimating an equation on a selected sub-sample obtained in the population can lead to biased estimates. However, the first econometric developments

[10]A selection model is a model in which the dependent variable is not always observed. The selection criterion is not directly on the value of the dependent variable, but is defined by an auxiliary equation.

emphasized the consequences of that sample selecting since the work of Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979). We suggest here, a specific econometric model which takes into account the selection. We first test the existence of a selection bias using the inverse of the ratio of Mills (Greene, 2003). The test has revealed a selection problem which led us to use an Ordered Probit with Heckman Selection Modeling (Greene and Hensher, 2010).

Employee Share Ownership (ESO) and Profit Sharing (PS) may have as an objective to align the interests of all employees with those of the firm by sharing the risk of overall performance with employees and should then lower conflicts (see Heywood et al., 2005). We have then implemented an endogeneity test using a two step regression based on Hausmann test (see Wooldridge, 2010, regression based residuals). In the first step, each of the two equations (ESO and PS) is estimated adequately with a probit and we propose to recover the residues from these regressions. These residues are used at the second step in the performance equation. Hence, if the coefficient associated to residuals of ESO is significant, then this variable is considered endogenous. We do the same for variable suspected as endogenous.

ESO, and PS are found to be endogenous. In this case, we obtain a block of four equations (see Heckman, 1978). This leads us to consider a third way by estimating a structural model where ESO (Probit), PS (Probit) and the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict (Ordered Probit with Heckman Selection Modeling) are estimated simultaneously by using Roodman (2011) estimation procedure based on the maximum likelihood (ML). The recursive system we want to estimate is then the following:

Since we got four ordered responses, the model we estimate tries to identify the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict "j" with $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$.

Let X_1 and X_2 be respectively a set of explanatory variables of ESO and PS.

X_1= Activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, Product quality for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic situation of the firm, diffusion of information on firm strategy, size dummies, industry dummies.

X_2= Activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, price for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic

situation of the firm, size dummies, industry dummies.

Let X_3 be a set of explanatory variables of the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict.

X_3= Topics of Negotiations dummies, employee's autonomy, problem solving groups, information on economic situation, who participated to end the conflict, size dummies, industry.

Let X_4 be a set of explanatory of selection variable $conflict_i$. $conflict_i = 1$ if the firm "i" has experienced at least a collective conflict, $conflict_i = 0$ otherwise; $i = 1, ...N$.

X_4= Union impede firm activity, work council, worker autonomy, unionization rate, who control the work, size dummies, industry dummies.

$$\begin{cases} Satisfconf_i \ is \ observed \ when \ Conflit_i = 1 \\ ESO_i = F(X_{i1}\alpha) + \epsilon_{i1} \\ PS_i = F(X_{i2}\beta) + \epsilon_{i2} \\ Satisfconf_i = F((eso_i, ps_i, X_{i3})\phi) + \epsilon_{i3} \\ Conflit_i = F(X_{i4}\lambda) + \epsilon_{i4} \ (Selection \ Equation) \end{cases}$$

3.4 Empirical Results

We present the results of our regressions at three models from each point of view (employee and management representatives). We use the first model for an ordered probit, the second model is an ordered probit with the inclusion of selection and the third model takes into account not only the selection but also endogeneity of ESO and PS. The Likelihood Ratio tests are all significant, leading us to reject the hypothesis of nullity of global parameters. Overall, the signs of the parameters do not change from one model to another, our interpretations are based mainly on the results of the third model which takes into account the various problems (selection and endogenous variables) we may encounter in the other two models.

3.4.1 Employee Representatives Point of View

Table 4.13 (marginal effects) presents the results from employee representatives point of view on the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict. The main result concerning financial participation is that both employee share ownership and profit sharing participate significantly to increase the total satisfaction after the conflict with respectively a marginal effect of 5.9% and 1.6% which is consistent with the findings of Poole and Jenkins (1991), Desbrières (2002), Colvin (2004)'s studies, who found that financial participation has greater effects on the reduction of collective conflicts. The employee's autonomy and problem solving groups have a statistically significant positive association with satisfaction after the conflict. These results provide good support for the prediction that innovative organizational practices give a better structure to resolve collective conflicts (Stevens and Gist, 1997, Alper et al., 1998, Duffy et al., 2000). This conflict-reducing effect, in turn, may reduce the overall utilization rate of conflict resolution procedures.

The union presence has a positive effect on the total satisfaction after the conflict. This result is in favor with the pluralist vision of unionism which assumes that union presence has to help effectively and equitably the conflict resolution within firms (Lewin, 2005). Union presence can be seen here as a determinant for formal communication quality between employers and employees, and also as a way of getting power. (Pohjola, 1987) found that a profit sharing agreement as a device for implementing efficient bargaining solutions in the firm and the share of profit going to employees, is exactly equal to the union bargaining power.

Among the eight negotiation topics, wages, employment, work conditions, organizational changes and professional gender equality have a statistically significant negative association with total satisfaction after the conflict. These result can be explained by the fact that negotiations on these topics do not result to an agreement. As Bangoura and Dayan (2001) finding, negotiation in the firm does not necessarily lead to the conclusion of an agreement. In this line, it seems that the negotiations on qualification & careers and professional training resulted to agreements because they have a positive effect on total satisfaction after the conflict.

Information sharing regularly and occasionally on economic situation have significant negative effect on the total satisfaction. This result is not surprising, since information is

shared on the economic situation of the firm, it is clear that employees (especially if this information indicates good economique situation) through their representatives will have high demands and therefore make difficult the negotiations. This result is in favor with Elias (1990)'s finding for whom the information symmetry between employer-employee generally leads to greater divergence. May be employers avoid disclosure to not weaken their position during negotiations, avoiding costly conflicts regulations.

When the end of the conflict is at the initiative of the employees involved in the conflict or all employees or even by the elected staff, this increases the total satisfaction after the conflict. When the end of conflict is initiated by the union or fraying, this has a negative impact on total satisfaction with the outcome of the conflict. These results indicate that employees derive maximum satisfaction from their claim when the conflict ended broadly at their initiative.

We also control for size effects as well as industrially affiliation. The larger is the firm, the more total is satisfaction after conflicts. With regards to the sectors, we find that Food Industry, Transport & Warehousing, Accommodation & Food, and Information, Communication, Financial & Real Estate Activity are more prone to increase the probability of the total satisfaction at the end of the conflict. However, the sector of Auto Industry & Equipment Goods is likely to exhibit less total satisfaction (the effects of other sectors are statistically insignificant). This result is not surprising, since the period of the survey (RESPONSE 2008-2010), corresponds to the period of the economic recession. Mainly the sector of Auto Industry & Equipment Goods (and financial sector) has been the most affected, resulting in the closure of some factories as well as major layoffs.

Table 3.1: **Conflict resolution employee representative (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	Oprobit	Heckman	HeckEndo
Topics of Negotiations			
Wages	-0.095***	-0.096***	-0.098***
	(-17.99)	(-19.37)	(-17.95)
Working Hours	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003
	(-0.83)	(-0.42)	(-0.57)
Qualifications & Careers	0.046***	0.043***	0.047***
	(8.58)	(8.40)	(8.32)
Employment	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.010***
	(-4.25)	(-3.94)	(-4.22)
Work Conditions	-0.073***	-0.069***	-0.075***
	(-12.25)	(-11.94)	(-11.79)
Organizational Changes	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.005**
	(-1.90)	(-2.11)	(-2.05)
Professional Training	0.067***	0.060***	0.067***
	(11.43)	(10.48)	(11.02)
Professional Gender Equality	-0.077***	-0.069***	-0.077***
	(-13.30)	(-11.87)	(-12.37)
Employee Share Ownership	0.059***	0.052***	0.059***
	(8.95)	(8.04)	(8.43)
Profit Sharing	0.014**	0.015**	0.016**
	(2.43)	(2.66)	(2.57)
Employee's Autonomy	0.011**	0.008	0.012**
	(2.49)	(1.85)	(2.54)
Problem Solving Groups	0.034***	0.032***	0.035***
	(7.10)	(7.02)	(7.01)
Union Presence	0.013**	0.011*	0.015**
	(2.24)	(1.88)	(2.40)
Information on Economic Situation (Ref.: Never)			
Regularly	-0.273***	-0.248***	-0.276***
	(-22.85)	(-19.05)	(-19.08)
Occasional	-0.216***	-0.197***	-0.222***
	(-17.66)	(-15.65)	(-15.90)
Who Participated to End the Conflict (Ref.: Other)			
The Employees Involved	0.027***	0.027***	0.029***

Continued on next page...

... table 4.13 continued

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
	(4.12)	(4.31)	(4.22)
All Employees	0.148***	0.142***	0.154***
	(20.68)	(20.24)	(19.36)
The Elect Staff Representatives	0.114***	0.109***	0.116***
	(11.36)	(11.35)	(11.01)
Union	-0.027**	-0.023**	-0.024**
	(-2.90)	(-2.51)	(-2.48)
Fraying (Nobody in Particular)	-0.120***	-0.114***	-0.122***
	(-14.26)	(-13.86)	(-13.59)
Number of Employees (Ref.: < 20 Employees)			
20 to 49 Employees	0.086***	0.083***	0.089***
	(10.64)	(10.66)	(10.26)
50 to 99 Employees	0.113***	0.110***	0.121***
	(12.61)	(12.71)	(12.24)
100 to 199 Employees	0.138***	0.138***	0.146***
	(13.32)	(14.05)	(13.18)
200 to 499 Employees	0.098***	0.098***	0.104***
	(9.09)	(9.52)	(9.04)
500 Employees or more	0.127***	0.123***	0.127***
	(7.13)	(7.23)	(6.79)
Sector (Ref.: Trade & Auto Repair)			
Food Industry	0.221***	0.212***	0.226***
	(16.31)	(15.98)	(15.02)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	-0.060***	-0.058***	-0.067***
	(-4.32)	(-4.36)	(-4.59)
Energy Industry	-0.014	-0.011	-0.015
	(-1.61)	(-1.37)	(-1.65)
Construction	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003
	(-0.11)	(-0.09)	(-0.20)
Transport & Warehousing	0.071***	0.067***	0.072***
	(7.19)	(7.13)	(7.00)
Accommodation & Food	0.206***	0.198***	0.206***
	(12.43)	(12.44)	(11.78)
Info., Com., Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.053***	0.052***	0.053***
	(4.90)	(5.06)	(4.73)
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.008	-0.003	-0.009
	(-0.91)	(-0.37)	(-1.02)

Continued on next page...

... table 4.13 continued

Variables	Oprobit	Heckman	HeckEndo
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.010	0.000	-0.016
	(-1.29)	(0.04)	(-1.72)
N	2692		

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

3.4.2 Manager Representatives Point of View

Table 4.14 (marginal effects) presents the results from management representatives point of view the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict. The main result concerning financial participation is that both employee share ownership and profit sharing participate significantly to increase the total satisfaction after conflict with respectively a marginal effect of 4.4% and 7.6% which is consistent with the findings of Poole and Jenkins (1991), Desbrières (2002), Colvin (2004)'s studies, who found that financial participation has greater effects on the reduction of collective conflicts. While employee autonomy has negative effect on total satisfaction after conflict, problem solving groups have a statistically significant positive association with satisfaction after the conflict.

Union presence has a positive effect on the total satisfaction after the conflict. This result is in favor with the pluralist vision of unionism which assumes that union presence has to help effectively and equitably the conflict resolution within the firms (Lewin, 2005). Union presence can be seen here as a vector for formal communication quality between employers and employees, and also as a way of getting power. (Pohjola, 1987) found that a profit sharing agreement as a device for implementing efficient bargaining solutions in the firm and the share of profit going to employees, is exactly equal to the union bargaining power.

Among the eight negotiation topics, wages, employment, professional training and professional gender equity have a statistically significant negative association with total satisfaction after the conflict. This result can be explained by the fact that negotiations on

these topics do not result to an agreement. As found Bangoura and Dayan (2001), negotiation in the firm does not necessarily lead to the conclusion of an agreement. However, working hours and work conditions have positive association with total satisfaction after the conflict (the effect of working hours is not statistically significant).

Information sharing regularly on economic situation have significant positive effect on total satisfaction. This result is not surprising when we consider manager's point of view and it is in line with Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1996)'s argument, who emphasized that the exchange of information between employers and employees conflicts is a necessary factor to resolve problems and facilitate the negotiation.

When the end of the conflict is at the initiative of the employees involved in the conflict or all employees, the elected staff, the union or even by fraying, this increases the total satisfaction after the conflict. These results indicate that from the manager's point of view, employees derive maximum satisfaction from their claim whatever who initiated the conflict end.

We also control for industry affiliation as well as the firm size. The larger is the firm, the more total is satisfaction after conflicts. However, firms with 200 to 499 employees have a certain particularity because the marginal effect is not statistically significant. Beroud et al. (2008*a*) showed that the union presence has increased particularly in french establishments with 200 to 499 employees and these establishments experienced the largest increase of collective conflicts over the same period. This implies that conflict resolution involves multiple unions in these firms, which may render the negotiations more difficult, thus, leading numerous agreements.

With regards to the sectors, we find that Food Industry, Transport & Warehousing, Accommodation & Food, and Information, Communication, Financial & Real Estate Activity are more prone to increase the probability of the total satisfaction at the end of the conflict. However, the sector of Auto Industry & Equipment Goods is likely to exhibit less total satisfaction (the effects of other sectors are statistically insignificant). This result is not surprising, since the period of the investigation (RESPONSE 2010), corresponds to the period of the economic recession. Mainly the sector of Auto Industry & Equipment Goods (and financial sector) has been the most affected, resulting in the closure of some factories as well as major layoffs.

Table 3.2: **Conflict resolution mangement representative (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
Topics of Negotiations			
Wages	-0.028**	-0.024***	-0.036***
	(-3.15)	(-6.18)	(-6.54)
Working Hours	0.109***	0.058***	0.101***
	(12.63)	(10.76)	(17.52)
Qualifications & Careers	0.034***	0.013***	0.008
	(4.14)	(3.44)	(1.46)
Employment	-0.015***	-0.006**	-0.006**
	(-3.72)	(-2.83)	(-2.28)
Work Conditions	0.062***	0.025***	0.046***
	(5.61)	(4.68)	(6.87)
Organizational Changes	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(-0.01)
Professional Training	-0.008	-0.009	-0.030***
	(-0.63)	(-1.41)	(-3.57)
Professional Gender Equality	-0.096***	-0.038***	-0.052***
	(-8.74)	(-6.16)	(-7.49)
Employee Share Ownership	0.034**	0.010*	0.044***
	(3.09)	(1.88)	(6.11)
Profit Sharing	0.086***	0.038***	0.076***
	(9.55)	(7.71)	(13.11)
Employee's Autonomy	-0.014	-0.017***	-0.014**
	(-1.58)	(-3.94)	(-2.49)
Problem Solving Groups	-0.026**	-0.018***	0.003
	(-3.28)	(-4.70)	(0.61)
Union Presence	0.130***	0.061***	0.114***
	(10.59)	(8.74)	(14.53)
Information on Economic Situation (Ref.: Never)			
Regularly	0.061**	0.054***	0.069***
	(2.97)	(5.40)	(5.29)
Occasional	-0.008	0.020**	-0.011
	(-0.43)	(2.22)	(-0.95)
Who Participated to End the Conflict			
(Ref.: Other)			
The Employees Involved	0.063***	0.038***	0.059***

Continued on next page...

... table 4.13 continued

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
	(4.81)	(5.46)	(6.85)
All Employees	0.039***	0.028***	0.027***
	(3.60)	(5.12)	(3.91)
The Elect Staff Representatives	0.012	0.003	-0.010
	(0.72)	(0.36)	(-0.92)
Union	0.021	0.011*	0.043***
	(1.50)	(1.69)	(4.52)
Fraying (Nobody in Particular)	0.043**	0.016**	0.047***
	(3.15)	(2.46)	(5.55)
Number of Employees (Ref.: < 20 Employees)			
20 to 49 Employees	-0.179***	-0.090***	-0.086***
	(-10.92)	(-9.18)	(-8.35)
50 to 99 Employees	-0.035*	-0.010	0.032**
	(-2.09)	(-1.31)	(2.89)
100 to 199 Employees	-0.041**	-0.002	0.044***
	(-2.13)	(-0.21)	(3.46)
200 to 499 Employees	-0.075***	-0.031***	-0.003
	(-4.23)	(-3.56)	(-0.31)
500 Employees or more	-0.094***	-0.027**	0.039**
	(-3.52)	(-2.11)	(2.13)
Sector (Ref.: Trade & Auto Repair)			
Food Industry	0.065**	0.039**	0.041**
	(2.32)	(3.00)	(2.34)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	-0.127***	-0.040**	-0.042**
	(-4.38)	(-2.80)	(-2.30)
Energy Industry	-0.020	-0.015	-0.002
	(-1.07)	(-1.61)	(-0.20)
Construction	-0.208***	-0.054**	-0.055**
	(-6.79)	(-3.12)	(-2.72)
Transport & Warehousing	0.148***	0.081***	0.126***
	(8.67)	(9.45)	(12.43)
Accommodation & Food	-0.046	-0.010	-0.062
	(-0.84)	(-0.38)	(-1.88)
Info., Com., Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.041**	0.020**	0.035**
	(2.31)	(2.48)	(3.17)
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.090***	-0.033**	-0.008
	(-4.49)	(-3.27)	(-0.63)

Continued on next page...

... table 4.13 continued

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	0.108***	0.064***	-0.024
	(5.95)	(7.83)	(-1.76)
N		2692	

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Opposed Results Between Employee and Manager Representatives

Our findings reveal opposite effects on total satisfaction after the conflict (between employee and management representatives) from two topics of negotiation (working conditions and professional training), information sharing and employee autonomy.

Our results from employee representatives show that working conditions have a negative effect and professional training has a positive effect on total satisfaction, while those from employee representatives show that working conditions have a positive effect and professional training has a negative effect on total satisfaction after the conflict. We find that the total satisfaction after conflict, from the employee representatives view increase with information sharing and decrease with the employee autonomy. The opposite is true from the management representatives view. Similarly, there are also differences results with "who participated to end the conflict". For the employee representative, satisfaction is total when it's only employees who are at the initiative of the conflict end, while for management representatives, satisfaction is total regardless of the party who is at the initiative of the conflict end (employees involved, all employees, the elected staff, the union or even by fraying).

As underlined by Beroud et al. (2008*a*), these divergences in the results are due to information asymmetries, to differences in cultural and institutional positions and finally the social contexts of the establishments..

3.5 Conclusion

This study set out to examine the relationship between negotiation, financial participation and the resolution of collective conflicts. The analyses of this paper revealed that employee share ownership and profit sharing positively influence the resolution of conflicts. Some critics of financial participation argue that it often involve the intensification of work, rather than empowerment of employees and reduction of conflict. Mainly, the results of this study provide clear support for the latter view than the former view.

Union presence as a voice mechanism appears to be very efficient in the total satisfaction after conflict. In this case, as discussed by Eaton and Voos (1989), "unions help creating a better participatory environment by placing emphasis on a more acceptable quality of work life and by providing contractual protections against arbitrary or inequitable treatment and managerial reprisal."

While consistent with some prior studies, these results make a new contribution by showing that the effects of negotiation topics, information sharing and employee autonomy on the resolution of collective conflicts can differ depending on the view of both employee representatives and management representatives.

Appendix 3.5

Table 3.3: **Variable Descriptions (Chapter 3) (%)**

Variable	Variable definition	Average
Satisfaction at the end of the conflict employee representative	Ordered variable (from 1 to 4) if the satisfaction at the end of the conflict from the employee representatives belongs to one of the four following classes:	
	No satisfaction	43.26
	No direct satisfaction	8.53
	Partial satisfaction	30.80
	Total satisfaction	17.41
Satisfaction at the end of the conflict manager representative	Ordered variable (from 1 to 4) if the satisfaction at the end of the conflict from the management representatives belongs to one of the four following classes:	
	No satisfaction	41.81
	No direct satisfaction	9.51
	Partial satisfaction	34.57
	Total satisfaction	14.12
Employee Share Ownership	Binary variable that equals to 1 if employees have a share of the firm's capital, equals to 0 otherwise	15.06
Profit Sharing	Binary variable equals to 1 if employees in the firm are covered by a profit sharing contract, equals to 0 otherwise	31.96
Worker Autonomy	Binary variable equals to 1 if in case of an accident in production or of the service, employees are first encouraged to solve the problem themselves, equals to 0 otherwise	48.88
Problem Solving Groups	Binary variable equals to 1 if there are problem solving groups, equals to 0 otherwise	41.80
Union Presence	Binary variable equals to 1 if there are union representatives in the firm, equals to 0 otherwise	36.72

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... table 3.3 continued

Variable	Variable definition	Average
Topics of Negotiations	Binary variables equal to 1 (equal to 0 otherwise) if there has been in the firm negotiations on the following topics:	
	Wages	39.03
	Working Hours	32.80
	Qualifications & Careers	32.83
	Employment	39.12
	Work Conditions	55.79
	Organizational Changes	52.11
	Professional Training	62.59
	Professional Gender Equality	30.86
Information on economic situation	Ordered variable (from 1 to 3) if the information on the economic situation of the firm is shared to all employees:	
	Regularly	63.14
	Occasional	27.24
	Never	18.18
Who participated to end the conflict	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 6) if the following was involved to the conflict end	
	The Employees Involved	27.18
	All Employees	20.65
	The Elect Staff Representatives	6.44
	Union	9.30
	Fraying (Nobody in Particular)	14.17
	Other	22.25
Number of employees	Ordered variable (from 1 to 6) if the size (number of employees) of the firm belongs to one of six classes:	
	Less than 20 Employees	39.65
	20 to 49 employees	37.05
	50 to 99 employees	12.76
	100 to 199 employees	5.86
	200 to 499 employees	3.46
	500 employees or more	1.22

Continued on next page...

... table 3.3 continued

Variable	Variable definition	Average
Sector	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 10) if the firm belongs to one of the ten following sectors	
	Food industry	2.79
	Auto industry & equipment goods	2.47
	Energy industry	12.62
	Construction	11.30
	Trade & auto repair	19.36
	Transport & warehousing	7.54
	Accommodation & food	6.67
	Information, communication, financial & real estate activity	7.08
	Scientific & technical activities	11.67
	Public administration, health & social work	18.49

Table 3.4: **Crossing the point of view of management and employee representatives**

	Manager Satisfaction			
	No	No direct	Middle	Total
Employee Satisfaction				
No	45.32	15.59	25.78	13.31
No direct	96.46	0.00	3.54	0
Middle	36.53	12.12	48.56	2.80
Total	17.26	5.80	58.63	18.30

Read in line: for example in 45.32% of cases where an employee representative says no satisfaction at the end of the conflict in 2008-2010, the management representatives of the same establishment says the same 54.68% of disagreements).

Pearson $\chi 2(9) = 542.3897$ $Pr = 0.000$. The satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict from the employee representatives point of view is not distributed independently of the satisfaction of claims at the end of the conflict from the point of view of management representative.

Table 3.5: **Employee representative versus manager representative (Marginal Effects)**

Variables	**HeckEndo ER**	**HeckEndo MR**
Topics of Negotiations		
Wages	-0.098***	-0.036***
	(-17.95)	(-6.54)
Working Hours	-0.003	0.101***
	(-0.57)	(17.52)
Qualifications & Careers	0.047***	0.008
	(8.32)	(1.46)
Employment	-0.010***	-0.006**
	(-4.22)	(-2.28)
Work Conditions	-0.075***	0.046***
	(-11.79)	(6.87)
Organizational Changes	-0.005**	-0.000
	(-2.05)	(-0.00)
Professional Training	0.067***	-0.030***
	(11.02)	(-3.57)
Professional Gender Equality	-0.077***	-0.052***
	(-12.37)	(-7.49)
Employee Share Ownership	0.059***	0.044***
	(8.43)	(6.11)
Profit Sharing	0.016**	0.076***
	(2.57)	(13.11)
Employee's Autonomy	0.012**	-0.014**
	(2.54)	(-2.49)
Problem Solving Groups	0.035***	0.003

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... table 3.5 continued

Variables	**HeckEndo ER**	**HeckEndo MR**
	(7.01)	(0.61)
Union Presence	0.015**	0.114***
	(2.40)	(14.53)
Information On Economic Situation (Ref.: Never)		
Regularly	-0.276***	0.069***
	(-19.08)	(5.29)
Occasional	-0.222***	-0.011
	(-15.90)	(-0.95)
Who Participated to End the Conflict		
(Ref.: Other)		
The Employees Involved	0.029***	0.059***
	(4.22)	(6.85)
All Employees	0.154***	0.027***
	(19.36)	(3.91)
The Elect Staff Representatives	0.116***	-0.010
	(11.01)	(-0.92)
Union	-0.024**	0.043***
	(-2.48)	(4.52)
Fraying (Nobody in Particular)	-0.122***	0.047***
	(-13.59)	(5.55)
Number of Employees (Ref.: $<$ 20 Employees)		
20 to 49 Employees	0.089***	-0.086***
	(10.26)	(-8.35)
50 to 99 Employees	0.121***	0.032**
	(12.24)	(2.89)
100 to 199 Employees	0.146***	0.044***
	(13.18)	(3.46)
200 to 499 Employees	0.104***	-0.003
	(9.04)	(-0.31)
500 Employees or more	0.127***	0.039**
	(6.79)	(2.13)
Sector (Ref.: Trade & Auto Repair)		
Food Industry	0.226***	0.041**
	(15.02)	(2.34)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	-0.067***	-0.042**
	(-4.59)	(-2.30)
Energy Industry	-0.015	-0.002

Continued on next page...

... table 3.5 continued

Variables	HeckEndo ER	HeckEndo MR
	(-1.65)	(-0.20)
Construction	-0.003	-0.055**
	(-0.20)	(-2.72)
Transport & Warehousing	0.072***	0.126***
	(7.00)	(12.43)
Accommodation & Food	0.206***	-0.062
	(11.78)	(-1.88)
Info., Com., Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.053***	0.035**
	(4.73)	(3.17)
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.009	-0.008
	(-1.02)	(-0.63)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.016	-0.024
	(-1.72)	(-1.76)
N	2692	

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Encadré 3: Alternative Dispute Resolution (Traditional conflict resolution procedures)

The negotiation covers efforts by employers and employee representatives (usually union) to resolve conflicts themselves without third party intervention. However, the negotiation procedure is not always appropriate in resolving all conflicts. Power differences may exist in a conflict (power can be on the employer side or the employee side). In this case the negotiation procedure does not guarantee the party who has little or no bargaining power. The party who has more power can ignore the interests of the other or simply refuse the negotiation procedure. It is a power struggle and competition where the strongest can override the lowest. The party that has little or no power necessarily considers the other as an opponent to whom he must seek to extract concessions to reach an agreement. The context created by this situation could affect the reciprocal strategies for the party who holds more power to state its position to conceal information that might weaken that position to favor an opaque communication and if necessary, threats, which usually leads to a win-lose conflict resolution. Bendersky (2007) believes that the negotiation procedure does not eliminate the zero-sum nature of certain conflicts because for her, the negotiation procedure can not alone solve the problems that arise when one of the parties in conflict realizes its negotiating power. The author also points out that the reality of power differences in a conflict means that the negotiation procedure is not sufficient in itself to solve a conflict.

Continued on next page...

... Encadré 3 continued Alternative Dispute Resolution (Traditional conflict resolution procedures)

In case of failure of negotiation procedure between the parties (employers and employees), the negotiation procedure can progress to a more interactive approach to conflict resolution requiring the intervention of a third party, that is to say the conflict can be submitted either to the mediation (conciliation) or either the arbitration procedures (in case of failure of the mediation procedure).

Mediation is a procedure that involves the intervention of a third party in the resolution of conflict. The mediation process used to help reach an agreement that meets the interests rather than whether the rights of a party are infringed by the other (Bendersky (2007)). Since mediation is in itself an educational phenomenon, it aims initially to introduce dialogue and consensus through meetings (Lemieux, 1996). Also the mediation process used to establish a better communication between the parties in conflict; communication would not have been possible without the presence of a mediator in certain types of conflictResearch were conducted to study the impact of the mediation process and its fallen on the settlement of conflicts within public firms in the US. One common finding in all these studies is that mediation process has generated conflict settlement rates between 60 and 80 % with high degrees of satisfaction at the fallen. However, the effectiveness of mediation process is limited when they act of independent way. Kochan and Jick (1978) show that certain types of workplace conflicts are more appropriate for mediation than others. There may be issues that will have political implications beyond the conflict resolution (such as the case with collective bargaining) that require the presence of the State in the resolution of collective conflicts. If mediation procedure does not lead to an agreement, the conflict resolution is submitted to arbitration.

Arbitration is the final step of conflict resolution procedure (Dunlop and Zack, 1997, Lewin and Peterson, 1999). Studies on the arbitration procedure have often been conceptualized in the theory of "Exit, voice and loyalty" of Hirschman (1970). Although they offer contradictory results about how the arbitration procedure affects productivity, these studies have shown that against this procedure clearly reduces the turnover and costs of recruiting and training employees (Bemmels and Foley, 1996, Colvin, 1999, Spencer, 1986, Freeman and Medoff, 1984)The limit of the arbitration procedure is that it design only for conflicts concerning violations or interpretations of work contract. Since these procedures are generally available to all employees who perceive themselves as having been treated unfairly, other types of conflicts that occurred in the workplace (such as conflicts related to work slow conflict or refusals of overtime work) are wrongly placed in arbitration procedure. This can have negative consequences for both conflicting parties (employers and employees). Once a formal complaint is filed in an arbitration procedure, a long and costly bureaucratic process is usually necessary to determine whether or not the request is almost appropriate and legitimate. The party anticipates being twisted during the conflict may consider arbitration as a non-transparent, unsatisfactory and unfair.

However, it should be noted that there is a difference between mediation and arbitration. According to Le Flanchec and Rojot (2010), the difference between mediation and arbitration procedures is that the arbitrator has the power to decide after hearing the parties (taking decisions), while the mediator helps just the parties reach an agreement (even if the parties remain free to consent).

4 Financial Participation, Collective Conflicts and Firm Performance

4.1 Introduction

Financial participation and collective conflicts in France has attracted considerable attention from scholars (in industrial relation), firm leaders, employees leaders (union) and government. This attention is due to the fact that the implementation of financial participation agreement requires the intervention of collective bargaining and the involvement of social partners in order to share the benefit of the firms with employees and in order to empower employees in the firm and reduce tensions between employers and employees. Financial participation is recognized to align the interests of employees with those of the firm, which would tend to reduce collective conflicts (Heywood et al., 2005). However, sources of collective conflicts in the firm are numerous; so that collective conflicts are inevitable but, within certain conditions, may be essential to firm performance.

Most of the empirical studies show that financial participation improves firm's performance (Cable and Wilson, 1990, Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Kruse et al., 2010, Kruse, 2012). On the other hand, the majority of studies analyzing the impact of collective conflicts on the firm performance, mainly conducted on Anglo-Saxon data, indicates that collective conflicts impede firm performance (McDonald, 1972, Neumann and Reder, 1984, Becker and Olson, 1986, Kramer and Vasconcellos, 1996, Kleiner et al., 2002). However, the rare few studies analyzing the links between financial partici-

pation and conflicts show that financial participation influence conflicts (Heywood et al., 2005, Cramton et al., 2010).

Thus, this chapter provides the first evidence showing that financial participation and collective conflicts may affect firm performance using French data. We suggest in this study, to build the bridge between financial participation, collective conflicts and firm performance. If financial participation impacts collective conflicts, what will be the remaining effect of financial participation on productivity once we endogenize its effect on collective conflicts? Is financial participation a real incentive which improves the firm performance or does it work as a simple tool for improving workplace atmosphere? By endogenizing also financial participation, we suggest to move from reduced form estimates to some structural ones that look at the effects of financial participation on several indicators. This gives more robustness to our results and will certainly comfort available finding on productivity effects of financial participation.

The chapter is organized as follows: section two summarizes a review of the main theoretical and empirical links between financial participation and firm performance. This includes a review of the main empirical findings of the effect of collective conflicts on firm performance. In the third section, we present the data used and the econometric methodology. This brings us to the fourth section where we estimate the effect of financial participation and collective conflicts on firm performance. The last section concludes.

4.2 Background

Sharing Schemes in French Context

Born with De Gaulle under the philosophy of sharing the value, Profit Sharing ("Intéressement") was introduced in 1959. It concerns all the firms once a contract, after a bargaining process, is signed between the two parties (unions or workers' representative and the employer). The bonus depends on some objectives defined ex-ante. In any case, the bonus cannot be substitute to wages. The amount of the bonus cannot exceed 20% of wage (with a limit of 17.676 euros in 2011). Bonuses can be the same for all employees, or depend on wages (as stipulated in the contract). The legislation evolved several times since there

(1994, 2006, 2012). There are a several fiscal advantages associated to Profit Sharing, both for employees and for employers. For the firm, Profit Sharing bonus is deduced from the taxable profit and there is no wage tax associated to it. For the employees, the bonus is exempt from social security contribution and if the employee put it in a firm saving account (within 15 days), there is no tax on income. However, the employer can get immediately the bonus, in which case, he/she loses all the fiscal benefits. The December 2008 law encourages firms to adopt profit sharing since all contracts concluded between December 2008 and December 2014 can benefit from 20% credit tax. This law also extended the bonus to the manager in firms with 250 employees or less (it was 100 employees max). With the crisis, the fiscal benefits associated to Profit Sharing are reduced. To help financing social security, the 2009 law introduced the "social withdrawal" at 2%. Modified several times, the "social withdrawal" is now at 20% (august 2012 law).

The second participatory scheme is Employee Share Ownership. It was harmonized with the 1973 law. Employee share ownership covers all devices to grant employees shares in their firm on preferential terms and checking one of the three following conditions: filing actions on a firm savings plan or either a firm mutual fund, issuance of shares not transferable in a firm's privatization process, and finally distribution of shares as part of participation. Outside of these three terms, any other forms of holding of shares by employees enters the official definition of employee share ownership. The trade law 2001 stipulates that employee share ownership covers all schemes allowing employers to sell shares to employees at favorite conditions (usually 20-30% price cut, possible employers contribution, facilities of payment..). These conditions are usually conditional on a minimum detention period (two years).

There are also some other participatory schemes that we will not consider in this study. The first is "participation", a compulsory profit sharing scheme for firm with 50 employees or more (100 or more before 1990). The compulsory nature of the contract can rule out any possible employee incentive-motivation. The second is the so-called employees saving plan. The profit sharing and/or the participation bonuses and these plans are usually associated since the bonuses of the first are saved in the saving plans, which may introduce redundancy.

Financial Participation and Performance

Financial participation such as profit sharing and employee share ownership received great attention in the literature (see Kruse et al., 2010, for a survey). Kruse (1996) shows that profit sharing and employee share ownership are predicted to be a substitute for costly supervision, and to be used where capital intensity is high, production is highly interdependent, the technology is not stable, and task complexity is high. Kruse (1996) suggests that financial participation has positive effects on firm performance since employees adjust their effort to maximize their income and are then encouraged to work more cooperatively.

Financial participation, consequently, also reduce the intensity of vertical monitoring (control by the supervisor) and can increase employee autonomy (self-control and colleague control), even though it suffer from the "free rider" problems[1]. Mutual or horizontal monitoring according to Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) or "peer pressure" according to Kandel and Lazear (1992), at an optimum level, can alleviate this problem of "free rider". Financial participation makes employees more sensitive to the firm objectives (Pendleton et al., 1998), which may decrease the risk of employees to quit the firm (therefore the stability of employment). Wilson and Peel (1991) for UK and Fakhfakh (2004) for France provide evidence for this logic, showing that financial participation reduce the voluntary departure of employees.

Several studies analyze the impact of the introduction of financial participation and their relationships with the cooperation and firm performance. Large of them show positive relationship between financial participation and firm performance (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987, Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Kruse et al., 2010, Burgess et al., 2010). Some studies attempt to examine the relationship between financial participation and firm performance using comparable cross-national firm data. Kalmi et al. (2005), using data from a survey of listed firms in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, find positive effects of employee share ownership but not of profit sharing on financial performance. Poutsma et al. (2009), using a large cross-national database covering 32 countries, find that profit sharing is associated with superior performance whereas employee share ownership are not. More

[1]It could be better for an isolated employee not to contribute to the collective effort but ultimately comes to enjoy the gains from this collective effort.

recently Williams (2016) examine the relationship between profit sharing, employee share ownership and labor productivity across 29 European countries using a representative workplace survey. He finds that profit sharing is associated with greater labor productivity, but finds mixed evidence for employee share ownership. However, the author also finds that in countries with higher levels of collective bargaining coverage, profit sharing performs less well, whereas employee share ownership performs better. Union may fear to loose control on wage bargaining with the introduction of profit sharing.

Made of their character to encourage employees to the effort and cooperation, even reducing the departure of employees, financial participation is suggested by some authors as mechanisms to reduce conflicts in firms. Cable and Fitzroy (1980) suggest that sharing schemes can fundamentally transform the atmosphere of the workplace by eliminating the traditional conflict between workers and managers. Kruse (1996) pointed out that profit sharing and employee share ownership are both promoted for their potential to reduce conflict in the workplace by improving firm performance. Desbrières (2002) showed from a theoretical model that employee ownership allows reducing turnover, increasing individual and team performance, and is one of the privileged way of regulating conflicts in firms. Poole and Jenkins (1991) developed a firm-level model to show the influence of profit sharing and employee share ownership. Their model explains that firms implement these two schemes to enhance intrinsic commitment as well as extrinsic commitment, resulting in improved the firm's economic performance and hence in reduced conflict. Cramton et al. (2010) is the only empirical study that looks at the impact of employee share ownership on labor disputes, using a theoretical model developed by Cramton and Tracy (1992). Using data on major collective bargaining from USA, they found consistent evidence with the prediction of their theoretical model that employee share ownership reduces the overall incidence of conflicts.

There is an agreement that financial participation schemes are associated with perceptions that the firm is fair with employees. Using UK cross-section and panel data, Green and Heywood (2010) show that profit sharing increase worker satisfaction with their superiors. These perceptions may also help reduce conflict between employers and employees. Heywood et al. (2005) use the employee data from the German socio-economic panel to illustrate the influence of profit sharing on conflict with the supervisors. The authors show that the presence of profit sharing reduce the overall occurrence of conflicts between

employees and supervisors.

However, the prositive arguments in in favor of financial participation are not without critics. Heywood et al. (2005) explain that two types of employees are not able to provide a high effort. The first are those in poor health, and the second are those with advanced age. Thus, the authors also showed that profit sharing may be, however, a factor increasing conflicts between non-productive employees and supervisors in any workplace. Kelly and Kelly (1991) assume that sharing systems allow improved relations between the employers and employees if there is real confidence, if the employees feel they are treated fairly in the firm and have any information regarding the firm's profits. As stated by Wadhwani and Wall (1990) "far from reducing conflict between employers and employees, sharing schemes will increase it, because there are incentives for managers to cheat in the definition of profits". This probably refers to the problems of moral hazard of the employer side during the sharing of profits. The firm's performance may seriously be affected by this kind of conflict.

Conflicts and Performance

There exists a large body of literature dealing with the impact of collective conflicts on firm performance. However, the majority of these studies are more interested in the impact of strikes as one form of collective conflicts. Two exceptions areKleiner et al. (2002), Ding (2014), who take into account, in addition to strikes, work slowdown (work-to-rule) as collective action. Using USA commercial aircraft with monthly data from January 1974 to November 1991, Kleiner et al. (2002) show that strikes and slowdowns influence negatively the productivity by large percentages and large absolute dollar amounts. Ding (2014) shows that both strikes and work slowdowns (such as work-to-rule) have no significant effect on the resale value of commercial aircraft.

While many empirical studies are interested in the impact of strikes on profitability as measure of performance, fewer studies look at the impact on prices, productions and sales (Gunderson and Melino, 1987), labor productivity (Naples, 1988, McHugh, 1991), output (Paarsch, 1990), capital market reaction (Davidson et al., 1988) and the quality of production (Mas, 2008, Krueger and Mas, 2003). The majority of these studies underline that the strikes have negative and short-term effects on different measures of performance of the

industry or firms examined (Neumann and Reder, 1984, Becker and Olson, 1986, Davidson et al., 1988, Naples, 1988, McHugh, 1991, Kramer and Vasconcellos, 1996, Schmidt and Berri, 2004). One of the few studies found positive links between strikes and labor productivity is the study of Knight (1989) in the context of the UK manufacturing. The author associates a "therapeutic role" to strikes, as a vent to frustration or as a mechanism to resolve conflicts that would otherwise remain unresolved.

However, some studies point out that the negative impact of strikes can be mitigated by the existence of reactions to conflict mechanisms, initiated by firms in order to maintain a constant level or even increasing productivity, by partially replacing striking employees(see McHugh, 1991, Tanguy, 2015). If firms, through these mechanisms, manage to maintain a constant or higher output level, it will be done of the detriment of the product or service quality because the replacements employee have not necessarily the qualification of striking workers, nor the experience due to the routine associated with the tasks performed by striking workers[2]. It is in this context that Krueger and Mas (2003) examined a long contentious strikes which involved the hiring of replacement workers at a tire plant between 1994 and 1996. Looking before and after the strike and across plants, the authors found that tires produced during these years coincided with lower product quality, and also with periods when replacement workers worked together with returning strikers. A similar case, where the replacement of employees requires special skills, is Gruber and Kleiner (2012)'s study. Gruber and Kleiner (2012) analyze the effects of nurses' strikes in hospitals on patient outcomes in New York State. Using data collected on every nurses' strike over the 1984 to 2004 period in New York State, the authors find that nurses' strikes increase in hospital mortality by 18.3 percent and readmission by 5.7 percent for patients admitted during a strike. There results reveal a short-run adverse consequence of hospital strikes. These strikes may, however, contribute to long-run improvements of the hospitals' quality of productivity driven by union-related workplace improvement initiatives.

Apart from the direct effects, other empirical studies have examined the indirect effects of labor conflicts on the firm performance. This is particularly the subject of De Fusco and Fuess (1991), McDonald and Bloch (1999) studies. Using Australian firm data between 1983-1995, (the IBIS firm database), McDonald and Bloch (1999) find that industrial actions at a firm level have no significant effect on the firm profitability. However, the

[2]The labor code in France clearly states that such practices are illegal.

authors find that industrial actions increase the profitability of competing firms. De Fusco and Fuess (1991) show that strikes in the US airline industry have a positive impact on the share prices of other country airlines.

To our knowledge, only two studies examined empirically the impact of french collective conflicts on performance. Belot and Waxin (2012) examine the relationship between strike activity and the french firm performance. From the REPONSE 2002-2004 Survey, they show that strikes have a negative impact on firm's profitability but found that this negative relationship between strikes and firm performance weakens when the firm is family-controlled. Tanguy (2015), using merged data from both REPONSE 2002-2004 and the EAE (Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise) find that strikes frequency affect positively labor productivity.

There is almost strong consensus that financial participation improve firm performance. However, we remark that there are contrasting empirical results with the impact of collective conflicts on firm performance but the majority of these studies show a negative relationship between collective conflicts and performance. We also remark that these studies are only interested in the effect of strikes of firm performance. If the various forms of conflicts are in fact linked, the failure to take account of such relationships in empirical work can lead to errors in the estimates. For example, work slowdowns or refusal of overtime works are often considered as alternatives to work strikes, which can seriously affect production. Hence, we decide to consider financial participation as well as all types of collective conflicts together to empirically evaluate their real effects on the performance of French firms.

4.3 Data and Methodology

In this section, we first present our data. We then describe the econometric specification used in this study.

4.3.1 REPONSE and FARE

The data used in this study are derived from a large sample of French firms. We use two individual data sources: The REPONSE survey 2008-2010 ("RElations PrOfessionnelles et NégociationS d'Entreprises" see the first chapter, section data) and the FARE 2008 (Fichier Approché des Résultats Esane[3]). FARE is conducted by INSEE (Institut National de Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques) through the DSE (Direction des Statistiques d'Entreprises). This survey provides information on profit and loss, employment, wages, capital, investments and transfers, turnover and activities professional expenditure, and other information for certain sectors. The information provided by FARE allow us to objectively determine labor productivity of each firm, which could not be possible using the REPONSE survey.

Data from REPONSE and FARE have been merged (with the SIREN number of firms referenced in the two sources), resulting in a final sample of 3348 observations. We have two levels of information: the information from survey RESPONSE at the establishment level and FARE information at the firm level. So the financial data of the firm are matched with one or many establishments (many establishments can be on the same firm). For firms which have only one establishment, financial data (from FARE) are the same. However, for firms with multiple establishments, it is only possible to observe the effect of collective conflicts (at least for an establishment of this firm) on the performance of the entire firm. But, matching the establishment and firm data can pose a sampling problem in the case of firms with multiple establishments. To correct this problem, several authors (see Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2006) focus their studies on only single-firm (establishment), which consequently can cause a risk of selection bias in the estimates. Other authors apply a weighting method based on the share of each establishment in the total employment of the firm. Tanguy (2015) emphasizes that the only risk which may cause bias in the estimates,

[3]ESANE: Elaboration des statistiques Annuelles d'Entreprise, INSEE

would be that the level variables are not giving a good indicator variables at the firm level. This risk, however, seems to be minimal or even absent for the REPONSE survey since Ananian et al. (2006) show that establishments interviewed in the REPONSE have (on average) a significant weight within their firm (see Tanguy, 2015). Thus, in addition to this, we decided to retain multi-firms and establishments that have the highest number of employees.

Several variables are selected to carry out this research. The dependent variables are the economic performance using data from FARE and the relative profitability derived from the survey REPONSE. Several explanatory variables are used and additional, control variables are included to take into account the possible cross-influences.

Dependent Variables

The added value is frequently used as a measure of firm performance. It measures the own activity of the firm and contributes substantially to the firm result. This is a very important performance indicator as it allows the compensation of production factors such as compensation of employees, return on capital, but also of lenders. The choice of the value added as measure of performance is based on many existing empirical studies which have tested the link between collective conflicts (strikes in particular) and the firm's economic performance (e.g McHugh, 1991, Morishima, 1991, Knight, 1989, Laroche et al., 2006, Tanguy, 2015).

We have also a second measure of firm performance, evaluated from a subjective indicator given by "management representative" of REPONSE Survey. The questionnaire includes an item to measure the perception of the firms' profitability compared to their competitors ("top", "equal", "lower"). This indicator is particularly interesting as it measures performance relative to a competitive environment. In addition, the validity of this perceptual indicator in terms of economic data is assessed by many studies Gauzente et al. (2000), Bryson et al. (2011).

Independent Variables

A part of the management representative of REPONSE survey is intended to reflect the collective conflicts in French firm. Eight forms of collective conflicts are suggested by the survey questionnaire. We can make a distinction between collective conflicts with work stoppage (including walkouts, less than two-day strikes, two-days strikes or more) and collective conflicts without work stoppage (go-slow strikes, work to rule, refusals of overtime work, demonstrations and petitions).

To be confident about the main influential types of collective conflicts, we decide to run multiple correspondence analysis and clustering of firms. Using clustering, leads us to consider five clusters of firms regarding collective conflicts (see Table 1.5 in the first chapter). From this preliminary analysis, we notice that the main types of conflicts are: two-day strikes or more, short strikes (walkouts and less than two-day strikes), refusals of overtime work and petitions. We can then rank these most influential types from the most costly (two-day strikes or more) to the less costly types of conflicts (petition).

For these reasons, we decide to construct a multi-categorical exclusive measure that reflects the severity of conflict types. This measure ranges from the Strong conflicts (two-day strikes or more), Less strong conflicts (walkouts and less than two-day strikes), Overtime conflicts (refusals of overtime work), Petition conflicts and finally firms with no conflict at all.

Our production function (Cobb-Douglas) takes into account the capital stock in the firm. The carrying value of tangible assets is used here as a proxy of the real capital stock (e.g Tanguy, 2015). It is also essential to control the size of firms (as expressed in logarithmic form). Unions are better represented in large firms where operating rules and exchanges are based much more on structured social relations. Furthermore, we do not retain the union presence among our explanatory variables for two reasons. The first reason is that in France the majority of collective conflicts is at the initiative of trade unions (according to the DARES), which justifies a strong correlation between union presence and collective conflicts (see Laroche and Schmidt, 2004). The second reason is that the impact of union presence on the firm performance may be subject to an empirical study in itself[4].

[4]In the French case, few studies have addressed the question. Using data from the first REPONSE Survey held in 1992, Coutrot (1996) examined the effect of unions on labor productivity and showed that

The REPONSE survey also have variables reflecting financial participation including profit sharing and employee share ownership. Profit sharing measures whether or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) the firm's has a sharing profit plan, which rewards employees based on "group output or performance". Employee ownership measures whether or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) the firm's has a employee ownership plan.

Most of the previous works on the subject reflect the industrial affiliation in their analyzes (see McDonald and Bloch, 1999, Belot and Waxin, 2012). Collective conflicts are in fact very different from one sector to another. Thus, it is essential to control for the effect of industrial affiliation.

We also use an indicator of the firms age. We control for the percentage of each occupational group existing in the firm (manual workers, non-manual workers, semi-skilled and skilled workers). In this sense, the empirical literature shows that labor productivity increases significantly with the percentage of skilled workers in the workforce (see Matteucci et al., 2005, Tanguy, 2015).

We include a control variable indicating if the firm is publicly traded (1 = yes, 0 = no). Furthermore, we constructed an indicator for monitoring the share of the firm market (divided into indicator) and the horizon of the market (International =1 or not=0). As one of the problems is the merging of data at the establishment (single-firm) level and at the firm level, we also add an indicator for single-firm (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Variables on innovative organizational practices in the firm have been added. These variables indicate if there are working groups (1 = yes, 0 = no), if there are quality circles (1 = yes, 0 = no) and if management provides information to employees (1 = yes, 0 = no). All these variables provide interesting insights to our study.

Table 4.3 (in appendix 4.5) gives description and the distribution of the set of variables

union presence appear to be associated with higher labor productivity. Doucouliagos and Laroche (2002) studied the impact of employee relations on performance with a sample of French equipment manufacturing firms (REPONSE 2004-2005). The author's main conclusion is that union presence have negative effect on both efficiency and productivity. The first study published in the French case was conducted by Laroche (2004) who showed no significant relationship between union presence and performance, demonstrating the weakness of union influence in the French context. However, recent studies by Laroche and Wechtler (2011), et Bryson et al. (2011) showed that unions have a significant negative effect on french firm's performance. For more details (see Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003), who published a meta-analysis on studies published in thirty years devoted to the links between union and productivity.

that we suggest to use in this study.

4.3.2 Econometric Methodology

We aim to explain the effect of collective conflicts on firm performance. The economic performance equation we wish to estimate for the **first model** has the following form:

$$LogQ_i = F(ESO, PS, Col.conflict_{i_j}, X_i) + \epsilon_i$$

where $LogQ$ is the output of firm (value added), and $Col.conflictj$ is multi-categorical exclusive variables coded $1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ according to the cluster of conflicts as described earlier. X is a set of variables (described in the previous section) considered relevant to the determination of the performance level of the firm, and ϵ corresponds to the error term.

We first estimate the model with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The parameters estimated with this method are unbiased if the explanatory variables in the model are not correlated with the error term ($E(\epsilon i|conflictj, X_i) = 0$). However, several reasons can justify the existence of a non-zero correlation between certain variables and the error term ϵ in the performance equation. Several authors provided examples of unobserved factors explaining both the incidence of collective conflicts (particularly strike activity) and profitability or productivity in the firm. Kennan (1986) emphasizes that some components of profitability are unobservable to union members, and that the strike is viewed as a mechanism that allows workers to extract higher wages from more profitable employers. Flaherty (1987) emphasizes that successful initiatives of the employer to increase productivity can lead to defensive strikes, which aim to stop the acceleration in productivity, claiming lost work rules and practices.

Moreover, the same observation can be made about unobserved factors between financial participation (Employee share ownership and profit sharing) and firm performance. Employee share ownership and profit sharing may have as objective to align the interests of all employees with those of the firm by sharing the risk of overall performance with employees. Several works mentioned the endogeneity of the decision to have these two plans (see Kruse, 1996). In this case, it is necessary to test the endogeneity of collective

conflicts, employee ownership and profit-sharing using appropriate estimators.

Endogeneity : We have implemented an endogeneity test using a regression based on Hausmann test in two step (see Wooldridge, 2010, regression based residuals). In the first step, each of the three equations (conflicts, employee share ownership and profit sharing) is estimated adequately and we propose to recover the residues from these regressions. These residues are used at the second step in the performance equation. Hence, if the coefficient associated to residuals of conflict is significant, then this variable is considered endogenous. We do the same for residues of any other variables suspected as endogenous (including employee share ownership and profit sharing).

The endogeneity tests show that collective conflicts, employee share ownership and profit sharing are clearly endogenous. We then use the simultaneous estimation of the performance equation (Output), plus the three equations related to collective conflicts, employee share ownership and profit sharing. Because of the mixed nature of our endogenous variables (qualitative for collective conflicts, employee share ownership, profit sharing, and quantitative for performance), standard methods of estimation of simultaneous equations (such as 2SLS, 3SLS) are no longer valid. In the general case of a system of simultaneous equations where the endogenous variables have different natures, it is recommended to use the estimation by least asymptotic squares (see Gourieroux et al., 1985). However, the system of equations we consider is recursive. We propose to adopt Roodman (2011)'s approach for estimation of simultaneous recursive equations models including dependent variables of mixed natures (three qualitative and one quantitative). This system uses the estimation of a SUR model by the Maximum Likelihood where the correlations between the different disturbance equations are also estimated.

Let X_1 and X_2 be respectively the sets of explanatory variables of ESO and PS.

X_1= activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, Product quality for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic situation of the firm, diffusion of information on firm strategy, size dummies, industry dummies.

X_2= activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, price for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic

situation of the firm, size dummies, industry dummies.

Let X_3 be a set of explanatory variables of the different clusters of conflicts.

X_3= union impede firm activity, work council, worker autonomy, unionization rate, who control the work, size dummies, industry affiliation dummies.

Let X_4 be a set of control variables of the output (added value).

X_4= logarithm of the capital, logarithm of the total number of employees, single firm, diffusing information on wage evolution, problem solving group, international market, market share dummies, firm age dummies, occupational category dummies, industry affiliation dummies.

The recursive system we want to estimate is then the following:

$$\begin{cases} ESO_i = F(X_{i1}) + \epsilon_{i1} \\ PS_i = F(X_{i2}) + \epsilon_{i2} \\ Col.Conflict_{i_j} = F(ESO_i, PS_i, X_{i3}) + \epsilon_{i3},\ j = 1,2,3,4,5 \ is\ the\ cluster\ index \\ lnQ_i = F(ESO, PS, Col.Conf, X) + \epsilon_{i4} \end{cases}$$

In an alternative model, where the performance dependent variable is qualitative kind (the perception of the manager on the profitability of the firm compared to competitors), the system of equations we consider is also recursive. Unlike the first model, the Roodman (2011) approach is used in order to estimate the simultaneous equations recursive model with only qualitative dependent variables. This system uses a multinomial Probit estimation for Collective conflicts equation, two Pobit for employee share ownership and profit sharing equation, and finally an ordered Probit for the performance equation. The recursive system we want to estimate is the following:

X_1= activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, Product quality for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic situation of the firm, diffusion of information on firm strategy, size dummies, industry dummies.

X_2= activity easy to predict, single establishment, belong to group, price for competition, service for competition, market location, diffusion of information on the economic situation of the firm, size dummies, industry dummies.

Let X_3 be a set of explanatory variables of the different clusters of conflicts.

X_3= union impede firm activity, work council, worker autonomy, unionization rate, who control the work, size dummies, industry affiliation dummies.

Let X_4 be a set of control variables of the profitability compared to competitor.

X_4= single firm, diffusing information on wage evolution, problem solving group, international market, market share dummies, firm age dummies, occupational category dummies, size dummies, industry affiliation dummies.

$$\begin{cases} ESO_i = F(X_{i1}) + \epsilon_{i1} \\ PS_i = F(X_{i2}) + \epsilon_{i2} \\ Col.Conflict_{i_j} = F(ESO_i, PS_i, X_{i3}) + \epsilon_{i3} \\ Rentab_i = F(ESO_i, PS_i, Col.Conf_{i_j}, X) + \epsilon_{i4} \end{cases}$$

Identification : In the case of linear simultaneous equations system, identification is a crucial issue (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Greene, 2003)[5]. However, Wilde (2000) argues that in this case, "no exclusion restrictions for the exogenous variables are needed if there is sufficient variation in the data" (p.312). In this analysis, the identification restrictiton is respected (results did not change when we relaxe identification). In each equation, we use both specific explanatory variables as well as common explanatory variables compared to other equations. This guaranties identification. Furthermore, the identification of parameters is possible because of the non-linearity of the Multinomial Probit model[6].

[5]Greene (2003) show that there are two conditions for the parameter identification. The first condition, which is a necessary condition but not sufficient for identification is the Order Condition: "the number of exogenous variables included from the equation must be at least equal to number of endogenous variables included". The sufficient condition (the second) for identification is the stronger Rank Condition which impose a restriction such as exclusion variable.

[6]According to Heckman and Robb (1985), identification of parameters is possible because of the non-linearity of the Probit model and does not require the use of instruments or exclusion restrictions. Wilde (2000) shows that a general (recursive) multi-equation probit model is identified as long as each equation contains one varying predetermined variable.

4.4 Empirical Results

First, we present the results obtained with added value as a measure of economic performance are highlighted. Second, the results with regards to profitability of the firm as compared to its competitors are commented (a subjective measure of performance from the point of view of management representative)[7]

4.4.1 Added Value as Performance Measure

Table 4.1 (see appendix 4.5 for more details) reports the estimation results (the dependent variable is the value added as measure of economic performance), obtained from the matched data. Overall, we find that the explanatory power of the models is very high (97 %), which is not surprising since we have enough variables that may explain the variation in firm productivity.

Our findings show a positive effect of the firm's size (number of employees) on the firm's productivity. This effect is entirely consistent with the existing literature, where this positive effect is mainly associated with the capital stock.

Collective conflicts and financial participation are considered exogenous in the specification (1) and the performance equation is estimated by OLS, controlling the robustness of standard deviations to the presence of heteroscedasticity. The endogeneity tests reveal that collective conflicts and financial participation are all endogenous to the performance equation. To correct this problem and have no biased estimates, the second specification (2) (simultaneous equations) takes into account the endogeneity of these variables (see "Encadré 4" in appendix 4.5 for the calculation of net effects).

The most robust result is that the positive effect of financial participation on the performance of French firms is not neutralized by the observed effects on collective conflicts. However, it should be recalled that the lack of indigenization systematically overestimates

[7]As a reminder, we have two levels of information: the information from survey RESPONSE at the establishment level and FARE information at the firm level (see date section). So, this study is carried out on a sample of single-firm (only one establishment) and multi-firm (two or more establishments). One way to check the robustness of our results were to estimate on a sample of firms with only one establishment. We were pleasantly surprised that our main results hardly changed.

the effects of financial participation but also of collective conflicts. Indeed, the OLS results show that the profit increases productivity by 12%. However, when only conflicts are endogenized, the effect of the profit sharing is 7.8% (column A Table 4.1). Finally, when we endogeneize both collective conflicts and financial participation, profit sharing increases the productivity by 8.5%. A similar effect in sign and magnitude is obtained by Fakhfakh and Perotin (2000).

Meanwhile, the OLS estimates show that employee share ownership increases productivity by 6.3%. However, the indogenization of collective conflicts (4.6%) or collective conflicts and financial participation reduce the effect of employee share ownership by 4.7%. The financial participation contribute has certainly an effect on collective conflicts but that's not the only effect since the impact of financial participation on productivity continues to be positive and significant (+8.5% for profit sharing and +4.7% for employee share ownership). These results are in line with many empirical and theoretical studies (Cable and Wilson, 1990, Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Poutsma et al., 2009, Burgess et al., 2010, Williams, 2016), which show that financial participation improve firm performance. However, the profit sharing generates more positive effects on productivity rather than the employee share ownership, which is consistent with the findings of Williams (2016) and Poutsma et al. (2009) for whom the profit sharing generally has stronger effects on firm performance than the employee share ownership.

Concerning the effect of collective conflicts on performance, it is plausible to conclude that the Petitions and Strong conflicts impact positively firms' productivity. Every things being equal elsewhere, firms having known Strong conflicts show a higher productivity by 1.8 percent whereas Petition conflicts are accompanied by an increase in productivity by 0.3%. This positive result of Strong conflicts (long strikes) on productivity joins Tanguy (2015) findings. The explanation for these results could be found in Freeman and Medoff (1984), for whom collective actions can improve communication, employee morale, cooperation, which in turn, can positively affect firms' performance. As for Knight (1989), we can also associate this positive effect to a "therapeutic role" of Strong and Petition conflicts in the firm.

Conversely, we note that the Less Strong conflicts is negatively related to firm productivity. However, the coefficient associated with Overtime is not statistically significant.

Less Strong conflicts appear to have lower productivity of about 1.5 percent compared to other firms. This negative effect of Less Strong conflicts (from few hours to less than two-day strikes) on productivity, could have an explanation. The value added is the balance of the production account, i.e equal to the value of production (turnover), minus intermediate consumption[8]. The descriptive statistics on conflict reasons from the RESPONSE survey, show that the main reason of collective conflicts is the increase in wages. If we consider that the impact of Less strong conflicts on wages leads firms to pass the wage increase on prices (by increasing prices), we can then consider a lower demand (and therefore turnover), which will affect the added value of the firm.

With regards to variables capturing the innovative organizational practices in the firm, results show that the sharing information with employees about wage evolution and the presence of group problem resolutions are significant positive and that these coefficients have the expected effect. Hence, information sharing and group problem resolutions seem to be good factors for improving firm productivity.

Unsurprisingly, estimation results indicate a negative relationship between productivity and the single-firm (only one establishment). Regarding the variables describing the competitive environment of the firms, productivity is not significant when the market share is less than 15%, but also when it is above 50%. However, productivity is higher when the market share is between 15-49% compared with the market share of less than 3%. Moreover, firms competing in an international market seem more productive than the others which are not.

Furthermore, results emphasize that productivity is significantly related to the occupational category of the workers. We observe positive and significant coefficients when the occupational category is manual, semi-skilled and non-manual worker. Thus, unskilled workers seem to be more productive than skilled workers. Regarding the variable describing the age, it seems that productivity is higher when the firm age is between 10-19 years but lower when it is over 50 years compared to younger firms (less than 5 years).

Finally, productivity is higher in the sectors of Scientific & technical activities, Information, communication, financial & real estate activities, Construction, Energy industry and Auto industry & equipment goods. However, it is lower in the sectors of Food industry,

[8]According to INSEE (Institut National de Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques).

Accommodation & restaurant and Public administration, health & social work.

After examining the link between collective conflicts and firm productivity from the matched data of REPONSE survey and FARE, we propose a complementary analysis of the effects of financial participation and collective conflicts, relying on the perceived profitability of the firm. This performance measure is the subjective perception of management representative about the firm's profitability compared to its main competitors.

Table 4.1: **Added value as performance measure (*LogQ*)**

Variables	**OLS (1)**	**Simultaneous Equations (2)**		
	OLS	Only Conflict Endogenous (A)	Only FP Endogenous (B)	FP-Conflict Endogenous (C)
LogK	0.211***	0.211***	0.209***	0.210***
	(183.19)	(83.84)	(85.92)	(88.43)
LogL	0.697***	0.697***	0.690***	0.690***
	(447.95)	(187.34)	(196.14)	(200.33)
Employee Share Ownership	0.063***	0.063***	0.046***	0.047***
	(15.89)	(15.32)	(27.82)	(29.03)
Profit Sharing	0.123***	0.124***	0.078***	0.085***
	(34.91)	(32.74)	(34.80)	(40.51)
Conflicts (Ref: No Conflict)				
Strong	0.123***	0.018***	0.099***	0.020***
	(9.73)	(10.70)	(8.31)	(14.47)
Less Strong	0.036***	-0.002	0.001	-0.015***
	(5.91)	(-1.20)	(0.19)	(-6.45)
Overtime	-0.014**	-0.002	-0.009	-0.001
	(-2.27)	(-1.15)	(-1.19)	(-0.21)
Petition	0.034**	0.003***	-0.000	0.004***
	(2.79)	(7.06)	(-0.04)	(13.10)
N	3217			

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

4.4.2 Profitability Compared to Competitor as Performance Measure

Here, we analyze the effect of financial participation and collective conflicts on the likelihood that a firm obtains higher profitability compared to its main competitors. Table 4.2 (see appendix 4.5 for more details) reports the results of the estimates. Employee ownership, profit sharing and collective conflicts are each estimate by a Probit (as considered endogenous after testing) and the equation of the relative profitability is estimated by Ordered Probit. Hence, the model estimated is a system of simultaneous and recursive equations.

It should be stressed that the propensity to deem the performance (by management representative) as superior to that of competitors depends on the existence of financial participation including employee ownership and profit sharing.

The employee share ownership firms have significantly higher probability to be considered as a good performer (4%). The effect of profit sharing is slightly higher since profit sharing firms are 5% more to declare being more profitable. Here also, these results join many empirical findings (Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Poutsma et al., 2009), which show that financial participation improve firm performance. However, the profit sharing generates more positive effects on performance rather than the employee share ownership, which is consistent with the findings of Williams (2016) and Poutsma et al. (2009) for whom the profit sharing generally has stronger effects on firm performance than the employee share ownership.

We also note that Strong and Less Strong conflicts (mainly strikes) are significantly and negatively associated with perceived higher profitability by management representatives. However Overtime and Petition conflicts (conflicts without strikes) are significantly and positively associated with the higher profitability compared to their competitor. This means that firms which have mainly experienced a total work stoppage (strike), have a lower perceived profitability than their main competitors, while firms that have experienced conflicts without work stoppages appears to have a higher probability of being more

profitable compared to their competitors. This result is in line with many studies (Naples, 1988, Kleiner et al., 2002, McHugh, 1991, Gruber and Kleiner, 2012). It is clair that for the employer or the management representative, employees can show their discontent without adopting collective action with work stoppages (strikes), creating additional costs for the firm, which in turn affect their profitability especially in a competitive environment. Following this line of thought, Eaton (1972) emphasizes that strikes represent a poor investment for the employers and a good investment for employees or unions. We may also associate this result to the indirect effect of collective conflicts which consists in saying that strikes at a firm level have a negative effect on the firm own' profitability but increase the profitability of competing firms (see De Fusco and Fuess, 1991, McDonald and Bloch, 1999).

Unfortunately, these results contrast with those obtained on the objective measure of performance, the added value. Using added value, we showed that firms having experienced Strong conflict (long strikes) are more productive. However, the perceptions of firm's performance is judged to be lower in this case by manager representative. This opposite result on productivity and on the perceived performance could be related to the psychological effects that strikes may engender on manager behavior. Manager are of course unhappy and even disappointed where they have to face strikes. This kind of events may then bias their judgment on perceived performance.

The perception of profitability by the management representatives, also seems very related to variables describing the firm economic environment. Thus, the profitability of firms operating as part of an international market is considered higher than that of firms operating within other markets. Moreover, we observe that firms with a market share between 15-24% appear to be rather profitable than competitive, compared to other categories of market share. We also note that, being a single-firm increases significantly the firm's profitability. Similarly, firms of 10-19 years appear to be less profitable (relative to competitors) than firms under five years (reference category). This growth in profitability with firms' age is verified consistently for all age categories considered.

It is comforting to observe that the effects of the variables reflecting the innovative organizational practices in the firm (the sharing of information with employees about wage evolution and the group problem resolutions), have their expected sign, as they appear to have a positive and significant influence on the firm's profitability. Indeed, information

sharing and group problem resolutions seem to be good factors for firm's profitability.

We also observe that the profitability is linked to occupational category at the firm. Thus, according to management representatives, and in contrast to results obtained in the objective analysis of economic performance, non-manual workers are likely influence positively the profitability compared to competitors than other categories of employees in the firm. We then find that profitability compared to competitors increases with the size of the firm. The more the firm is large, the more it is profitable. However, for firms with 200 to 499 employees, we observed a significantly lower profitability relative to their competitors as these firms dispose specific characteristics. (Beroud et al., 2008*a*) show that the union presence has increased particularly in french firms with 200 to 499 employees and that these firms have experienced the largest increase of strikes.

Table 4.2: **Profitability compered to competitor as performance measure**

Variables	**Regression coef.**	**Marginal effects**
Employee Share Ownership	0.090***	0.040***
	(5.20)	(5.20)
Profit Sharing	0.393***	0.050***
	(21.56)	(21.06)
Collective Conflicts : Ref: no conflict		
Strong	-0.432***	-0.097***
	(-14.30)	(-14.30)
Less Strong	-0.356***	-0.070***
	(-24.14)	(-24.30)
Overtime	0.116***	0.037***
	(6.82)	(6.82)
Petition	0.089***	0.028***
	(3.63)	(3.63)
N	3566	

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Finally, the analysis of the industry affiliation effect shows that profitability is deemed better (compared with the trade sector as reference) in the sectors of Scientific & technical activities, Public administration, health & social work and Auto industry & equipment goods. However, the profitability of the sectors of Food industry, Construction, Transport & warehousing, Accommodation & restaurant and Information, communication, financial & real estate activities are considered as lower.

4.5 Conclusion

This study represents an empirical analysis of the effects of financial participation and collective conflicts on French firm's performance from data matched the REPONSE survey and FARE.

The most robust finding is that the positive effect of financial participation on French firms' performance has not been affected by collective conflicts. Financial participation impact collective conflicts and the commonly observed effect on productivity may be due (partly) to indirect effects that goes through collective conflicts.

It is comforting to observe that the presence of profit sharing and employee share ownership increase very significantly the firm's productivity (or profitability), suggesting that French firms can use these types of incentives to improve their performance. These results are in line with many empirical and theoretical studies (Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Poutsma et al., 2009, Burgess et al., 2010, Williams, 2016), arguing that financial participation is an efficient tool for the firm performance.

Our results show that collective conflicts affect significantly and differently the firm performance. Strong and Petition conflicts positively affect productivity, while Less Strong conflicts negatively affect productivity. This positive effect of Strong conflicts on productivity is in line with the finding of Knight (1989) and more recently Tanguy (2015). Furthermore, Petition conflicts appear to be a good tool for firm performance because they can be considered as the "reasonable" kind of conflicts since they allow employees to express their dissatisfaction through a democratic expression of their "voice" without

affecting the firm's performance.

Collective conflicts are not necessarily undesirable, mainly when there is employee dissatisfaction in a given firm that have to be acknowledged. Collective conflicts may be considered as a source of wasting resources when accompanied by strikes or work stoppages, since firms may miss production and employees may loose income. Nevertheless, collective conflicts could also be considered as a potential source of efficiency if they can help improving industrial relations inside the firm.

Although this study underline important results, it has some limitations that should be addressed in future research. The cross-section data used allow to reveal a static relationship between financial participation, collective conflicts and performance. It would be interesting to conduct a longitudinal study to reflect the dynamic relationships between financial participation, collective conflicts and performance. This should also potentially address the influence of the interaction terms between financial participation and collective conflicts on firm performance.

Appendix 4.5

Table 4.3: **Variable Descriptions (Chapter 4) (%)**

Variable	**Variable definition**	**Average(%)**
LogQ	Logarithm of the Added value published by INSEE	8.01
LoK	Logarithm of the capital stock is determined based on the carrying value of fixed assets	7.26
LogL	Logarithm of the total number of employees in the firm	4.09
Profitability compared to competitors	Ordered variable (from 1 to 3) if the Profitability compared to competitors belonging to one of the three classes: Higher Stable Lower	 26.12 58.32 15.56
Employee Share Ownership	Binary variable equals to 1 if employees have a share of the firm's capital, equals to 0 otherwise	15.06
Profit Sharing	Binary variable equals to 1 if the employees in the firm are covered by a profit sharing contract, equals to 0 otherwise	31.96
Problem Solving Groups	Binary variable equals to 1 if there are problem solving groups, equals to 0 otherwise	41.80
International Market	Binary variable equal to 1 if the main activity of the firm is international market, equals to 0 otherwise	82.22
Market Share	Continuous variables indicating the percentage of the Market share belonging to one of the five classes: Less than 3% 3% to 14% 15% to 24% 25% to 49% 50% and More	 24.55 24.50 14.55 15.07 21.33

Continued on next page...

... table 4.3 continued

Variable	Variable definition	Average(%)
Firm age	Ordered variable (from 1 to 5) if the firm belongs to one of the five classes:	
	Less than 5 years	4.35
	5 to 9 years	10.66
	10 to 19 years	25.34
	20 to 49 years	41.24
	50 years and More	18.41
Occupational Category	Continuous variables indicating the percentage of the workforce belonging to each of the occupational category	
	Manual Workers	9.88
	Semi-skilled Workers	9.03
	Engineers or Skilled Workers	40.14
	Non-Manual	40.95
Organizational change	Binary variable equals to 1 if the firm has conducted at least one organizational change, equals to 0 otherwise	71.51
Work Council	Binary variable equals to 1 if the work council exists in the firm, equals to 0 otherwise	18.90
Unions impede the firm activities	Binary variable equals to 1 if the unions impede the progress of the firm's activities from the opinion of the firm's representative, equals to 0 otherwise	40.17
Worker Autonomy	Binary variable equals to 1 if an accident in production or of the service, employees are first encouraged to solve the problem themselves, equals to 0 otherwise	48.88
Unionization rate	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 4) if the unionization rate of the firm belongs to one of the four classes:	
	Less than 5%	72.87
	5% to 9%	14.90
	10% to 20%	5.90
	More than 20%	6.33
Who Controls the Work	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 3) if the employee's work is controlled primarily by:	

Continued on next page...

... table 4.3 continued

Variable	Variable definition	Average(%)
	Superior Hierarchy	88.30
	Customers & Specialized Service	7.25
	Colleague	4.45
Firm activity's is easy to predict	Binary variable equals to 1 if one year to another, it is easy to predict the evolution of the firm's activity, equals to 0 otherwise	28.98
Single establishment	Binary variable equals to 1 if the firm is a single establishment, equals to 0 otherwise	55.77
The firm belongs to a group	Binary variable equals to 1 if the firm belongs to a group, equals to 0 otherwise	34.80
Price as a strategy to compete	Binary variable equals to 1 if the price is the main element on which is based the firm's strategy against the competition, equals to 0 otherwise	13.19
Product quality as a strategy to compete	Binary variable equals to 1 if the product quality is the main element on which is based the firm's strategy against the competition, equals to 0 otherwise	16.86
Service quality as a strategy to compete	Binary variable equals to 1 if the service quality is the main element on which is based the firm's strategy against the competition, equals to 0 otherwise	43.53
Market	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 5) if the main activity of the firm is:	
	Local market	36.05
	Regional market	22.15
	National market	24.02
	European market	6.47
	World market	11.30
Diffusing of Information on economic situation	Binary variable equals to 1 if the information on the economic situation of the firm is shared to all employees, equals to 0 otherwise	90.38

Continued on next page...

... table 4.3 continued

Variable	**Variable definition**	**Average(%)**
Diffusing Information on firm strategy	Binary variable equals to 1 if the information on the strategies and orientations of the firm is shared to all employees, equals to 0 otherwise	91.22
Diffusing Information on wage evolution	Binary variable equals to 1 if the information on wage evolution of the firm is shared to all employees, equals to 0 otherwise	81.82
Number of employees	Ordered variable (from 1 to 6) if the size (number of employees) of the firm belongs to one of six classes:	
	Less than 20 Employees	39.65
	20 to 49 employees	37.05
	50 to 99 employees	12.76
	100 to 199 employees	5.86
	200 to 499 employees	3.46
	500 employees or more	1.22
Sector	Multinomial variable (from 1 to 10) if the firm belongs to one of the ten following sectors	
	Food industry	2.79
	Auto industry & equipment goods	2.47
	Energy industry	12.62
	Construction	11.30
	Trade & auto repair	19.36
	Transport & warehousing	7.54
	Accommodation & Restaurant	6.67
	Information, communication, financial & real estate activity	7.08
	Scientific & technical activities	11.67
	Public administration, health & social work	18.49

Encadré 4: Calculation of Net Effects

When estimating a production function by OLS, the parameters associated with the presence of collective conflicts (Strong, Lesstrong, Overtime, Petition), ESO and PS are interpreted as the performance differential (because our Production function is logarithmic).

However, the estimation of a system of two (or more) simultaneous equations (Strong, Lesstrong, Overtime, Petition, ESO and PS) changes the interpretation of strong, Lesstrong, Overtime, Petition, ESO and PS coefficients in the performance equation. Indeed, each of these variables in this last equation is associated to the predicted probability. Since this probability is continuous the associated parameter is no longer a probability differential. To get the productivity differential we need λ estimates, the predicted probability of each alternative (for example the predicted probability of PS corresponding to PS firms $\hat{ps}_{(ps=1)}$ and the predicted probability of PS for non PS firms $\hat{ps}_{(ps=0)}$). This differential can be obtained by calculating the following:

$\hat{\lambda}_{strong}(\overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=1)} - \overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{lesstrong}(\overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=1)} - \overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{overtime}(\overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=1)} - \overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{petition}(\overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=1)} - \overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{eso}(\overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=1)} - \overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{ps}(\overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=1)} - \overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=0)})$

We can then test the significance of this differential by testing the differences between the following quantities:
$\hat{\lambda}_{strong} * \overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{strong} * \overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{lesstrong} * \overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{lesstrong} * \overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{overtime} * \overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{overtime} * \overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{petition} * \overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{petition} * \overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{eso} * \overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{eso} * \overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{ps} * \overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{ps} * \overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=0)}$

Table 4.1: **Added Value as Performance Measure** *LogQ*

Variables	**OLS (1)**	**Simultaneous Equations (2)**		
	OLS	Conflict Endogenous	FP (A) Endogenous (B)	FP-Conflict Endogenous (C)
LogK	0.211***	0.211***	0.209***	0.210***
	(183.19)	(83.84)	(85.92)	(88.43)
LogL	0.697***	0.697***	0.690***	0.690***
	(447.95)	(187.34)	(196.14)	(200.33)
Employee Share Ownership	0.063***	0.063***	0.046***	0.047***
	(15.89)	(15.32)	(27.82)	(29.03)
Profit Sharing	0.123***	0.124***	0.078***	0.085***
	(34.91)	(32.74)	(34.80)	(40.51)
Conflicts (Ref: No Conflict)				
Strong	0.123***	0.018***	0.099***	0.020***
	(9.73)	(14.47)	(8.31)	(10.70)
Less Strong	0.036***	-0.002	0.001	-0.015***
	(5.91)	(-1.20)	(0.19)	(-6.45)
Overtime	-0.014**	-0.002	-0.009	-0.001
	(-2.27)	(-1.15)	(-1.19)	(-0.21)
Petition	0.034**	0.003***	-0.000	0.004***
	(2.79)	(7.06)	(-0.04)	(13.10)
Single Firm	-0.106***	-0.108***	-0.028***	-0.020***
	(-29.12)	(-26.88)	(-6.68)	(-4.77)
Diffusing Information on Wage Evolution	0.050***	0.051***	0.031***	0.030***
	(13.37)	(13.84)	(8.37)	(7.84)
Problem Solving Groups	0.038***	0.039***	0.026***	0.024***
	(12.26)	(11.91)	(8.40)	(7.70)
International Market	0.144***	0.142***	0.101***	0.096***
	(35.70)	(33.89)	(23.09)	(21.69)
Market Share (Ref: Less than 3%)				
3% to 14%	0.019***	0.018***	0.009**	0.007

Continued on next page...

... table 4.1 continued

Variables	**OLS (1)**	**Simultaneous Equations (2)**		
	OLS	Conflict Endogenous	FP (A) Endogenous (B)	FP-Conflict Endogenous (C)
	(4.54)	(4.20)	(2.15)	(1.60)
15% to 24%	0.045***	0.044***	0.034***	0.033***
	(9.26)	(9.45)	(7.32)	(7.19)
25% to 49%	0.091***	0.092***	0.081***	0.079***
	(18.96)	(17.58)	(15.79)	(15.64)
50% and More	0.009**	0.007	0.006	0.004
	(1.97)	(1.65)	(1.27)	(0.87)
Firm age (Ref: Less than 5 years)				
5 to 9 years	0.012	0.012	-0.011	-0.015
	(1.49)	(1.31)	(-1.20)	(-1.60)
10 to 19 years	0.092***	0.092***	0.090***	0.090***
	(18.92)	(19.40)	(18.92)	(18.96)
20 to 49 years	0.019***	0.019***	0.007*	0.006
	(5.18)	(4.94)	(1.92)	(1.48)
50 and More	-0.056***	-0.057***	-0.061***	-0.063***
	(-12.84)	(-12.37)	(-13.35)	(-13.35)
Occupational Category (Ref:Engineers or Skilled)				
Manul Workers	0.410***	0.410***	0.401***	0.399***
	(63.23)	(47.01)	(46.01)	(45.79)
Semi Skilled workers	0.224***	0.224***	0.216***	0.216***
	(33.96)	(34.05)	(32.47)	(32.43)
Non-Manual Worker	0.067***	0.067***	0.070***	0.070***
	(14.64)	(13.16)	(14.08)	(14.11)
Sector (Ref: Trade & Auto Repair)				
Food Industry	-0.187***	-0.184***	-0.153***	-0.147***
	(-20.46)	(-18.44)	(-14.53)	(-13.80)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.063***	0.069***	0.023**	0.026**

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... table 4.1 continued

Variables	**OLS (1)**	**Simultaneous Equations (2)**		
	OLS	Conflict Endogenous	FP (A) Endogenous (B)	FP-Conflict Endogenous (C)
	(7.05)	(7.76)	(2.36)	(2.45)
Energy Industry	0.034***	0.036***	0.017**	0.018**
	(6.15)	(6.31)	(2.82)	(3.12)
Construction	0.197***	0.198***	0.146***	0.143***
	(33.57)	(37.91)	(25.36)	(24.81)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.019**	-0.023***	-0.005	-0.006
	(-2.91)	(-3.94)	(-0.91)	(-0.89)
Accommodation & Food	-0.413***	-0.421***	-0.391***	-0.391***
	(-65.28)	(-71.94)	(-68.02)	(-54.15)
Info., Com., Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.434***	0.431***	0.412***	0.412***
	(59.54)	(47.64)	(47.90)	(39.71)
Scientific & Technical Activities	0.196***	0.196***	0.174***	0.176***
	(35.28)	(23.78)	(23.00)	(21.54)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.385***	-0.390***	-0.277***	-0.262***
	(-52.89)	(-35.42)	(-24.57)	(-20.43)
Intercept	3.570***	3.430***	3.336***	3.322***
	(364.10)	(368.89)	(350.15)	(268.22)
N	3217			

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Table 4.2: **Profitability Compered to Competitor as Performance Measure**

Variables	Regression coef.	Marginal effects
Employee Share Ownership	0.090***	0.040***
	(5.20)	(5.20)
Profit Sharing	0.393***	0.050***
	(21.56)	(21.06)
Collective Conflicts (Ref: No Conflict)		
Strong	-0.432***	-0.097***
	(-14.30)	(-14.30)
Less Strong	-0.356***	-0.070***
	(-24.14)	(-24.30)
Overtime	0.116***	0.037***
	(6.82)	(6.82)
Petition	0.089***	0.028***
	(3.63)	(3.63)
Single Firm	0.054***	0.017***
	(7.01)	(7.01)
Diffusing Information on Wage Evolution	0.028***	0.009***
	(3.35)	(3.35)
Problem Solving Groups	0.061***	0.019***
	(9.16)	(9.16)
International Market	0.052***	0.016***
	(5.85)	(5.85)
Market Share (Ref: Less than 3%)		
3% to 14%	0.248***	0.079***
	(29.40)	(27.82)
15% to 24%	0.465***	0.147***
	(44.73)	(45.14)
25% to 49%	0.285***	0.090***
	(27.68)	(27.74)
50% and More	0.389***	0.123***
	(40.52)	(40.66)
Firm age (Ref: Less than 5 years)		

Continued on next page...

... table 4.2 continued

Variables	Regression coef.	Marginal effects
5 to 9 years	-0.034**	-0.011**
	(-2.14)	(-2.14)
10 to 19 years	0.056***	0.018***
	(5.32)	(5.32)
20 to 49 years	0.029***	0.009***
	(3.65)	(3.65)
50 years and More	0.050***	0.016***
	(5.59)	(5.59)
Occupational Category (Ref: Engineers or Skilled)		
Manual Workers	-0.132***	-0.042***
	(-10.81)	(-10.82)
Semi-Skilled Workers	-0.281***	-0.089***
	(-21.03)	(-21.08)
Non-Manual	0.019*	0.006*
	(1.95)	(1.95)
Number of Employees (Ref: $<$ 20 Employees)		
20 to 49 Employees	0.019**	0.006**
	(2.64)	(2.64)
50 to 99 Employees	0.005	0.002
	(0.43)	(0.43)
100 to 199 Employees	0.091***	0.029***
	(5.97)	(5.97)
200 to 499 Employees	-0.064**	-0.020**
	(-3.27)	(-3.27)
500 Employees or more	0.317***	0.100***
	(10.56)	(10.56)
Sector (Ref: Trade & Auto Repair)		
Food Industry	-0.180***	-0.057***
	(-9.17)	(-9.17)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.144***	0.046***
	(7.17)	(7.17)
Energy Industry	0.021*	0.006*

Continued on next page...

... table 4.2 continued

Variables	Regression coef.	Marginal effects
	(1.66)	(1.66)
Construction	-0.104***	-0.033***
	(-7.95)	(-7.96)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.077***	-0.024***
	(-5.64)	(-5.64)
Accommodation & Restaurant	-0.061***	-0.019***
	(-4.34)	(-4.34)
Info., Com., Financial & Real Estate Activ	-0.050***	-0.016***
	(-3.68)	(-3.68)
Scientific. & Technical Activities	0.149***	0.047***
	(12.96)	(12.97)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	0.200***	0.063***
	(14.29)	(14.31)
N	3566	

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Table 4.6: **Results of ESO and PS equations**

Variables	Probit ESO	Probit PS
Firm's Activity is Easy to Predict	0.058***	0.234***
	(7.01)	(31.96)
Single-firm	-0.342***	-0.523***
	(-40.80)	(-73.21)
Firm Belongs to a Group	0.342***	0.574***
	(40.26)	(79.56)
Price to Competitive Strategy	-0.221***	-
	(-18.17)	-
Product Quality to Competitive Strategy	-	0.131***
	-	(13.81)
Service Quality to Competitive Strategy	0.046***	0.177***
	(5.52)	(23.97)

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... table 4.6 continued

Variables	**Probit ESO**	**Probit PS**
Internatinal Market	0.150***	0.338***
	(15.96)	(39.72)
Diffusing Information on Economic Situation	0.380***	0.582***
	(25.28)	(40.09)
Diffusing Information on Firm Strategies	-	0.369***
	-	(26.48)
Number of Employees (Ref: Less than 20 Employees)		
20 to 49 Employees	-0.143***	0.167***
	(-16.25)	(21.86)
50 to 99 Employees	0.044***	0.508***
	(3.68)	(47.93)
100 to 199 Employees	0.044**	0.557***
	(2.79)	(39.99)
200 to 499 Employees	0.029	0.681***
	(1.52)	(38.47)
500 Employees or more	0.453***	1.031***
	(15.97)	(32.91)
Sector (Ref: Trade & Auto Repair)		
Food Industry	-0.233***	-0.209***
	(-9.25)	(-9.60)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.311***	-0.072***
	(14.31)	(-3.42)
Energy Industry	0.096***	0.100***
	(7.51)	(8.79)
Construction	0.385***	0.321***
	(28.95)	(26.25)
Transport & Warehousing	-0.233***	0.153***
	(-14.40)	(11.21)
Accommodation & Restaurant	0.027	-0.236***
	(1.67)	(-15.52)
Info, Com, Financial & Real Estate Activ.	0.052***	0.113***
	(3.43)	(8.43)

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... table 4.6 continued

Variables	**Probit ESO**	**Probit PS**
Scientific & Technical Activities	0.205***	0.017
	(15.82)	(1.45)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.798***	-0.969***
	(-48.95)	(-75.47)
Intercept	-1.197***	-1.311***
	(-60.22)	(-65.88)
N	3217	

Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Table 4.7: **Results of collective conflicts equation**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Employee Share Ownership	-0.366***	0.333***	-0.249***	0.122***
	(-7.30)	(13.99)	(-8.79)	(3.41)
Profit Sharing	-0.410***	0.821***	-0.294***	0.269***
	(-10.17)	(39.56)	(-11.54)	(8.01)
Organizational Change	0.198***	0.256***	0.157***	-0.167***
	(6.78)	(20.08)	(12.61)	(-10.65)
Unions Impede the Firm Activities	0.170***	-0.091***	0.068***	-0.082***
	(7.63)	(-8.26)	(6.17)	(-5.20)
Works Council	0.112***	0.261***	0.077***	-0.085***
	(4.35)	(21.85)	(4.75)	(-4.34)
Worker Autonomy	-0.176***	0.118***	-0.119***	0.067***
	(-8.39)	(12.02)	(-11.14)	(4.67)
Unionization rate (Ref: Less than 5%)				
5% to 9%	0.407***	0.715***	-0.059***	0.215***
	(13.67)	(57.28)	(-3.59)	(12.13)
10% to 20%	0.983***	1.082***	-0.263***	-0.047
	(33.52)	(70.50)	(-9.58)	(-1.59)

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... table 4.7 continued

Variables	Strong	Lestrong	Overtime	Petition
More Than 20%	0.907***	1.121***	-0.040	-0.023
	(29.95)	(73.73)	(-1.77)	(-0.85)
Who Controls the Work (Ref: Superior)				
Customers & Specialized Service	-0.407***	0.072***	-0.168***	-0.519***
	(-8.30)	(3.85)	(-7.42)	(-10.98)
Colleague	-0.425***	0.332***	0.037	0.427***
	(-7.43)	(16.56)	(1.46)	(16.17)
Number of Employees (Ref: < 20 Employees)				
20 to 49 Employees	-0.120***	0.152***	0.114***	0.094***
	(-3.68)	(11.38)	(9.15)	(4.96)
50 to 99 Employees	0.340***	0.272***	0.318***	0.348***
	(9.50)	(16.87)	(17.85)	(15.02)
100 to 199 Employees	0.656***	0.366***	-0.069*	0.531***
	(18.13)	(18.97)	(-2.51)	(19.11)
200 to 499 Employees	1.131***	0.362***	-0.150***	0.652***
	(29.48)	(15.82)	(-3.86)	(18.69)
500 Employees or more	1.236***	0.470***	-0.067	0.731***
	(23.55)	(13.92)	(-0.97)	(14.98)
Sector (Ref: Trade & Auto Repair)				
Food Industry	-0.184**	-0.173***	0.020	-0.686***
	(-2.85)	(-4.53)	(0.69)	(-6.55)
Auto Industry & Equipment Goods	0.392***	0.211***	0.344***	-0.595***
	(7.62)	(7.41)	(12.64)	(-7.91)
Energy Industry	0.298***	0.206***	0.050**	-0.268***
	(8.72)	(11.46)	(2.88)	(-7.99)
Construction	-0.631***	-0.301***	-0.060***	-0.127***
	(-7.37)	(-11.42)	(-3.32)	(-3.84)
Transport & Warehousing	0.021	0.136***	-0.372***	0.206***
	(0.50)	(6.48)	(-15.38)	(7.15)
Accommodation & Restaurant	0.011	-0.441***	-0.541***	0.125***
	(0.21)	(-11.84)	(-19.96)	(3.81)
Info., Com., Financial & Real Estate Activ	0.064	0.301***	-0.955***	0.070*

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... table 4.7 continued

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
	(1.54)	(15.21)	(-22.60)	(2.22)
Scientific & Technical Activities	-0.306***	0.054**	-0.166***	-0.016
	(-6.15)	(2.64)	(-8.86)	(-0.55)
Public Admin., Health and Social Work	-0.432***	0.750***	-0.539***	0.545***
	(-10.21)	(43.17)	(-26.42)	(23.54)
Intercept	-2.739***	-2.752***	-1.439***	-2.299***
	(-60.50)	(-132.14)	(-74.92)	(-90.34)
N	3217			

Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Conclusion Générale

L'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. Cette recherche apporte un éclairage sur la question car la mise en œuvre des mécanismes d'incitation collective en France a pour objectif de favoriser la négociation collective et l'implication de tous les acteurs dans l'entreprise. Les principaux résultats de chacun des chapitres ainsi que les prolongements et les perspectives de cette thèse peuvent être résumés comme suit :

Le premier chapitre vise à mettre en évidence une typologie des entreprises françaises en fonction des formes de conflits (collectifs d'une part et individuels d'autre part). L'analyse des correspondances multiples et la classification hiérarchique ascendante nous ont permis de combiner de manière optimale, les entreprises qui sont semblables selon les différentes formes de conflit.

Ainsi, la typologie des entreprises françaises en fonction des formes de conflits sur la période 2008-2010 se compose de la manière suivante :

- Cinq groupes pour les conflits collectifs : (1) groupe d'entreprises sans conflits collectifs, (2) groupe d'entreprises avec seulement des pétitions "Petition", (3) groupe d'entreprises avec seulement des refus d'heures supplémentaires "Overtime", (4) groupe d'entreprises avec des arrêts de travail de courtes durées (débrayages et grèves de moins de deux jours) "Less strong conflicts" et (5) groupe d'entreprises avec des arrêts de travail de longues durées (grèves de deux jours et plus) "Strong conflicts".
- Quatre groupes pour les conflits individuels : (1) groupe d'entreprises sans conflits individuels, (2) groupe d'entreprises avec seulement des avertissements, (3) groupe d'entreprises avec les avertissements et les recours aux prud'hommes et (4) groupe d'entreprises avec tous les conflits individuels.

À partir de cette analyse, nous remarquons que la typologie des entreprises en fonction des conflits individuels ne permet pas d'établir une caractéristique propre à chaque groupe, parce que les avertissements écrits sont présents dans chacun de ces groupes. Ce qui peut se comprendre car l'avertissement écrit est l'une des mesures disciplinaires la plus légère en vertu de la loi du travail français d'autant plus qu'elle est la seule sanction qui ne touche ni à la fonction, ni à la carrière ni au salaire de l'employé.

Par contre, pour la typologie des entreprises en fonction des conflits collectifs, des ca-

ractéristiques propres se dégagent de chaque groupe partant des plus influents et coûteux aux moins coûteux. Dans certaines entreprises françaises, les grèves restent inexistantes, mais les formes de conflits sans arrêts de travail prennent place sous forme de pétitions ou de refus heures supplémentaires. En revanche, dans d'autres entreprises, diverses formes d'arrêts de travail de courtes durées apparaissent au détriment des arrêts de travail de longues durées sans que les formes sans arrêts de travail soient beaucoup présentes. Par ailleurs, la présence des arrêts de travail dans certaines entreprises, qu'ils soient de courtes ou de longues durées, s'accompagne d'une plus forte diffusion de manifestations. Les manifestations permettent aux employés de renforcer la visibilité du conflit.

Notre analyse incite à ne pas raisonner seulement en terme de grève dans la prise en compte des conflits dans l'entreprise, mais également à considérer toutes les formes de conflits collectifs dans leur ensemble.

Le deuxième chapitre étudie l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. La participation financière (notamment l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) rend les employés plus sensibles aux objectifs de l'entreprise. Cela peut générer un changement dans l'attitude et le comportement des employés. Partant de ce constat, nous menons une analyse empirique où nous considérons que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié peuvent être des facteurs expliquant la probabilité de l'émergence des conflits collectifs dans les entreprises françaises. En guise de robustesse de nos résultats, nous complétons cette analyse en prenant en compte les conflits individuels.

Nous observons que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié (en contrôlant ou non par les conflits individuels) participent de façon significative à réduire la probabilité des "Strong conflicts" (les grèves de deux jours et plus). Il s'agit d'un résultat important, qui est en faveur de plusieurs arguments avancés par Kruse (1996), Cable and Fitzroy (1980), et Cramton et al. (2008). Ce résultat montre que la participation financière permet d'éviter des actions collectives plus coûteuses. L'alignement des intérêts, qui est au cœur du rôle de la participation financière, permet aux employés de s'identifier à l'entreprise et d'éviter des actions très coûteuses. Les employés doivent également tenir compte de l'image de l'entreprise qui peut souffrir des grèves de longues durées.

Cependant, l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié réduisent la probabilité des "Over-

time" (refus d'heures supplémentaires), mais augmentent la probabilité de l'émergence des pétitions. Les employés peuvent penser offrir une productivité déjà plus élevée de sorte que leur entreprise soit plus productive. Ce différentiel de productivité peut aider l'entreprise à moins faire recours aux heures supplémentaires. Ainsi, seuls les systèmes d'incitations collectives peuvent permettre aux employés d'adhérer aux objectifs de l'entreprise.

L'actionnariat salarié et l'intéressement affectent positivement l'émergence des "Less strong conflicts" (débrayages et grèves de moins de deux jours) et l'émergence des pétitions. Le fait que la participation financière augmente la probabilité des "Less strong conflicts" n'est pas nécessairement un signal négatif. Si la participation financière permet d'éviter les conflits très coûteux (grèves de deux jours ou plus), les employés peuvent substituer les "Strong conflicts" aux "Less strong conflicts" pour éviter d'éventuelles conséquences négatives des grèves de longues durées.

Les pétitions, quant à elle, peuvent être considérées comme un type de conflit "désirable" favorisant l'option de "voice" (la contestation) (Hirschman, 1970) qui n'affecte nullement l'activité de l'entreprise. L'un des succès de la participation financière repose sur le fait qu'elle impose une meilleure communication (Fakhfakh, 1997*b*). Nous pouvons attribuer une partie de ces effets positifs à des changements dans les attitudes et les comportements des employés (Pendleton et al., 1991). Une meilleure communication et une meilleure diffusion de l'information peuvent permettre aux employés d'éviter, à l'avance, certains conflits. Les pétitions permettent aux employés "d'alerter" les managers, avant de manifester leur mécontentement par d'autres moyens moins pacifiques.

L'analyse complémentaire nous a conduit à étudier l'impact de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs en considérant les conflits individuels. La prise en compte de ces derniers confirme bien tous les résultats précédents relatifs aux effets de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. Cependant, nous montrons que certains conflits individuels contribuent de façon significative à l'émergence de conflits collectifs. Sauf dans deux cas : les licenciements pour faute qui réduisent la probabilité des "Less strong conflicts" et les mis à pieds, qui eux aussi, réduisent la probabilité des "Less strong conflicts". Les résultats sont en faveur des conclusions de Klaas et al. (1991), Lewin and Peterson (1999), Dixon et al. (2004), et Jefferys (2011) pour qui, une complémentarité semble exister entre les conflits individuels et les conflits collectifs. Le droit de manifester son mécontentement étant intégré dans les institutions juridiques françaises, les conflits collectifs et individuels

ne peuvent qu'être connectés.

Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. La procédure de négociation, en cas de succès, est clairement l'approche la plus efficace et la moins coûteuse dans la résolution des conflits dans l'entreprise. Toutefois, elle ne convient pas toujours à résoudre tous les conflits. Ainsi, en plus de la procédure de négociation, la participation financière peut également aider à faciliter la résolution des conflits. La participation financière renforce l'engagement intrinsèque ainsi que l'engagement extrinsèque des employés, ce qui pourrait entraîner une amélioration des relations de travail. Cette amélioration suppose que les employés sont en mesure de résoudre eux-mêmes quelques problèmes, ce qui peut affecter leur satisfaction à l'issue du conflit.

Les résultats de ce chapitre apportent une nouvelle contribution en montrant que les effets de certains thèmes de négociation (les conditions de travail et la formation professionnelle), du partage d'information et de l'autonomie des employés sur la satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif peuvent varier en fonction de l'avis des représentants du personnel et celui des représentants de direction. Comme souligné par Beroud et al. (2008*a*), ces divergences dans les résultats sont dues à "des asymétries d'information, à des différences de positionnements culturels et institutionnels, et enfin aux contextes sociaux des établissements".

Mais au-delà des différences de perception entre les représentants du personnel et ceux de la direction, les résultats mettent en évidence que l'existence des négociations sur les thèmes comme le salaire, l'emploi et l'égalité professionnelle homme-femme n'engendre pas de satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif. Comme conclu par Bangoura and Dayan (2001), la négociation dans l'entreprise ne conduit pas nécessairement à la conclusion d'un accord.

Nos analyses révèlent aussi que les dispositifs de participation financière des employés sont particulièrement efficaces dans la résolution des conflits de travail. Ces résultats confirment ceux obtenus par Poole and Jenkins (1991), Desbrières (2002). Certaines critiques à l'endroit des dispositifs de participation financière font valoir qu'ils impliquent souvent l'intensification du travail, plutôt que pour l'autonomie des employés et la résolution des conflits. Les résultats de cette étude fournissent plus de soutien pour le dernier

point de vue que le premier. Cet effet de réduction des conflits, à son tour, permet de réduire le taux global d'utilisation des procédures de résolution des conflits. Ces résultats peuvent aussi expliquer, en partie, pourquoi les entreprises en France font rarement recours aux modes de résolution alternative des conflits collectifs (tels que la médiation ou l'arbitrage).

La présence syndicale en tant que mécanisme favorisant l'option de "voice" en France, se trouve être très efficace dans la satisfaction totale après un conflit collectif en France. Ce résultat va dans le même sens que la vision pluraliste du syndicalisme qui suppose que la présence syndicale doit aider efficacement et équitablement à résoudre les conflits au sein des entreprises (Lewin, 2005). Comme soulignent Eaton and Voos (1989) "les syndicats aident à créer un meilleur environnement participatif des employés en mettant l'accent sur une qualité plus acceptable de la vie de travail et en offrant des protections contractuelles contre un traitement arbitraire ou inéquitable et de représailles de la part de la direction de l'entreprise".

Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse analyse l'effet de la participation financière et les conflits collectifs sur la performance des entreprises françaises. La majorité des études montre que la participation financière améliore la performance des entreprises, tandis que les études analysant l'impact des conflits collectifs sur la performance indiquent que les conflits collectifs peuvent entraver la performance. Cependant, les rares études analysant les liens entre la participation financière et les conflits montrent que l'actionariat salarié réduit les conflits collectifs (Cramton et al., 2010) alors que l'intéressement réduit les conflits individuels (Heywood et al., 2005).

La conclusion la plus robuste est que l'effet positif de la participation financière sur la performance des entreprises françaises n'est pas neutralisé par les effets observés sur les conflits collectifs. Toutefois, il convient de rappeler que l'absence d'endogénéisation conduit systématiquement à une surestimation des effets de la participation financière mais aussi des conflits collectifs. En effet, les résultats des MCO montrent que l'intéressement augmente la productivité de 12%. Toutefois, lorsque seuls les conflits sont endogénéisés, l'effet de l'intéressement est de 7.8%. Enfin, lorsque nous endogénéisons à la fois les conflits collectifs et la participation financière, l'intéressement augmente la productivité de 8.5%.

Parallèlement, l'estimation par les MCO montre que l'actionnariat salarié augmente la productivité de 6.3%. Toutefois, l'endogénéisation des conflits collectifs (4.6%) ou des conflits collectifs et la participation financière ramène l'effet de l'actionnariat salarié à 4.7%. La participation financière a certes un effet sur les conflits collectifs mais ce n'est pas le seul effet puisque l'impact de la participation financière sur la productivité continue à être positif et significatif (+8.5% pour l'intéressement et +4.7% pour l'actionnariat salarié). Ces résultats sont dans la lignée de nombreuses études empiriques et théoriques (Cable and Wilson, 1990, Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Poutsma et al., 2009, Burgess et al., 2010, Williams, 2016).

Les résultats d'estimations mettent aussi en évidence que les conflits collectifs affectent significativement et différemment la productivité des entreprises françaises. Les "Strong conflicts" (les grèves de deux jours et plus) ainsi que les pétitions affectent positivement la productivité des entreprises. Cet effet positif des "Strong conflicts" sur la productivité est en faveur des conclusions de Knight (1989) et plus récemment celle de Tanguy (2015). Les pétitions semblent être un bon outil pour la performance des entreprises françaises car elles permettent aux employés d'exprimer leur mécontentement à travers une expression "démocratique" sans pour autant affecter l'activité des entreprises.

Les "Less strong conflicts" (les débrayages et les grèves de moins de deux jours) affectent négativement la productivité (l'effet sur des refus d'heures supplémentaires n'est pas significatif). Ce résultat est dans la lignée de nombreuses études (Naples, 1988, Kleiner et al., 2002, McHugh, 1991, Gruber and Kleiner, 2012). Cet effet négatif des "Less strong conflicts" sur la productivité pourrait s'expliquer par le faite que les grèves de courtes durées peuvent avoir pour objectif d'imposer une augmentation salariale. Si nous considérons que les "Less strong conflicts" amènent les entreprises à répercuter la hausse salariale sur les prix, nous pouvons alors envisager une baisse de la demande (et par conséquent du chiffre d'affaires) qui affectera leur productivité.

Nous mettons aussi en évidence (en guise de robustesse) l'effet de la participation financière et des conflits sur une mesure qualitative de la rentabilité des entreprises quand celles-ci comparent leur rentabilité à celle des concurrents. Cette analyse subjective confirme l'effet positif de la participation financière sur la performance. Cependant, les résultats montrent que les "Strong conflicts" et les Less Strong conflicts" (i.e principalement les

conflits avec arrêts de travail) ont un impact négatif sur la rentabilité des entreprises, tandis que les refus d'heures supplémentaires ainsi que les pétitions (i.e les conflits sans arrêts de travail) influencent positivement la rentabilité par rapport aux concurrents. Ces résultats montrent que, pour les employeurs ou pour les représentants de direction en France, les employés peuvent manifester leur mécontentement sans pour autant adopter des actions collectives avec arrêts de travail, qui engendrent des coûts supplémentaires pour l'entreprise, qui à leur tour peuvent affecter la rentabilité relative.

La participation financière affecte les conflits collectifs et l'effet (positif) des conflits observé sur la productivité peut être dû (en partie) aux effets indirects de la participation financière sur les conflits.

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Dans cette thèse, nous ne cherchons pas à justifier une absence totale de conflits. Seul un "mécanisme non démocratique" conduit à l'absence de toute forme de conflits, parce que les réactions "d'exit" (départ) peuvent dominer les réactions de "voice" (contestation) (Hirschman, 1970). En outre, "l'exit" et le "voice" ne sont pas les seules options possibles pour les employés. Une option de réponse supplémentaire est le "silence". Lewin (2005) souligne que le silence peut résulter de la crainte des employés de représailles si l'option "voice" est choisie. Cependant, une spécificité importante de la réglementation française est de favoriser la négociation collective et l'implication des syndicats et représentants des employés. Ce qui réduit les options "d'exit" et de "silence" en donnant une possibilité supplémentaire aux employés de s'exprimer et de communiquer directement ou indirectement (Hirschman, 1970, Freeman and Medoff, 1984).

Les conflits collectifs ne sont pas nécessairement indésirables, surtout quand il y a des insatisfactions des employés dans une entreprise donnée, qui doivent être reconnus. Les conflits peuvent être considérés comme une source de gaspillage des ressources lorsqu'ils sont accompagnés de grèves engendrant une manque de productions et par conséquent une perte de revenus pour les employés. Néanmoins, les conflits collectifs peuvent également être considérés comme une source potentielle d'efficacité s'ils peuvent aider à améliorer les

relations professionnelles au sein de l'entreprise et éviter les problèmes liés au partage de la rente lorsque l'entreprise arrive à réaliser des profits sans pour autant faire bénéficier ses salariés.

Bien que cette thèse souligne des résultats très importants et novateurs, elle a cependant quelques limites qui devraient être abordés dans les recherches futures. Une des limites de cette thèse est la restriction des questions posées dans l'enquête REPONSE. Bien qu'elle fournit des informations utiles sur les conflits du travail, il y a un manque d'information dans certains cas, tels que les questions sur les procédures alternatives de résolution de conflits (la médiation et l'arbitrage), le taux de règlement des conflits, le nombre de jours de conflits, le pourcentage de grévistes etc. Aussi, les données transversales utilisées permettent de révéler une relation statique entre la participation financière et les conflits. Il serait donc intéressant de mener une étude longitudinale afin de refléter les relations dynamiques entre la participation financière et les conflits. L'utilisation de données de panel permettrait aussi de contrôler les caractéristiques non observables des entreprises.

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Résumé

"Nous travaillerons ensemble pour soutenir le courage là où il y a la peur, pour encourager la négociation là où il y a le conflit, et donner l'espoir là où règne le désespoir."

Nelson Mandela

Introduction

Les économistes ne cessent de porter leur intérêt à l'étude de la théorie de la firme, et les pistes de recherche allant de l'étude sur les relations entre le marché et les hiérarchies (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1973), en passant par l'étude des systèmes de gouvernance et les problèmes d'agence (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Akerlof, 1984) provoqués par des conflits d'intérêt entre employeurs et employés qui composent l'entreprise. Les économistes montrent que l'un des facteurs importants affectant les changements dans l'entreprise est la structure incitative des salariés (voir Encadré 1 théorie des incitations ci-dessous).

D'une manière générale, l'incitation des salariés, source de motivation[9], recherchée par les employeurs, peut être réalisée de deux manières. La première façon est la rémunération incitative[10] dont les préoccupations concernent le salaire ou une partie du salaire. Dans ce cas, l'incitation est entièrement suscitée par des avantages économiques, symboliques ou sociaux tirés de l'activité professionnelle. La seconde manière est l'assimilation subjective par le salarié des buts de l'entreprise[11]. Il s'agit de conduire le salarié à faire siens les

[9]La motivation au travail est un phénomène qui se situe au cœur des recherches du comportement de l'entreprise. Rousseau (1990) défini la motivation au travail comme un processus qui implique la volonté de faire des efforts, d'orienter et de soutenir durablement l'énergie vers la réalisation des objectifs et de la charge du travail d'une part et d'autre part, la concrétisation de cette intention en comportement effectif, au mieux des capacités personnelles.

[10]La motivation extrinsèque qui relève des incitations extérieures (monétaires) qui peuvent amener l'individu à se motiver pour obtenir un élément extérieur au travail lui-même (Meyer-Waarden and Benavent, 2006). Ces éléments relèvent soit de la carotte (rémunération, délégation, promesses etc.), soit du bâton (surveillance, menace, sanction etc.) (Benabou and Tirole, 2003)

[11]La motivation intrinsèque qui soutient que les salariés entreprennent de nombreuses activités sans attendre une récompense extrinsèque. La motivation intrinsèque est donc considérée comme étant d'une importance majeure pour le comportement humain (voir par exemple Deci, 1971, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Ryan and Deci, 2000)

objectifs définis par l'employeur indépendamment des gratifications économiques et sociales qui en découlent ou des conditions de travail. L'essentiel, pour le salarié est la certitude d'être reconnu comme un facteur de la réussite collective.

Une façon hybridant les proportions plus ou moins importantes des deux, est de faire participer les salariés aux fruits de l'entreprise. Cette façon consiste à proposer aux salariés un mécanisme d'incitation collective i.e une participation financière où une partie du salaire de l'employé est reliée à la performance de l'entreprise (un plan d'intéressement) et/ou une mise en place d'un plan d'actionnariat salarié par l'entreprise. Le modèle développé par Poole and Jenkins (1991) illustre bien l'influence de ce type d'incitation au sein de l'entreprise. Les auteurs expliquent que les entreprises mettent en place un système de participation financière dans le but de renforcer aussi bien l'engagement intrinsèque qu'extrinsèque des salariés, ce qui entraîne une amélioration de la performance économique.

Les études sur le partage du profit ont connu un regain d'intéret après les travaux de Weitzman (1984). Se plaçant dans un cadre macroéconomique, cet auteur suggère que le partage de profit pouvait conduire au plein emploi. Cependant, les études qui ont suivi ont délaissé l'aspect macroéconomique pour se focaliser sur les effets microéconomiques d'un tel dispositif incitatif. Dans cette thèse, nous nous plaçons dans un cadre microéconomique et nous étudions les effets de ce type de dispositifs incitatifs sur divers indicateurs de la performance sociale (conflits) et de la performance économique de l'entreprise (la productivité).

Plusieurs auteurs analysent les liens entre les dispositifs de participation financière, comme outils d'incitations collectives, et la performance de l'entreprise (voir Kruse et al., 2010, pour une revue). Ainsi, la participation financière conduit à des effets positifs sur la performance dans la mesure où les salariés vont ajuster leurs efforts pour maximiser leurs revenus et vont être incités à travailler de manière plus coopérative puisque c'est la performance du groupe qui compte, ce qui va permettre de réduire les coûts de monitoring (Kruse, 1993). Les salariés vont également se sentir plus engagés grâce à une meilleure communication sur la performance de l'entreprise et à une plus grande sensibilisation à l'importance de la notion de profit et d'efficacité (Blasi et al., 2008).

Les dispositifs de participation financière sont souvent plus efficaces que les incitations individuelles car ils permettent de contourner les problèmes de mesure de l'effort indi-

viduel. Selon Gibbs et al. (2009), les problèmes de mesure de l'effort liés aux incitations individuelles sont dus à la distorsion et à la manipulation de l'information. Certaines incitations individuelles telles que les primes liées à l'effort, génèrent des difficultés parce que l'évaluation de l'employé par le superviseur peut être relativement subjective, ce qui peut être une source d'insatisfaction et de litige (Lazear, 2000). Les incitations individuelles doivent être principalement applicables à des emplois avec des caractéristiques très spécifiques car elles peuvent engendrer des problèmes quand un minimum de coopération est nécessaire au cours de l'activité de production (voir Lazear, 1989, Drago and Garvey, 1998).

Par contre, les dispositifs de participation financière peuvent faciliter davantage les relations de coopération des salariés en milieu de travail (Green and Heywood, 2010) compte tenu de la co-dépendance de leurs revenus pour chaque effort commun fourni (Drago and Turnbull, 1988). La participation financière peut accroitre la volonté des employés à "internaliser les externalités" lorsqu'ils travaillent avec des "amis proches" (Bandiera et al., 2005).

De plus, les dispositifs de participation financière permettent aux entreprises d'introduire de nouvelles technologies et d'obtenir des changements dans les règles de travail plus facilement (Cooke, 1994). L'efficacité de la participation financière dépend aussi de la capacité des salariés à instaurer et à contrôler un bon comportement collectif (Green and Heywood, 2010). En effet, les employés sont souvent mieux placés pour observer l'effort des collègues. Étant donné que la participation financière conditionne les récompenses des salariés non seulement à leur propre effort mais aussi à ceux de leur collègue, ils seront plus incités à se surveiller mutuellement afin de minimiser les comportements de "passager clandestin" (resquilleur)[12]. Ainsi, la surveillance horizontale suggérée par Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) et "la pression des pairs" pour Kandel and Lazear (1992) permettent aux employés de coopérer, de détecter et de prendre des mesures contre les resquilleurs (Freeman, 2010), ce qui réduit l'intensité du contrôle vertical tout en augmentant l'autonomie des employés.

[12]Il pourrait être meilleur pour un employé isolé de ne pas contribuer à l'effort collectif, mais ce dernier vient finalement profiter des gains de cet effort collectif.

Encadré 1: La théorie des incitations

La théorie des incitations suppose d'une manière générale que les employés ne fournissent pas un effort maximum. Par conséquent, afin d'inciter les employés à fournir plus d'effort, les employeurs doivent fournir des incitations externes. Ainsi, la mise en place d'incitation implique que des employés supportent une partie du risque aléatoire sur les revenus présents et futurs. L'enjeu est donc pour les employeurs de concilier risque et incitation en proposant un contrat efficace dans lequel les coûts engendrés par la prise de risque soient compensés par les gains générés par les mesures incitatives.

Cependant, l'objectif est d'inciter les employés à adopter un comportement conforme aux souhaits de l'employeur (Prendergast, 1999).

L'appareil théorique utilisé est le modèle standard principal-agent où généralement une seule partie, le principal, possède tout le pouvoir de négociation et l'autre partie, l'agent, a une information supérieure au sujet des déterminants importants de la production tels que son effort et/ou sa productivité.

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... Encadré 1 continue

La théorie des incitations

En général, dans le modèle standard de la théorie des incitations, les décisions de l'employeur (le principal) et de l'employé (l'agent) se prennent selon les étapes suivantes:

- Etape 1: L'employeur décide d'une structure de rémunération qui maximise son profit.
- Etape 2: L'employé décide de travailler ou non selon la structure de rémunération choisie par l'entreprise.
- Etape 3: L'employé décide de l'effort fourni au travail étant donnée la structure de rémunération choisie par l'employeur.

Évidemment, il n'est pas possible pour l'employeur d'observer, à un coût minime, l'effort fourni par les employés. Selon Williamson (1973), les individus sont supposés être opportunistes, parce qu'ils sont prêts à tricher en vue de satisfaire au mieux leur propre intérêt. Puisque l'agent est supposé posséder des informations qui ne sont pas connues du principal, le problème à résoudre consiste à expliciter comment le principal peut concevoir un système de rémunération (en procédant par contrat) qui peut inciter un autre individu (l'agent) à agir dans son intérêt. Cependant, il ne permet pas de connaître les véritables préférences de l'agent lors de la délégation. Par conséquent, il a pour intérêt de susciter, en quelque sorte, des informations sur ces préférences. Le principal étudie la façon de construire un mécanisme, à savoir un système décisionnel de génération d'information et un système de transfert. Le but pour le principal est de se rendre compte d'une décision rationnelle pour chaque agent à révéler ses véritables préférences et à donner des signaux qui fournissent une base suffisante, pour lui, afin de prendre des décisions. La difficulté est que l'agent peut donner des faux signaux au sujet de ses préférences dans la tentative de manipuler le principal afin de gagner le transfert maximum.

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... Encadré 1 continue

La théorie des incitations

Dans les modèles standards de l'aléa moral (Laffont and Martimort, 2002), les incitations pour exercer un niveau d'effort approprié sont livrées en liant la rémunération de l'agent à sa performance. Généralement, les systèmes de récompense analysés dans les modèles théoriques sont des fonctions linéaires de la performance. Lorsque la production est parfaitement observable, comme dans le cas d'un résultat monétaire, la valeur de la production fournit un indicateur parfait de l'effort de l'agent, donc payer un individu à la pleine valeur de sa production va induire le niveau d'effort "Pareto optimal". Lorsque l'output dépend aussi de certaines composantes aléatoires, le principal n'est pas en mesure de déduire l'effort de l'agent avec précision. Si l'agent a une aversion au risque, le régime optimal implique des incitations moins fortes. Le système de récompense est constitué d'un terme constant - une prime de risque - pour compenser l'agent pour le risque intrinsèque du processus de production et une récompense marginale proportionnelle à l'output produit, qui mesure l'intensité du système d'incitation.
Ce modèle est également utilisé par de nombreuses études existantes telles que celles de Baron and Myerson (1982), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Laffont and Martimort (2002).

En général, la réglementation en matière de participation financière implique fortement la négociation collective dans la mesure où ces dispositifs sont nécessairement mis en place par voie d'accord conclu entre les employeurs et les employés. Dans cette perspective, cela suggère un changement dans la nature de leur relation. Ce changement peut aboutir soit à une amélioration du climat de travail soit, au contraire, à une dégradation du climat de travail pouvant aboutir aux conflits.

Le conflit est certainement l'un des phénomènes majeurs dans l'entreprise. Tandis que les uns le considèrent comme une situation, d'autres le considèrent comme un type de comportement. Baron (1990), après avoir examiné un certain nombre de définitions du conflit, conclu que bien que les définitions ne sont pas identiques, elles se chevauchent en ce qui concerne les éléments suivants: (1) le conflit comprend des intérêts opposés entre les individus ou les groupes dans une situation à somme nulle, (2) ces intérêts opposés doivent être reconnus pour que les conflits existent, (3) le conflit implique que les intérêts d'une partie vont déjouer les intérêts de l'autre partie, (4) Le conflit est un processus qui

se développe à partir des relations existantes entre les individus ou les groupes et reflète leurs interactions passées et les contextes dans lesquels ils ont pris place, (5) les mesures prises par une partie peuvent contrecarrer les objectifs de l'autre.

Des théories classiques aux approches les plus récentes, la place accordée par les différents auteurs à la problématique du conflit au sein de l'analyse économique traditionnelle a subi de diverses transformations. Pendant que certains niaient son existence, d'autres le considéraient comme néfaste. Actuellement, les conflits dans l'entreprise sont considérés comme inévitables et ne sont pas toujours jugés indésirables. Rousseau (1990) souligne que "le conflit n'a de caractère positif que s'il est résolu pour certains, prévenus pour d'autres, maîtrisés pour tous" (page 7). Trois différentes visions émergent en ce qui concerne la prise en compte des conflits dans l'entreprise (voir Robbins, 1974).

La première vison concerne celle des théoriciens classiques (Fayol, 1947, Taylor, 1957, Weber, 1978). Ces théoriciens de l'entreprise semblaient négliger les différents impacts que peuvent avoir les conflits dans l'entreprise[13]. Ces auteurs considéraient l'entreprise comme un tout intégré dans lequel le conflit constitue une menace pour son existence. Ils ont prescrit des structures organisationnelles mécanistes avec des lignes claires de l'autorité, des structures hiérarchiques, une division du travail, etc., qui favoriseraient l'harmonie et la coopération. Ils ont implicitement supposé que le conflit était préjudiciable à l'efficacité de l'entreprise et devrait donc être réduit au minimum. Cette approche de la gestion des entreprises est fondée sur l'hypothèse que l'harmonie, la coopération et l'absence de conflit étaient appropriées pour atteindre l'efficacité.

La deuxième vision est celle des béhavioristes et peut être décrite comme la reconnaissance que le conflit est inévitable dans les entreprises (March and Simon, 1958, Cyert et al., 1963, Pondy, 1967). Les béhavioristes acceptent la présence des conflits et même parfois préconisent leur amélioration pour augmenter l'efficacité organisationnelle. Mais, ils n'ont pas activement analysé les conditions qui génèrent des conflits dans les entreprises. March and Simon (1958) définissent le conflit dans leur analyse comme étant un phénomène déviant à une structure normale de l'entreprise. Si les études des béhavioristes ont le grand

[13]Parmi les théoriciens de l'organisation classique, Follett (1926/1940) a été une exception notable. Son comportement à forte orientation de gestion et d'organisation dans les années 1920 l'a placé de plusieurs décennies d'avance sur son temps. Elle a noté la valeur du conflit constructif dans une organisation. Elle a fermement défendu la nécessité d'une intégration, celle de la résolution de problèmes comme une méthode de gestion des conflits organisationnels.

avantage de montrer la nécessité de reconnaître l'existence des conflits dans l'entreprise, elles ne mentionnent pas la nécessité de reconnaître la normalité des conflits, ni surtout leur éventuelle utilité.

La troisième vision est celle des intégrationnistes (Whyte, 1967, Putnam and Poole, 1987, Rahim, 2010) qui diffère sensiblement des deux précédentes. Pour ces auteurs, le conflit est un ingrédient indispensable de la vie de l'entreprise. Cette vision est caractérisée par les éléments suivants: (1) la reconnaissance de la nécessité absolue des conflits, (2) l'encouragement explicite à l'opposition, (3) définir la gestion des conflits afin d'inclure les méthodes de résolution, (4) considérant la gestion du conflit comme une responsabilité majeure de tous les administrateurs. Whyte (1967) souligne que l'harmonie est un objectif souhaitable pour le bon fonctionnement d'une organisation. L'objectif ne doit pas être seulement de construire une entreprise harmonieuse, mais de construire une entreprise capable de reconnaître les problèmes auxquels elle est confrontée et le développement des moyens permettant de les résoudre. Puisque les conflits sont une partie inévitable de la vie des entreprises, il est important que les procédures de résolution de conflits soient intégrées dans leur conception.

Le conflit au sein de l'entreprise tel qu'il est actuellement, est considéré comme légitime, inévitable et dans certaines conditions essentiel à la performance des entreprises. Dans cette perspective, deux hypothèses théoriques émergent en ce qui concerne le lien entre les conflits et la performance. Les partisans de la première hypothèse soulignent que le conflit est la principale source de stress et diminue la productivité de tous les managers et les employés d'une entreprise. En effet, pour ces auteurs, le conflit se termine presque toujours par affecter la qualité des produits ou des services (McDonald, 1972, Sexton, 1996). Ces auteurs estiment que les coûts liés aux conflits, notamment les grèves, peuvent à un moment donné, dépasser les coûts supportables par l'entreprise ce qui peut compromettre leur survie. Cependant, les partisans de la deuxième hypothèse soulignent qu'il est non seulement impossible d'éliminer les conflits au sein de l'entreprise, mais aussi le fait que les employeurs tentent d'éliminer tous les conflits peut entraîner des répercussions négatives sur la productivité à long terme de l'entreprise (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Rahim, 2010). Pour ces auteurs, le conflit peut être positif, car il peut conduire à la formation et à la création de solutions pour les employés où la réalisation effective des objectifs de l'entreprise qui auparavant, n'aurait pas été possible.

L'idée de base des contrats incitatifs est celle de la réalisation d'intérêts communs provoquant des changements dans le comportement des salariés et l'amélioration de la performance de l'entreprise. Les résultats et les succès de l'entreprise dépendent également du climat des relations professionnelles. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. La recherche sur ces deux thèmes est d'une importance pratique et novatrice. Tout d'abord, il existe au sein de l'entreprise une multitude de types de conflits. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux conflits collectifs. Ensuite, la plupart des études sur les conflits collectifs se concentre uniquement sur les grèves, en ignorant les autres formes d'actions collectives, et très peu d'études font le lien avec les systèmes d'incitations collectives au sein de l'entreprise. Ainsi, ce constat soulève plusieurs questions: Existe t-il une forme de conflit ou doit-on parler de plusieurs formes de conflits en fonction de la nature et des thèmes de conflits dans les entreprises ? Quelles est l'influence de la participation financière (ainsi que celle des conflits individuels) sur les conflits collectifs? La participation financière participe t-elle à la résolution des conflits collectifs? La participation financière et les conflits collectifs affectent-ils la performance des entreprises?

Ces questions sont traitées autour de quatre chapitres correspondant chacun à une étude empirique distincte[14]. Le premier chapitre vise à analyser les différentes formes de conflits au sein de l'entreprise. Le deuxième chapitre analyse l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Enfin, le chapitre quatre examine la performance des entreprises en fonction de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs.

[14]A part le chapitre un, chaque chapitre de la thèse constitue un papier de recherche autonome. Par ailleurs, les principaux résultats obtenus (notamment dans les chapitres un et deux) avec l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010 sont conformes à ceux obtenus avec celle de 2002-2004

Chapitre 1: Analyse des Différentes Formes de Conflits

Le premier chapitre de cette thèse à pour objectif de rappeler le contexte des conflits de travail en France avant d'éclairer le débat sur le lien pouvant exister entre les conflits collectifs et individuels grâce à une rétrospective des travaux de recherche existants. Ensuite, nous mettons en évidence une typologie des entreprises en fonction des formes de conflits collectifs d'une part et d'autre part de conflits individuels.

Le volet représentant de direction de l'enquête REPONSE (2008-2010) renseigne sur deux familles de conflits: les conflits collectifs et les conflits individuels. Huit formes de conflits collectifs sont proposées dans le questionnaire. Nous distinguons d'une part les conflits collectifs avec arrêt de travail (les débrayages, les grèves de moins de deux jours, les grèves de deux jours et plus) et d'autre part, les conflits sans arrêt de travail (les grèves perlées, les grèves de zèle, les refus d'heures supplémentaires, les manifestations et enfin les pétitions).

En ce qui concerne les conflits individuels, six formes sont proposées dans le questionnaire: les conflits individuels liés à des mesures disciplinaires prises par l'entreprise (les avertissements écrits, les mis à pieds, les licenciements pour faute, les rétrogradations et les mutations) et le recours aux prud'hommes lorsque l'employé pense qu'une action disciplinaire est inacceptable.

Ainsi, la typologie des entreprises françaises en fonction des formes de conflits sur la période 2008-2010 se compose de la manière suivante:

- Cinq groupes pour les conflits collectifs: (1) groupe d'entreprises sans conflits collectifs, (2) groupe d'entreprises avec seulement des pétitions "Petition", (3) groupe d'entreprises avec seulement des refus d'heures supplémentaires "Overtime", (4) groupe d'entreprises avec des arrêts de travail de courtes durées (débrayages et grèves de moins de deux jours) "Less strong conflicts" et (5) groupe d'entreprises avec des arrêts de travail de longues durées (grèves de deux jours et plus) "Strong conflicts".
- Quatre groupes pour les conflits individuels: (1) groupe d'entreprises sans conflits individuels, (2) groupe d'entreprises avec seulement des avertissements, (3) groupe d'entreprises avec les avertissements et les recours aux prud'hommes et (4) groupe d'entreprises avec tous les conflits individuels.

À partir de cette analyse, nous remarquons que la typologie des entreprises en fonction des conflits individuels ne permet pas d'établir une caractéristique propre à chaque groupe, parce que les avertissements écrits sont présents dans chacun de ces groupes. Ce qui peut se comprendre car l'avertissement écrit est l'une des mesures disciplinaires la plus légère en vertu de la loi du travail français d'autant plus qu'elle est la seule sanction qui ne touche ni à la fonction, ni à la carrière ni au salaire de l'employé.

Par contre, pour la typologie des entreprises en fonction des conflits collectifs, des caractéristiques propres se dégagent de chaque groupe partant des plus influents et coûteux aux moins coûteux. Dans certaines entreprises françaises, les grèves restent inexistantes, mais les formes de conflits sans arrêts de travail prennent place sous forme de pétitions ou de refus heures supplémentaires. En revanche, dans d'autres entreprises, diverses formes d'arrêts de travail de courtes durées apparaissent au détriment des arrêts de travail de longues durées sans que les formes sans arrêts de travail soient beaucoup présentes. Par ailleurs, la présence des arrêts de travail dans certaines entreprises, qu'ils soient de courtes ou de longues durées, s'accompagne d'une plus forte diffusion de manifestations. Les manifestations permettent aux employés de renforcer la visibilité du conflit.

Notre analyse incite à ne pas raisonner seulement en terme de grève dans la prise en compte des conflits dans l'entreprise, mais également à considérer toutes les formes de conflits collectifs dans leur ensemble.

Table 4.9: **Répartition des groupes après classification des conflits collectifs** (%)

	CL 1	CL 2	CL 3	CL 4	CL 5	Au moins un conflit
Observations	*79.85*	*3.18*	*5.15*	*8.24*	*3.57*	***20.15***
Grèves de deux jours et plus	0	0	0	0.01	**34.11**	**6.05**
Grèves de moins de deux jours	0	19.53	0	**58.55**	**52.44**	**36.34**
Débrayage	0	0	0	**46.08**	**82.20**	**33.43**
Refus d'heures supplémentaires	0	0	**100**	1.26	30.98	**31.10**
Grèves du zèle	0	0	0	6.97	**15.73**	**5.64**
Grèves perlées	0	0	0	6.16	**10.6**	**4.4**
Manifestations	0	7.98	2.42	**31.41**	**54.65**	**24.42**
Pétitions	0	**100**	8.33	1.79	**63.78**	**30**

Source: REPONSE 2008-2010, volet "Représentant de Direction", DARES

Table 4.10: **Répartition des groupes après classification des conflits individuels (%)**

	CL 1	CL 2	CL 3	CL 4	Au moins un conflit
Observations %	*46.6*	*18.9*	*9.6*	*24.8*	***53.4***
Avertissements écrits	0	**100**	**100**	77.79	**78.65**
Mis à pieds	0	0	0	**73.42**	**29.97**
Licenciements pour faute	0	0	25.75	**68.21**	**31.92**
Mutations	0	0	0	**6.37**	**2.60**
Rétrogradations	0	0	0	**3.56**	**1.45**
Recours aux prud'hommes	0	0	**100**	**44.50**	**34.76**

Source: REPONSE 2008-2010, volet "Représentant de Direction", DARES weighted statistics

Chapitre 2: Participation Financière et Conflits Collectifs

Le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. Nous examinons plus spécifiquement, l'effet de l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié sur les conflits collectifs dans les entreprises françaises.

La plupart des études empiriques montrent que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié améliorent la productivité de l'entreprise (Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Kruse et al., 2010), augmentent les salaires et rendent le marché de l'emploi plus stable (Kruse, 1998, Kruse et al., 2010), réduisent l'absentéisme (Brown et al., 1999, Wilson and Peel, 1991), et participent à la stabilité de l'emploi dans l'entreprise (Wilson and Peel, 1991, Azfar and Danninger, 2001, Fakhfakh, 2004). Mais aucune étude ne fait de liens avec les conflits, surtout lorsque ceux-ci sont collectifs. Par ailleurs, il est reconnu que la participation financière rend les employés plus sensibles aux objectifs de l'entreprise. Cela peut générer un changement dans l'attitude et le comportement des employés. Ainsi, partant du postulat que la participation financière permet d'aligner les intérêts des employés et des employeurs, certains auteurs n'hésitent pas à mettre en relation la participation financière et les conflits.

Cable and Fitzroy (1980) soulignent que la participation financière peut transformer fondamentalement l'atmosphère dans l'entreprise en réduisant le conflit traditionnel entre les employés et les employeurs. Kruse (1996), quant à lui, souligne que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié sont promus pour leur potentiel à réduire les conflits en milieu de travail en améliorant la performance des entreprises.

Cependant, d'autres auteurs prennent une position un peu prudente. Kelly and Kelly (1991) soulignent que la participation financière ne permet d'améliorer les relations entre les employeurs et les employés que s'il y a une réelle confiance i.e que si les employés sentent qu'ils sont traités équitablement dans l'entreprise et sont susceptibles d'avoir des informations concernant les bénéfices de l'entreprise. Cette vison est aussi partagée par Wadhwani and Wall (1990).

A notre connaissance, seulement deux études empiriques (Heywood et al., 2005, Cramton et al., 2010)[15] se sont penchées sur ces questions et ont montré que la participation

[15]Nous pouvons ajouter une troisième étude Stévenot and Guery (2013) qui analyse le lien entre

financière réduit la survenance globale des conflits. Cependant, non seulement aucune de ces deux études n'a considéré conjointement l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié (l'intéressement pour Heywood et al. (2005) et l'actionnariat salarié Cramton et al. (2010)) mais, aussi, elles se sont plus axées sur les conflits individuels employé-employeur que sur les conflits collectifs dans toutes ces formes.

Ainsi, l'une des nouveautés de cette analyse empirique est justement de considérer conjointement l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié comme des facteurs possibles pouvant expliquer la baisse de la probabilité de survenance des conflits collectifs dans l'entreprise. Nous complétons cette analyse (en guise de test de robustesse) en prenant aussi en compte les conflits individuels[16]. Plusieurs études analysant les conflits montrent que les conflits individuels conduisent à des conflits collectifs (Klaas et al., 1991, Lewin and Peterson, 1999, Dixon et al., 2004). Cependant, d'autres études montrent que les conflits individuels sont des substitues aux conflits collectifs (Ozaki et al., 1988, Sapsford and Turnbull, 1994, Hebdon and Stern, 1998, Jefferys, 2011).

Ces arguments contradictoires à travers la littérature empirique nous permettent ainsi d'examiner la manière selon laquelle les conflits individuels affectent les conflits collectifs (complémentarité ou substitution) d'une part, et d'autre part de tester la manière dont les effets de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs peuvent varier lorsque les conflits individuels sont pris en compte[17].

Nous exploitons dans ce chapitre la richesse statistique du volet représentant de la direction de l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010. Nous nous basons sur la typologie (réalisée dans le premier chapitre) des entreprises en fonction des conflits collectifs qu'elles déclarent avoir connus. Nous décidons de construire une mesure exclusive et multi-catégorielle qui reflète la gravité des types de conflit. Cette mesure va de "Strong conflits" (les grèves de deux jours et plus), "Less strong conflict" (les débrayages et les grèves de moins de deux jours), "Overtime" (les refus d'heures supplémentaires), "Petition" (pétitions) au "No

l'intéressement et le climat social à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. Les auteurs montrent que l'intéressement influence positivement le climat social, sans pour autant faire un lien direct entre climat social et conflits collectifs dans l'entreprise

[16]Les liens entre les conflits individuels et les conflits collectifs sont discutés dans le premier chapitre

[17]Nous retenons quatre confits individuels: trois liés à des mesures disciplinaires (les avertissements, les mis à pieds, les licenciements) et le recours aux prud'hommes lorsque l'employé pense qu'une action disciplinaire est inacceptable.

conflict" (les entreprises sans conflit collectif). Nous utilisons l'approche proposée par Roodman (2011) pour contrôler l'endogénéité de l'intéressement et de l'actionnariat salarié afin d'expliquer les déterminants de chaque catégorie de conflit collectif[18].

Nous observons que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié (en contrôlant ou non par les conflits individuels) participent de façon significative à réduire la probabilité des "Strong conflicts" (les grèves de deux jours et plus). Il s'agit d'un résultat important, qui est en faveur de plusieurs arguments avancés par Kruse (1996), Cable and Fitzroy (1980), et Cramton et al. (2008). Ce résultat montre que la participation financière permet d'éviter des actions collectives plus coûteuses. L'alignement des intérêts, qui est au cœur du rôle de la participation financière, permet aux employés de s'identifier à l'entreprise et d'éviter des actions très coûteuses. Les employés doivent également tenir compte de l'image de l'entreprise qui peut souffrir des grèves de longues durées.

Cependant, l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié réduisent la probabilité des "Overtime" (refus d'heures supplémentaires), mais augmentent la probabilité de l'émergence des pétitions. Les employés peuvent penser offrir une productivité déjà plus élevée de sorte que leur entreprise soit plus productive. Ce différentiel de productivité peut aider l'entreprise à moins faire recours aux heures supplémentaires. Ainsi, seuls les systèmes d'incitations collectives peuvent permettre aux employés d'adhérer aux objectifs de l'entreprise.

L'actionnariat salarié et l'intéressement affectent positivement l'émergence des "Less strong conflicts" (débrayages et grèves de moins de deux jours) et l'émergence des pétitions. Le fait que la participation financière augmente la probabilité des "Less strong conflicts" n'est pas nécessairement un signal négatif. Si la participation financière permet d'éviter les conflits très coûteux (grèves de deux jours ou plus), les employés peuvent substituer les "Strong conflicts" aux "Less strong conflicts" pour éviter d'éventuelles conséquences négatives des grèves de longues durées.

Les pétitions, quant à elle, peuvent être considérées comme un type de conflit "désirable" favorisant l'option de "voice" (la contestation) (Hirschman, 1970) qui n'affecte nullement l'activité de l'entreprise. L'un des succès de la participation financière repose sur le fait qu'elle impose une meilleure communication (Fakhfakh, 1997*b*). Nous pouvons attribuer

[18]Pour donner plus de robustesse à nos résultats, nous contrôlons aussi l'endogénéité pour les conflits individuels.

une partie de ces effets positifs à des changements dans les attitudes et les comportements des employés (Pendleton et al., 1991). Une meilleure communication et une meilleure diffusion de l'information peuvent permettre aux employés d'éviter, à l'avance, certains conflits. Les pétitions permettent aux employés "d'alerter" les managers, avant de manifester leur mécontentement par d'autres moyens moins pacifiques.

L'analyse complémentaire nous a conduit à étudier l'impact de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs en considérant les conflits individuels. La prise en compte de ces derniers confirme bien tous les résultats précédents relatifs aux effets de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. Cependant, nous montrons que certains conflits individuels contribuent de façon significative à l'émergence de conflits collectifs. Sauf les deux cas: les licenciements pour faute qui réduisent la probabilité des "Less strong conflicts" et les mis à pieds, qui eux aussi, réduisent la probabilité des "Less strong conflicts". Les résultats sont en faveur des conclusions de Klaas et al. (1991), Lewin and Peterson (1999), Dixon et al. (2004), et Jefferys (2011) pour qui, une complémentarité semble exister entre les conflits individuels et les conflits collectifs. Le droit de manifester son mécontentement étant intégré dans les institutions juridiques françaises, les conflits collectifs et individuels ne peuvent qu'être connectés.

Table 2.1: **Participation Financière et Conflits Collectifs (Effets Marginaux)**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Actionnariat Salarié	-0.020***	0.023***	-0.008***	0.005***
	(-6.30)	(7.72)	(-5.48)	(5.30)
Intéressement	-0.010***	0.060***	-0.005***	0.002**
	(-5.38)	(14.20)	(-5.37)	(2.06)
Prime Individuelle	0.003**	0.029***	0.010***	0.005***
	(2.47)	(10.51)	(5.80)	(8.75)
Changement Organisationnel	0.005***	0.041***	0.003***	-0.005***
	(4.24)	(15.63)	(4.91)	(-8.58)
Syndicat Dérange l'Activité de la Firme	0.013***	-0.010***	0.002***	-0.004***
	(6.31)	(-5.51)	(4.60)	(-7.26)
Présence de Comité d'Entreprise	0.010***	0.051***	0.001**	0.002**
	(5.86)	(16.67)	(3.00)	(2.64)
Autonomie du Salarié	-0.004***	0.009***	-0.002***	-0.001
	(-4.07)	(5.51)	(-4.62)	(-1.45)
Taux de Syndicalisation				
(Ref.: Moins de 5%)				
5% à 9%	0.015***	0.130***	-0.000	0.006***
	(6.13)	(18.88)	(-0.34)	(8.80)
10% à 20%	0.034***	0.185***	0.003**	0.001
	(6.55)	(19.70)	(3.26)	(0.73)
Plus de 20%	0.040***	0.202***	0.006***	0.004***
	(6.64)	(19.63)	(4.68)	(4.05)
Qui Contrôle le Salarié				
(Ref.: Chefs Hiérarchiques)				
Clients & Services Spécialisés	-0.025***	0.021***	-0.006***	-0.015***
	(-6.19)	(6.09)	(-5.03)	(-9.30)
Collègues	-0.002	0.024***	0.004***	0.009***
	(-0.77)	(5.77)	(4.38)	(9.19)
Nombre de Salariés				
(Ref.: < 20 Salariés)				
20 à 49 Salariés	-0.002**	0.032***	0.004***	0.000

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... table 2.1 continue

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
	(-2.00)	(11.95)	(5.38)	(0.26)
50 à 99 Salariés	0.015***	0.053***	0.010***	0.009***
	(6.07)	(16.33)	(5.66)	(11.36)
100 à 199 Salariés	0.022***	0.065***	0.003***	0.013***
	(6.37)	(15.58)	(3.68)	(12.92)
200 à 499 Salariés	0.045***	0.061***	0.013***	0.018***
	(6.71)	(13.61)	(5.22)	(14.11)
500 Salariés et Plus	0.063***	0.095***	0.019***	0.025***
	(6.86)	(14.88)	(5.22)	(13.49)
Secteur				
(Ref.: Commerce & Réparation Auto)				
Industrie Agroalimentaire	-0.004	-0.017**	0.001	-0.018***
	(-1.60)	(-2.67)	(1.40)	(-5.24)
Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	0.011***	0.056***	0.006***	-0.015***
	(4.42)	(9.77)	(4.61)	(-6.21)
Industrie Énergétique	0.015***	0.045***	0.004***	-0.006***
	(6.08)	(12.19)	(4.99)	(-5.29)
Construction	-0.018***	-0.036***	0.004***	-0.008***
	(-4.47)	(-7.67)	(4.78)	(-6.67)
Transports & Entreposages	-0.005**	0.008**	-0.003***	0.010***
	(-2.80)	(2.22)	(-4.14)	(9.85)
Hébergement & Restauration	-0.023***	-0.056***	-0.014***	0.004***
	(-4.56)	(-8.29)	(-5.55)	(3.76)
Info. Com., Activités Finan. & Immob	0.003	0.064***	-0.021***	0.007***
	(1.78)	(13.23)	(-5.72)	(6.55)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	-0.019***	0.019***	-0.008***	-0.001
	(-5.84)	(5.29)	(-5.41)	(-0.58)
Administrations, & Éducation-Santé-Social	-0.011***	0.108***	-0.006***	0.021***
	(-5.00)	(16.61)	(-5.14)	(19.11)
N		2914		

Niveau de Significativité: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Table 2.2: **Participation Financière, Conflits Individuels et Conflits Collectifs (Effets Marginaux)**

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
Actionnariat Salarié	-0.011**	0.033***	-0.002**	0.004**
	(-3.21)	(9.31)	(-3.26)	(3.25)
Intéressement	-0.009**	0.073***	-0.001**	0.006***
	(-3.22)	(13.86)	(-2.24)	(5.91)
Prime Individuelle	-0.001	0.032***	0.002***	0.003***
	(-0.62)	(12.08)	(3.43)	(4.22)
Conflits Individuels				
Avertissement	0.024***	0.030***	0.002***	0.003**
	(7.91)	(9.03)	(3.36)	(2.66)
Mis à Pieds	0.010**	-0.022***	0.001**	0.005***
	(3.19)	(-6.94)	(3.02)	(4.49)
Licenciement pour Faute	-0.009**	-0.001	0.003**	0.014***
	(-2.81)	(-0.35)	(3.29)	(10.48)
Recours aux Prud'homme	0.027***	0.010***	0.001**	0.005***
	(8.24)	(3.52)	(2.07)	(4.70)
Changement Organisationnel	0.006**	0.043***	0.001**	-0.009***
	(2.59)	(13.33)	(2.83)	(-11.89)
Syndicat Dérange l'Activité de la Firme	0.024***	-0.010***	0.000	-0.007***
	(11.21)	(-4.95)	(0.35)	(-9.22)
Présence de Comité d'Entreprise	0.014***	0.049***	0.000	0.003***
	(6.34)	(14.77)	(1.68)	(3.67)
Autonomie du Salarié	-0.005**	0.009***	-0.000	-0.000
	(-2.92)	(5.57)	(-1.46)	(-0.57)
Taux de Syndicalisation				
(Ref.: Moins de 5%)				
5% à 9%	0.042***	0.136***	-0.000**	0.007***
	(13.98)	(18.09)	(-2.84)	(8.66)
10% à 20%	0.091***	0.191***	-0.001**	0.002
	(20.72)	(17.44)	(-2.78)	(1.48)
Plus de 20%	0.098***	0.214***	-0.000	0.009***

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... table 2.1 continue

Variables	Strong	Lestrong	Overtime	Petition
	(21.52)	(18.46)	(-0.68)	(6.71)
Qui Contrôle le Salarié				
(Ref.: Chefs Hiérarchiques)				
Clients & Services Spécialisés	-0.035***	0.025***	-0.001**	-0.019***
	(-8.52)	(6.91)	(-3.16)	(-8.88)
Collègues	-0.012**	0.033***	0.001**	0.015***
	(-2.41)	(7.81)	(2.63)	(10.17)
Nombre de Salariés				
(Ref.: < 20 Salariés)				
20 à 49 Salariés	-0.034***	0.030***	-0.000	-0.004***
	(-9.85)	(11.20)	(-0.17)	(-4.54)
50 à 99 Salariés	-0.002	0.046***	-0.000	0.005***
	(-0.62)	(14.17)	(-1.33)	(4.09)
100 à 199 Salariés	0.006	0.059***	-0.003**	0.008***
	(1.41)	(14.06)	(-3.22)	(6.21)
200 à 499 Salariés	0.059***	0.054***	-0.003**	0.014***
	(12.01)	(12.30)	(-3.11)	(7.93)
500 Salariés et Plus	0.077***	0.092***	-0.003**	0.020***
	(11.95)	(14.76)	(-2.99)	(8.20)
Secteur				
(Ref.: Commerce & Réparation Auto)				
Industrie Agroalimentaire	-0.026***	-0.008	0.001**	-0.028***
	(-4.56)	(-1.15)	(2.68)	(-5.89)
Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	0.039***	0.074***	0.002**	-0.010***
	(7.96)	(12.00)	(3.24)	(-3.58)
Industrie Énergétique	0.035***	0.055***	0.001**	-0.003*
	(11.64)	(13.24)	(3.11)	(-2.27)
Construction	-0.077***	-0.018***	0.001**	-0.007***
	(-10.15)	(-3.91)	(3.26)	(-4.01)
Transports & Entreposages	-0.007*	0.010**	-0.001**	0.014***
	(-1.92)	(2.49)	(-2.82)	(10.34)
Hébergement & Restauration	-0.041***	-0.043***	-0.004***	0.001

Continue sur la page suivante...

... table 2.1 continue

Variables	**Strong**	**Lestrong**	**Overtime**	**Petition**
	(-4.72)	(-6.36)	(-3.35)	(0.62)
Info. Com., Activités Finan. & Immob	0.024***	0.063***	-0.004***	0.012***
	(6.79)	(11.39)	(-3.37)	(8.20)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	-0.035***	0.022***	-0.001**	0.002
	(-8.36)	(5.67)	(-3.24)	(1.63)
Administrations, & Éducation-Santé-Social	-0.002	0.125***	-0.001**	0.031***
	(-0.54)	(16.35)	(-2.85)	(19.84)
N		2419		

Niveau de Significativité: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Chapitre 3: Négociation, Participation Financière et Résolution des Conflits Collectifs

Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Une autre originalité de cette thèse est qu'aucune étude empirique n'a examiné cette question sur les données françaises.

La littérature sur la résolution des conflits collectifs est beaucoup alimentée par des travaux anglo-saxons et est principalement basée sur les modes alternatifs de résolution de conflits collectifs et la complémentarité entre ces modes: la négociation, la médiation (ou la conciliation) et l'arbitrage.

La procédure de négociation porte sur les efforts déployés par les employeurs et les représentants des employés (généralement le syndicat) pour résoudre les conflits eux-mêmes sans intervention d'un tiers (Lewicki et al., 1999). La procédure de négociation, en cas de succès, est clairement l'approche la plus efficace et la moins coûteuse dans la résolution des conflits dans l'entreprise. Elle permet aux employeurs et aux employés d'obtenir des solutions plus intégrées, à savoir des solutions gagnant-gagnant (Harinck et al., 2000). Toutefois, la procédure de négociation ne parvient pas toujours à résoudre tous les conflits. Les différences de pouvoir de négociation peuvent exister dans un conflit (le pouvoir peut être du côté de l'employeur ou de celui des employés). Dans ce cas, la procédure ne garantit pas à la partie qui a peu ou pas de pouvoir de négociation (Bendersky, 2007).

En cas d'échec, la procédure de négociation entre les employeurs et les employés peut évoluer vers une approche plus interactive de la résolution des conflits, nécessitant l'intervention d'un tiers, c'est à dire que la résolution du conflit peut être soumise soit à la procédure de médiation (conciliation) soit à la procédure d'arbitrage[19] (en cas d'échec de la procédure de médiation). Cependant, la médiation et l'arbitrage ont très peu de place dans le système français de relations professionnelles, contrairement à d'autres pays de l'Europe et des pays d'Amérique du Nord (Le Flanchec and Rojot, 2010). L'une des principales raisons est que la médiation et l'arbitrage sont des procédures facultatives en France.

[19]Selon Le Flanchec and Rojot (2010), la différence entre les procédures de médiation et d'arbitrage est que l'arbitre a le pouvoir de décider après avoir entendu les parties (la prise de décisions), tandis que le médiateur aide seulement les parties à parvenir à un accord (même si les parties restent libres de consentir)

Par ailleurs, la littérature anglo-saxonne souligne que le non-recours aux procédures de médiation et d'arbitrage peut être imputé à la présence de la participation financière au sein de l'entreprise (Hammer, 1988, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991, Colvin, 2004). Plusieurs arguments ont été avancés pour expliquer pourquoi les programmes de participation des employés peuvent réduire les conflits et l'utilisation des procédures alternatives de résolution des conflits (i.e la médiation et l'arbitrage).

Un élément central est que les dispositifs de participation financière donnent aux employés des gains aussi bien intrinsèques qu'extrinsèques. Ces gains permettent aux employés d'adopter un comportement plus coopératif, en améliorant leur productivité et les relations du travail (Cable and Fitzroy, 1980, Hammer, 1988, Kruse, 1996). Cette amélioration des relations de travail suppose que les employés sont en mesure de résoudre eux-mêmes quelques problèmes de façon informelle, ce qui permet d'augmenter leur satisfaction à l'issue du conflit. Cable and Fitzroy (1980) soulignent que la participation financière peut transformer fondamentalement l'atmosphère de l'entreprise en réduisant le conflit traditionnel entre les employés et les employeurs.

En outre, en adoptant les dispositifs de participation financière, l'entreprise indique qu'elle apprécie la contribution des employés (Allen et al., 2003, Pendleton and Robinson, 2011), qui à son tour améliore l'engagement lié à l'entreprise (Mayer and Schoorman, 1998, Park et al., 2010). Cela peut augmenter le sentiment d'auto-efficacité des employés, ce qui rend plus facile l'acceptation du changement organisationnel et donne une meilleure structure pour résoudre les conflits du travail (Hammer, 1988, Alper et al., 1998).

La conclusion qui se dégage de ces arguments est que cet effet de réduction des conflits, à son tour, permet de réduire le taux global d'utilisation des procédures de résolution des conflits. Cependant, ces discussions n'ont pas été associées à une réelle analyse empirique. La résolution des conflits collectifs implique fortement la négociation tandis que la participation financière favorise le dialogue, donc la négociation. Il est alors pertinent d'analyser conjointement l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs.

Afin de bien mener cette analyse empirique, nous combinons l'information fournie par le volet représentant de direction et celui du personnel de l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010 pour ainsi confronter les points de vue. Quant à la résolution des conflits, nous retenons la

satisfaction à l'issue du conflit en fonction des thèmes qui ont provoqué le conflit collectif en France afin d'analyser la résolution des conflits. Nous nous inspirons de l'approche d'estimation proposée par Heckman (1978) (voir Greene and Hensher, 2010) et celle de Roodman (2011) pour respectivement contrôler la sélection (due à l'absence des entreprises sans conflit) et l'endogénéité de la participation financière.

Les résultats de ce chapitre apportent une nouvelle contribution en montrant que les effets de certains thèmes de négociation (les conditions de travail et la formation professionnelle), du partage d'information et de l'autonomie des employés sur la satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif peuvent varier en fonction de l'avis des représentants du personnel et celui des représentants de direction. Comme souligné par Beroud et al. (2008a), ces divergences dans les résultats sont dues à "des asymétries d'information, à des différences de positionnements culturels et institutionnels, et enfin aux contextes sociaux des établissements".

Mais au-delà des différences de perception entre les représentants du personnel et ceux de la direction, les résultats mettent en évidence que l'existence des négociations sur les thèmes comme le salaire, l'emploi et l'égalité professionnelle homme-femme n'engendre pas de satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif. Comme conclu par Bangoura and Dayan (2001), la négociation dans l'entreprise ne conduit pas nécessairement à la conclusion d'un accord.

Nos analyses révèlent aussi que les dispositifs de participation financière des employés sont particulièrement efficaces dans la résolution des conflits de travail. Ces résultats confirment ceux obtenues par Poole and Jenkins (1991), Desbrières (2002). Certaines critiques à l'endroit des dispositifs de participation financière font valoir qu'ils impliquent souvent l'intensification du travail, plutôt que pour l'autonomie des employés et la résolution des conflits. Les résultats de cette étude fournissent plus de soutien pour le dernier point de vue que le premier. Cet effet de réduction des conflits, à son tour, permet de réduire le taux global d'utilisation des procédures de résolution des conflits. Ces résultats peuvent aussi expliquer, en partie, pourquoi les entreprises en France font rarement recours aux modes de résolution alternative des conflits collectifs (tels que la médiation ou l'arbitrage).

La présence syndicale en tant que mécanisme favorisant l'option de "voice" en France, se trouve être très efficace dans la satisfaction totale après un conflit collectif en France.

Ce résultat est en faveur avec la vision pluraliste du syndicalisme qui suppose que la présence syndicale doit aider efficacement et équitablement à résoudre les conflits au sein des entreprises (Lewin, 2005). Comme soulignent Eaton and Voos (1989) "les syndicats aident à créer un meilleur environnement participatif des employés en mettant l'accent sur une qualité plus acceptable de la vie de travail et en offrant des protections contractuelles contre un traitement arbitraire ou inéquitable et de représailles de la part de la direction de l'entreprise".

Table 4.13: **Résolution des Conflits Collectifs Représentant du Personnel (Effets Marginaux)**

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
Thèmes de Négociation			
Salaire	-0.095***	-0.096***	-0.098***
	(-17.99)	(-19.37)	(-17.95)
Temps de Travail	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003
	(-0.83)	(-0.42)	(-0.57)
Qualification & Carrière	0.046***	0.043***	0.047***
	(8.58)	(8.40)	(8.32)
Emploi	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.010***
	(-4.25)	(-3.94)	(-4.22)
Conditions de Travail	-0.073***	-0.069***	-0.075***
	(-12.25)	(-11.94)	(-11.79)
Changement Organisationnel	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.005**
	(-1.90)	(-2.11)	(-2.05)
Formation Professionnelle	0.067***	0.060***	0.067***
	(11.43)	(10.48)	(11.02)
Égalité Professionnelle Homme-Femme	-0.077***	-0.069***	-0.077***
	(-13.30)	(-11.87)	(-12.37)
Actionnariat Salarié	0.059***	0.052***	0.059***
	(8.95)	(8.04)	(8.43)
Intéressement	0.014**	0.015**	0.016**
	(2.43)	(2.66)	(2.57)

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... table 4.13 continue

Variables	Oprobit	Heckman	HeckEndo
Autonomie du Salarié	0.011**	0.008	0.012**
	(2.49)	(1.85)	(2.54)
Groupe de Résolution de Problème	0.034***	0.032***	0.035***
	(7.10)	(7.02)	(7.01)
Présence Syndicale	0.013**	0.011*	0.015**
	(2.24)	(1.88)	(2.40)
Partage d'Info. sur la Situation Économique			
(Ref.: Jamais)			
Régulièrement	-0.273***	-0.248***	-0.276***
	(-22.85)	(-19.05)	(-19.08)
Occasionnellement	-0.216***	-0.197***	-0.222***
	(-17.66)	(-15.65)	(-15.90)
Qui a Participé à la Fin du Conflit			
(Ref.: Autres)			
Les employés Impliqués	0.027***	0.027***	0.029***
	(4.12)	(4.31)	(4.22)
Tous les Employés	0.148***	0.142***	0.154***
	(20.68)	(20.24)	(19.36)
Les Représentants du Personnel	0.114***	0.109***	0.116***
	(11.36)	(11.35)	(11.01)
Syndicats	-0.027**	-0.023**	-0.024**
	(-2.90)	(-2.51)	(-2.48)
Effilochage (Personne en Particulier)	-0.120***	-0.114***	-0.122***
	(-14.26)	(-13.86)	(-13.59)
Nombre de Salariés			
(Ref.: < 20 Salariés)			
20 à 49 Salariés	0.086***	0.083***	0.089***
	(10.64)	(10.66)	(10.26)
50 à 99 Salariés	0.113***	0.110***	0.121***
	(12.61)	(12.71)	(12.24)

Continue sur la page suivante...

... table 4.13 continue

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
100 à 199 Salariés	0.138***	0.138***	0.146***
	(13.32)	(14.05)	(13.18)
200 à 499 Salariés	0.098***	0.098***	0.104***
	(9.09)	(9.52)	(9.04)
500 Salariés et Plus	0.127***	0.123***	0.127***
	(7.13)	(7.23)	(6.79)
Secteur			
(Ref.: Commerce & Réparation Auto)			
Industrie Agroalimentaire	0.221***	0.212***	0.226***
	(16.31)	(15.98)	(15.02)
Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	-0.060***	-0.058***	-0.067***
	(-4.32)	(-4.36)	(-4.59)
Industrie Énergétique	-0.014	-0.011	-0.015
	(-1.61)	(-1.37)	(-1.65)
Construction	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003
	(-0.11)	(-0.09)	(-0.20)
Transports & Entreposages	0.071***	0.067***	0.072***
	(7.19)	(7.13)	(7.00)
Hébergement & Restauration	0.206***	0.198***	0.206***
	(12.43)	(12.44)	(11.78)
Info. Com., Activités Finan. & Immob	0.053***	0.052***	0.053***
	(4.90)	(5.06)	(4.73)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	-0.008	-0.003	-0.009
	(-0.91)	(-0.37)	(-1.02)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	-0.010	0.000	-0.016
	(-1.29)	(0.04)	(-1.72)
N	2692		

Niveau de Significativité: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Table 4.14: **Résolution des Conflits Collectifs Représentant de Direction (Effets Marginaux)**

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
Thèmes de Négociation			
Salaire	-0.028**	-0.024***	-0.036***
	(-3.15)	(-6.18)	(-6.54)
Temps de Travail	0.109***	0.058***	0.101***
	(12.63)	(10.76)	(17.52)
Qualification & Carrière	0.034***	0.013***	0.008
	(4.14)	(3.44)	(1.46)
Emploi	-0.015***	-0.006**	-0.006**
	(-3.72)	(-2.83)	(-2.28)
Conditions de Travail	0.062***	0.025***	0.046***
	(5.61)	(4.68)	(6.87)
Changement Organisationnel	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(-0.01)
Formation Professionnelle	-0.008	-0.009	-0.030***
	(-0.63)	(-1.41)	(-3.57)
Égalité Professionnelle Homme-Femme	-0.096***	-0.038***	-0.052***
	(-8.74)	(-6.16)	(-7.49)
Actionnariat Salarié	0.034**	0.010*	0.044***
	(3.09)	(1.88)	(6.11)
Intéressement	0.086***	0.038***	0.076***
	(9.55)	(7.71)	(13.11)
Autonomie du Salarié	-0.014	-0.017***	-0.014**
	(-1.58)	(-3.94)	(-2.49)
Groupe de Résolution de Problème	-0.026**	-0.018***	0.003
	(-3.28)	(-4.70)	(0.61)
Présence Syndicale	0.130***	0.061***	0.114***
	(10.59)	(8.74)	(14.53)
Partage d'Info. sur la Situation Économique			
(Ref.: Jamais)			
Régulièrement	0.061**	0.054***	0.069***

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... table 4.13 continue

Variables	Oprobit	Heckman	HeckEndo
	(2.97)	(5.40)	(5.29)
Occasionnellement	-0.008	0.020**	-0.011
	(-0.43)	(2.22)	(-0.95)
Qui a Participé à la Fin du Conflit			
(Ref.: Autres)			
Les employés Impliqués	0.063***	0.038***	0.059***
	(4.81)	(5.46)	(6.85)
Tous les Employés	0.039***	0.028***	0.027***
	(3.60)	(5.12)	(3.91)
Les Représentants du Personnel	0.012	0.003	-0.010
	(0.72)	(0.36)	(-0.92)
Syndicats	0.021	0.011*	0.043***
	(1.50)	(1.69)	(4.52)
Effilochage (Personne en Particulier)	0.043**	0.016**	0.047***
	(3.15)	(2.46)	(5.55)
Nombre de Salariés			
(Ref.: < 20 Salariés) 20 à 49 Salariés	-0.179***	-0.090***	-0.086***
	(-10.92)	(-9.18)	(-8.35)
50 à 99 Salariés	-0.035*	-0.010	0.032**
	(-2.09)	(-1.31)	(2.89)
100 à 199 Salariés	-0.041**	-0.002	0.044***
	(-2.13)	(-0.21)	(3.46)
200 à 499 Salariés	-0.075***	-0.031***	-0.003
	(-4.23)	(-3.56)	(-0.31)
500 Salariés et Plus	-0.094***	-0.027**	0.039**
	(-3.52)	(-2.11)	(2.13)
Secteur			
(Ref.: Commerce & Réparation Auto)			
Industrie Agroalimentaire	0.065**	0.039**	0.041**
	(2.32)	(3.00)	(2.34)
Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	-0.127***	-0.040**	-0.042**
	(-4.38)	(-2.80)	(-2.30)

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... table 4.13 continue

Variables	**Oprobit**	**Heckman**	**HeckEndo**
Industrie Énergétique	-0.020	-0.015	-0.002
	(-1.07)	(-1.61)	(-0.20)
Construction	-0.208***	-0.054**	-0.055**
	(-6.79)	(-3.12)	(-2.72)
Transports & Entreposages	0.148***	0.081***	0.126***
	(8.67)	(9.45)	(12.43)
Hébergement & Restauration	-0.046	-0.010	-0.062
	(-0.84)	(-0.38)	(-1.88)
Info. Com., Activités Finan. & Immob	0.041**	0.020**	0.035**
	(2.31)	(2.48)	(3.17)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	-0.090***	-0.033**	-0.008
	(-4.49)	(-3.27)	(-0.63)
Administrations, & Éducation-Santé-Social	0.108***	0.064***	-0.024
	(5.95)	(7.83)	(-1.76)
N		2692	

Niveau de Significativité: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Chapitre 4: Participation Financière, Conflits Collectifs et Performance de l'Entreprise

Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse analyse l'impact de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs sur la performance des entreprises françaises et constitue l'une des originalités de cette thèse.

La participation financière tels que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié ont reçu une grande attention dans la littérature (pour un survey voir Kruse et al., 2010). Kruse (1996) suggère que la participation financière a des effets positifs sur la performance de l'entreprise dans la mesure où les employés vont ajuster leurs efforts pour maximiser leur revenu et être encouragés à collaborer davantage. Plusieurs études analysent l'impact de l'introduction de la participation financière et leurs relations avec la coopération et la productivité des employés. Cependant, la grande majorité de ces études montrent que la participation financière améliore la performance de l'entreprise (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987, Cable and Wilson, 1990, Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Burgess et al., 2010, Williams, 2016).

Hormis son caractère à encourager les employés à l'effort et à la coopération, la participation financière est montrée par certains auteurs comme un mécanisme pouvant réduire les conflits dans les entreprises (Heywood et al., 2005, Cramton et al., 2010). Cable and Fitzroy (1980) suggèrent que la participation financière peut transformer fondamentalement l'atmosphère du lieu de travail en réduisant le conflit traditionnel entre les employés et les employeurs. Kruse (1996) souligne que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié sont tous deux connus pour leur potentiel à réduire les conflits en milieu de travail tout en améliorant la performance des entreprises.

La littérature empirique (principalement anglo-saxonne) a en effet des résultats mitigés en ce qui concerne l'impact des conflits collectifs sur les performances des entreprises. Bien que certaines études montrent qu'un niveau modéré de conflit (principalement la grève) au sein de l'entreprise peut améliorer les performances dans certaines circonstances (Knight, 1989, Tanguy, 2015), d'autres travaux indiquent que les conflits (principalement la grève) entravent la performance des entreprises (Neumann and Reder, 1984, Becker and Olson, 1986, Davidson et al., 1988, Naples, 1988, Kramer and Vasconcellos, 1996, McHugh, 1991,

Schmidt and Berri, 2004). D'autres études empiriques s'intéressant aux effets indirects des conflits, montrent que les conflits collectifs (notamment les grèves) affectent négativement la performance propre à l'entreprise, mais positivement la performance des entreprises concurrentes (De Fusco and Fuess, 1991, McDonald and Bloch, 1999).

Nous proposons dans ce chapitre un appariement du volet représentant de la direction de l'enquête REPONSE 2008-2010 avec l'enquête FARE 2008 afin d'analyser empiriquement la performance des entreprises françaises. La valeur ajoutée est retenue comme mesure objective de la performance des entreprises. Elle est souvent utilisée pour mesurer la productivité d'une entreprise, en dehors de l'acquisition de matières premières et avant toutes opérations d'amortissements ou de provisions. Une fonction de production à deux inputs (capital et travail) est alors suggérée pour mesurer les effets de la productivité des différentes variables retenues.

La conclusion la plus robuste est que l'effet positif de la participation financière sur la performance des entreprises françaises n'est pas neutralisé par les effets observés sur les conflits collectifs. Toutefois, il convient de rappeler que l'absence d'endogénéisation conduit systématiquement à une surestimation des effets de la participation financière mais aussi des conflits collectifs. En effet, les résultats des MCO montrent que l'intéressement augmente la productivité de 12%. Toutefois, lorsque seuls les conflits sont endogénéisés, l'effet de l'intéressement est de 7.8%. Enfin, lorsque nous endogénéisons à la fois les conflits collectifs et la participation financière, l'intéressement augmente la productivité de 8.5%.

Parallèlement, l'estimation par les MCO montre que l'actionnariat salarié augmente la productivité de 6.3%. Toutefois, l'endogénéisation des conflits collectifs (4.6%) ou des conflits collectifs et la participation financière ramène l'effet de l'actionnariat salarié à 4.7%. La participation financière a certes un effet sur les conflits collectifs mais ce n'est pas le seul effet puisque l'impact de la participation financière sur la productivité continue à être positif et significatif (+8.5% pour l'intéressement et +4.7% pour l'actionnariat salarié). Ces résultats sont dans la lignée de nombreuses études empiriques et théoriques (Cable and Wilson, 1990, Hansen, 1997, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997, Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, Bryson and Freeman, 2007, Poutsma et al., 2009, Burgess et al., 2010, Williams, 2016).

Les résultats d'estimations mettent aussi en évidence que les conflits collectifs affectent

significativement et différemment la productivité des entreprises françaises. Les "Strong conflicts" (les grèves de deux jours et plus) ainsi que les pétitions affectent positivement la productivité des entreprises. Cet effet positif des "Strong conflicts" sur la productivité est en faveur des conclusions de Knight (1989) et plus récemment celle de Tanguy (2015). Les pétitions semblent être un bon outil pour la performance des entreprises françaises car elles permettent aux employés d'exprimer leur mécontentement à travers une expression "démocratique" sans pour autant affecter l'activité des entreprises.

Les "Less strong conflicts" (les débrayages et les grèves de moins de deux jours) affectent négativement la productivité (l'effet sur des refus d'heures supplémentaires n'est pas significatif). Ce résultat est dans la lignée de nombreuses études (Naples, 1988, Kleiner et al., 2002, McHugh, 1991, Gruber and Kleiner, 2012). Cet effet négatif des "Less strong conflicts" sur la productivité pourrait s'expliquer par le faite que les grèves de courtes durées peuvent avoir pour objectif d'imposer une augmentation salariale. Si nous considérons que les "Less strong conflicts" amènent les entreprises à répercuter la hausse salariale sur les prix, nous pouvons alors envisager une baisse de la demande (et par conséquent du chiffre d'affaires) qui affectera leur productivité.

Nous mettons aussi en évidence (en guise de robustesse) l'effet de la participation financière et des conflits sur une mesure qualitative de la rentabilité des entreprises quand celles-ci comparent leur rentabilité à celle des concurrents. Cette analyse subjective confirme l'effet positif de la participation financière sur la performance. Cependant, les résultats montrent que les "Strong conflicts" et les Less Strong conflicts" (i.e principalement les conflits avec arrêts de travail) ont un impact négatif sur la rentabilité des entreprises, tandis que les refus d'heures supplémentaires ainsi que les pétitions (i.e les conflits sans arrêts de travail) influencent positivement la rentabilité par rapport aux concurrents. Ces résultats montrent que, pour les employeurs ou pour les représentants de direction en France, les employés peuvent manifester leur mécontentement sans pour autant adopter des actions collectives avec arrêts de travail, qui engendrent des coûts supplémentaires pour l'entreprise, qui à leur tour peuvent affecter la rentabilité relative.

La participation financière affecte les conflits collectifs et l'effet (positif) des conflits observé sur la productivité peut être dû (en partie) aux effets indirects de la participation financière sur les conflits.

Table 4.1:**Valeur Ajoutée (*LogQ*)**

Variables	**MCO (1)**	**Équations Simultanées (2)**		
	MCO	Conflit Endogène	PF (A) Endogène (B)	PF-Conflit Endogenous (C)
LogK	0.211***	0.211***	0.209***	0.210***
	(183.19)	(83.84)	(85.92)	(88.43)
LogL	0.697***	0.697***	0.690***	0.690***
	(447.95)	(187.34)	(196.14)	(200.33)
Actionnariat Salarié	0.063***	0.063***	0.046***	0.047***
	(15.89)	(15.32)	(27.82)	(29.03)
Intéressement	0.123***	0.124***	0.078***	0.085***
	(34.91)	(32.74)	(34.80)	(40.51)
Conflits				
(Ref: Pas de Conflit)				
"Strong"	0.123***	0.018***	0.099***	0.020***
	(9.73)	(14.47)	(8.31)	(10.70)
"Less Strong"	0.036***	-0.002	0.001	-0.015***
	(5.91)	(-1.20)	(0.19)	(-6.45)
"Overtime"	-0.014**	-0.002	-0.009	-0.001
	(-2.27)	(-1.15)	(-1.19)	(-0.21)
"Petition"	0.034**	0.003***	-0.000	0.004***
	(2.79)	(7.06)	(-0.04)	(13.10)
Mono Établissement	-0.106***	-0.108***	-0.028***	-0.020***
	(-29.12)	(-26.88)	(-6.68)	(-4.77)
Partage d'Info. sur la Situation Économique	0.050***	0.051***	0.031***	0.030***
	(13.37)	(13.84)	(8.37)	(7.84)
Groupe de Résolution de Problème	0.038***	0.039***	0.026***	0.024***
	(12.26)	(11.91)	(8.40)	(7.70)
Marché International	0.144***	0.142***	0.101***	0.096***
	(35.70)	(33.89)	(23.09)	(21.69)

Continue sur la page suivante...

... table 4.1 continue

Variables	**MCO (1)**	**Équations Simultanées (2)**		
	MCO	Conflict Endogenous	PF (A) Endogène (B)	PF-Conflit Endogenous (C)
Part de Marché				
(Ref: Moins de 3%)				
3% à 14%	0.019***	0.018***	0.009**	0.007
	(4.54)	(4.20)	(2.15)	(1.60)
15% à 24%	0.045***	0.044***	0.034***	0.033***
	(9.26)	(9.45)	(7.32)	(7.19)
25% à 49%	0.091***	0.092***	0.081***	0.079***
	(18.96)	(17.58)	(15.79)	(15.64)
50% et plus	0.009**	0.007	0.006	0.004
	(1.97)	(1.65)	(1.27)	(0.87)
L'âge de l'Entreprise				
(Ref: Moins de 5 ans)				
5 à 9 ans	0.012	0.012	-0.011	-0.015
	(1.49)	(1.31)	(-1.20)	(-1.60)
10 à 19 ans	0.092***	0.092***	0.090***	0.090***
	(18.92)	(19.40)	(18.92)	(18.96)
20 à 49 ans	0.019***	0.019***	0.007*	0.006
	(5.18)	(4.94)	(1.92)	(1.48)
50 ans et Plus	-0.056***	-0.057***	-0.061***	-0.063***
	(-12.84)	(-12.37)	(-13.35)	(-13.35)
Catégorie Socio-Professionnelle				
(Ref:Ingénieurs et Cadres)				
Ouvriers	0.410***	0.410***	0.401***	0.399***
	(63.23)	(47.01)	(46.01)	(45.79)
Techniciens et Agents de Maîtrise	0.224***	0.224***	0.216***	0.216***
	(33.96)	(34.05)	(32.47)	(32.43)
Employés et Commerciaux	0.067***	0.067***	0.070***	0.070***
	(14.64)	(13.16)	(14.08)	(14.11)

Continue sur la page suivante...

... table 4.1 continue

Variables	**MCO (1)**	**Équations Simultanées (2)**		
	MCO	Conflict Endogenous	PF (A) Endogène (B)	PF-Conflit Endogenous (C)
Secteur				
(Ref.: Commerce & Réparation Auto)				
Industrie Agroalimentaire	-0.187***	-0.184***	-0.153***	-0.147***
	(-20.46)	(-18.44)	(-14.53)	(-13.80)
Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	0.063***	0.069***	0.023**	0.026**
	(7.05)	(7.76)	(2.36)	(2.45)
Industrie Énergétique	0.034***	0.036***	0.017**	0.018**
	(6.15)	(6.31)	(2.82)	(3.12)
Construction	0.197***	0.198***	0.146***	0.143***
	(33.57)	(37.91)	(25.36)	(24.81)
Transports & Entreposages	-0.019**	-0.023***	-0.005	-0.006
	(-2.91)	(-3.94)	(-0.91)	(-0.89)
Hébergement & Restauration	-0.413***	-0.421***	-0.391***	-0.391***
	(-65.28)	(-71.94)	(-68.02)	(-54.15)
Info. Com., Activités Finan. & Immob	0.434***	0.431***	0.412***	0.412***
	(59.54)	(47.64)	(47.90)	(39.71)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	0.196***	0.196***	0.174***	0.176***
	(35.28)	(23.78)	(23.00)	(21.54)
Administrations, & Éducation-Santé-Social	-0.385***	-0.390***	-0.277***	-0.262***
	(-52.89)	(-35.42)	(-24.57)	(-20.43)
Constante	3.570***	3.430***	3.336***	3.322***
	(364.10)	(368.89)	(350.15)	(268.22)
N	3217			

Niveau de Significativité: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%

Table 4.2: **Rentabilité par Rapport aux Concurrents**

Variables	Regression coef.	Effets Marginaux
Actionnariat Salarié	0.090***	0.040***
	(5.20)	(5.20)
Intéressement	0.393***	0.050***
	(21.56)	(21.06)
Conflits		
(Ref: Pas de Conflit)		
"Strong"	-0.432***	-0.097***
	(-14.30)	(-14.30)
"Less Strong"	-0.356***	-0.070***
	(-24.14)	(-24.30)
"Overtime"	0.116***	0.037***
	(6.82)	(6.82)
"Petition"	0.089***	0.028***
	(3.63)	(3.63)
Mono Établissement	0.054***	0.017***
	(7.01)	(7.01)
Partage d'Info. sur la Situation Économique	0.028***	0.009***
	(3.35)	(3.35)
Groupe de Résolution de Problème	0.061***	0.019***
	(9.16)	(9.16)
Marché International	0.052***	0.016***
	(5.85)	(5.85)
Part de marché		
(Ref: Moins de 3%)		
3% à 14%	0.248***	0.079***
	(29.40)	(27.82)
15% à 24%	0.465***	0.147***
	(44.73)	(45.14)
25% à 49%	0.285***	0.090***
	(27.68)	(27.74)
50% et plus	0.389***	0.123***

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... table 4.2 continue

Variables	Regression coef.	Effets Marginaux
	(40.52)	(40.66)
L'âge de l'Entreprise		
(Ref: Moins de 5 ans)		
5 à 9 ans	-0.034**	-0.011**
	(-2.14)	(-2.14)
10 à 19 ans	0.056***	0.018***
	(5.32)	(5.32)
20 à 49 ans	0.029***	0.009***
	(3.65)	(3.65)
50 ans et plus	0.050***	0.016***
	(5.59)	(5.59)
Catégorie Socio-Professionnelle		
(Ref:Ingénieurs et Cadres)		
Ouvriers	-0.132***	-0.042***
	(-10.81)	(-10.82)
Techniciens et Agents de Maîtrise	-0.281***	-0.089***
	(-21.03)	(-21.08)
Employés et Commerciaux	0.019*	0.006*
	(1.95)	(1.95)
Nombre de Salariés		
20 à 49 Salariés	0.019**	0.006**
	(2.64)	(2.64)
50 à 99 Salariés	0.005	0.002
	(0.43)	(0.43)
100 à 199 Salariés	0.091***	0.029***
	(5.97)	(5.97)
200 à 499 Salariés	-0.064**	-0.020**
	(-3.27)	(-3.27)
500 Salariés et Plus	0.317***	0.100***
	(10.56)	(10.56)

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... table 4.2 continue

Variables	Regression coef.	Effets Marginaux
Secteur		
(Ref.: Commerce & Réparation Auto)		
Industrie Agroalimentaire	-0.180***	-0.057***
	(-9.17)	(-9.17)
Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	0.144***	0.046***
	(7.17)	(7.17)
Industrie Énergétique	0.021*	0.006*
	(1.66)	(1.66)
Construction	-0.104***	-0.033***
	(-7.95)	(-7.96)
Transports & Entreposages	-0.077***	-0.024***
	(-5.64)	(-5.64)
Hébergement & Restauration	-0.061***	-0.019***
	(-4.34)	(-4.34)
Info. Com., Activités Finan. & Immob	-0.050***	-0.016***
	(-3.68)	(-3.68)
Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	0.149***	0.047***
	(12.96)	(12.97)
Administrations, & Éducation-Santé-Social	0.200***	0.063***
	(14.29)	(14.31)
N	3566	

Niveau de Significativité: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%

Conclusion

L'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. Cette recherche apporte un éclairage sur la question car la mise en œuvre des mécanismes d'incitation collective en France a pour objectif de favoriser la négociation collective et l'implication de tous les acteurs dans l'entreprise. Les principaux résultats de chacun des chapitres ainsi que les prolongements et les perspectives de cette thèse peuvent être résumés comme suit:

Le premier chapitre vise à mettre en évidence une typologie des entreprises françaises en fonction des formes de conflits (collectifs d'une part et individuels d'autre part). L'analyse des correspondances multiples et la classification hiérarchique ascendante nous ont permis de combiner de manière optimale, les entreprises qui sont semblables selon les différentes formes de conflit.

Nous faisons le choix d'utiliser les méthodes d'analyses multidimensionnelles pour réaliser cette typologie: l'Analyse des Correspondances Multiples (ACM) et la Classification Hiérarchique Ascendante (CHA). Ces deux méthodes nous ont permis d'établir les probables proximités entre les entreprises en fonction des formes de conflits qu'elles ont connues (les conflits individuels d'une part et d'autre part les conflits collectifs).

Notre typologie se compose de cinq groupes d'entreprises pour les conflits collectifs (allant de sans conflits aux conflits avec des arrêts de travail de longues durées), et de quatre groupes d'entreprises pour les conflits individuels (allant de sans conflits individuels à tous les conflits individuels). Nous nous basons sur cette typologie dans le cadre de l'étude des conflits collectifs dans le deuxième et le quatrième chapitre.

Le deuxième chapitre étudie l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. La participation financière (notamment l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) rend les employés plus sensibles aux objectifs de l'entreprise. Cela peut générer un changement dans l'attitude et le comportement des employés. Partant de ce constat, nous menons une analyse empirique où nous considérons que l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié peuvent être des facteurs expliquant la probabilité de l'émergence des conflits collectifs

dans les entreprises françaises. En guise de robustesse de nos résultats, nous complétons cette analyse en prenant en compte les conflits individuels.

Nous montrons surtout que participation financière (l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) participe significativement à la réduction des "Strong conflits" (conflits avec les grèves de deux jours ou plus). La participation financière est également un outil efficace contre les "Overtime" (les refus d'heures supplémentaires) en particulier lorsque les heures supplémentaires sont considérées comme un moyen augmentant la productivité de l'entreprise. Par ailleurs, la participation financière augmente la probabilité de l'émergence des "Less strong conflit" (les débrayages et les grèves de moins de deux jours) et aussi la probabilité de l'émergence des pétitions.

La prise en compte des conflits individuels (en plus de la participation financière) nous amène à conclure qu'il semble exister davantage une relation de complémentarité entre les conflits collectifs et les conflits individuels en France qu'une relation de substitution.

Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. La procédure de négociation, en cas de succès, est clairement l'approche la plus efficace et la moins coûteuse dans la résolution des conflits dans l'entreprise. Toutefois, elle ne convient pas toujours à résoudre tous les conflits. Ainsi, en plus de la procédure de négociation, la participation financière peut également aider à faciliter la résolution des conflits. La participation financière renforce l'engagement intrinsèque ainsi que l'engagement extrinsèque des employés, ce qui pourrait entraîner une amélioration des relations de travail. Cette amélioration suppose que les employés sont en mesure de résoudre eux-mêmes quelques problèmes, ce qui peut affecter leur satisfaction à l'issue du conflit.

Au-delà des différences de perception entre les représentants de direction et ceux des employés, les résultats mettent en évidence que l'existence des négociations sur les thèmes comme le salaire, l'emploi et l'égalité professionnelle homme-femme n'engendre pas de satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif. Par contre, les programmes de participation des employés influencent positivement la satisfaction à l'issue du conflit collectif.

Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse analyse l'effet de la participation financière et les conflits collectifs sur la performance des entreprises françaises. La majorité des études montre que la participation financière améliore la performance des entreprises, tandis que les études analysant l'impact des conflits collectifs sur la performance indiquent que les conflits collectifs peuvent entraver la performance. Cependant, les rares études analysant les liens entre la participation financière et les conflits montrent que l'actionariat salarié réduit les conflits collectifs (Cramton et al., 2010) alors que l'intéressement réduit les conflits individuels (Heywood et al., 2005).

Nous menons aussi une analyse complémentaire de l'effet de la participation et des conflits collectifs en s'appuyant sur une mesure subjective de la performance. Cette mesure de la performance correspond à la perception subjective du représentant de direction, de la rentabilité de l'entreprise par rapport à ces principaux concurrents. Dans les deux cas, nous utilisons l'approche d'estimation proposée par Roodman (2011) pour contrôler l'endogénéité de la participation financière ainsi que chaque catégorie de conflit collectif (en se servant de la typologie des entreprises réalisée dans le premier chapitre).

Les résultats d'estimations mettent en évidence que l'effet positif de la participation financière sur la performance des entreprises françaises n'est pas affecté par la présence des conflits collectifs. Ainsi, l'existence des plans d'actionnariat salarié et d'intéressement augmente significativement la performance, ce qui suggère que les entreprises françaises peuvent faire appel à ce type d'incitation afin d'améliorer leur performance. Les résultats révèlent également que tous les conflits collectifs ne portent pas atteinte à la performance des entreprises françaises, certains participent à l'amélioration de la productivité de l'entreprise.

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Dans cette thèse, nous ne cherchons pas à justifier une absence totale de conflits. Seul un "mécanisme non démocratique" conduit à l'absence de toute forme de conflits, parce que les réactions "d'exit" (départ) peuvent dominer les réactions de "voice" (contestation) (Hirschman, 1970). En outre, "l'exit" et le "voice" ne sont pas les seules options possibles

pour les employés. Une option de réponse supplémentaire est le "silence". Lewin (2005) souligne que le silence peut résulter de la crainte des employés de représailles si l'option "voice" est choisie. Cependant, une spécificité importante de la réglementation française est de favoriser la négociation collective et l'implication des syndicats et représentants des employés. Ce qui réduit les options "d'exit" et de "silence" en donnant une possibilité supplémentaire aux employés de s'exprimer et de communiquer directement ou indirectement (Hirschman, 1970, Freeman and Medoff, 1984).

Les conflits collectifs ne sont pas nécessairement indésirables, surtout quand il y a des insatisfactions des employés dans une entreprise donnée, qui doivent être reconnus. Les conflits peuvent être considérés comme une source de gaspillage des ressources lorsqu'ils sont accompagnés de grèves engendrant une manque de productions et par conséquent une perte de revenus pour les employés. Néanmoins, les conflits collectifs peuvent également être considérés comme une source potentielle d'efficacité s'ils peuvent aider à améliorer les relations professionnelles au sein de l'entreprise et éviter les problèmes liés au partage de la rente lorsque l'entreprise arrive à réaliser des profits sans pour autant faire bénéficier ses salariés.

Bien que cette thèse souligne des résultats très importants et novateurs, elle a cependant quelques limites qui devraient être abordés dans les recherches futures. Une des limites de cette thèse est la restriction des questions posées dans l'enquête REPONSE. Bien qu'elle fournit des informations utiles sur les conflits du travail, il y a un manque d'information dans certains cas, tels que les questions sur les procédures alternatives de résolution de conflits (la médiation et l'arbitrage), le taux de règlement des conflits, le nombre de jours de conflits, le pourcentage de gréviste etc. Aussi, les données transversales utilisées permettent de révéler une relation statique entre la participation financière et les conflits. Il serait donc intéressant de mener une étude longitudinale afin de refléter les relations dynamiques entre la participation financière et les conflits. L'utilisation de données de panel permettrait aussi de contrôler les caractéristiques non observables des entreprises.

Annexes

Encadré 2 : L'approche de Roodman pour les modèles récursifs mixtes Conditional Mixed Process

La principale méthodologie économétrique utilisée dans cette thèse fait appel aux systèmes d' équations simultanées. Notre système d'équations simultanées est récursif. Dans ce cas particulier de système d'équations avec variables dépendantes qualitatives, nous ne pouvons plus utiliser les techniques d'estimation standard (2SLS, 3SLS) puisque notre but est de trouver des probabilités conditionnelles plutôt que des relations linéaires.
Amemiya (1978) a déjà établi certaines propriétés de l'estimateur en deux étapes dans le cas de deux équations avec une variable endogène entrant dans la deuxième équation comme exogène. Greene (2003) a également suggéré cette estimation en deux étapes comme estimateur efficace. Roodman (2011) généralise cette procédure d'estimation en deux étapes pour le cas où un grand nombre de variables endogènes ne sont pas toutes quantitatives. Le modèle doit être alors récursif pour permettre l'estimation.
Le modèle structurel est ainsi estimé par la technique d'estimation développée par Roodman (2011) qui présente un avantage supplémentaire puisqu'elle permet de résoudre des cas inévitables de variables endogènes qualitatives parmi les variables explicatives.
La commande "cmp" a été suggérée par Roodman (2011) sous Stata pour estimer les modèles mixtes à processus récursif.
"Mixed Process" signifie que les différentes équations peuvent avoir différents types de variables dépendantes (types de réponse). Les modèles disponibles sont: les modèles classiques de régression linéaire, Tobit, Intervalle Censuré, Probit, Probit Ordonné, le Probit Multinomial etc.
Il convient également de noter que le CMP est basé sur le maximum de vraisemblance (utilisant une méthode de simulation) et par conséquent il partage tous les avantages associés à l'estimation ML. En outre, l'approche CMP a l'avantage d'être asymptotiquement plus efficace que toutes les autres méthodes d'estimation (Roodman, 2011).

Table 4.17: **Définition des Variables (%)**

Variables	**Définition des Variables**	**Moyennes**
Actionnariat Salarié	Variable binaire égale à 1 si les employés ont une part du capital de l'entreprise, égale à 0 sinon	15.06
Intéressement	Variable binaire égale à 1 si les employés sont couverts par un accord d'intéressement, égale à 0 sinon	31.96
Prime Individuelle	Variable binaire égale à 1 si les employés de l'entreprise ont reçu une prime liée à la performance individuelle, égale à 0 sinon	53.59
Changement Organisationnel	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'entreprise a procédé à au moins un changement organisationnel, égale à 0 sinon	71.51
Présence de Comité d'Entreprise	Variable binaire égale à 1 si un comité d'entreprise existe, égale à 0 sinon	18.90
Syndicat Dérange l'Activité de la Firme	Variable binaire égale à 1 si les syndicats entravent l'avancement des activités de l'entreprise à partir de l'opinion du représentant de l'entreprise, égale à 0 sinon	40.17
Autonomie du Salarié	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'employé est encouragé d'abord à résoudre le problème lui-même, égale à 0 sinon	48.88
Taux de Syndicalisation	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 4) si le taux de syndicalisation de l'entreprise appartient à l'une des quatre classes suivantes: Moins de 5% 5% à 9% 10% à 20% Plus de 20%	 72.87 14.90 5.90 6.33
Qui Contrôle le Salarié	Variable Multinomiale (de 1 à 3) si le travail de l'employé est contrôlé principalement par: Chefs ou Supérieurs Hiérarchiques Clients & Services Spécialisés Collègues	 88.30 7.25 4.45

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... table 4.17 continue

Variables	Définition des Variables	Moyennes
Satisfaction à l'Issue du Conflit selon le Représentant du Personnel	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 4) si la satisfaction à la fin du conflit, selon le représentant du personnel, appartient à l'une des quatre catégories suivantes:	
	Pas de Satisfaction	43.26
	Pas de Satisfaction Directe	8.53
	Satisfaction Partielle	30.80
	Satisfaction Totale	17.41
Satisfaction à l'Issue du Conflit selon le Représentant de Direction	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 4) si la satisfaction à la fin du conflit, selon le représentant de direction, appartient à l'une des quatre catégories suivantes:	
	Pas de Satisfaction	41.81
	Pas de Satisfaction Directe	9.51
	Satisfaction Partielle	34.57
	Satisfaction Totale	14.12
Thèmes de Négociation	Variable binaire égale à 1 (égale à 0 sinon) s'il y a eu des négociations sur les thèmes suivants:	
	Salaire	39.03
	Temps de Travail	32.80
	Qualification & Carrière	32.83
	Emploi	39.12
	Conditions de Travail	55.79
	Changement Organisationnel	52.11
	Formation Professionnelle	62.59
	Égalité professionnelle homme-femme	30.86
Présence Syndicale	Variable binaire égale à 1 s'il y a des représentants syndicaux dans l'entreprise, égale à 0 sinon	36.72
Mono Établissement	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'entreprise est un établissement unique, égale à 0 sinon	55.77
Groupe de Résolution de Conflit	Variable binaire égale à 1 s'il existe des groupes de résolution de conflit dans l'entreprise, égale à 0 sinon	41.80
Partage d'Information sur la Situation Économique	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 3) si l'information sur la situation économique de l'entreprise est partagée à tous les employés:	

continue sur la page suivante...

... table 4.17 continue

Variables	**Définition des Variables**	**Moyennes**
	Régulièrement	63.14
	Occasionnellement	27.24
	Jamais	9.62
Partage d'Information sur la Stratégie de l'Entreprise	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 3) si l'information sur les stratégies et les orientations de l'entreprise est partagée à tous les employés:	
	Régulièrement	50.44
	Occasionnellement	31.38
	Jamais	18.18
Qui a Participé à la Fin du Conflit	Variable multinomiale (de 1 à 6) si les catégories suivantes ont été impliqué à la fin du conflit :	
	Les Employés Impliqués	27.18
	Tous les employés	20.65
	Les Représentants du Personnel	6.44
	Syndicats	9.30
	Effilochage (Personne en Particulier)	14.17
	Autres	22.25
LogQ	Logarithme de la Valeur Ajoutée	8.01
LoK	Logarithme du stock de capital est déterminé en fonction de la valeur comptable des immobilisations	7.26
LogL	Logarithme du Nombre Total d'Employés dans l'Entreprise	4.09
La Rentabilité par Rapport aux Concurrents	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 3) si la rentabilité par rapport aux concurrents appartient à l'une des trois classes suivantes:	
	Supérieure	26.12
	Stable	58.32
	Inférieure	15.56
Diffusion de l'Information sur la Situation Économique	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'information sur la situation économique de l'entreprise est partagée à tous les employés, égale à 0 sinon	90.38

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... table 4.17 continue

Variables	**Définition des Variables**	**Moyennes**
Diffusion de l'Information sur la Stratégie de l'Entreprise	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'information sur les stratégies et les orientations de l'entreprise est partagée à tous les employés, égale à 0 sinon	91.22
Diffusion de l'Information sur l' Évolution des Salaires	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'information sur l'évolution des salaires est partagée à tous les employés, égale à 0 sinon	81.82
Marché International	Variable binaire égale à 1 si l'activité principale de l'entreprise est le marché international, égale à 0 sinon	82.22
Part de Marché	Les variables continues indiquant le pourcentage de la part de marché de l'entreprise appartenant à l'une des cinq classes suivantes:	
	Moins de 3%	24.55
	3% à 14%	24.50
	15% à 24%	14.55
	25% à 49%	15.07
	50% et Plus	21.33
L'âge de l'Entreprise	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 5) si l'âge de l'entreprise appartient à l'une des cinq classes suivantes:	
	Moins de 5 ans	4.35
	5 à 9 ans	10.66
	10 à 19 ans	25.34
	20 à 49 ans	41.24
	50 ans et Plus	18.41
Catégorie Socio-Professionnelle	Les variables continues indiquant le pourcentage de chaque catégorie socio-professionnelle suivante dans l'entreprise:	
	Ouvriers	9.88
	Techniciens et Agents de Maîtrise	9.03
	Ingénieurs et Cadres	40.14
	Employés et Commerciaux	40.95
Nombre de Salariés	Variable ordonnée (de 1 à 6) si la taille (nombre d'employés) de l'entreprise appartient à l'une des six classes suivantes:	
	Moins 20 Salariés	39.65

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... table 4.17 continue

Variables	**Définition des Variables**	**Moyennes**
	20 à 49 Salariés	37.05
	50 à 99 Salariés	12.76
	100 à 199 Salariés	5.86
	200 à 499 Salariés	3.46
	500 Salariés et Plus	1.22
Secteur	Variable Multinomiale (de 1 à 10) si l'entreprise appartient à l'un des dix secteurs suivants:	
	Industrie Agroalimentaire	2.79
	Industrie Automobile & Biens d'Équipement	2.47
	Industrie Énergétique	12.62
	Construction	11.30
	Commerce & Réparation Automobile	19.36
	Transports & Entreposages	7.54
	Hébergement et Restauration	6.67
	Informations, Communications, Activités Financières& Activités Immobilières	7.08
	Activités Scientifiques et Techniques	11.67
	Administrations, & Éducation-Santé-Social	18.49

Encadré 3 : Calcul des effets Nets

Strong = Arrêts de travail de longues durées (grèves de deux jours et plus)
Lesstrong = Arrêts de travail de courtes durées (débrayages et grèves de moins de deux jours)
Overtime = Refus d'heures supplémentaires
Petition = Pétition
ESO = Actionnariat Salarié
PS = Intéressement
Lors de l'estimation d'une fonction de production par MCO, les paramètres associés à la présence de conflits collectifs, de l'actionnariat salarié et de l'intéressement sont interprétés comme l'écart de performance car notre fonction de production est en logarithme.
Toutefois, l'estimation d'un système de deux (ou plusieurs) équations simultanées ("Strong", "Lesstrong", "Overtime", "Petition", "ESO "and "PS") modifie l'interprétation des coefficients dans l'équation de la performance. En effet, chacune de ces variables dans cette dernière équation est associée à la probabilité prédite. Étant donnée que cette probabilité est continue, le paramètre associé n'est plus un différentiel de Productivité. Pour obtenir le différentiel de productivité, nous avons besoin des estimations de λ, la probabilité prédite de chaque alternative (par exemple la probabilité prédite de PS correspondante aux entreprises avec PS $\hat{ps}_{(ps=1)}$ et la probabilité prédite pour les entreprises sans PS $\hat{ps}_{(ps=0)}$). Cette différence peut être obtenue en calculant les éléments suivants:

$\hat{\lambda}_{strong}(\overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=1)} - \overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{lesstrong}(\overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=1)} - \overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{overtime}(\overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=1)} - \overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{petition}(\overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=1)} - \overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{eso}(\overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=1)} - \overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=0)})$
$\hat{\lambda}_{ps}(\overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=1)} - \overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=0)})$

Nous pouvons alors tester la signification de ce différentiel en testant les différences entre les quantités suivantes:
$\hat{\lambda}_{strong} * \overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{strong} * \overline{\hat{strong}}_{(strong=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{lesstrong} * \overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{lesstrong} * \overline{\hat{lesstrong}}_{(lesstrong=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{overtime} * \overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{overtime} * \overline{\hat{overtime}}_{(overtime=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{petition} * \overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{petition} * \overline{\hat{petition}}_{(petition=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{eso} * \overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{eso} * \overline{\hat{eso}}_{(eso=0)}$
$\hat{\lambda}_{ps} * \overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=1)}$ and $\hat{\lambda}_{ps} * \overline{\hat{ps}}_{(ps=0)}$

Résumé. Intéressement, Actionnariat et Conflits dans l'Entreprise : Études sur Données d'Entreprises Françaises

L'idée de base des contrats incitatifs est celle de la réalisation d'intérêts communs provoquant des changements dans le comportement des salariés et l'amélioration de la performance de l'entreprise. Les résultats et les succès de l'entreprise dépendent également du climat des relations professionnelles. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière (l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. La recherche sur ces deux thèmes est d'une importance pratique et novatrice. Tout d'abord, il existe au sein de l'entreprise une multitude de types de conflits. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux conflits collectifs. Ensuite, la plupart des études sur les conflits collectifs se concentre uniquement sur les grèves, en ignorant les autres formes d'actions collectives, et très peu d'études font le lien avec les systèmes d'incitations collectives au sein de l'entreprise. Ainsi, ce travail se décompose en quatre études empiriques. La première vise à analyser les différentes formes de conflits au sein de l'entreprise. La deuxième analyse l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. La troisième étude s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Enfin, la dernière examine la performance des entreprises en fonction de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs. Nos recherches reposent sur des outils d'analyse multidimensionnelle et économétriques. L'approche multidimensionnelle fait appel à l'Analyse des Correspondances Multiples et à la Classification Hiérarchique Ascendante. L'approche économétrique fait usage de méthodes d'estimations classiques (OLS, Probit Simple, Probit Multinomial, Probit Ordonné), de modèles à sélection (Heckman), et des techniques d'estimations de modèles récursifs à équations simultanées traitant ainsi les problèmes d'endogénéité et la mixture (quantitative et qualitative) des variables dépendantes (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process).

Descripteurs : économie du travail, participation financière, intéressement, actionnariat salarié, grève, conflits du travail, résolution des conflits, syndicat, négociation, performance, économétrie appliquée, analyse multidimensionnelle

Abstract. Profit Sharing, Employee Ownership and Conflicts in the Firm: Evidences from French Firms

The basic idea of incentive contracts is that of achieving common interests causing changes in the behavior of employees and improving firm performance. The firms' outputs and success also depend on the industrial relation climate. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership) and its links with the conflicts using data on French firms. Research on these topics is innovative and highly recommended. First, there exists within the firm a multitude of types of conflicts. We are primarily concerned with collective conflicts. Most of studies on collective conflicts focuses only on strikes, ignoring other forms of collective actions. Very few studies make the link between collective incentive schemes and collective conflicts. Thus, this work is divided into four empirical studies. The first one analyzes the different forms of conflicts within the firm. The second one analyzes the effect of financial participation on collective conflicts. The third study focuses on the impact of bargaining and financial participation on the resolution of collective conflicts. The last one examines firm's performance based on financial participation and collective conflicts. Our research is based on multidimensional analysis and econometric tools. The multidimensional approach uses the Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering. The econometric approach uses classical estimation methods (OLS, Probit, Mutinomial Probit, Ordered Pobit), selection models (Heckman), and methods estimating simultaneous and recursive equations, treating the endogeneity problems and the mixture (quantitative and qualitative) of the dependent variables (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process).

Keywords: labor economics, financial participation, profit sharing, employee share ownership, strikes, labor conflicts, conflict resolution, union, negotiation, performance, applied econometrics, multidimensional analysis